2011 CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX

FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The 2011 CSO Sustainability Index
for Sub-Saharan Africa

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INTRODUCTION

USAID is pleased to present the third edition of the *CSO Sustainability Index (CSOSI)[1] for Sub-Saharan Africa.* The Index relies on local capacity and expertise to assess key components of the sustainability of the civil society organization (CSO) sectors in twenty-three countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including countries in East, West, and Southern Africa. This year's Index covers four new countries -- Botswana, Malawi, The Gambia, and Zambia.

The *CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa* complements the long-standing *CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia*, the fifteenth edition of which was published in June 2012. Given the increasing prominence of civil society and its role in development, the Index expanded into two new regions in 2011. The first editions of the *CSO Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa* and the *CSO Sustainability Indexes for Afghanistan and Pakistan* were published in July 2012, bringing the total number of countries covered by *CSOSI* reports to sixty-one.

The CSOSI highlights both advances and setbacks in CSO sector sustainability, and allows for comparisons across countries and sub-regions over time. The Index is a useful source of information for local CSOs, governments, donors, academics, and others to better understand and monitor key aspects of sustainability of the CSO sector.

The Index's methodology relies on local expertise from CSO practitioners and experts to assess and rate seven interrelated dimensions of CSO sustainability: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, and public image. The scores for each dimension are averaged to produce an overall CSO sustainability score. An Editorial Committee comprised of technical and regional experts reviews each panel's scores and corresponding narrative reports, with the aim of maintaining standards of quality and promoting cross-country comparability. Based on their scores, countries fall within three basic categories of CSO sustainability: Sustainability Enhanced, Sustainability Evolving, and Sustainability Impeded. More detail about the methodology used to calculate scores and produce corresponding narrative reporting is provided in Annex A (pages 166 -179).

A publication of this type would not be possible without the contributions of many individuals and organizations. This publication was made possible in part by the financial support provided by the Aga Khan Foundation. Specific acknowledgements of the CSO partner organizations responsible for the Index appear on the following page. We would further like to express our deepest gratitude to all of the local CSO representatives and experts, USAID partners, and international donors who participated in the expert group panels in each country. Their knowledge, research, observations, and contributions are the foundation upon which the CSO Sustainability Index is based.

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[1] Readers of the Index will notice that the Index has a new name this year. In recognition of the broad range of nonprofit organizations active in these countries, these reports will now be called CSO Sustainability Indexes instead of NGO Sustainability Indexes.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The CSO sectors in the twenty-three countries surveyed in the *CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa* continue to vary considerably in all seven dimensions of sustainability. However, they all continue to be works in progress: not a single score falls within the highest category of development – Sustainability Enhanced. The overall sectoral sustainability for fifteen countries falls into the Sustainability Evolving category, with South Africa and Kenya reporting the strongest sectors. The other eight countries – Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, Guinea, and Malawi – fall into the Sustainability Impeded category.

The estimated size of the sector in the surveyed countries varies greatly. Some countries – like Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Angola – have just a few hundred registered CSOs. Nigeria and South Africa have the largest registered sectors, with over 54,000 and 76,000 registered CSOs, respectively. Unregistered CSOs operate throughout the region, especially in countries where registration is a long and difficult process and CSOs fear government interference. Countries tend to lack reliable data on the size of this informal part of the sector, although in some countries, unregistered CSOs are estimated to significantly outnumber registered CSOs. For instance, Mali has just 1,254 registered organizations, but 40,000 to 60,000 unregistered CSOs.

The overall sustainability of CSOs remained stable in most countries since 2010. Kenya's and Uganda's scores improved slightly, while the scores for Angola, Ethiopia, and Senegal deteriorated.

In Kenya, new opportunities for CSOs to partner with the government on projects and participate in policymaking led to improvements in the advocacy dimension. Uganda's sector improved in organizational capacity, advocacy, infrastructure, and public image as CSOs strengthened networks, developed a memorandum of understanding with the government to institutionalize CSO/government partnerships, and engaged with the government over legal and policy reform.

Angola's scores worsened in five of the seven dimensions. The global financial crisis led several international donors to withdraw from the country, and the government, threatened by the Arab Spring revolutions,

arrested and threatened CSO activists and organizations involved in protests. Ethiopia's sector declined in four out of the seven dimensions, as new government-issued directives restricted the ability of CSOs to raise funds, network, and engage in advocacy. In Senegal, the legal environment and organizational capacity worsened. Tension between the government and CSOs over presidential elections in 2012 led the government to suspend all host-state agreements with international CSOs and threaten a CSO movement that opposed constitutional reforms meant to benefit the incumbent president.

This year's reports reveal three trends affecting African CSOs.

The role of elections. Seven of the surveyed countries held elections in 2011: DRC, Gabon, Liberia, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia. The elections prompted CSO advocacy and civic education efforts to ensure fair and transparent elections in Nigeria, Uganda, and Gabon. In Gabon, the government's refusal to establish a biometric identification system for voters in the 2011 general elections led a coalition of CSOs to demand fair elections; this was the first time that civil society took a clear position on a political debate. In other countries, elections led to heightened tensions with or outright hostility from the government. In Zambia, for instance, the general elections of 2011 prompted significant political intimidation that included restrictions on free assembly and incidents of violence by the ruling party.

Reduced funding opportunities. The global financial crisis continued to affect CSO sectors across the continent, undermining their financial viability. Foreign funding, on which CSOs often depend, declined, weakening CSOs' abilities to deliver services and improve their organizational capacities. For example, in Senegal, funding for institutional capacity building became increasingly scarce. Reductions in funding drove qualified staff into more stable sectors in South Africa. In Tanzania, more organizations stagnated or closed, especially those engaged in service provision. CSOs in Angola, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe were also weakened by the financial crisis.

Increased government restrictions. CSOs in several countries experienced increased intimidation and restrictions by the government. For example, demonstrations in Angola for better living conditions and a stop to corruption led to the arrest, disappearance, and beating of youth. In 2011, the governments of Angola, Ethiopia, and the Gambia enacted or proposed laws that would increase government control over CSOs and discretion to shut down disfavored CSOs. As mentioned above, the government in Senegal also increased restrictions on CSOs.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

The legal environments for CSOs vary considerably across the surveyed countries. South Africa continues to have the most permissive legal environment in the region. South African civil society is encouraged and protected by the constitution and laws, and operates freely and openly. In other countries, CSOs face substantial barriers to entry and regulatory systems that enable government authorities to harass CSOs. Ten countries – Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Uganda, Gabon, the Gambia, Guinea, Angola, Malawi, and Zimbabwe – fall into the Sustainability Impeded category in this dimension.

Six countries experienced regressions in 2011. The governments in Angola and Ethiopia have enacted or proposed laws that will likely increase government control over CSOs. In the Gambia, which was covered in the Index for the first time this year, a proposed bill would grant the government substantial authority to close down CSOs with activities that do not conform to the government's development agenda. Ethiopian CSOs continue to suffer from the most restrictive legal environment among surveyed countries, and in 2011, the government issued seven new directives that tighten government control on CSO activities, including access to funding. In Senegal, tension during the run-up to the 2012 elections led the government to suspend host-state agreements with international CSOs, deny CSO tax exemptions, and block training programs. In Burundi, Gabon and Zimbabwe, the government increasingly intimidated, threatened, and harassed CSOs working on human rights and good governance.

Legal Environment

The legal environments in Mozambique, Nigeria, and Tanzania improved in 2011. CSOs in Mozambique were able to navigate the legal environment better as a result of increased access to information on the laws governing their activities, while the time needed to register at the national level in Nigeria was reduced from a few months to just a week. In Tanzania, CSO understanding of the registration process improved, and government threats to ban CSOs decreased.

Botswana, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Zambia report that their registration processes are straightforward. CSOs in these countries may nonetheless experience minor problems registering. For example, registration fees are too high for small CSOs in Zambia, and registration can be delayed by understaffed government offices in Sierra Leone. Registration remains a burdensome, time consuming process in many countries. For instance, in Kenya, non-governmental organizations must be vetted by the National Security Agency. Registration can especially be burdensome for rural organizations that are far from government offices, and for human rights and advocacy organizations, which face more administrative obstacles in certain countries, such as Ethiopia and Malawi.

In Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, and Rwanda, CSOs generally operate without state interference and can criticize the government. In Kenya, for example, CSOs have filed claims in court barring government actions. In other countries, however, CSOs are vulnerable to dissolution based on vague grounds in the law, as well as to threats of arrest and detention. CSOs that criticize the government or engage in civil liberties or human rights issues are particularly likely to face such harassment. In the DRC, for example, special service agents regularly question and deny travel visas for human rights CSOs and other organizations that work on sensitive issues. In the Gambia, the government regularly carries out arbitrary arrests and detentions without trial against CSO staff working on human rights and good governance issues.

Many countries provide CSOs with tax exemptions on income, as well as exemptions from customs duties. However, CSOs complain that these exemptions are difficult to access because laws are applied arbitrarily or the process is long. Other countries only provide tax exemptions to certain CSOs, such as charitable organizations in Botswana, international CSOs in Burundi, and CSOs addressing HIV/AIDs and vulnerable children in Tanzania.

In the vast majority of the surveyed countries, few lawyers are familiar with CSO law, and legal services are cost prohibitive and unavailable outside major cities. In countries such as Angola, Botswana, and the Gambia,

the few available lawyers are reluctant to challenge the government and work on controversial issues for fear of reprisal. The number of lawyers is increasing in Tanzania, Botswana, Liberia, and Malawi, however, due to efforts by universities, governments, and local bar associations.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

Organizational Capacity

Region	2011	2010	2009
Southern Africa	4.7	4.8	4.8
West Africa	4.9	4.8	4.8
East Africa	4.7	4.7	4.7

1.0   3.0   5.0   7.0

Sustainability Enhanced   Sustainability Evolving   Sustainability Impeded

Most countries maintained the same scores as in 2010 in the organizational capacity dimension. Four countries - Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, and Sierra Leone - exhibited stronger organizational capacity this year. In Mozambique, more organizations developed strategic plans, and several CSOs received grants to acquire modern office equipment and Internet access. Fifty-three Rwandan CSOs received training to improve their internal management, networking, and advocacy skills, and as a result developed financial control systems, procurement committees, fundraising strategies, and websites. In Sierra Leone, CSOs are exercising more transparency in their operations, and CSOs that partner with international organizations have improved the functioning of their boards of directors. In Uganda, twenty organizations received internal management quality assurance certifications in 2011, an 80 percent increase over previous years.

Organizational capacity in Angola, Senegal, and South Africa slightly declined in 2011, mainly due to declines in funding stemming from the global financial crisis. In Angola and South Africa, more qualified CSO staff members left their positions for more stable jobs, while in Senegal, increased financial constraints have caused CSOs to shift away from their areas of expertise to adopt the strategic objectives of donors.

The DRC, Guinea, Ghana, and Zambia report that CSOs routinely mobilize constituents and include them in project planning and implementation. Lack of sustainable funding has prevented CSOs in the Gambia, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe from reaching out to constituents, and has led CSOs in Liberia, Botswana, Kenya, and Tanzania to target specific constituents to access donor funds.

Many CSOs throughout the region lack strong management structures. Boards of directors may not meet regularly or operate transparently; sometimes CSOs have boards of directors only to fulfill donor or registration requirements. Even when boards do function, many countries report that there is no clear division of responsibilities between the board and staff, and often CSOs are run by one executive director or founder, who makes decisions unilaterally.

Due to reliance on short-term funding, CSOs across the region find it difficult or impossible to retain long-term staff or update modern office equipment and communications technologies, and these difficulties worsened over the past year in countries including South Africa and Angola. CSOs typically depend on a mix of volunteers and short-term staff hired on a project basis. In addition, many qualified professionals left the sector for international organizations or more stable positions in government or business. CSOs in Rwanda, for example, depend on volunteers because the lack of secure, long-term funding drives staff to more stable positions elsewhere. In Tanzania, insufficient funding has resulted in CSOs hiring under-qualified staff. In Zambia, CSOs rely on volunteers, interns, and recent graduates.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY

Financial Viability

Financial viability is the weakest dimension overall across the surveyed countries, a situation that has been exacerbated by the global financial crisis. All but six countries fall into the Sustainability Impeded category, and five of those are near impeded sustainability.

Only the DRC and Nigeria saw slight improvements in their scores due to CSOs winning additional grants and government contracts in 2011. The scores of four countries – Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa, and Angola – worsened, with Angola and Ethiopia experiencing the most significant declines. In Angola, many international donors and organizations withdrew from the country as their funding declined and in Ethiopia, new government directives have made public fundraising too challenging for most CSOs.

Throughout the region, CSO sectors generally rely on foreign funding, which declined in 2011. In several countries, including Tanzania, Kenya, Mali, and Senegal, donors have shifted funding away from CSOs and toward the government instead. Across the region, smaller CSOs suffer the most from the decline in funding, as the competition for grants has become fiercer, and they do not have the professional capacity to meet donor requirements.

Most CSOs generate little revenue from philanthropy due to a lack of fundraising skills and difficult economic conditions. In addition, the public and businesses do not donate to CSOs for several reasons. A culture of philanthropy is lacking in Angola, Burundi, and Sierra Leone. Private companies in Angola and

Zimbabwe have political concerns with donating to CSOs. The Gambia lacks tax incentives for donors, and in Zimbabwe and Kenya, CSOs are perceived as already being well-funded by foreign donors. Throughout the region, any philanthropy generated tends to be channeled to charity or development organizations, as opposed to governance or human rights groups.

Private giving is slowly emerging in some countries, however. In South Africa, for example, corporate social investment obligations grew to about R 6.2 billion ($820 million) in 2011. Malian expatriates, particularly in France, fund projects in their native villages related to health, education, drinkable water, and solar energy. In Burundi, the local population makes in-kind contributions to community development projects, such as the construction of schools and health centers. Civil servants in Botswana receive a half day off per week to engage in community service.

Few CSOs earn income from economic activity, either because of burdensome conditions or because they lack the capacity or resources to enter a market. However, some CSOs in countries such as Kenya, Mali, South Africa, and Tanzania are attempting to diversify their resources through commercial ventures, such as renting out or managing property, or providing training, consultancy, and research services. In Rwanda, Duhamic-Adri Association for Integrated Rural Development helps farmers to grow cereal crops and legumes, which it then buys and processes into a highly nutritional porridge. CSOs in Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Malawi, and Guinea earn some revenue by contracting with the government to provide social services. Membership fees provide nominal revenue throughout the region, in part because organizations usually have few members.

In many of the countries surveyed, CSOs lack sound financial management systems. The DRC, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, and Mozambique report that CSOs rarely publish annual reports or submit to external audits. However, in a few countries, such as Burundi, Ghana, Nigeria, and Rwanda, more organizations are developing strong financial management systems or increasing their transparency due to donor requirements and increased competition for funding.

ADVOCACY

Advocacy is one of the stronger dimensions of CSO sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa. Only five countries – Angola, Guinea, the Gambia, Gabon, and Ethiopia – have scores in the Sustainability Impeded category, with the rest falling in Sustainability Evolving. Ten countries saw improvement in their scores in 2011, with Guinea showing the most progress. In Guinea, CSOs continue to lead the effort to advance political transition and resolve a political impasse that has delayed elections.

Ethiopia and Angola were the only countries surveyed in which advocacy scores declined during 2011. In Ethiopia, a 2009 law restricts advocacy organizations' access to foreign funding, and thus has greatly reduced the number of CSOs working on human rights, gender equality, the rights of children and the disabled, conflict resolution, and access to justice. New directives adopted in 2011 further restrict advocacy organizations' ability to raise funds domestically through public fundraising and income generation. In Angola, the government passed a law on associations without consulting the CSO community, illustrating the government's disregard for civil society. The government has also deterred advocacy by intensifying harassment and detentions of CSO activists this year. Many staff left the sector, further decreasing CSO capacity to engage in advocacy.

In at least a third of the countries surveyed, governments have developed formal mechanisms to facilitate communication between CSOs and policy makers, in part because many foreign donors require governments to consult with CSOs and include them in program implementation as a condition of foreign aid. In Zimbabwe, for example, CSOs have formal opportunities to present evidence on key issues before legislators and make policy recommendations. In at least nine countries, however, CSOs report that their communication with government is informal and ineffective, sometimes little more than a formality. Senegal experienced a decline in the quality of CSO-government relations, as several formal coordination mechanisms foundered in 2011 due to tension between the government and CSOs in connection with the 2012 election.

In most of the countries surveyed, CSOs form coalitions and engage in broad-based campaigns around many issues, such as poverty, environment, and corruption. In Gabon and the DRC, for example, CSOs successfully advocated in support of transparent elections. CSO campaigns also led to the passage of new laws and initiatives, such as the restoration of a development fund in Liberia and the Freedom of Assembly bill in Nigeria. Nevertheless, CSOs often struggle to network and form coalitions, partially due to a lack of networking experience, as well as financial difficulties that stir competition among CSOs for limited donor funding.

SERVICE PROVISION

Service provision is also one of the stronger dimensions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Only three countries – Gabon, Guinea, and Angola – fall into the Sustainability Impeded category, while the rest are in Sustainability Evolving. Service provision scores remained stable this year. Only Mali experienced a score change, a slight improvement from the previous year, because the government and international organizations increasingly turned to CSOs to provide services in diverse fields, such as health, governance, and peace and security.

The extent to which services reflect the needs and priorities of the communities varies widely among countries. CSOs in several countries generally respond effectively to the needs of the communities they serve. For example, CSOs in Botswana, Burundi, DRC, and Zimbabwe routinely conduct needs assessments. In other countries, including Angola, Ghana, Kenya, and Liberia, service provision is more likely to be driven by donor priorities and the availability of funding than community needs.

CSOs in all countries surveyed struggle to recover costs for the services they provide, perpetuating the widespread dependence on donor funding. Due to the poverty of beneficiaries or community expectations that services should be free of charge, CSOs rarely charge for their services.

Service Provision

Governments typically appreciate the role of CSOs in filling gaps in social services. To support service provision, governments in several countries, including Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Ghana, Zambia, and Kenya, increasingly offer grants and contracts for service provision. For example, in Kenya, the National Disability Fund has a budget of $2.4 million for 2011/2012 to disburse resources to organizations for persons with disabilities.

INFRASTRUCTURE

Infrastructure is one of the weaker dimensions in Sub-Saharan Africa, with ten countries falling into the Sustainability Impeded category and most other countries with scores in the lower half of Sustainability Evolving. The scores in this dimension remained stable in most countries over the past year. Scores in Mali and Uganda improved, but deteriorated in Ethiopia and Gabon. In Mali, CSO capacity to network and share information improved; twenty-seven coalitions formed in 2011 to address a range of policy issues. In Uganda, CSOs had numerous opportunities in 2011 to engage in information sharing and networking, including a national civil society fair where CSOs showcased their projects and ideas. On the other hand, new directives in Ethiopia prevent networks from undertaking projects; organizations that receive international funding cannot form networks with advocacy and human rights organizations; and intermediary support organizations (ISOs) can no longer sub-grant international funds to local institutions. In Gabon, the Strengthening Non-State Actors in Gabon Program (PROGREANE) shut down, decreasing support for CSOs.

Most countries have only a handful of ISOs or CSO resource centers that support the sector. These centers typically provide some basic training and materials to CSOs. ISOs and resource centers are typically concentrated in urban areas and not easily accessible to rural CSOs. Written materials are generally not translated into the local languages. ISOs and CSO resource centers typically do not earn income from their services, relying mainly on grants from foreign donors. Most of the surveyed countries only have a few local grantmaking organizations that re-grant international donor funds.

Across the region, CSO networks and coalitions are emerging, implementing joint projects and improving information sharing. In the DRC, for example, CSOs have formed hundreds of networks. Despite obstacles, coalitions continue to expand in Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. In other countries, however,

Infrastructure

Southern Africa	5.0 (2011) / 4.9 (2010) / 4.9 (2009)
West Africa	5.0 (2011) / 5.0 (2010) / 5.0 (2009)
East Africa	4.9 (2011) / 4.9 (2010) / 4.9 (2009)

Legend: 2011, 2010, 2009

Axis: 1.0 — 3.0 — 5.0 — 7.0

Sustainability Enhanced   Sustainability Evolving   Sustainability Impeded

information sharing remains a challenge for several reasons, including a lack of funding for networks in Zambia, lack of Internet access in Malawi, and in South Africa, the absence of an organized movement to link coalitions and spread best practices on networking.

Trainings on topics such as organizational management, financial management, and strategic planning are typically available in nearly all the countries surveyed. Training in other subjects that CSOs demand, like board development or fundraising, is less frequently available.

Intersectoral partnerships with media and businesses are still not common in the region, but are emerging in several countries. For instance, CSOs in Nigeria are beginning to collaborate with local businesses on research and advocacy initiatives, while in Mozambique, nonprofit media organizations are conducting joint investigative journalism with for-profit media on pollution, corruption, and other public policy issues. Partnerships between CSOs and governments are more common and are increasing in frequency.

PUBLIC IMAGE

Public image is a relatively strong dimension of CSO sustainability in the region. Only Ethiopia and Angola fall into the Sustainability Impeded category. Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Mali, Senegal, and Mozambique improved their scores slightly in 2011. In Rwanda and Mozambique, CSOs are increasingly using media to reach out to the public. In Mali, the public image of CSOs improved due to their financial and technical contributions on local projects. Angola's score worsened as state controlled media offers CSOs few opportunities to voice concerns on issues or attract public support; in 2011, the ruling party instructed radio stations to decrease coverage of issues of public concern.

The sector's image depends largely on media coverage, which varies widely across the region. In Burundi, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, and South Africa, CSOs generally receive positive media coverage. In Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Gabon, the state media avoids covering CSOs that criticize the government or are affiliated with the political opposition, while private media provides positive and more frequent coverage. In Sierra Leone, Malawi, Mali, and Gabon, CSOs must pay for media reporting, allowing only larger CSOs with ample funding to publicize their activities. In Angola and Ethiopia, fear of

Public Image

	Public Image
Southern Africa	4.6 (2011), 4.6 (2010), 4.6 (2009)
West Africa	4.5 (2011), 4.5 (2010), 4.5 (2009)
East Africa	4.5 (2011), 4.5 (2010), 4.6 (2009)

Legend: 2011, 2010, 2009

Scale: 1.0 — 3.0 — 5.0 — 7.0

Sustainability Enhanced | Sustainability Evolving | Sustainability Impeded

government reprisal keeps media from reporting on CSO activity, while in Liberia, the media does not distinguish CSOs from businesses and thus does not cover CSO activity frequently.

In the majority of the countries surveyed, the public – especially direct beneficiaries of CSOs – has a positive perception of CSOs and generally appreciates their efforts, particularly in service provision and infrastructure development. CSOs in Gabon, Nigeria, and Rwanda are also appreciated for their advocacy work. In countries such as Ethiopia and Liberia, the public harbors distrust and disdain for CSOs, believing them to have a lot of money that they spend ineffectively or use for personal enrichment. In a few countries, the public still does not understand the role of CSOs. For instance, in Angola, CSOs are often confused with for-profit companies. Throughout the region, due to lack of resources or knowledge, few CSOs develop clear media or public relations strategies, cultivate relationships with journalists, or use social networks and websites to publicize their activities.

CONCLUSION

This annual assessment of sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates the impact of political and economic developments and continued areas of weakness that impede long-term sustainability. It also illustrates some of the accomplishments of civil society in these countries over the past year. By providing this data, CSO activists, policymakers, and the international community can track trends and utilize this information to determine priorities and approaches.

2011 CSO SUSTAINABILITY SCORES

2011 CSO SUSTAINABILITY SCORES

COUNTRY	Legal Environment	Organizational Capacity	Financial Viability	Advocacy	Service Provision	Infrastructure	Public Image	CSO Sustainability
EAST AFRICA								
Burundi	5.9	5.9	6.0	4.4	4.5	5.6	4.3	5.2
DRC	5.4	5.1	5.7	4.4	4.5	5.6	5.0	5.1
Ethiopia	6.5	5.1	6.1	6.1	4.9	5.5	5.1	5.6
Kenya	4.1	3.9	4.8	3.4	3.4	3.7	4.3	3.9
Rwanda	4.3	4.5	5.3	3.8	4.0	5.0	4.4	4.5
Tanzania	4.4	4.4	4.9	3.8	3.4	4.3	4.1	4.2
Uganda	5.1	3.9	5.1	3.8	3.5	4.6	4.3	4.3
Average	**5.1**	**4.7**	**5.4**	**4.2**	**4.0**	**4.9**	**4.5**	**4.7**
WEST AFRICA								
Gabon	6.1	5.5	6.1	5.1	5.1	5.2	5.0	5.4
The Gambia	6.1	5.9	6.5	5.9	5.0	5.4	5.0	5.7
Ghana	3.9	3.9	5.7	3.8	3.8	4.7	4.3	4.3
Guinea	5.5	5.8	6.3	5.3	5.1	5.7	4.9	5.5
Liberia	4.9	5.1	5.8	4.1	4.4	4.8	4.7	4.8
Mali	4.2	4.2	5.6	3.9	3.6	4.6	4.4	4.4
Nigeria	4.9	4.7	5.5	3.7	4.2	5.0	4.0	4.6
Senegal	4.7	4.0	5.0	3.9	3.9	4.7	3.8	4.3
Sierra Leone	5.0	4.8	5.7	4.5	4.1	5.1	4.5	4.8
Average	**5.0**	**4.9**	**5.8**	**4.5**	**4.4**	**5.0**	**4.5**	**4.9**
SOUTHERN AFRICA								
Angola	6.1	5.8	6.1	5.7	5.3	5.7	5.5	5.7
Botswana	3.8	4.0	4.6	3.8	3.6	4.9	4.4	4.2
Malawi	5.2	5.3	5.8	4.4	4.5	5.6	5.0	5.1
Mozambique	4.7	5.3	5.0	4.5	4.0	5.1	4.7	4.8
South Africa	3.3	3.8	4.1	3.4	3.2	3.8	3.6	3.6
Zambia	4.7	4.2	5.5	3.9	4.5	5.0	4.4	4.6
Zimbabwe	6.1	4.5	5.9	4.5	3.4	5.0	4.5	4.8
Average	**4.8**	**4.7**	**5.3**	**4.3**	**4.1**	**5.0**	**4.6**	**4.7**

COUNTRY REPORTS

ANGOLA

2011 Scores for Angola

	Score
CSO Sustainability	5.7
Legal Environment	6.1
Organizational Capacity	5.8
Financial Viability	6.1
Advocacy	5.7
Service Provision	5.3
Infrastructure	5.7
Public Image	5.5

Sustainability Enhanced — Sustainability Evolved — Sustainability Impeded

Capital*: Luanda

Government Type: Republic; Multiparty Presidentail Regime

Population: 18,056,072 (July 2011 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $6,000

Human Development Index: 148

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.7

The environment in which Angolan civil society operates deteriorated further in 2011. On the surface, new policies this year – including the creation of new forums that allow for public participation and influence – appeared to be friendlier to CSOs. In practice, however, CSOs face new and fundamental challenges to their ability to operate, register, and grow. In part, the government is restricting the sector's rights because of the early 2011 demonstrations in North Africa as part of the Arab Spring. Recent demonstrations by CSOs demanding improved living conditions and a stop to corruption have led to the arrest and beating of many youth. Some detainees have disappeared and the

CSO Sustainability in Angola

2009	2010	2011
5.6	5.6	5.7

government remains unresponsive to CSO requests for information on the detainees' whereabouts. In addition, the sector remains severely impeded by government favoritism of CSOs with ties to the ruling party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); bureaucratic and administrative burdens; government corruption; limited staff capacity; government resistance to monitoring;

and a state-controlled media. International funding has decreased dramatically over the last few years, local funding is extremely rare, and there is no culture of philanthropy among wealthy Angolans.

There is no accurate data on the number of CSOs in the country. The most recent data from the government's coordination body for CSOs, Unidade Técnica de Coordenação da Ajuda Humanitária (UTCAH), estimates that there were 127 international CSOs, 464 national CSOs, 25 church foundations, and 19 foundations in 2007. Many CSOs operate without registration because of bureaucratic and political hurdles. Although the government did not shut down any CSOs in 2011, it views any criticism from CSOs as political opposition and regularly threatens to shut down CSOs engaging in advocacy.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1

Angola's legal environment has declined since 2010. The government no longer organizes public discussions of new policies or laws and civil society generally only learns of new policies after they have passed.

In late 2011, the government proposed a law designed to replace the Law on Associations (Law No. 14/91). The process of drafting the law completely lacked transparency; no CSOs were consulted in its design and there was no other form of public debate. CSOs believed the law would make

Legal Environment in Angola

	2009	2010	2011
1			
3			
5	6.0	6.0	6.1
7			

the CSO registration process more difficult. However, the government refused to circulate the draft, so there was no way to know until its passage. The law was approved in early 2012 and will be described fully in next year's report.

Law 17/10 of July 2010 allows CSOs to participate in municipal advisory committees (Conselho de Auscultação e Concertação Social or CACS). However, CACS are just a forum to discuss local development priorities and lack any decision-making power. Furthermore, few CACS have been established to date.

The CSO registration process is lengthy, inefficient, and cumbersome. Registration must be done in person in Luanda, severely hampering organizations from outside the capital. In addition, in order to register, an organization must obtain a notary certificate and a Ministry of Justice Certificate and publish its by-laws in the Government Gazette (Diário da República). It takes at least five years to fulfill these requirements. According to a 2011 World Learning study on the status of CSOs, of the 302 CSOs surveyed, only 85.1 percent have notary certificates, 81.5 percent have published by-laws in the Government Gazette, and 70.5 percent have Certificates of Registration from the Ministry of Justice. CSOs with government-aligned political affiliations or with directors who are high-ranking MPLA members receive preferential treatment.

Only CSOs that have obtained Public Utility status through the Ministry of Justice are eligible to receive government grants; the government sets aside millions of dollars in its annual budget for such organizations. According to the World Learning study, only 13.2 percent of CSOs have secured this status, even though most CSOs meet the established criteria, including holding non-profit status and having a public benefit mission, a board of directors, and by-laws. The government routinely ignores organizations' applications for this status.

CSOs run by high-ranking members of the ruling party are more likely to get Public Utility status. CSOs run by MPLA members that have Public Utility status include AJA PRAZ, Fundução Lwini, Movimento Nacional Expontaneo, Criança Futuro, and the President's Fundução Eduardo dos Santos (FESA). Most of these organizations operate government-friendly charity programs, such as programs around sanitation, malaria prevention, HIV prevention, health awareness, daycare centers, literacy programs, teacher training,

and vocational training for youth, rather than social development programs. Advocacy CSOs such as OMUNGA and the Association for Building Communities (ACC) do not seek this status.

In June, the government, threatened by the Arab Spring uprisings, arrested CSO activists protesting deteriorating political conditions, government corruption, and increasing poverty in Luanda; the number of arrests remains unknown. Some of the arrested youth disappeared and the police will not inform the families of their whereabouts. Also this year, the government evicted thousands of families from their land in Huila and Benguela provinces under a "state urbanization program." Some CSOs, including ACC and OMUNGA, attempted to provide legal support to those evicted, but the government threatened these CSOs with arrests and closure and arrested a number of individuals. CSOs have effectively been intimidated by these state actions, reducing their ability to function effectively.

Few lawyers in any part of the country want to suffer the consequences of challenging the state by offering legal support to CSOs. As a result, there is little legal recourse available to CSOs that are harassed or discriminated against.

There are no indirect cost recovery programs or tax exemptions available to CSOs. CSOs are not entitled to earn income from the provision of goods and services. With the exception of those with Public Utility status, CSOs are not able to compete for government contracts.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.8

Organizational Capacity in Angola

CSOs have had limited success in identifying and building local constituencies for their initiatives. Many international organizations provide strategic planning training and many CSOs have strategic plans. However, only a few organizations, such as World Learning and NOVIB-Holland, support the development and implementation of strategic plans. As a result, many CSOs keep their strategic plans in their desk drawers in case a donor requests them, but lack the capacity to truly implement them. In addition, most CSOs lack visionary leaders with strategic approaches. Decisions tend to be made on an ad hoc, short-term basis, based primarily on donor priorities.

Although CSOs are legally required to have boards of directors, the boards rarely function. According to the World Learning study, over 90 percent of boards met only at the time a CSO is created.

CSOs have difficulty attracting and maintaining capable staff because of insufficient and unreliable funding. Most highly skilled people work for the government or the oil industry. Few CSO jobs are publicly advertised; instead they are given to relatives or friends without regard for experience or qualifications. The World Learning study found that only 50.7 percent of CSO staff has completed high school and a mere 0.12 percent graduated from university. At least 48.5 percent of CSO employees hold other jobs. Human resource management is also limited. Organizations rarely utilize contracts, terms of reference, pay scales, or staff evaluations. The few organizations that use these tools develop them to meet the funding requirements of specific projects, but do not incorporate them into organizational practices. Organizational capacity has deteriorated over the past year as many trained and talented CSO staff members left their positions.

CSOs have limited technical equipment due to a lack of funding and scarcity of technological resources throughout the country. Of the 302 CSOs surveyed in the World Learning study, only 26.2 percent own their own offices; 8.9 percent have no office, while the remainder rent offices or share space with others. A vast majority (87.7 percent) of surveyed organizations have telephone service, while only 53 percent have email

facilities; 69.2 percent have a computer and at least 65.2 percent have a printer. Fewer organizations have their own vehicles (28.1 percent), photocopy machines (39.1 percent), or Internet access (45.4 percent).

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.1

Local CSOs face serious challenges in securing diverse and sustainable funding because they lack fundraising capacity and knowledge of funding opportunities. In addition, funding opportunities declined dramatically over the past few years. Because of the global financial crisis, the expense of operating in Angola, and the challenges for CSO personnel to obtain work visas, many international donors and organizations have withdrawn from the country over the past three years, including the Dutch Development Agency, the Global Fund, and the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation. IBIS, CARE International, Save the Children, and Trocaire announced that they plan to withdraw in early 2012, and the German sustainable development organization, GTZ, is also planning to leave. This exodus has exacerbated an already challenging funding and capacity building environment, particularly for organizations working on good governance, HIV/AIDs, and human rights, the areas of focus for most of the organizations and donors leaving the country.

Local funding is rare. There is no systematic cultivation of local financial support, both because of entrenched poverty and the weak culture of philanthropy. Nevertheless, CSOs are able to draw on local resources for specific projects, such as the rehabilitation of *jangos* (community meeting places) or seed distribution. Corporate philanthropy in Angola remains undeveloped; the private sector in Angola is dominated by the political class and is uninterested in funding CSOs. In addition, there is no culture of volunteerism, in part because the high cost of living means people cannot afford not to get paid.

CSOs do not earn income from services because they do not have the staff capacity to develop high-quality income-generating services.

Local CSOs do not have the capacity or funding to maintain financial management systems, and organizations do not conduct audits unless required to and paid for by donors.

ADVOCACY: 5.7

CSOs are limited in their understanding of the importance of advocacy, their capacity to shape policy, and the meaning and role of civil society. Very few CSOs engage in advocacy activities. The departure of staff from the CSO sector this year has resulted in further deterioration of advocacy capacity, as new entrants to the sector lack an understanding of advocacy and how it shapes policy.

The lack of transparency in drafting the new Law on Associations is clear evidence of the government's disregard for civil society participation. Only organizations run by people with links to the MPLA have lines of communication with the government. UTCAH, the governmental CSO coordinating body, is supposed to serve as a mechanism for including CSOs in decision-making processes. However, it actually functions as a controlling mechanism, continuously requesting financial and narrative reports from CSOs to monitor how they spend their money. At the same time, it praises organizations that provide services while criticizing those

that engage in advocacy. In particular, UTCAH incessantly criticizes the work of those CSOs advocating for land and housing rights, such as OMUNGA.

CSOs face constraints in their operations due to intense scrutiny from the state, and find it difficult to voice concerns or criticism of the ruling party. CSOs fear harassment, arrests, and closure. Therefore, advocacy campaigns tend to be small-scale and focused on issues that do not upset the ruling party. For example, the Forum of Angolan Non-Governmental Organizations' (FONGA) recent campaign focused on improving garbage collection in communities in Cabinda.

OMUNGA and ACC are involved in more controversial advocacy work around land and housing rights. For example, OMUNGA is best known for its work supporting street children and organizing peaceful demonstrations against unilateral plans for neighborhood demolitions that inadequately address relocation. The "Don't Tear Down My House" campaign successfully reversed five demolitions in the province of Benguela and continues to pressure authorities throughout the country to reconsider other demolitions that are forthcoming. Organizations such as OMUNGA are able to engage effectively in advocacy efforts because of their relatively well-developed organizational capacities, including strong leadership, and great public visibility, which makes the government willing to meet with them.

The caution CSOs must take when engaging in advocacy limits their opportunities to collaborate. The National Civil Society Conference is one of the few forums that provides an opportunity for exchange within the sector, but this rarely translates into collaborative advocacy projects.

The fact that the media is state-controlled is another impediment to CSOs garnering support for and raising awareness about issues such as accountability, transparency, and citizen empowerment.

CSOs lack widespread awareness of how a favorable legal and regulatory framework could enhance CSO effectiveness and sustainability, in part because no CSO promotes legal reforms and there is no funding to support such work.

SERVICE PROVISION: 5.3

Few CSOs provide services. Those services that are provided focus on health awareness related to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis; access to health care; education; and water. Most CSOs lack the capacity to implement quality projects. CSOs are highly dependent on external funding and tend to follow donor priorities, rather than developing goods and services that reflect the needs of the communities they serve. Very few CSOs conduct needs assessments, both because they lack funds to do so and because donors generally only fund projects based on their own agendas. At the same time, many CSOs have trouble getting grants because of a lack of capacity to deliver services and a lack of financial accountability.

Service Provision in Angola

| 2009 | 2010 | 2011 |
| 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 |

Local CSOs do not market their projects to wider, external audiences and rarely publish reports to influence the policy agenda or increase awareness among the public or policy makers. CSOs do not have the capacity to monitor the impact of their work. With the exception of Public Utilities, most CSOs do not receive recognition or support from the government.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.7

Infrastructure in Angola

2009	2010	2011
5.7	5.7	5.7

Local organizations do not have the capacity or resources to offer training, and CSOs depend on international organizations such as World Learning, Norwegian's People Aid, and Trocaire for communication networks, training, and technical assistance. However, services are rarely offered in local languages, most experts are based in Luanda, and the quality is often poor. Furthermore, follow-on training is not offered regularly to reinforce capacity.

Every year, CSOs organize the National Civil Society Conference, which is aimed at improving public awareness of the state of Angolan civil society, democratizing Angolan society, and facilitating communication between the state, businesses, and civil society. In addition, some organizations meet regularly at civil society conferences at the provincial and municipal levels. Provincial meetings tend to be dominated by government officials, but municipal meetings provide more space for discussion. The frequency and effectiveness of these gatherings varies by location.

UTCAH is responsible for coordinating CSOs at the national level, but such coordination is limited. There are a few networks uniting CSOs, including the Children's Network, the Education for All Network, Agua para Todos, and the Land Rights Network, but most networks exist only on paper or function only when donor funds are available. When networks do function, they play a very limited role in advocacy and lack a common agenda. CSOs rarely share information with one another because they view each other as competitors for scarce resources.

There are no examples of CSOs partnering with local businesses or the media. Most CSOs are not aware of the possibilities of such partnerships and do not pursue them.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.5

The media in Angola is almost entirely state-controlled. The ruling party has bought all private newspapers, and private TV stations are all under the ownership of the President's family. CSOs with links to the ruling party receive favorable media coverage, including analysis of their activities. The media also occasionally covers basic information about the activities of organizations without links to the ruling party. Most CSOs, however, do not have a public platform from which to voice their concerns or attract public support. Radio Ecclesia, a private Catholic Radio station, occasionally

Public Image in Angola

2009	2010	2011
5.4	5.4	5.5

provides analysis and commentary on CSO activities, but is discouraged from operating in the provinces, so has limited reach.

Since early 2011, Radio Eccelsia and other private stations have been instructed by the ruling party to decrease their coverage of issues of social concern, such as lack of water and electricity in certain communities. There is little to no social media reporting on youth demonstrations across the country and both private and public radio stations are prohibited from reporting on demonstrations.

Independent media outlets face significant state scrutiny. Although no journalists were arrested in 2011, some journalists were harassed throughout the year for reporting on the government's poor performance in providing the population with basic services such as water, electricity, health, education, and housing.

CSOs do not have the resources to develop clear media strategies or to fund their own media, nor are they willing to risk the consequences of doing so. Some large national CSOs have websites, and OMUNGA, one of the few CSOs that actively promotes its image, has a blog. Most CSOs, however, make little or no use of other media such as community newspapers, newsletters, or the Internet to publicize their activities.

The public does not understand the role of CSOs, often confusing them with for-profit companies. The government strives to ignore CSOs altogether or reinforce negative perceptions to limit CSO influence. The business sector also perceives CSOs as disruptive, although the oil industry supports organizations affiliated with the MPLA.

CSOs do not have a code of ethics. Only Acção de Desenvolvimento Rural de Angola (ADRA) publishes an annual report.

BOTSWANA

2011 Scores for Botswana

Indicator	Score
CSO Sustainability	4.2
Legal Environment	3.8
Organizational Capacity	4.0
Financial Viability	4.6
Advocacy	3.8
Service Provision	3.6
Infrastructure	4.9
Public Image	4.4

1 — 3 — 5 — 7

Sustainability Enhanced   **Sustainability Evolved**   **Sustainability Impeded**

Capital: Gaborone

Government Type: Parliamentary Republic

Population: 2,098,018 (July 2012 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $16,200

Human Development Index: 118

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.2

Botswana's diverse civil society sector includes community-based, faith-based, small welfare, large national organizations, and international NGOs (INGOs). The country's registration database includes about 4,500 CSOs legally registered with the Ministry of Labor and Home Affairs under the Societies Act. CSOs work in eleven sub-sectors: agriculture and environment; arts and culture; church development; disability; gender and development; health and HIV/AIDS; human rights; media; microfinance, credit and empowerment; science and technology training; and youth and children.

One hundred thirty organizations are affiliated with the Botswana Council of Nongovernmental Organizations (BOCONGO). Affiliation with BOCONGO gives organizations access to decision-making and policy-making forums; coordination under the NGO Secretariat that advocates on behalf of BOCONGO members; and increased access to funding by donors that prefer to work with BOCONGO affiliates.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.8

CSOs in Botswana register under the Societies Act, and trade unions register under the Trade Unions Act. The relevant laws outline governance and compliance requirements. Registration requirements for societies include a list of board members, a constitution, and minutes of a board meeting reflecting the board's resolution to register. A few CSOs are also registered as trusts, which simply entails registering with a lawyer and filing the paperwork with the government. Some organizations abuse this form of registration because it

comes with little accountability. As a result of community protests about such abuses, the government plans to develop monitoring and accountability obligations for trusts.

Though CSO registration in Botswana is fairly straightforward, some organizations find it difficult to meet all registration requirements due to a lack of understanding or adequate guidance from the Registrar of Societies. For example, the registration application of the Domestic Workers Association, submitted in 2002, is still pending; the organization has not received an explanation for the delay. The government reserves the right to reject registration if an organization's mandate does not fall within the law or is unconstitutional. For example, the gay and lesbian society, LEGABIBO, has been denied registration because homosexuality is illegal in Botswana. There are no legal repercussions for functioning without registration; however, an unregistered organization cannot open a bank account, acquire a lease, or engage in any form of official transaction.

The Societies Act requires organizations to submit annual audited financial statements. Organizations suspected of abusing funds are required to undergo a full external audit. This requirement poses a problem for CSOs with limited funding that are unable to afford an audit. Financial abuse, including failure to submit annual returns, is grounds for an organization's dissolution or deregistration; however, this rarely occurs.

The constitution guarantees freedom of expression, and CSOs are allowed to criticize the government. However, organizations that challenge the government by raising civil liberties issues or engaging in other activities perceived by the government as too political, face consequences, including the threat of dissolution. For example, during the 2011 strike, the government threatened to dissolve some trade unions. The government recently prohibited civil servants from attending the Media Institute of Southern Africa-Botswana's (MISA-Botswana) Transparency Awards ceremony, which recognizes government ministries that demonstrate openness and transparency. The ceremony went ahead as planned, with awards granted to the relevant ministries in absentia. Leaflets produced by the Botswana Network on Ethics, Law, and HIV/AIDS (BONELA) were confiscated recently, allegedly by government agents, for outlining the weaknesses of the government's HIV prevention program. Notwithstanding the above examples, the government works within the law, and CSOs have the right to appeal government actions in the courts.

Most CSOs must pay taxes, including Value Added Tax (VAT), although charitable organizations can apply for tax exemptions. It is essential for CSOs to comply with the rules and regulations of the Botswana Unified Revenue Services (BURS). However, many CSOs fail to properly file tax returns because of limited understanding of the process.

CSOs are allowed to compete for government contracts, but many are unable to prepare competitive applications. In addition, some CSOs have problems applying for government contracts because they do not comply with rules set by government regulatory bodies such as BURS. CSOs do not receive special consideration in the bidding process because of their non-profit status.

Lawyers tend to be profit-oriented and avoid controversial cases such as human rights cases. Some law firms help CSOs, particularly INGOs, with registration and contracts. The Botswana Network of Ethics Law and HIV and AIDS (BONELA) has lawyers who provide pro-bono services to CSOs. However, few local independent lawyers work with CSOs or are familiar with the relevant laws.

The government of Botswana is piloting a legal aid project that provides funds to engage lawyers for CSO beneficiaries who otherwise would not have access to legal services because of financial constraints.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.0

Most CSOs form to meet specific needs, but some shift their priorities according to funding availability. For example, when HIV/AIDS-focused INGOs started coming to the country, many local CSOs began mainstreaming HIV/AIDS work into their programming.

CSOs' relationships with constituents vary depending on the type of organization. For example, organizations that deliver direct services and membership-driven network organizations, including BOCONGO, the Botswana Network of AIDS Services Organization (BONASO), and the Botswana Network of People with HIV/AIDS (BONEPWA), work closely with their constituents on problem solving and strategic partnering.

Most organizations have clearly defined mission statements, and many CSOs have strategic plans. However, few CSOs have operational plans that explain how they will pursue their strategic goals.

Most CSOs lack a clear separation of governance and management functions and many board members have limited skills on how to govern effectively. Board members frequently manage daily operations, which hinders proper organizational functioning. Many organizations suffer from "founder syndrome," in which a director handpicks board members and wields power over them. Power struggles between the board and management are common.

Most CSOs experience high levels of staff turnover because they have insufficient and irregular funding, and therefore can only afford to employ staff members on short-term contracts with uncompetitive salaries. Many staff members leave to work for INGOs, which offer better terms. Some organizations have human resources tools in place, including job descriptions, and utilize professional staff, such as accountants.

While most CSOs are not able to retain volunteers over the long-term or provide them with stipends, they are extremely efficient in engaging volunteers when they can. Many young people and volunteers use CSOs as stepping stones to more secure employment opportunities. The government also provides stipends to interns to work at CSOs.

While most urban organizations are equipped with modern equipment, CSOs outside of cities rarely have modernized basic office equipment, especially in rural areas where there is no electricity.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.6

Most CSOs rely on grants for survival. However, since Botswana was classified as a middle-income country about a decade ago, donor funding has declined significantly.

Botswana has no laws in place, such as tax laws that incentivize local giving. Nevertheless, some companies provide support to CSOs. The government and private sector also encourage giving in other ways. For example, some corporate staff members contribute funds to build houses for orphans, families living in poverty, or those made homeless by floods. The government gives civil servants half a day off per week to engage in community service. Some individuals donate to CSOs, including through annual events such as Christmas to the poor, but this is still uncommon. Some organizations hold innovative fundraising activities such as cultural diversity events, art shows, and sales events.

Few CSOs engage in income-generating activities both because of complex compliance requirements and because many CSOs inaccurately think they are prevented from earning income in this way. Trade unions primarily depend on membership dues, but members do not always pay their dues. Some local companies contract CSOs to provide services such as family counseling, but these contracts usually pay nominal fees and cannot sustain CSOs. An exception to this is in the health sector, in which the government supports many services provided by CSOs, such as same-day HIV testing. The government has just signed a memorandum of understanding with the Botswana Society for the Deaf to provide education and job training to the deaf community.

Most CSOs have good financial management systems in place, and many organizations produce independently audited financial reports on an annual basis. Organizations without strong financial systems have trouble securing funding. BOCONGO used to have a capacity building program that provided financial

management training. Organizations that completed the program are now able to attract more funding because of their sound financial management practices.

ADVOCACY: 3.8

On paper, formal structures such as parliamentary committees exist to facilitate communication between CSO representatives and legislators, but these meetings rarely take place. Even when meetings are held, many organizations are unable to send representatives due to a lack of staff time. Despite these obstacles, CSOs recently met several times with the Parliament Health Committee to discuss providing condoms in prisons, and with other government committees about investigating corruption; no specific action has yet been taken. Successful lobbying campaigns by BONEPWA and BONELA include the passage of gender-sensitive amendments to laws and an amendment that prohibits discrimination against those affected or infected by AIDS.

CSOs have a history of forming coalitions for regional and national advocacy campaigns around issues such as health, poverty, social justice, and democratization. For example, in 2011 trade unions came together to demand a 16 percent salary increase for civil servants; the government was able to promise 3 percent. Previous coalition-based initiatives under BOCONGO have included a campaign to put poverty eradication and engagement with the poor at the forefront of the central and district-level government agendas and an initiative to provide Anti-Retrovirals (ARV), Preventing Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV (PMTCT), and adolescent reproductive health services at public clinics. Other networks also conduct advocacy and legal reforms campaigns. For example, Women against Rape (WAR), BONELA, and other gender-based organizations reach out to grassroots communities to raise awareness on issues such as health, education, and human rights.

Most CSOs, however, lack lobbying skills, and some activists are wary of criticizing the government for fear of being victimized by security forces or intelligence personnel or denied funding from the relevant line ministries.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.6

CSOs offer diverse products and services in a variety of fields, including education, health, social services, relief, environment, natural resource management, disability, and gender issues. Many service-oriented CSOs offer unique services, in particular in the areas of educating disabled communities, HIV and AIDS support groups, and life skills programs.

Most CSOs provide goods and services tailored to the needs of the communities they serve, within the limits of each organization's resources and geographical reach. These needs are often determined during traditional Kgotla meetings, community gatherings that ensure regular community dialogue. In addition, CSOs conduct baseline studies and needs assessments to ascertain levels of need and targets.

Health and gender CSOs provide information and services to stakeholders outside their membership base, including counseling services for marginalized communities. But most CSOs, especially membership-based organizations, do not reach beyond their constituencies, largely because of funding limitations.

The law permits cost recovery as long as the proceeds are reinvested in the organization. Many CSOs understand the market demand for their services because of client feedback and evaluation reports. However, the "non-profit" designation leads constituents to expect that all services are provided free, so CSOs tend not to charge fees. CSOs also lack expertise in areas that might lead to more profits, such as training of clinical personnel, and do not invest in branding or marketing.

The government sometimes provides financial support to CSOs for service provision, such as backyard garden cultivation and HIV testing programs.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.9

There are very few resource centers or intermediate support organizations (ISOs) in Botswana. Those that exist are poorly equipped and tend to be located in urban areas. The country's information technology strategy, known as Maitlamo, does not provide resources to resource centers or ISOs.

Information sharing is challenging because of a lack of funding and poor coordination among network organizations, although some mechanisms do exist. For example, BOCONGO disseminates some information, primarily among its members. In addition, BOCONGO's annual NGO Week Forum, a showcase of CSO activities and an opportunity to share information, is open to communities, government, and the private sector. BONASO has regional-level coalitions in Bobirwa and Selibe-Phikwe that come together quarterly to share information, and NCONGO provides information sharing opportunities for CSOs in the north. BONEPWA provides excellent information sharing services among the community and with various stakeholders, while the Southern African Development Community Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (SADC-CNGO) generates regional-level advocacy-related publications.

There are local grantmaking organizations, but they usually sub-grant funds from international organizations, rather than locally-raised resources. Such funds are usually targeted toward countrywide or even Southern Africa regional development programs, as opposed to locally-identified needs.

Many CSOs offer specialized training on a variety of topics in both urban and rural locations. However, many lack the resources to produce enough copies of training materials. Many training materials are available only in English, although BOCAIP and Kuru Trust have materials in other languages, including Setswana, Sekalaka, and Sesarwa. The University of Botswana offers certificates and diplomas in NGO management. Training is also available in health management, such as TB and HIV literacy.

While the government provides few contracts to CSOs, there are many other partnership opportunities with both the private sector and the government. For example, Tshole Trust and Somarelang Tikologo work with the government and the oil industry to recycle used oil, plastic, and bottle waste. Some CSOs provide services to private sector enterprises, such as employee counseling services when companies downsize. Makgabaneng, a radio program that addresses health issues through awareness raising and behavioral change, receives support through an intersectoral partnership between the government and local radio stations.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4

Though government controlled, state media covers CSO events upon request. CSOs also receive supportive coverage from the private media. However, the media lacks an in-depth understanding of CSOs, and therefore provides little analysis of the sector. The media rarely reports on the closing of CSOs or scandals and other issues that may tarnish the sector's image.

The media and CSOs distinguish between public service announcements and corporate advertising, and appropriately cover different types of activities. For example, an annual meeting would be announced through the events pages, whereas the launch of a program would be covered in the news.

CSOs often provide training to journalists to understand and effectively report on CSO work and help project a positive image of the sector. However, high turnover among journalists means that such relationships are unsustainable. Some experienced reporters rely on CSOs for specialized research materials such as clinical information; however, this is not a very common practice.

CSOs also publicize their activities through radio, flyers, websites, and program reports.

The public does not fully understand or appreciate the concept of civil society, and does not know how to support the sector, financially or otherwise, despite the fact that there is demand for the services CSOs

provide. The government and business sectors tend to be skeptical of CSOs because of their limited understanding of the sector and past instances of CSOs allegedly mismanaging funds.

Leading CSOs publish their annual reports, but smaller organizations cannot afford to publish such reports. BOCONGO has a code of ethics that it shares with its members and re-distributes annually. According to the BOCONGO code of ethics, all CSOs have to host annual general meetings where they report to their members or boards about their programmatic and financial activities and present their audited financial statements. The Societies Act also requires CSOs to file audited financial reports on an annual basis. However, there is no information available as to how many CSOs actually fulfill these obligations.

BURUNDI

2011 Scores for Burundi

Indicator	Score
CSO Sustainability	5.2
Legal Environment	5.9
Organizational Capacity	5.9
Financial Viability	6.0
Advocacy	4.4
Service Provision	4.5
Infrastructure	5.6
Public Image	4.3

Sustainability Enhanced — **Sustainability Evolved** — **Sustainability Impeded**

Capital: Bujumbura

Government Type: Republic

Population: 10,557,259 (July 2012 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $600

Human Development Index: 185

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.2

Civil society in Burundi continues to operate in a difficult legal environment but there were several laws proposed in 2011 that would reform the legal framework for CSOs. A new law was promulgated that regulates small, local CSOs known as pre-cooperatives which are now officially recognized at the level of the commune. A proposed law on faith-based organizations was awaiting approval by the government as was a bill proposed in 2009 to replace the law governing not-for-profit associations. This proposition would create a legal status for these organizations at the level of both the national ministry and the commune, legally recognize public interest organizations, and create a mechanism for CSOs to collaborate with the Interior Ministry and the technical ministries. At present, the laws regulating CSOs have not been translated from French into the national language, Kirundi, which leaves them inaccessible to many organizations, and registration is time-consuming and costly.

CSO Sustainability in Burundi

Year	Score
2009	5.2
2010	5.2
2011	5.2

As of August 9, 2011, the Interior Minister had registered 4,642 CSOs. However, many of these organizations exist only in name, lacking permanent personnel, offices, or internal management structures. Many organizations further lack financial resources and most funding comes from foreign donors. Local resources and membership fees are insufficient to ensure sustainability, and the government does not fund CSOs, except for a set of pro-government organizations which are set up by the government and intended to be a counter-balance to independent CSOs'

influence.

CSOs actively advocate on public policy and issues such as human rights, good governance, corruption, economic management, gender, education, land reform, and agricultural policy. However, CSOs are typically unable to recruit and train staff that can organize effective advocacy campaigns, access public information, or make direct contacts with decision makers.

The relationship between CSOs and the government deteriorated this year as CSOs took an active role criticizing the actions of the government. For example, the Observatoire de l'Action Governementale (OAG) publically denounced a series of extrajudicial executions between July and November of 2011, which the government denies. In an ongoing response to the assassination in 2009 of Ernest Manirumva, the former Vice President of the Anti-corruption and Economic Embezzlement Observatory (OLUCOME), a demonstration was held on April 15, 2011 calling for truth and justice, which was broken up by the police.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.9

Article 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi guarantees freedom of assembly and association, as well as the right to form associations or organizations in accordance with the law. Not-for-profit associations are governed by the Decree-Law 1/11 of April 18, 1992. However, this law has become outdated, particularly regarding the regulation of umbrella groups. As a result, five provincial networks of associations were blocked from registering in 2011. A draft revision of the legislation was introduced in July 2009, but it has not yet been reviewed by the Council of Ministers. The

Legal Environment in Burundi

2009	2010	2011
5.8	5.8	5.9

revision was drafted by CSOs funded by the EU's Support and Capacity Building for Non-State Actors project (ARCANE). Another proposed law that would regulate government relations with faith-based organizations is awaiting adoption by the government. However, the government did adopt a new law in 2011, which allows pre-cooperatives to be legally recognized at the level of the commune.

Like most laws, the Decree-Law No. 1/11 is only available in French. In addition, registration must take place in person at the Ministry of Interior in Bujumbura, which makes it difficult for organizations outside the capital to register. CBOs and other local organizations are recognized by the local authorities, but must register at the national level in order to attain official legal status. The only CSOs that do not register through this procedure are labor unions, cooperatives, and foundations. The documentation required is extensive, expensive to obtain, and often available only in Bujumbura. Required documents include criminal records, which are necessary for obtaining a certificate of good conduct and moral character, and which must be issued by the provincial governor or the mayor of the city of Bujumbura.

CSOs are authorized under the law to undertake activities without government interference. However, contrary to the law, the Interior Minister issued instructions to CSOs in 2010 which remained in effect in 2011 stating that authorization must be obtained from the Interior Ministry for any projects taking place outside the capital.

Local CSOs may raise funds locally and internationally. Tax exemptions are granted only to international CSOs. International CSOs must each sign a convention with the Government of Burundi through the Ministry of Exterior Relations and Cooperation. Under that convention, the government may accord tax exemptions for goods and services necessary for the completion of projects if the goods and services are acquired in Burundi and the organization has received authorization from both the Ministry of Exterior Relations and Cooperation and the Ministry of Finances.

New networks, platforms, and umbrella groups continued to form in 2011. According to the Article 2 of the Decree-Law 1/11, these organizations should be eligible for registration, but since 2009, the Interior Minister has suspended all new registration of these groups and did not publically provide a rationale for the decision. For example, the Forum of Agricultural Producers of Burundi (FOPABU) has been awaiting registration approval from the Interior Minister since late 2009, and in January 2011, the minister revoked the Forum for Strengthening Civil Society's 2009 registration.

The state views CSOs, particularly those working on human rights and good governance issues, to be supporters of the political opposition, and as a result has started to create parallel, competing organizations to in order to weaken their influence. The government considers some CSOs to be too vocal in their critiques, and those organizations have been intimidated, threatened, and harassed. This year in particular has been marked by accusations, provocations, abrupt convocations, and the imprisonment of civil society leaders and journalists. Notably, the presidents of OLUCOME and the Association for the Protection of Human Rights and of Prisoners (APRODH) and the vice president of OAG were summarily called in for questioning regarding the assassination of the former vice president of OLUCOME, Feu Ernest Manirumva. The police also broke up a demonstration calling for truth and justice regarding the assassination of Feu Ernest Manirumva and two of the demonstration organizers were arrested and detained.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.9

Organizational capacity continues to be limited in Burundi, and although many CSOs want to expand their capacity, they do not have the resources to do so. According to a recent study by Professor Christophe Sebudandi, only 5 percent of registered CSOs operate professionally. Very few organizations conduct activities throughout the country and have offices, equipment, Internet access, and permanent staff. Many CSOs work in areas that have no electricity or Internet access at all. However, some organizations have transparent management and decision-making processes, including governing statutes, internal regulations, administrative and financial procedures, and strategic and operational plans. They produce regular annual narrative and financial reports, and submit to independent financial audits conducted by firms certified by the Professional Accountants Association.

Building on their work in this area in 2010, certain CSOs are gradually building local support groups and networks to help them extend the reach of their activities, improve their visibility, and build support in the field. Notable groups that have been successful in this area include the Forum for Strengthening Civil Society (FORSC), the Cooperative of Women Associations and CSOs of Burundi (CAFOB), DUSHIREHAMWE Women's Association, the League Iteka, the Youth Cooperative Associations (CPAJ), the Governmental Action Watchdog Agency (OAG), The Consumer Protection Agency (ABUCO), the Anti-corruption and Economic Embezzlement Observatory (OLUCOME), the Organization Supporting Self Promotion (AOP), and the Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained Persons (APRODH).

Civil society organizations do not have the necessary resources to provide sufficient training for their staff. Moreover, CSOs suffer from a high rate of staff turnover, particularly among senior management, who are often attracted by the higher salaries offered by international CSOs or donor agencies. However, several projects and organizations are working to build the institutional capacity of CSOs including initiatives by international CSOs such as Oxfam. Due to donor requirements, some CSOs are improving their administrative and financial management systems.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.0

The financial situations of CSOs vary widely as a result of their size, area of intervention, visibility, target beneficiaries, and zone of operation. The strongest CSOs rely on foreign donors, but most organizations are unable to obtain this funding. According to a recent study, only 5 percent of CSOs have the capacity required to mobilize donor funding and those that do are much more likely to receive future funding. Membership fees are insufficient because of the low income of the population and the government does not fund CSOs. In the absence of secure sources of funding, many organizations rely heavily on volunteers.

Financial Visibility in Burundi

2009	2010	2011

1.0
3.0
5.0   6.0   6.0   6.0
7.0

Private media outlets, which most frequently are registered as not-for-profit associations, sustainably raise revenue through the sale of programs, newspapers, and commercials and advertisements.

Since the most organizationally strong CSOs depend on a limited number of foreign donors, they have difficulty diversifying their funding sources. There is no culture of philanthropy in Burundi and CSOs have weak fundraising strategies. However, the population shows a clear willingness to make in-kind contributions for concrete community development projects, such as the construction of schools and health centers. Only a few CSOs charge for their services. In 2011, several organizations have had to halt or scale back their activities due to lack of funding. Notably, organizations that were funded by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) during the 2010 election ended their programs in 2011.

In accordance with donor guidelines, the government increasingly works with CSOs to implement activities through sub-grants or sub-contracts of projects funded by the World Bank, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (FMSTP), and the European Union.

Donors are working to build the financial management capacity of CSOs through trainings and by closely monitoring expenditures and reporting to ensure transparency. In addition, many donors require CSOs to submit to annual audits; some donors even impose specific audit firms.

ADVOCACY: 4.4

Advocacy in Burundi

2009	2010	2011

1.0
3.0   4.6   4.5   4.4
5.0
7.0

CSOs engaged in advocacy are challenged by the government's lack of commitment to civil society, the tense political situation, and security concerns. CSOs actively advocate on issues such as human rights protection, governance, corruption, gender sensitivity in decision-making bodies, inheritance rights for women, land reform, agricultural policy, education, and gender-based violence.

In 2011, major advocacy successes for CSOs included putting in place an Independent National Commission on Human Rights (CNIDH). CSOs' recommendations for the principals and steps for the nomination of commissioners were adopted. CSOs also successfully advocated for the percent of the national budget allocated to agriculture to be increased from 6.7 percent to 11 percent. Advocacy for a law that would improve women's access to land ownership was not successful. This was in part due to resistance from the government, but also because of cultural resistance. Certain campaigns against impunity were also unsuccessful, particularly in cases where the presumed criminals were senior government officials.

Professional organizations, such as trade unions, bar associations, and journalist associations, are also very active in advocacy. Private media organizations organized a demonstration to demand freedom of speech after the government made threats to several private independent radio station. The Bar Association led a campaign to free several lawyers who they considered to have been imprisoned arbitrarily. A teachers' union organized a strike to demand fair and regular salaries. A professional association of magistrates also led a strike to demand the implementation of a statute regulating their profession and the independence of their profession.

Organizations involved in the analysis and monitoring of public policies continued to develop, including the Governmental Action Watchdog Agency (OAG), the Economic Development Institute of Burundi (IDEC), and the National Commission on Conflict Prevention (CENAP).These organizations publish analyses of public policies, budgets, and finances, and they are leading the government to increasingly involve CSOs in debates over public policy.

CSOs share information with one another through numerous networks that communicate by email lists, mailings, reports, meetings, and informal communications regarding policies, studies, and shared priorities.

Despite these successes, CSOs still find it difficult to react to government actions in a timely manner. For example, OAG publishes an analysis of the national budget each year, but the government frequently sends the budget to parliament only weeks before it is to be voted on, leaving little time to study the budget. CSOs also face challenges in overcoming deep-rooted political and cultural barriers, particularly in relation to gender and inheritance.

To meet donor conditions, the government includes CSOs in steering committees, such as those in charge of monitoring the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, and in national consultations on issues such as transitional justice, public procurement, labor, and social security. However, this collaboration remains largely a formality in most cases. In August, the government organized a General Assembly of Civil Society that resulted in misunderstanding between government and civil society. While CSOs' hoped to increase their opportunities to collaborate with the government, the government's goal was to create a unique platform for collaboration with the government.

CSOs generally lack the trained personnel and financial resources necessary to engage in lobbying. CSOs are monitoring the progress of the bill proposed in 2009 under the guidance of the ARCANE, which would update and improve the laws regulating CSOs, but the law has not yet been reviewed by the government. CSOs are also continuing to campaign for the establishment of a law protecting human rights advocates.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5

CSOs continued in 2011 to provide services in areas such as health, education, housing, water supply systems, environmental protection, and food security, including the development of agriculture and livestock. Due to a lack of expertise and insufficient financial resources, there is a lack of services in other areas such as energy provision.

Service Provision in Burundi

Services are offered in response to community needs, and beneficiaries are involved in program design, implementation, and results sharing. CSOs often hold participatory planning meetings to develop locally determined development plans at the level of the commune. Given the country's widespread poverty, which has been exacerbated by the global financial crisis, demand for services has increased, but the sector has not been able to keep up with the increased demand.

Products and services, including social services, reports, and workshops, are generally offered for free or at subsidized prices to the public.

The government recognizes CSOs' contributions in service provision, but does not grant them any direct funding. However, government increasingly embraces CSOs' contributions to debates over public policy as well as their participation in steering committees and monitoring and evaluation committees for public programs. In some cases, the government also signs memorandums of understanding with CSOs and participate in their activities.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6

Infrastructure in Burundi

	2009	2010	2011
1.0			
3.0			
5.0	5.6	5.6	5.6
7.0			

Opportunities for CSOs to access training and technical support, decreased in 2011 due to the closure of the ARCANE project, which had provided training for CSOs and their staff. Very few opportunities are now available for CSOs to access training and technical support.

There are active CSO platforms and networks, located mostly in Bujumbura. These networks typically help to build their members' capacities through training programs, discussions, and outreach workshops. Networks are becoming more structured and in 2011 several organizations created websites and disseminated newsletters. Some CSOs have hosted workshops on management and leadership, negotiation, communication, and conflict resolution. The majority of these workshops have been conducted in local languages.

Successful CSO coalitions include the advocacy coalition that sought justice for the survivors of the murdered Ernest Manurumva, former vice president of the Anti-corruption and Economic Embezzlement Observatory (OLUCOME). The networks that formed in 2010 to address issues related to the elections that year are no longer active due to the absence of funding, but may reconstitute during future electoral periods. Sub-regional networks have continued gain strength in Burundi, including the Civil Society Organizations of East Africa (EACSOF), the African Union's Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), and the Network of Defenders of Human Rights in East Africa and the Horn of Africa (EHAHRDP)

Universities, churches, and external experts that receive reports and publications often become involved in advocating for public policy recommendations based on the findings of the studies.

Local experts are starting to emerge that can provide training to CSOs and their staff in planning, monitoring and evaluation, and other areas of project management. However CSOs are still undertrained and lack the capacity to fully meet the needs of the populations they serve.

Very few CSOs work in partnership with businesses or the government, though there are examples of collaboration in the areas of health, agriculture, education, and human rights. CSOs do collaborate with the media.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3

CSO activities receive positive coverage from both the national and local media, thanks to their collaborative relationship. In 2011, the two sectors worked together on issues of security, human rights, education, health, environment, and governance through television and radio programs, public forums, and press conferences. The media also collaborated with CSOs by offering free public service announcements which are not subject

to fees as an advertisement would be. This positive relationship with the media helped improve the overall perceptions of CSOs as did the visibility of demonstrations and advocacy campaigns led by CSOs in 2011.

The public understands and supports the work done by CSOs, and provides feedback by participating in call-in public radio shows and in sensitization workshops and other public events. The public also actively participates in CSO activities, notably by helping to build certain infrastructure projects such as schools and health centers.

Public Image in Burundi

	2009	2010	2011
1.0			
3.0	4.4	4.3	4.3
5.0			
7.0			

Government perceptions of civil society have deteriorated as CSOs speak out against government abuses of power. This has been manifest notably in the government's reaction to the ongoing demands for truth and justice for regarding the assassination of the former vice president of OLUCOME.

Some CSOs have a code of conduct, but adoption of the code is optional and there is no code of conduct adopted by the sector as a whole. A code of conduct was adopted in 2010 by the political parties, the media, and the government that makes recommendations on governance, rule of law, fight against impunity, and respecting civil and private liberties remains. There is a monitoring committee to monitor adherence to this code, but it is not enforced with any penalties.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

2011 Scores for the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Category	Score
CSO Sustainability	5.1
Legal Environment	5.4
Organizational Capacity	5.1
Financial Viability	5.7
Advocacy	4.4
Service Provision	4.5
Infrastructure	5.6
Public Image	5.0

Sustainability Enhanced — Sustainability Evolving — Sustainability Impeded

Capital: Kinshasa

Government Type: Republic

Population: 73,599,190 (July 2012 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $400

Human Development Index: 187

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.1

In 2011, the Congolese voted in the second multiparty legislative and presidential elections in the country's history. According to reports by both international and national observers, the elections were marred by irregularities. The voter rolls were contested, there were reports of ballot box stuffing, and there were arbitrary arrests and calls for unrest. The election results were widely contested, and the government responded by cracking down on the opposition party, restricting free speech, persecuting critics, and inciting ethnic hatred and riots.

The 2011 election unrest threatened the country's already fragile economy, and led to a crisis of confidence among development partners. Though key macroeconomic indicators suggested that the economy had started to improve, the election-related restrictions on civil liberties led to increased poverty and the deterioration of social services even as demand for these services increased. There were serious accidents as transportation infrastructure deteriorated and became increasingly unreliable.

CSOs, on the other hand, have grown during the year. Many new associations were formed, and the creation of several CSO networks and platforms has helped make the sector more professional. CSOs also became deeply involved in political events this year and some civil society leaders ran for parliament.

CSO Sustainability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Year	Score
2009	5.0
2010	5.1
2011	5.1

Although registration under Law 004 of 2001, which governs all not-for-profit organizations, remains difficult, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights granted legal status to a number of human rights CSOs, which have typically had the most difficulty registering. The ministry also held regular consultations with CSOs on a wide range of policy issues.

Congolese CSOs' financial capacity remained precarious due to CSOs' weak management capacities, declines in donor funding, and lack of funding from members and the national government. But some CSOs received short-term grants from the European Union's support fund for non-state actors, Christian Aid's Civil Society Support Fund, and USAID.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.4

Law 004 of July 20, 2001 on not-for-profit and public interest organizations provides the basic legal framework for CSOs in the DRC. Registration is difficult for organizations based in the provinces, because applications must be made in the capital, Kinshasa. There are also reports of corruption in the registration process and the creation of fictive organizations to embezzle funds. However, in 2011, the Minister of Justice expressed interest in collaborating more with CSOs, and CSOs based in Kinshasa faced few obstacles when registering. In response to the 2010 murder of human rights activist Floribert Chebeya and the ensuing international outcry, the

Legal Environment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Ministry of Justice instituted a simplified procedure in 2011 for the registration of human rights CSOs. However, this option is only available to organizations in Kinshasa, and there is a general concern among CSOs that the simplified registration process has not been institutionalized.

Law 004 includes detailed provisions about CSO management, which require CSOs to have a board of directors that is independent from the executive management, to hold regular general assembly meetings and elections, to maintain independent bank accounts, and to have a legitimate mission. The law also requires CSOs to submit annual and financial reports to the Ministry of Planning and the technical ministry that oversees their activities. However, this requirement is generally not enforced, and many CSOs to do not follow this procedure out of fear of control by the state. In some cases, they submit reports to their funders instead.

Law 004 prohibits the government from exercising arbitrary control over registered CSOs. The 2005 constitution protects the freedoms of association and speech and guarantees that while the government can suspend the activities of a CSO for up to three months, only a superior court can dissolve a CSO. CSOs have a right of appeal, and can only be dissolved for egregiously illegal activities. However, special service agents regularly harass human rights CSOs and other organizations that work on sensitive issues such as the illicit uranium and tantalite trade. This harassment most frequently takes the form of denying visas for travel and questioning by security agents. Harassment of other kinds of CSOs working in domains such as HIV/AIDS, poverty reduction, and protection of vulnerable populations has declined.

A small number of local attorneys practice not-for-profit law. Very few provide pro bono services to CSOs, but several donor-funded projects provide free legal services to certain organizations, especially those monitoring women's rights and providing justice to victims of sexual violence. These projects are centered in Kinshasa and depend on donor funding.

In theory, CSOs, not-for-profit organizations, and all public interest organizations benefit from tax exemptions from the value-added tax (VAT) and customs for vehicles, medicines, clothing, and other

supplies purchased for beneficiaries; in practice, the procedures to access these benefits are onerous and religious organizations are better able to benefit from these exonerations because of their credibility in the community.

The ability of CSOs to generate revenue has not changed since 2010. CSOs are permitted to sell their products and services and frequently do so. Legally, they can bid on government contracts but very few do, because they believe the selection criteria are subjective and that they are unlikely to win a contract through open competition.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1

Organizational Capacity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

	2009	2010	2011
1.0			
3.0			
	5.1	5.1	5.1
5.0			
7.0			

CSOs frequently consult with beneficiary communities in the planning and implementation of projects. The success of this process depends on the organizational capacity of a CSO, the competency of its management, and its financial and physical resources. Some CSOs are not rooted strongly enough in their communities to effectively engage in this process.

Every CSO must have a defined mission and mandate laid out in its statute and internal operating procedures when it registers. CSOs rarely employ strategic planning techniques, but this improved in 2011 as donors increasingly condition their funding on sound strategic planning and provide assistance to CSOs to undertake strategic planning.

CSOs' statutes and internal operating procedures must clearly define the division of responsibilities between the general assembly, board of directors, and executive management, each of which is required by law. However, because of a lack of organizational capacity and professionalism, CSOs often do not establish a functioning board of directors that holds regular meetings, and executive managers tends to run their organizations without any oversight.

The precarious financial position of many CSOs means that many do not have sufficient funding to afford modern office equipment or Internet access, nor can they afford the accounting software necessary for the transparent management of financial resources. Very few CSOs have any permanent salaried employees; instead, most rely on volunteers and employees hired under short-term contracts for specific projects

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.7

International CSOs win most of the grants and contracts made available to CSOs even at the local level largely because Congolese organizations have weak financial and management capacity. International CSOs therefore work in association with Congolese CSOs or networks of CSOs. However, in 2011, a small number of CSOs successfully won grants directly from the European Union, USAID, and Christian Aid's Civil Society Support Fund, which are intended to build the institutional capacity of these grantees through trainings, advocacy, civic education, and other field activities.

Financial Viability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

	2009	2010	2011
1.0			
3.0			
	5.8	5.8	5.7
5.0			
7.0			

There is no clear mechanism for the central and provincial governments to fund CSOs, but in 2001, President Kabila formed a quasi-governmental organization to fund CSOs called the Social Fund of the Republic. This organization is generally seen to operate very opaquely and its funding is not available to most CSOs. The central and provincial governments also sub-grant funding from the European Union, World Bank, and United Nations Development Programs (UNDP) to CSOs, but these are also issued in a highly opaque fashion.

Community based organizations (CBOs), religious organizations, and other CSOs often successfully mobilize volunteers. Foundations linked to multi-national corporations such as the Bralima Foundation, Telecommunications Vodacom, Airtel, and Tigo, provide funding to renovate health centers, schools, and public markets, and support other social services and projects to alleviate poverty. However, most CSOs do not have access to diverse financial resources and are dependent on foreign funding tied to specific projects. As a result, many CSOs do not have sufficient resources to remain viable in the long term.

The majority of Congolese CSOs do not have well developed financial management systems. CSOs only submit to annual financial audits when it is a mandatory donor requirement. Only a small number of national CSOs have internal manuals and established administrative and financial procedures. Annual reports are rarely published, though CSOs sometimes produce reports for donor-funded projects.

Few CSOs have loyal financial supporters, but CSOs are increasingly finding ways to generate revenue by leasing meeting spaces or vehicles, and providing photocopy, Internet, and library services. Some CBOs create and sell crafts, agricultural products, and reports and research. In many cases, the goals of these activities are to train their beneficiaries and the prices charged are generally very low. Most CSOs raise little revenue through membership fees, except for religious organizations and cooperatives, though these organizations still rarely raise enough money to cover even the rent of their office.

The government and the private sector are starting to recognize CSOs' expertise in project management, especially in humanitarian assistance and the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure such as bridges, roads, health centers, and flea markets. But local CSOs still implement these projects most frequently as subcontractors to international organizations.

ADVOCACY: 4.4

Advocacy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

2009	2010	2011
4.5	4.5	4.4

Opportunities have grown for dialogue between the central and local governments and national and local CSOs on a range of issues. Regular publications by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) have been the subject of intensive advocacy efforts directed at decision makers. CSOs have been involved in the development of the Growth and Poverty Alleviation Strategy Document (DCSRP), the implementation of the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the EITI, the process to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and deforestation (REDD), and projects on AIDS, water irrigation in rural areas, maternal and child health, and education. Generally, foreign donors require the government to consult CSOs in the implementation of their programs.

Congolese CSOs have built local support for their advocacy activities, and led many broad-based advocacy campaigns, including, in 2011, the Act for Transparency and Peace during Elections (AETA) campaign. The strong involvement of CSOs in this campaign institutionalized and legitimized the role of civil society in the electoral process and helped avoid a violent outcome to a tense electoral period, despite many CSO leaders noting deficiencies in the electoral process including organizational weaknesses of political partners and a lack

of resources available for civic education. Another important advocacy campaign known as the "rural movement campaign" was led by a coalition of CSO networks and platforms. This coalition successfully lobbied for the passage of the Law on the Fundamental Principles of Agriculture, which included principles favorable to agriculturalists such as increased participation of farmers in debates over the budget for the agricultural sector, and improved access to credit, agricultural inputs, and arable land.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5

CSOs provide a wide range of services in the areas of reproductive health, microfinance, nutrition, poverty alleviation, social rights, economic development, education, improved access to clean drinking water, the fight against childhood diseases, and maternal mortality. CSOs generally consult their constituents through forums, surveys, debates, and diagnostic studies to develop and implement field projects. Collaboration with beneficiaries is strongest in the renovation and construction of community infrastructure such as rural feeder roads. In these cases, the beneficiaries also often provide labor and contribute to ongoing maintenance. These methods of collaboration help Congolese CSOs respond well to the needs of the communities they serve.

Service Provision in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

CSOs increasingly produce publications, workshop reports, and analyses to distribute to other CSOs, universities, churches, and central and provincial government bodies. This includes, for example, the Rural Voices of the Congo journal published by CENADEP. CSOs generally distribute publications produced with donor funding for free or for less than their market value. CSOs sometimes sell products or services to generate revenue to support their primary activities. But generally, these activities are designed primarily to provide training and education. For example, a center for unemployed women provides training for women in sewing, but the organization charges very low prices for their products that do not fully cover their costs.

The government increasingly consults CSOs to develop and implement public policies regarding the provision of public services. CSOs generally feel that they are treated as partners in the elaboration of policy and provision of basic services, such as health, education, rural hygiene, and poverty alleviation.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6

Infrastructure in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and resource centers provide CSOs and government leaders with information, technology, education, literacy classes, Internet access, and technical assistance. However, these services are only available in larger cities. Generally ISOs and resources centers are supported by donor funding and do not charge for their services. Some ISOs also provide small sub-grants to beneficiary CSOs.

There are trainers available for issues such as CSO management and all CSOs have access to management training materials from organizations such as the Capacity Building Service for Civil Society and Local Communities in Central Africa (SERACOB), the Regional Program of Development Training and Exchanges (PREFED), CENADEP, the Network for the Promotion of Democracy and of Economic and Social Rights (PRODDES), and the National Council of NGOs (CNONG), which are dedicated to building the capacity of

CSOs. Organizations such as these regularly organize capacity-building trainings and project management workshops at the local and national levels. However, these trainings are most commonly conducted in French, and the training materials are rarely available in local languages. More specialized trainings are also available, but are frequently too expensive for typical CSOs. CSOs also have access to published monitoring and evaluation reports from completed projects.

Congolese CSOs working on similar issues have formed hundreds of networks to share information and help structure and expand the activities of its members. One effective network in DRC, for example, is made up of organizations working to improve children's rights.

Many CSOs develop formal or informal partnerships with local businesses, the government, and the media in order to achieve common goals. This is the case for the BRALIMA Foundation, for example, which is working with CSOs to improve sanitation in Kinshasa. However, leaders in many sectors are unaware of the advantages of forming partnerships with CSOs.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0

Congolese CSOs frequently pay the media to cover their activities. Because they are paying for this coverage, it tends to be generally positive. Community radio stations generally working in rural areas also dedicate time to covering CSO activities and do not request payment. The most professional media outlets, such as the BBC and RFI, call on civil society experts to discuss social and educational issues and do not request payment. However, mainstream, private media outlets', which are often affiliated with a political party, presentation of a CSO's activities can be colored by their perception of the CSO's political affiliation.

Public Image in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

	2009	2010	2011
1.0			
3.0			
	5.0	5.0	5.0
5.0			
7.0			

Generally, the beneficiaries of CSO activities have positive views of CSOs. However, the general public does not always have a favorable opinion of CSOs because they believe CSOs receive too much public funding that they use for their own benefit. This can be attributable largely to the irresponsible behavior and opaque management of certain CSOs, which leads the public to believe that this is the general tendency.

The government and the private sector generally form opinions on CSOs based on whether civil society is supportive of their activities.

CSOs usually produce reports solely for their donors, though the law requires that they send a copy of activity reports to the ministry overseeing them and to the Ministry of Planning. There is a code of conduct that has been established for CSOs during a national forum, but this code is not monitored or enforced in any way.

ETHIOPIA

2011 Scores for Ethiopia

Dimension	Score
CSO Sustainability	5.6
Legal Environment	6.5
Organizational Capacity	5.1
Financial Viability	6.1
Advocacy	6.1
Service Provision	4.9
Infrastructure	5.5
Public Image	5.1

Sustainability Enhanced — Sustainability Evolving — Sustainability Impeded

Capital: Addis Ababa

Government Type: Federal Republic

Population: 93,815,992 (July 2012 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $1,100

Human Development Index: 174

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.6

The civil society sector in Ethiopia emerged in its modern form in response to a series of natural disasters in the early 1970s. Consequently, the majority of CSOs in Ethiopia focus on relief and service delivery. The sector showed remarkable growth in numbers, strength, diversity, and geographical coverage in the 1990s after the current government came to power and ended the socialist political system.

In 2009, the Government of Ethiopia adopted new legislation governing CSOs, which classified the sector into two broad categories: charities and societies. According to this law, charities are established for the benefit of third parties, while societies are established for the benefit of members. In addition, based on sources of income, membership constituency, and place of registration, the law further divides the sector into Ethiopian charities or societies, Ethiopian residents' charities or societies, and foreign charities. For a CSO to be considered an Ethiopian charity or society, 90 percent of its income must come from domestic sources. Only Ethiopian charities or societies can work on rights-related issues such as human, women's, children's and disabled rights; access to justice; and conflict resolution. By the end of 2011, a total of 2,319 charities and societies were registered with the Federal Charities and Societies Agency (CSA). This number does not include CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), or faith-based organizations (FBOs) working at the regional level or below, for which there are no statistics.

CSO Sustainability in Ethiopia

2009	2010	2011
5.5	5.5	5.6

Only 5 percent of CSOs are registered as Ethiopian charities, which are allowed to work on advocacy issues but are limited to mobilizing resources from domestic sources. Ethiopian

societies, which are established mainly to protect the interests of their members using local resources, represent 13 percent of the sector; this group includes business associations, professional associations, and sport clubs. About 63 percent of registered CSOs are Ethiopian residents' charities, which work for the benefit of others with both foreign and domestic funds. Ethiopian residents' societies, which are established to protect the interests of their members but can access foreign funds, constitute only 3 percent of the total of registered CSOs. Foreign charities represent 11 percent of the sector.

In September 2011, the CSA issued seven directives that severely limit CSO organizational capacity, financial viability, efficient infrastructure, and advocacy activity. The Directive for the Administration of Project and Administrative Cost Utilization, for example, limits network organizations to serving strictly as funding channels, meaning that all funding they receive must be distributed to their members. As a result, networks can no long engage in any project implementation, thereby eliminating their roles in building capacity, promoting ethics, voicing common concerns, and facilitating information and technology sharing. The directives, some of which apply retroactively, were issued without any consultation with CSOs.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.5

The 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) and the Regulation of the Council of Ministers govern CSO registration. The CSP requires all CSOs to register and obtain permission for their activities. If an organization fails to register within three months of formation, it is considered an unlawful organization and is terminated. The law has different requirements for an international organization, which must produce an authenticated certificate of registration, demonstrate the board's resolution to open a branch office in Ethiopia, and obtain letters of

Legal Environment in Ethiopia

recommendation from the organization's home country's Ethiopian Embassy and the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The registration process is cumbersome and slow. The CSA, which is in charge of handling CSO registration and oversight, sometime acts outside the law. For example, it denied registration for organizations working on child adoption with no legal grounds. In addition, the CSA is not adequately staffed with competent professionals.

There is no appeals process for organizations that have their registration applications rejected. It takes human rights and advocacy organizations longer to register than development or service delivery organizations.

The current legislation outlines the requirements for internal management, permissible activities, registration procedures, financial reporting, fundraising, income generating activities, and dissolution of CSOs. According to the proclamation, organizations that receive more than 10 percent of their funding from foreign sources are not permitted to work on human rights, gender equality, the rights of disabled persons and children, conflict resolution, or access to justice.

During the re-registration period following the adoption of the CSP in 2009, the CSA froze the accounts of two prominent human rights organizations, the Ethiopian Women Lawyers' Association and the Human Rights Council, on the grounds that as Ethiopian charities registered to work on rights issues, they cannot use foreign funds. The organizations appealed the decisions, arguing that the funds seized were from grants received before the passage of the new law and that some of the funds were raised locally, but the Board upheld the decision. In 2011, the Federal High Court similarly upheld the decision on further appeal. Consequently, the two organizations have been forced to downsize their staff and operational activities.

The CSP also allows CSOs to be dissolved on various grounds, including for "unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare, or security." These terms are not defined, opening up implementation to arbitrary application and abuse by government officials and civil servants.

In September 2011, the CSA issued seven directives, including the Directives for the Administration of Project and Administrative Cost Utilization; Income Generating Activities; Submission of Audit and Activities Report; Establishment of Endowment, Trusts, and Charitable Institutions; Conducting Public Collections; Establishment of Charitable Committees; and Liquidation, Transfer, and Removal of Property of Charitable Organizations. The directives, some of which apply retroactively, focus primarily on resource mobilization and utilization, permissible sources of funding, and the establishment and roles of different types of charities. The directives were issued without CSO consultation or input . Although it is too early to determine their impact, the directives have important negative implications for the sector. In particular, they strengthen the CSA's control and further restrict CSO access to funding, especially for consortia.

The Directive for the Administration of Project and Administrative Cost Utilization requires that administrative costs be kept at or below 30 percent of an organization's total budget. This will severely limit CSOs' ability to pay permanent and temporary staff and continue to function, given the directive's broad definition of administrative costs, which includes parking, electricity, telephone, fax, water, printing, office rent, taxes, Internet, vehicle procurement and maintenance, audit services, lawyers, monitoring and evaluation costs, and any training related cost except per diem to trainees and material production. In addition, salaries for officers, auditors, administrative, finance, program and project directors, property administrators, cashiers, accountants, security personnel, drivers, human resources managers, clerks, cleaners, gardeners, and secretaries are considered to be administrative costs.

CSOs are not subject to income tax on grants, but are required to pay transaction taxes such as Value Added Taxes (VAT) and Turn Over Taxes, a 10 percent tax imposed on those not subject to VAT. Both individual and institutional donations to organizations working in health, education, and emergency relief are tax-deductible.

The CSP gives CSOs the right to engage in income generating activities, but stipulates restrictive conditions. CSOs must get permission from the CSA, the activity must be in line with the organization's mission, and profits can only be used for project activities, not for administrative costs. CSOs are not legally allowed to compete for government contracts or procurements unless they have special permission from the CSA to engage in income generating activities. According to the new Directive on Income Generating Activities, in order to obtain this permission, an organization must demonstrate that the business activity is directly related to the objectives for which the organization was established; the organization is carrying out its activities according to its objectives for which it was registered and licensed; the proposed business activity is ethical; and the organization has demonstrated a strong performance in carrying out its general activities.

There are lawyers in major cities who can provide legal services to CSOs. Since 2009, the Law Faculty of Addis Ababa University has offered a course in non-profit association law.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1

Organizational Capacity in Ethiopia

Membership is primarily a formality in order for CSOs to be eligible for registration. Due to lack of capacity or willingness on the part of CSOs, constituency building remains a major organizational challenge. Consequently, CSOs' relationships with both beneficiaries and members are weak, and the participation of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, and evaluation of most CSO projects is very poor.

While most CSOs have mission statements, financial

constraints lead many CSOs to work in areas outside of their missions. As a result of financial constraints and a lack funding for long-term projects, the majority of CSOs do not have long-term strategic plans.

The CSP requires a CSO to have a governing structure that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of the different organs of the organization. However, both board and staff members lack the required commitment to adhere to their roles, and board members rarely participate in governance or fundraising. Board members are selected from among the general membership and are accountable to the General Assembly of the organization.

The culture of volunteerism in the CSO sector is still underdeveloped, and most CSOs use permanent paid staff. As discussed above, the Directive for the Administration of Project and Administrative Cost Utilization will greatly limit an organization's ability to hire permanent staff and continue to function.

The CSP requires that each CSO has an auditor to monitor the financial and proprietary administration of the organization. The majority of CSOs use accountants and other professionals as needed. For the most part, only international organizations use the services of lawyers.

With the exception of newly established organizations and CBOs, most CSOs have modern technical equipment such as computers, telephones, fax machines, and Internet services.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.1

CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funds from foreign sources. The lack of volunteers, strong constituencies, and local philanthropy means that most CSOs depend on a single source of funding.

The CSP requires CSOs to have sound financial management systems, independent financial audits, and annual reports, and most organizations adhere to these stipulations. However, few organizations make their audits or annual reports publicly available.

Financial Viability in Ethiopia

The CSP allows CSOs to engage in income generating activities, but the stipulations are restrictive, and made even more so by the new Directive on Income Generating Activities. CSOs are not allowed to engage in businesses that are not related to their organizational objectives, and profits from business activities can be used only for project activities and not administrative expenses. An organization must have separate books and a bank account for the business, as well as a dedicated manager and accountant.

Membership fees, when charged, are nominal, and even then, members often do not pay. This is due, in part, to the fact that many organizations lack a strategy to develop membership loyalty.

In order for CSOs to contract with the government or businesses, they must have a business license and permission from the CSA, which is obtained by application.

The 2011 Directive on Conducting Public Collections (fundraising) determines the guidelines for door-to-door public collections. The directive prohibits public collections in and around religious places or cemeteries and stipulates that the CSA determines how, where, when, and for how long public collection activities may be conducted. The directive makes public collections a last resort for organizations to meet their objectives. Consequently, organizations that have other funding sources, particularly foreign sources, are not allowed to engage in public collections. This limits opportunities for CSOs to diversify their resources and steeply curbs essential domestic resource mobilization.

The new Utilization of Project and Administrative Costs directive also poses challenges to the financial viability of CSOs. According to the Directive, CSOs may only use a maximum of 30 percent of their budgets for administrative costs; the other 70 percent must go toward projects. The directive defines administrative costs broadly, and includes consultancy fees, audit fees, costs for printing, telephone and internet, car purchase and maintenance, fees for monitoring and evaluation, most training costs, salaries for program and project coordinators, and more. This broad definition makes it extremely difficult for an organization to operate within the 30/70 parameters.

ADVOCACY: 6.1

Advocacy in Ethiopia

The CSP denies advocacy organizations access to foreign funding, greatly reducing the number of CSOs working on human rights, gender equality, the rights of children and the disabled, conflict resolution, and access to justice. The new Directives on Income Generating Activities and Public Collections severely restrict advocacy organizations from engaging in these activities. It is particularly difficult for advocacy organizations to find income generating activities that coincide with their missions.

The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, a government organ, has been collaborating on projects with advocacy and human rights organizations and universities to promote human rights, access to justice, and gender equality. This innovative arrangement has helped human rights organizations access foreign funds through the Commission. However, these funds are too limited to fully address organizational needs.

Because of the CSP's restrictions on advocacy CSOs, there is currently no concrete advocacy effort toward legal reform. Although there were initially plans to challenge the constitutionality of the CSP and advocate for legal amendments, these did not materialize.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.9

CSOs provide services in a variety of fields including health, education, relief, food security, water, agriculture, environment, and energy. Service providers attract huge sums of money to the country and facilitate the transfer of technology, knowledge, and skills to local communities and the government. CSOs engage in government capacity-building activities by providing infrastructure support and training, particularly to local governments.

Service Provision in Ethiopia

CSOs receive little financial or in-kind support from the communities in which they work. Due to a lack of capacity or knowledge, CSOs do not employ cost-recovery approaches to service delivery.

The Ethiopian government's 2010-2015 Millennium Development Goal plan, the Growth and Transformation Plan, guides political, economic, and social policy. The Plan appreciates "the expansion in the number of development activities of CSOs and NGOs and their increasing engagement, which can both contribute resources, more implementation capacity, and innovative approaches to solving development challenges." The document recognizes the role of CSOs in democratization and good governance; as well as the role of NGOs, which are membership organizations such as youth and women's associations, in economic development, social welfare and service provision. However, it fails to acknowledge CSOs' monitoring roles, particularly in government accountability.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.5

Infrastructure in Ethiopia

	2009	2010	2011
	5.3	5.3	5.5

Thirty-six networks address issues such as poverty, education, health, environment, gender, agriculture, HIV/AIDS, and disabled persons. The networks facilitate capacity building, information sharing, and technology transfer. However, the 2011 Directive on Administration of Project and Administrative Cost Utilization states that consortia cannot run programs and therefore cannot have operational costs, essentially ending networks' ability to function. The actual effects of this directive remain to be seen.

Though not legally registered, a consultative forum known as the Forum for Networks Harmonization and Enabling Environment was established in December 2011 with the objective of harmonizing the activities of and improving the relationships among network organizations. The Forum involves network organizations working in different sectors and is hosted by the Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Associations (CCRDA). To date, the Forum has formulated its by-laws and established an executive committee to facilitate its future work.

The Directive on the Establishment of Consortiums states that organizations receiving international funds cannot form networks with advocacy and human rights organizations, which must raise all of their funding from local sources. This restriction effectively prevents the establishment of a single national organization representing the interests of the entire civil society sector.

In the past, international organizations acted as both intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and sub-granters. However, in 2011, the CSA started to prohibit ISOs from sub-granting to local organizations, stating that they should implement projects directly, despite the fact that there is no law prohibiting ISOs from acting as donors. No local community foundations provide grants to CSOs to address locally-identified needs and projects. There are no institutions specifically established to provide special training on CSO management, although some network organizations do so.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.1

The relationship between the media and the CSO sector remains weak. CSOs' fear of government reprisal and lack of outreach experience impedes them from using the media effectively to promote their activities. Few CSOs, particularly those working in service areas, work closely with media professionals; in fact, the majority prefer working in low profile.

Public Image in Ethiopia

	2009	2010	2011
	5.1	5.1	5.1

The public perceives CSOs as enriching their participants through per-diem and transportation allowances. CSOs have weak public outreach skills and have been ineffective at changing public opinion, in part because CSOs and constituents do not work closely together on project design, evaluation, or implementation.

With the exception of a few service organizations, CSOs do not widely use social media to promote their activities or change public perception, in part because Internet access is very limited.

CSOs have been unable to improve significantly their relationship with the government, as evidenced by the content of the new directives and the lack of CSO participation in their development. The CSA usually takes a dictatorial approach towards CSOs. CSOs, in turn, have not found a way to collectively challenge the CSA.

CSOs do not receive support from the business sector.

Apart from brief mentions in policy documents, the government rarely acknowledges the role of CSOs in resource mobilization or as sources of expertise and information.

It is difficult for Ethiopian CSOs to establish a strong nationwide self-regulatory system because of the restrictions of the Directive on the Establishment of Consortiums, which prohibits the formation of networks between organizations that receive foreign funds and organizations that receive local funds.

GABON

2011 Scores for Gabon

Indicator	Score
CSO Sustainability	5.4
Legal Environment	6.1
Organizational Capacity	5.5
Financial Viability	6.1
Advocacy	5.1
Service Provision	5.1
Infrastructure	5.2
Public Image	5.0

1.0 — Sustainability Enhanced
3.0 — Sustainability Evolved
5.0 / 7.0 — Sustainability Impeded

Capital: Libreville

Government Type: Republic; Multiparty Presidential Regime

Population: 1,608,321 (July 2012 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $16,400

Human Development Index: 106

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.4

CSO sustainability in Gabon was largely stagnant in 2011. No progress was made toward improving the legal environment as the revision of Law 35/62 on Associations was postponed indefinitely. CSOs also faced a tense political environment due to the legislative elections held in 2011. When the government refused to implement a biometric identification system for voters, the opposition boycotted the elections and a coalition of CSOs led a movement called "Enough is Enough" to demand fair elections. Through this movement, civil society actors took a clear position on a political debate for the first time in Gabon, and the coalition submitted a list of thirteen demands for transparent elections. However, relatively few CSOs participated in this movement, while many more remained silent due to fear of the government, and pressure and intimidation.

The movement also exacerbated tensions within civil society. One distinctive feature of Gabonese civil society is the division between pro-government CSOs and more independent CSOs. While CSOs are theoretically not linked to any particular political party, they frequently align themselves with a political party to promote certain causes. Pro-government CSOs are formed by somebody in power or

CSO Sustainability in Gabon

Year	Score
2009	5.4
2010	5.4
2011	5.4

somebody looking for a patron in power. They generally benefit from some governmental favors, while those more critical of the government receive threats of dissolution or personal threats to the directors.

Divisions grew in 2011 between pro-government and independent CSOs. The increasing conflict between these two groups impeded the emergence of a strong and independent civil society. The government became increasingly hostile toward CSOs, especially those that challenged government policy. CSOs were only tolerated when the international community made aid conditional on their involvement in programs.

As CSOs come to understand their roles and responsibilities, they are working to become more professional in their staff, office facilities, management, and technical skills. CSOs are also beginning to collaborate more and form coalitions and platforms to pursue advocacy campaigns, as evidenced by the "Enough is Enough" movement and the environmental platform, Environment Gabon. Certain coalitions and platforms are beginning to develop strategic plans.

In addition to conflict with the government, CSOs are impeded by the scarcity of funding sources, which limits their activities and prevents them from hiring permanent staff and procuring the equipment required to function properly. This is due, in part to Gabon's designation as a middle income country, which limits the amount of international funding available to the country in general and to CSOs in particular.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1

The regulatory and legislative framework governing CSO operations, Law 35/62 of December 10, 1962, did not improve in 2011. In 2010, the Strengthening Non-State Actors in Gabon Program (PROGREANE) proposed a revision to this law that would have increased CSOs' autonomy. The proposal would have reduced the administrative procedures and declarations CSOs are required to make, recognized a special "NGO" status, widened permissible activities, and provided CSOs with new

Legal Environment in Gabon

protections from being dissolved. No progress was made in 2011 toward passing this revision to the law, even though the current law is no longer well adapted to Gabonese CSOs and the role they play in society. For example, the legal guidelines concerning internal management, the scope of authorized activities, and dissolution of CSOs are all ambiguous, which gives authorities room to handle CSOs arbitrarily, and leaves CSOs with little legal recourse against harassment, other than a direct appeal to the Council of State.

Many CSOs working on a diverse range of issues faced increased pressure from the government due to the conflict caused by the "Enough is Enough" movement and a dispute with national education labor union. CSOs that criticize the government face explicit or veiled threats of dissolution and in some cases their leaders face threats of physical harm. One of the most striking examples of government harassment in 2011 was the suspension in January of the salaries of the nine leaders of the National Convention of Unions in the Education Sector (CONASYSED) in retaliation for a strike led by CONASYSED. The nine leaders responded by holding a hunger strike from September 2, 2011 to September 18, 2011 until the archbishop of Libreville intervened to negotiate an end to the suspension of their salaries in exchange for an end to the strike. However, many of CONASYSED's original demands were not addressed.

While international organizations are exempt from paying VAT and certain custom duties, national CSOs are not granted any tax exemption under the law. While national CSOs can theoretically get tax exemptions if they obtain "public interest" status, few CSOs have this status because the process for obtaining this status is very cumbersome. When CSOs obtain a tax identification number, the taxing agency's software does not even have an option to register CSOs or not-for-profit organizations, so CSOs are registered as for-profit businesses. However, CSOs very rarely pay any taxes beyond the social charges for their employees, and therefore risk being charged back taxes.

It is still difficult for CSOs to obtain expert legal counsel because legal services are expensive and local lawyers are not always competent. There is no specialized training available for lawyers in the laws regulating CSOs, and few lawyers fully understand these laws and the functioning of CSOs.

There are still no laws concerning CSOs generating income from the provision of goods and services, but an increasing number of organizations now bid on contracts and provide goods and services to the government and other foreign and domestic funders.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.5

Organizational Capacity in Gabon

Most Gabonese CSOs have defined missions in their bylaws, which are based on the goals of their founding members. Gabonese CSOs understand the importance of strategic planning, both for programming in their areas of expertise and on broader national issues, but the implementation of strategic planning varies. In many cases, CSOs do not have the knowledge and funding to undertake extensive planning exercises, and they have difficultly planning far in advance, particularly because few funders will finance a three- or five-year plan.

Gabonese CSOs are limited by their inability to retain permanent staff. Because of the nature of their funding, CSOs generally hire employees on short-term contracts that cover the period of performance for a particular project, and rely heavily on volunteers. Because of the limited funding available to them, CSOs also cannot purchase modern office equipment. Many organizations share office space and some are forced to use cybercafés to access the Internet.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.1

If there is one threat that hangs over Gabonese CSOs like Damocles' Sword, it is financial viability. Since 2010, there has been no improvement in the availability of funding, especially at the local level. The tense socio-political situation surrounding the election caused many donors to abstain from launching funding opportunities that would be available to CSOs. The closing of PROGREANE in 2010 also reduced funding opportunities for CSOs. The Sylvia Bongo

Financial Viability in Gabon

Ondimba Foundation was founded by Gabon's first lady in 2011, in part to fill this gap. Its stated goals are to fund CSO activities in three domains: youth education, maternal and child healthcare, and professional

development for marginalized populations. In 2011, this organization issued its first request for proposals, but selection was conducted in a very opaque fashion and few CSOs were able to access these funds.

CSOs were also hindered by the government's shift in funding priorities in 2011. Almost all government funding was directed toward the preparations for the African Cup of Nations football tournament in 2012 and the organization of the legislative elections scheduled for December 17, 2011.

The government rarely issues procurements that CSOs can bid on, so the most financially viable CSOs focus their efforts on seeking external, international sources of funding. The largest sources of funding are certain private organizations, but foreign donors also occasionally make funding available to CSOs. However, the international financial crisis and the consequent reduction of international donations have heavily impacted the sector. There are very few local sources of philanthropy available to CSOs. In the rare cases when an individual donates to a CSO, it generally is for the purposes of gaining good publicity personally or for a political campaign. This kind of funding may be made available, for example, to organizations that organize sports for youth, which will in turn frequently publicize donors' names. Outside of a few well-funded CSOs, most CSOs have no systems in place for financial management.

ADVOCACY: 5.1

Advocacy in Gabon

The events of 2011 helped CSOs understand the impact that they can have on public debate and that policymakers increasingly monitored their actions, even though institutional frameworks for dialogue were not implemented. This year, CSOs participated in a number or forums and working groups on issues including family planning, sexually transmitted diseases, sanitation, and HIV/AIDs.

CSOs built widespread enthusiasm in 2011 through several high-profile advocacy campaigns on socio-political issues. In January, the Ministry of the Interior dissolved one of the main opposition parties, the National Union. After the Council of State confirmed the decision in July, a coalition of CSOs that fight for good governance and the protection of human rights initiated the Enough is Enough movement. The movement united a number of leaders from opposition parties with civil society leaders to demand transparency in the electoral process by implementing several new practices including the use of a biometric identification system. The coalition submitted a list of thirteen demands for transparent elections and led an advocacy and awareness-raising campaign throughout the country that successfully persuaded people to abstain from participating in the December legislative elections in order to protest the government's failure to implement their recommendation. The voter abstention rate was nearly 85 percent. The Civil Society Network for Good Governance in Gabon (ROLBG) and the National Observatory for Democracy (OND) also continued an ongoing campaign since the presidential elections in 2009 to allow civil society to participate more fully in the country's political life.

Throughout the year, student unions and unions in the health, educational, energy, and agriculture sectors among others held strikes for better working and living conditions.

The situation for lobbying has not improved from previous years, and some CSOs' access to government officials has been damaged by their association with the opposition political party through the Enough is

Enough movement. In 2011, CSOs contributed to the creation of proposed revisions to several laws including the environmental code and the forestry code, but all such bills were stalled due to the upcoming elections.

SERVICE PROVISION: 5.1

Despite the tense political situation in 2011, CSOs continued to provide services to the public. The range of products and services offered did not change significantly. They consisted primarily of information and outreach campaigns, trainings, and legal aid. However, the tensions from the Enough is Enough movement and strikes created internal cleavages among CSOs and animosity in the government against certain CSOs which negatively impacted CSOs' ability to deliver services. Declines in funding available to CSOs also hindered their ability to provide services.

Service Provision in Gabon

CSOs are improving their ability to respond to local needs as local communities and particularly urban populations are becoming increasingly aware of the missions and objectives of CSOs. However, many still do not agree with the practices of CSOs that publicly criticize private companies and the government.

CSOs generally are not able to recover the costs of the services they provide. While the government recognizes the role that CSOs play in service delivery, the financial support it provides CSOs does not reflect this. Grants made to environmental CSOs, for example, are much too small and irregular, and the selection of grantees is widely considered to be unfair.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.2

Infrastructure in Gabon

CSO infrastructure deteriorated with the end of the PROGREANE program, which had provided support to CSOs and worked to create a federation of CSOs. The Sylvia Bongo Ondimba Foundation does not fill this role as successfully, but it did recruit the French organization the Network of European NGOs for Agriculture, Commerce, the Environment, and Development (RONGEAD) to provide trainings for CSOs. However, many opinion leaders in Gabonese civil society believe the foundation is used to control CSOs. The few CSOs that receive its services are generally pro-government organizations, which are sometimes labeled by opposing CSOs as the "civil society service." The Sylvia Bongo Ondimba Foundation also focuses more narrowly on particular sectors. As of the end of the 2011, there were still no other intermediary support organizations, CSO resource centers, or grant-making organizations at the local level.

CSOs continue to share information through their networks, platforms, other movements, and traditional communication channels. These channels include formal meetings and forums as well as informal gatherings, and online mailing lists. In 2011, CSOs also used social media networks, especially Facebook, on a wider scale, particularly to denounce human rights violations.

Apart from the services offered by the Sylvia Bongo Ondimba Foundation, training opportunities have not improved. Organizations such as the Center for Women's Organizations in Gabon (CENAF) are limited in the number of organizations they can train due to financial constraints. While there are experts in Gabon on CSO management and administration, there are few training programs or academic programs available that are specifically intended for CSOs.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0

The state and private media's coverage of CSOs were biased by the tense political climate in 2011. The state media hold closely to the positions of the government and fail to cover the activities of CSOs that criticize the government. On the other hand, private media, especially those supporting the opposition parties, covered anti-government CSO activities positively and avoided covering pro-government CSOs' activities. However, there are also private media stations close to the government. Generally, CSOs must pay for visible and positive media coverage of their activities.

The concept of civil society and its role are not well understood in Gabon. But the public still perceives CSO actions positively, especially after the emergence of the Enough is Enough movement, which increasingly helped populations air grievances they had not been able to express publicly in the past. However, the media did not comprehensively cover this movement and some sectors of the population still have a skewed perception of CSOs.

The increased visibility of these movements has complicated the government's perception of those CSOs that it increasingly considers to be linked to the political opposition. The debate is no longer about technical questions regarding the recognition of CSOs' competencies; CSOs are now advocating for institutional change. For the first time, CSOs have become more critical of the government and adamant about improving governance in Gabon.

With the emergence of social media, CSOs are developing a wider range of tools and communication support systems to publicize their activities to journalists, policy makers, and the public.

Internally, CSOs have not developed a code of ethics or any other system of self-regulation. The only agreements in place are a few memoranda of understanding among some platforms and networks. Activity reports continue to be produced by CSOs and made available to partners and other interested parties.

THE GAMBIA

2011 Scores for The Gambia

Indicator	Score
CSO Sustainability	5.7
Legal Environment	6.1
Organizational Capacity	5.9
Financial Viability	6.5
Advocacy	5.9
Service Provision	5.0
Infrastructure	5.4
Public Image	5.0

Sustainability Enhanced — Sustainability Evolved — Sustainability Impeded

Capital: Banjul

Government Type: Republic

Population: 1,840,454 (July 2011 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $2,000

Human Development Index: 168

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.7

The 2011 UNDP Human Development Report classifies The Gambia as a least-developed country. Since gaining independence in 1965, the country has had a multiparty democratic system that was briefly interrupted by a military coup in 1994. In 2007, the second republic was ushered in. Since then, the head of the junta Yahya Jammeh continues to win presidential elections amidst allegations of unfair practices from both local and international organizations. The major challenge facing the country is in the area of respect for human rights and adherence to good governance principles and practices. Arbitrary arrests, detentions without trial, and abuses of power by the government occur regularly.

Unemployment is high, and according to the World Bank Doing Business Report, the country has the second highest total tax rate in the world. Social services are limited, expensive, and erratic, and corruption is rampant.

Civil society activity started in The Gambia prior to the founding of the republic in 1970. Informal self-help groups, women's associations, youth groups, and community associations are integral to Gambian culture, and historically have been found in all Gambian communities. The Gambia Family Planning Association, spearheaded by a young Gambian doctor in 1968, was one of the first formal organizations that sought to address social and economic conditions in the country. Within ten years, more CSOs emerged, including ActionAid International (AAITG), the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), and Catholic Relief Services. Since then, CSOs have continued to proliferate in practically all aspects of development, including education, health, agriculture, community development, trainings, HIV/AIDS, and the fight against harmful traditional practices and violence against women.

In order to be classified as a charitable organization, an organization must register as a charity with the Ministry of Justice. The number of registered charities is unknown, but is estimated to be in the thousands. To register as an NGO, an organization must also register with the NGO Affairs Agency. There are about 125 registered NGOs, seventy-three of which comprise The Association of Non-Governmental Organizations in The Gambia (TANGO), the leading NGO umbrella organization in the country. For the purposes of this report, CSOs refers to both charities and NGOs.

The overall operating environment for CSOs is mixed. While registration is straightforward, work on certain issues, such as the promotion of good governance and human rights issues like combating female genital mutilation, can be extremely difficult for CSOs.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1

In order to register as a charitable society, an organization must submit a copy of its constitution and pay a small fee to the Ministry of Justice, which then issues a certificate of incorporation under the Companies Act of 1955. In order to be classified as an NGO, an organization must register with the NGO Affairs Agency under NGO Decree 81 of 1996. Registration requirements include drafting a constitution, opening a bank account, acquiring a tax identification number, and identifying officers, a board of directors, and office space. Furthermore, the NGO Decree and TANGO membership require that organizations submit periodic activity and financial reports, work plans, and budgets. These requirements are generally not met, and enforcement mechanisms are weak. Although the registration and reporting processes are more stringent, NGOs do not receive any specific benefits and many organizations choose to operate as charities.

In 2010, the government began the process of transforming the NGO Decree into an act of parliament. However, the proposed bill contains severe provisions that will hamper the operation of NGOs. For example, NGOs would be required to re-register annually. Both the decree and the proposed bill require NGO activities to align with the policies and priorities of the government. Under the bill, the Agency would have arbitrary powers to close any NGO, as per Article 18, which stipulates that, "if the NGO's activities are found not to be in conformity with Government's development agenda or detrimental to the integrity of the Government and the peace and stability of the country, the Government shall revoke this Protocol of Accord".

In order to operate in some sectors such as education, CSOs are sometimes required to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the relevant ministry. In most cases this is a formality, but it does assist in building partnership and fostering closer collaboration.

Monitoring mechanisms required by the decree and the proposed bill include annual submissions of work plans, budgets, audited accounts, and activity reports by NGOs to the Agency. Failure to comply could lead to proscription. Generally, CSOs operate without hindrance from the government or local communities, although CSOs working on human rights and good governance issues have faced harassment, such as arrests, detention, and threats of closure. Consequently many CSOs engage in self-censorship to avoid confrontation with the government. In 2003, ActionAid International was given forty-eight hours to close down for implementing civic awareness activities in poor and rural communities. This year, the Ministry of Finance sacked the entire board of directors and the executive director of the Pro-Poor Advocacy Group (Pro-PAG).

Sedition laws potentially criminalize any author of material that negatively portrays the government or the president. The Public Order Act controls demonstrations and criminalizes any activity or message that the Minister of Interior deems harmful to public morality and decency.

While Gambian lawyers have the capacity to defend CSOs, a climate of fear has made it increasingly difficult to obtain legal representation. Risks include the possibility of trumped-up charges resulting in jail time. There have also been cases of physical violence, such as the shooting of Ousman Sillah, a leading lawyer who was shot in 2003 while defending a rival of the president.

The Gambia has the second highest total tax rate in the world. Foreign funds and materials, as well as salaries of expatriate CSO staff, are not taxed. However, incomes of local staff are taxed, and local donations are not tax-deductible, so the private sector provides little support to CSOs.

Because they are not-for-profit organizations, CSOs cannot compete for contracts, but they can receive grants for service delivery from donor agencies or the government.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.9

CSOs lack the financial resources to build constituencies even though they have identified targets or beneficiaries. Even CSOs that have existed for decades do not have sustained constituencies.

Because of funding challenges, many CSOs develop strategic plans only in order to raise funds or satisfy donor demands; these plans are not followed strictly. CSOs generally have clearly defined visions and missions, which can be found in their constitutions and are followed strictly.

Between 2008 and 2010, TANGO worked with fifty organizations to improve their management and governance systems and tools through the Empowering CSOs through Capacity Building and Network Linkages (EXCEL) Project. The project revealed that many CSOs have board members who also serve as staff. Most CSOs are small local organizations with limited understanding of CSO operations; many began as voluntary groups whose operational and governance systems and structures arose in an ad hoc fashion. Consequently, founding members are usually selected as board members, staff, or both, and remain in their positions for a long time. A chairperson or a few people often who work closely with the executive director to the total exclusion of other members usually dominate boards. While general member meetings are held periodically, members are not supplied with comprehensive activity or financial reports. Members, in turn, do not exercise the kind of scrutiny necessary to ensure transparency, accountability, or performance. However, the situation is improving as awareness about the roles and responsibilities of board members is increasing.

The basic staffing structure for a CSO includes an executive director, a program manager, program officers, an accountant, assistants, cleaners, gardeners, and a security person. Local CSOs usually have very limited staff, consisting of just an executive director, a program officer, and an accounts officer. Working conditions and incentives vary within the CSO community. More established organizations offer better tools and incentives than smaller ones. Staffing is often short-term, dictated by the availability of projects and funds.

Most local organizations are founded by volunteers or in response to a particular issue. Many CSOs engage volunteers, who are usually young graduates from secondary or tertiary institutions serving as project assistants or doing administrative work. There are also volunteers from foreign organizations such as the British Voluntary Services Overseas or the US Peace Corps.

TANGO and the NGO Affairs Agency require NGOs to organize annual general meetings and submit annual reports, audited accounts, and activity and financial reports. NGOs often lack the funds to conduct these meetings and produce these reports on time, which affects their ability to raise funds. This situation is further aggravated by the fact that The Gambia has only five auditing firms, which cater to the public and private sectors in addition to the CSO community, and therefore charge high fees that many organizations cannot afford.

Funding challenges limit CSOs' capacity to obtain office materials and equipment such as computers, photocopiers, furniture, scanners, vehicles, and basic office supplies.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.5

CSOs largely obtain their funding from traditional donors such as the United Nations, the European Union (EU), and the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFiD), as well as from foreign

embassies, mainly the United States and Taiwan. Most foreign donors only fund on a project-by-project basis, hindering CSO sustainability. The global economic crisis has diminished international funding opportunities, despite the fact that there is an increased demand for services. Foreign funding has also diminished as the interest of international organizations in issues such as HIV/AIDS, climate change, and illegal migration has declined.

Because the first CSOs in The Gambia were international organizations with large vehicles, a range of free services, and expatriate staff, there is a historical public misperception that CSOs are wealthy. In addition, CSOs receive limited financial contributions from the public because they lack strong constituencies and there is widespread poverty. However, CSOs receive substantial in-kind support such as voluntary labor, land, and general office upkeep from the communities in which they operate.

Obtaining local funding is a challenge because private sector firms and other philanthropic organizations donate either directly to the government or to communities, rarely to CSOs. Therefore, CSOs focus solely on international funding to sustain themselves and provide development services and activities. In addition, the lack of tax incentives hinders the growth of corporate philanthropy.

Neither the government nor the private sector gives contracts to CSOs. However, both the government and development organizations provide funding for service provision, a portion of which is allocated for general operating costs.

Some organizations rent out facilities or sell newspapers or food items to cover some overhead costs. As not-for-profit organizations, however, they cannot engage in full commercial ventures. Many CSOs train constituents to engage in some form of farming or horticulture, such as beekeeping, handicrafts, jewelry making, or the production of other personal and household items. However, given the high levels of unemployment and poverty in The Gambia, profits from the sale of these items usually go to support the craftspeople rather than back to the organization.

Most CSOs are membership-based, but membership dues are too small to fund even overhead costs, let alone programming activities. Some membership organizations such as TANGO, Pro-PAG, and the Network against Gender-Based Violence (NGBV) require annual membership subscriptions; others such as Child Protection Alliance (CPA) and the Gender Action Team (GAT) do not.

CSOs have limited capacity in financial management and tend to lack the internal control systems that ensure transparency and accountability in the procurement or use of funds. Over the years, TANGO has conducted training in financial management, monitoring and evaluation, proposal and report writing techniques, communications and advocacy, and project management, to make CSOs more sustainable and transparent.

ADVOCACY: 5.9

The environment for advocacy is mixed: some government agencies are amenable to engaging with CSOs on an informal basis, while others, including the president, are difficult to approach because of bureaucracy and availability. At the local level, CSOs frequently collaborate with the Ministries of Education and Agriculture, among others. Because they recognize and appreciate the role and contribution of CSOs, these departments schedule various policy forums and technical meetings with CSOs and include CSOs as sitting members of project and technical steering committees. This collaboration is also possible because key policymakers in these institutions have CSO work experience. For example, the current Minister of Education was previously the Executive Director of TANGO, and the current Minister of Youth and Sports was a Program Officer of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP Gambia).

Government institutions, particularly the Ministries of Education, Agriculture, Health, Finance, and Economic Affairs and Trade, form important partnerships with CSOs, including the Education for All Network (EFANet), CPA, the Forum for African Educationalists, Gambia Chapter, and TANGO. At the

national level, the Ministry of Education has a permanent consultative forum in which many CSOs participate; their views are actually heard and influence policy and decisions. Pro-PAG has also been cooperating with the National Assembly through training lawmakers on budget formulation, analysis, and tracking.

CSOs largely conduct soft lobbying and advocacy activities, such as dialogue, interpersonal engagements, and writing letters, as opposed to engaging in confrontational tactics, such as naming-and-shaming, demonstrations, litigation, or openly challenging government policies, laws, decisions, and actions. This approach is taken in order to avoid arbitrary arrests, detentions, and trials under the draconian laws on public order and sedition. In addition, CSOs have limited capacity in advocacy work, and therefore limited ability to challenge public policy and legislation.

However, CSOs have influenced several laws and policies, including the Women's Act of 2010 and the Children's Act of 2005. Currently, CSOs are influencing the draft bill on gender-based violence by holding policy forums on gender and women, leading activities in observation of International Women's Day, and organizing meetings with legislators, the Women's Bureau, and the Ministry of Women's Affairs.

There are several thematic coalitions such as the NGBV, GAT, and CPA. GAT played a leading role in the creation of the Women Act 2010, while CPA was a key player in the enactment of the Children's Act of 2005. CSOs have difficulty building and sustaining broad-based coalitions or building platforms for engagement, in part due to organizations' limited lobbying and advocacy skills and the difficult political environment, characterized by disregard for the rule of law and human rights, including arbitrary arrests, detention, and torture; a climate of fear forces individuals and organizations to focus on self-preservation.

A proposed bill seeks to replace the NGO Decree 81. While the CSO community raised concerns in 2010 over several provisions in the bill, the government has neither responded to these concerns nor placed the matter before the National Assembly. CSOs are concerned about the powers given to the Agency to de-register an organization for issues such as failure to submit financial and annual reports, being accused of opposing government policy, or failing to register annually. Many believe that the CSO community's concerns will be disregarded and the bill will be passed as it stands.

SERVICE PROVISION: 5.0

CSOs in The Gambia were originally created to address the country's socio-economic needs, and service delivery has remained a priority for the sector. CSOs provide goods and services in almost all sectors and in all parts of the country. Some of the goods and services provided by CSOs include building and supplying health facilities, schools, and community centers, providing water pumps for communities, and offering storage facilities, seeds, and farming implements to farmers. CSOs also provide training in soap making, new farming methods, and forest management, among others. Given the high levels of poverty and the inability of the government to provide adequate basic social services to all parts of the country, CSOs have become critical service providers for local communities.

Most CSOs offer goods and services to communities beyond their members, although some CSOs concentrate their services within particular villages and districts. There are membership associations that are open to anyone, such as farmers' associations, women's groups, and youth groups. Trade unions and professionals bodies focus primarily on their members.

Except those organizations that require membership fees or sell their products for income, service provision does not generate income for CSOs, as beneficiaries usually cannot afford to pay for goods and services.

Many government reports such as the Education Impact Evaluation of the Ministry of Basic Education or the Pre-Harvest Assessment of the 2010/2011 Cropping Season acknowledge the role and contribution of CSOs

to development and service provision, particularly at the local and community level. Both the central and local government plans for service provision incorporates CSOs, especially in areas such as health and education.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.4

Many CSOs operate a resource center or library in their head offices, but these are usually not regularly updated or adequately equipped with relevant materials due to limited funding. Most resource centers are free and open to the public. There is no data available on the number of resource centers in the country, but most centers are concentrated in urban areas.

Some multilateral and unilateral donors have established intermediary support organizations, such as the EU's Non-State Actors Strengthening Program (NSASP). The NSASP provided grants to thirteen organizations in 2011 for awareness raising, advocacy, and service provision activities.

Local grantmaking organizations include the President Jammeh Foundation for Peace, the Deyda Hydara Trust, and the Rotary Club. They sponsor students, provide communities with tools or water, and fund the cost of health care for those in need, among other activities. Other entities, such as the World Bank, provide funds to the government through poverty reduction programs. Because donors insist on CSO participation to ensure effective delivery and use of funds, the government administers these funds to CSOs through calls for proposals. While these grantmaking agencies are usually under the purview of a government ministry, CSOs sometimes sit on their boards.

CSOs train their members as well as members of the public and private sectors in various areas such as management, governance, and development issues. There are no training institutes run by CSOs, so independent consultants or CSO staff members conduct training. There are some private training institutes; for example, since 2010, TANGO and Jollof Tutors have worked in partnership to conduct management and operations training for its members. Other organizations have sent their staff to the government-owned Management Development Institute and other private training entities.

CSOs do not offer long-term training to their staff because of insufficient funding. In addition, CSO staff members are expected to already have the requisite knowledge and skills. Thus, the trainings provided serve as refresher courses or are aimed at upgrading skills to meet the demands of the changing world.

Several coalitions such as WANEP Gambia, CPA, GAT, NGBV, EFAnet, and Pro-PAG have formed around areas such as gender, children, education, and human rights. TANGO has created thematic working groups to improve information sharing, raise the profile of CSOs, and enhance the sector's ability to influence public policy. TANGO has also recently institutionalized a bi-monthly policy dialogue, an open forum that brings together policy and decision makers, development workers, politicians, community and religious leaders, and academics to discuss and engage on national development issues.

Partnerships between CSOs and the private sector are still rare. The private sector usually makes major donations to government institutions rather than to CSOs, possibly to curry favor with the authorities. Recently, CSOs have been making efforts to tap into the funding potential of the private sector, mainly telecommunications companies and banks.

Intersectoral partnership opportunities are beginning to grow. In 2011, TANGO and the Gambia Press Union (GPU) forged a partnership in support of freedom of expression. They jointly organized a forum for civil society leaders to discuss the role and significance of the media in development work, and how to establish a joint advocacy effort around draconian media laws. In the past two years, the two organizations have also jointly organized forums in observance of World Press Freedom Day on May 3 and a commemoration of the murder of journalist Deyda Hydara in 2004 by an unidentified gunman in Banjul.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0

CSOs enjoy favorable media coverage from both the public and private media. CSOs give interviews, organize press conferences, and take journalists to visit project sites and activities. That notwithstanding, the public and independent media complains that until the formation of the TANGO-GPU partnership, CSOs have been silent or unsupportive about the trials and tribulations of journalists; the media and journalists have suffered more than any sector from draconian laws, assassinations, forced exile, arbitrary arrests and detention, arson, closure of media houses, and trumped up charges.

While public misconceptions about CSOs exist, such as CSOs being wealthy, the public largely views CSOs positively and appreciates the role and contribution of CSOs to national development. The vast majority of Gambians have seen their lives transformed because of CSO involvement in access to clean drinking water and health and educational facilities. The public is also generally supportive of CSOs' advocacy and lobbying efforts, while also feeling that they could do more.

Government perceptions of CSOs are mixed. On one hand, the head of state and some top government officials have touted the idea that CSOs working on human rights, good governance, and government accountability are foreign-backed agencies bent on destabilizing the country or introducing foreign values inimical to Gambian culture. On the other hand, these same government functionaries, including ministers, directors, and mid-level managers, understand and value CSOs for their service delivery work.

Banks actively seek CSO business because of the large grants some receive. Some CSOs believe that because banks benefit from CSO business, they should donate to CSOs in addition to the public institutions they usually support.

CSOs still struggle to conduct effective public relations to further clarify their roles and share and celebrate their contributions and successes. Many organizations have started to develop their own websites or newsletters. While CSOs use the media to report on activities such as training workshops, annual general meetings, or the launch of new projects, they do not take advantage of their relationships with the media to enhance advocacy campaigns, organize press conferences, or share financial reports and audits with the public.

NGOs are supposed to disclose their financial and audit reports in order to register with the NGO Affairs Agency and to be members of TANGO, and submit periodic financial and annual reports thereafter. However, neither organization enforces these requirements, so NGOs are lax about conducting audits and preparing and submitting reports.

Some networks such as CPA, NGBV and EFANet require members to adhere to codes of conduct, but enforcement is weak, and there are no penalties for non-compliance.

GHANA

2011 Scores for Ghana

Indicator	Score
CSO Sustainability	4.3
Legal Environment	3.9
Organizational Capacity	3.9
Financial Viability	5.7
Advocacy	3.8
Service Provision	3.8
Infrastructure	4.7
Public Image	4.3

1.0 **Sustainability Enhanced** 3.0 **Sustainability Evolved** 5.0 **Sustainability Impeded** 7.0

Capital: Accra

Government Type: Constitutional Democracy

Population: 25,241,998 (July 2012 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $3,100

Human Development Index: 135

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.3

Ghana is often touted as a 'shining example' of liberal, multiparty democracy in Africa. The country's return to constitutional rule in 1992 and the attendant guarantee of civil and political liberties have seen the proliferation of various civic groups at both national and local levels.

The overall sustainability of CSOs in Ghana was unchanged in 2011. CSOs register and operate under the Companies Code of 1963 (Act 179) with little or no difficulty. Data from the Department of Social Welfare indicates that the number of registered CSOs increased by 11 percent, from 4,772 in 2010 to 5,232 in December 2011. CSOs are active in all ten regions of the country and work in all sectors.

Over the last year, CSOs have advocated for and influenced a number of government policy decisions. CSO inputs and lobbying influenced the passage of the Petroleum Revenue Management Law by Parliament. CSOs also participated in regional consultations on the Right to Information (RTI) Bill and submitted proposals regarding the review of the national constitution. Civil society advocacy compelled the government to suspend bilateral negotiations with the European Union (EU) on signing the full Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and convinced the National Communication Authority (NCA) to extend the registration period for mobile phone SIM card users.

CSO Sustainability in Ghana

2009	2010	2011
4.3	4.3	4.3

CSOs generally depend on funding from foreign donors as the government and the private sector do not provide direct funding for their activities. Funding in 2011 dwindled largely because of the global financial crisis, which led to budget cuts in donor countries.

Ghana has a vibrant and pluralistic media dominated by FM radio stations, which broadcast across the country. CSOs continue to enjoy favorable media coverage of their activities, and collaborated with the media to mobilize resources for flood victims in Accra and parts of the Eastern Region in 2011.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.9

CSO registration continues to be favorable. As there are no specific laws on CSOs, organizations register under the Companies Code of 1963 (Act 179) as not-for-profit organizations limited by guarantee, with members acting as guarantors. The National Consultative Group (NCG), a forum comprising representatives of various CSOs, the government, and its development partners, has proposed a Not-for-Profit Organization (NPO) bill, but the government has not yet finalized it or passed it into law. The constitution guarantees civil and political rights, allowing CSOs to exist without state interference, provided that their activities are consistent with the country's laws.

Legal Environment in Ghana

The state does not interfere in the registration of CSOs or engage in any form of harassment. CSOs can be registered in any part of the country. General legal practitioners and Company Code specialists are available to provide legal advice.

While CSOs are eligible for tax exemptions, many of them are unaware of the procedures involved and complain about the difficulty in accessing exemptions. According to the Social Welfare Department, CSO applications for the exemption are given prompt attention; however, few organizations complete the necessary applications. For instance, although CSOs implementing European Union (EU) funded projects are entitled to exemption from the Value Added Tax (VAT), most of them have failed to get the needed permits from the Ministry of Finance.

CSOs are not prevented from earning income and are able to compete for government contracts at the local and national levels.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.9

Organizational Capacity in Ghana

CSOs in Ghana generally have defined mission statements outlining their work and constituencies, as required by registration procedures. Both large and small CSOs located in urban and rural areas have target groups and beneficiaries, defined according to organizational objectives. Project beneficiaries are usually considered major project stakeholders and are therefore deeply engaged in activities. For example, project implementation usually includes intensive mobilization and sensitization of potential beneficiaries and target groups. Urban-based CSOs usually have more stable funding and stay focused on their mission statements. Smaller CSOs often operate according to donor priorities. As funding opportunities dwindle, more CSOs, including smaller organizations, have started developing and implementing strategic plans, a requirement for receiving grants.

Some CSOs have management and governance structures with a clear division of roles. Smaller and rural-based CSOs generally constitute boards only to fulfill registration requirements rather than as important structures for organizational governance; therefore, they do not perform oversight functions effectively.

Only larger CSOs are able to employ staff on a permanent basis; others hire staff on a contract or project basis. The attrition rate of staff in the sector is high, due to the project-based nature of work, lack of long-term funding, and dependency on foreign donors. The lack of core grant or long-term support for CSOs following the 2010 closure of the Ghana Research and Advocacy Program (G-RAP), which provided core funding to CSOs, continues to affect the sector's organizational development. The successor to G-RAP – Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Responsiveness in Ghana (STAR-Ghana) – only provides project-based funding, as opposed to operational support.

While many CSOs are accountable to their funders, there is an overall lack of accountability to constituents and the public. Very few CSOs, mainly the urban-based and highly resourced, are able to publish and disseminate annual reports.

CSOs utilize the services of professional staff, in particular academics, to carry out policy research and capacity-building activities. CSOs also use the services of other professionals, including accountants, communication experts, and Information Communication Technology (ICT) professionals, on a regular basis. Volunteerism is on the decline. The National Service Scheme, which provides a one-year stipend to young graduates, enables CSOs to augment their staffs. However, most of these young staff members leave when the one-year period ends.

Access to Internet facilities has been enhanced over the past five years by the general expansion in ICT facilities in the country; in particular, mobile Internet modems and mobile phones have increased access for rural CSOs. Most CSOs have office space with basic equipment, such as computers, printers, and phones. .Some CSOs depend on commercial enterprises for the use of fax machines and scanners.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.7

The financial situation of CSOs continues to deteriorate. Most CSOs are dependent on foreign donors and Ghana's emergence as an oil economy, coupled with the global economic crisis, has reduced the inflow of donor funding. CSO funding has been reduced by budget cuts and other austerity measures adopted by western countries. As a result, access to funding has become more competitive. Smaller CSOs face the biggest obstacles, as they do not have the capacity to produce the annual reports or strategic plans that most donors require to receive grants. Despite the

Financial Viability in Ghana

2009   5.5
2010   5.6
2011   5.7

commencement of oil production in commercial quantities, CSOs have not received any notable funding from oil firms to implement their activities. Significantly, some development partners such as USAID have provided funding to support CSO activities in the Western Region of Ghana where oil has been found.

STAR-Ghana, which is supported by a variety of foreign donors and embassies, commenced operations in 2011 and has already become the most notable local source of funding for CSOs in the country. STAR-Ghana provides funding for CSOs and networks to implement activities and has pledged to provide funding for CSO activities related to the 2012 elections. The Mwanachi Program, a component of DFID's Governance Transparency Fund (GTF), continues to provide funding for smaller CSOs to carry out activities aimed at strengthening citizen engagement in governance and development. CSOs have not yet benefited significantly from the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA), a government program to develop the northern part of the country.

Support from local philanthropic organizations remains low. Foundations set up by telecommunications companies such as Vodafone and MTN are the most notable exception.

Only a few CSOs, mostly urban-based organizations, have sufficient funding to support their work over the next three to five years. CSOs are increasingly diversifying their funding, although fundraising is still generally limited to proposal development and bilateral negotiations with funders.

CSO networks and coalitions mobilize some resources through the collection of annual membership dues, but these are generally inadequate to support activities. Some CSOs provide consulting services to government and the private sector and sell publications in order to earn income.

Larger and urban-based CSOs carry out annual external audits and publish annual reports. With the increasing competition for funding and demand by new donors, some smaller organizations have also started to produce annual audit reports.

ADVOCACY: 3.8

Advocacy in Ghana

2009   2010   2011

4.0   3.9   3.8

Engagement between the government and CSOs continues to improve and CSOs are involved in many policy formulation processes. Ministries, departments, and agencies invite and engage CSOs on diverse policy issues based on their expertise, and CSOs advocate for policy reviews and reforms on specific issues.

The contributions of the sector to the constitutional review process and the report by the review commission have not yet resulted in a government white paper that indicates the government's plans. However, the government has taken steps to improve decentralization, influenced by CSO advocacy related to the 2010 decentralization policy review.

Ahead of the 2012 elections, CSOs advocated strongly for electoral reforms, including the adoption of biometric voter registration and verification systems. These have been acceded to by the Electoral Commission, and will be funded by the government.

Sector-based CSO networks, such as the Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas, the Ghana Aid Effectiveness Forum, the Right to Information Coalition, the Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition (GNECC), and the National CSO Platform on the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), actively campaign and lobby the government on various policy issues. For example, the Platform on Oil and Gas actively influenced the passage of the Petroleum Revenue Management Law by parliament at the beginning of 2011. The Platform on EPAs actively campaigned against the signing of the full EPA with the EU by the government of Ghana; the Platform opposed the agreement because Ghana had already committed to having the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) lead the negotiation collectively for West Africa. As a result, the government's attempt to independently sign the full EPA with the EU was stalled.

CSO pressure forced the National Communications Authority (NCA) to postpone its plan to deactivate all unregistered mobile phones in the country and instead extend the period of registration. The RTI Coalition participated in regional consultations with a parliamentary select committee designated to solicit further opinions from citizens on the RTI Bill, which has resulted in improvements to the bill.

The campaign for a Not-for-Profit Organization (NPO) bill to regulate the sector's operations and enhance the sector's long-term sustainability and effectiveness has not produced results yet. Despite the continued lobbying by the NCG, the Attorney General's Department has not produced the draft bill for consideration by Cabinet and Parliament.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.8

CSOs in Ghana continue to operate in almost all sectors and provide a diversified range of goods and services in fields such as health, education, environment, and water and sanitation based on the needs of target groups and beneficiaries. Services provided are based largely on the availability of funding for activities.

Service Provision in Ghana

2009	2010	2011
3.8	3.8	3.8

During 2011, CSOs responded positively to the demands and needs of people affected by floods in parts of the Eastern Region and Accra. For instance, CSOs collaborated with the media to raise funds to support the victims and supported government agencies such as the National Disaster Management Organization (NADMO) in the identification of victims.

CSO products, such as the publications of Research and Advocacy Organizations (RAOs), are generally disseminated to and demanded by the wider public. In order to generate some income, publications are generally sold, with very few given out for free. Cost recovery within the sector, however, is generally low and CSOs that provide social services rarely recover costs.

The government recognizes the role of CSOs in the development process and awards contracts to CSOs to provide specific services based on their professional expertise.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.7

Infrastructure in Ghana

2009	2010	2011
4.7	4.7	4.7

There has been no significant change in sectoral infrastructure since last year. The World Bank's Public Information Center in Accra remains the most notable resource center for CSOs. The center provides valuable information and publications on a range of social, economic, and political issues, as well as copies of the policy documents produced by the Bank over the years.

As discussed above, STAR-Ghana is the main local grantmaking organization in the country. During 2011, STAR-Ghana advertised three major calls for proposals in the areas of education, elections, and support for strengthening network activities. Telecommunications companies have established foundations to support community development projects by CSOs in the areas of health and education.

The diversity of CSOs is reflected in the growth of coalitions uniting CSOs working in a variety of development issues in the country. Most coalitions and umbrella organizations focus on advocacy. For example, in 2011, the Platform for Oil and Gas provided information to the public through the media on issues of accountability within the oil and gas sector. The NCG is perhaps the only group dedicated to serving the interests of the civil society sector as a whole.

CSOs such as the West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI), which used to provide free training for CSOs, have started to roll out paid courses for CSOs on topics such as fundraising, project management, advocacy, and financial management. Larger CSOs are generally able to get donor funding to pay for these training activities. Smaller organizations, on the other hand, are generally not able to take advantage of these training programs due to lack of funding. Many CSOs continue to receive training and technical support from their funding partners in areas such as project management, financial management, and reporting procedures.

While CSOs are able to offer training for their target beneficiaries, the scale and number of trainings have generally declined lately, largely due to funding constraints.

There is some level of partnership with the private sector. For instance, the Tax Justice Network and the Chartered Institute of Taxation collaborated to educate the public on taxation issues.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3

The public image of CSOs in Ghana is positive, enhanced by media coverage of activities at both the local and national levels. The mass media covers CSO activities, including live broadcasts of events, and positively reports on the role of CSOs in supporting government development efforts. A typical example is the live broadcast of the Institute for Democratic Governance's Ghana Speaks Lectures by Joy FM, one of the leading radio stations in the country. Media publicity of CSO activities is generally distinct from corporate advertisement.

Public Image in Ghana

2009	2010	2011
4.3	4.3	4.3

CSOs form partnerships with media to disseminate information on their activities and research findings. Urban-based CSOs advertise their events through the print and electronic media on a regular basis. These CSOs are able to attract journalists to their events and therefore benefit from positive media coverage. CSOs are also able to enhance their public images in a variety of other ways, including developing information leaflets and event banners. Rural CSOs use community outreach projects to mobilize local support for their actions.

Communities are receptive to and recognize the roles of CSOs engaged in service delivery, such as organizations that provide relief to victims or provide direct funding to address community problems. Government and private sector perceptions of CSOs in Ghana are also generally good. Both sectors consult CSOs on pertinent issues. For example, the private sector often asks CSOs to assist with research projects. However, there is some level of suspicion about the influence of donors on the activities of CSOs.

With the exception of large and urban-based organizations, very few CSOs publish annual reports. CSOs previously attempted to improve their performance through an independent body called the Standards Commission that reviewed CSO standards, but this initiative was not sustainable.

GUINEA

2011 Scores for Guinea

Category	Score
CSO Sustainability	5.5
Legal Environment	5.5
Organizational Capacity	5.8
Financial Viability	6.3
Advocacy	5.3
Service Provision	5.1
Infrastructure	5.7
Public Image	4.9

1.0 — **Sustainability Enhanced**   3.0 — **Sustainability Evolved**   5.0   7.0 — **Sustainability Impeded**

Capital: Conakry

Government Type: Republic

Population: 10,884,958 (July 2011 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $1,100

Human Development Index: 178

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.5

Since the military coup of 2008, Guinea has faced a tense political situation. The country's first democratic, presidential elections were held in 2010, but legislative elections scheduled to take place six months after the presidential election in accordance with the Ouagadougou Accords were postponed. Over the course of the year, a political crisis built as the political opposition refused to accept the neutrality of the president of the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), opposed the CENI's approach to conducting a census to establish new voter rolls, and accused the transitional government of excluding them from government positions.

In 2011, representatives of the government, political parties, and civil society organizations represented by the National Council for Guinean Civil Society Organizations (CNOSC) gathered for a series of discussions to open a dialogue on the main sources of disagreement and determine a date to hold the legislative elections. During these meetings, the opposition's primary condition was to restructure the CENI and replace the president, whom they considered to be too close the government. But this did not take place.

CSO Sustainability in Guinea

2009	2010	2011
5.6	5.5	5.5

CSOs have been key partners in the ongoing dialogues concerning the incomplete political transition. CNOSCG has worked in a consortium with the Coalition for the Domestic Observation of Elections (CODE) and the Coalition of Human Rights Organizations (CODDH) to move past the political impasse.

While the democratic presidential election had raised hopes for the development of Guinean civil society, the CSO sector saw limited development in 2011. Guinea has faced embargo restrictions since 2008 under which most donors suspended funding. Many hope the gradual return of donors and renewed interest by the international community in Guinea will strengthen civil society, but the delayed political transition prevented this from occurring in 2011.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.5

CSOs are governed by Law L2005/013/AN of July 14, 2005. The National Service for Assistance to Cooperatives and Coordination of CSOs Activities (SACCO), an autonomous public institution set up by the government to coordinate and support CSOs, continues to manage CSO registration.

CSOs may register at the national level, the province, prefecture, or sub-prefecture depending on the scope of the activities and must submit several documents including their bylaws, a strategic plan, and minutes from their general

Legal Environment in Guinea

assembly meeting. The process is not cumbersome, but the total number of CSOs that apply for registration remained low in 2011. One obstacle is that a registration fee is required, but the exact amount is not specified in the law. Local SACCO employees determine the amount of this fee arbitrarily.

Given this legal ambiguity, many CSOs could benefit from legal counsel during the registration process. Certain law firms in Guinea understand CSO laws and regulations, but the majority of CSOs do not have the financial means to pay for legal advice. In addition, law firms are concentrated in the capital making them largely inaccessible to CSOs based elsewhere in the country.

The law clearly defines the normal standards for CSO operations, including the roles of each member of the board of directors, the scope of activities, and requirements for financial reporting requirements and audits. However, enforcement of these provisions remains weak.

The Finances Law of 2007 grants CSOs and public interest organizations tax exemptions for goods and services provided to the population. Individuals and businesses may also deduct contributions to CSOs from their taxable income. But many CSOs do not benefit from these exemptions because of they do not understand the tax code well enough to claim their exemptions. The government officials in charge of these exemptions also engage in corrupt practices and regularly solicit small bribes from CSOs applying for exemptions.

There is no specific legislation allowing CSOs to generate income from the provision of goods and services, but there are also no restrictions on the subject. CSOs that engage in income-generating activities do not face any legal problems, but must reinvest the revenue in their activities. The government rarely invites CSOs to bid on procurements.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.8

Depending on the nature of a CSO's activities, many CSOs engage their beneficiary communities by creating a consultative panel to oversee their projects. This participatory approach helps CSOs respond to the needs of the communities they serve.

Organizational Capacity in Guinea

The generally weak level of financial resources available to CSOs limits their organizational capacity in several ways. Due to limited resources, CSOs typically are not able to hire and retain permanent staff. Good personnel management practices are generally subject to donor funding. CSOs, therefore, rely on volunteers, but few CSOs have volunteers that can provide managerial support.

CSOs are also typically unable to undertake strategic planning activities. Though CSOs are required to define their mission and objectives when they register, few organizations rely on a clearly defined mission to guide the activities that they undertake.

CSOs also often lack access to modern technology due to limited funding, and cannot use the technology they have properly because of frequent power outages.

Internally, there is often conflict between the roles of the board of directors and the executive management, and board of directors is frequently dominated by the president. The president of an organization, who is most frequently the founder, presides over the board of directors. Without a delegation from the president, only the president or vice-president may lead a meeting of the board of directors. The president may make decisions with only the consent of the vice president and treasurer, which often causes frustration among other members of the board and leads to their resignation. The president is also responsible for convoking the organization's general assembly, but these meetings are generally held very infrequently.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.3

CSOs faced severe financial constraints in 2011. Prior to the international embargo, CSOs were highly dependent on foreign donors, but most funding to Guinea remained suspended in 2011. Though some donors have timidly started to return, they are not yet providing significant support to local CSOs. The government created the SACCO to provide support to CSOs, but it is significantly underfunded.

Financial Viability in Guinea

With the current scarcity of donor funding, most CSOs operate on the basis of member contributions and participation by the communities they serve through micro projects. Beneficiaries often contribute to projects by providing volunteer labor. Local financial support is virtually nonexistent and the donors who support local CSOs require cost shares of 8-10 percent in the form of in-kind donations. Member fees are generally insufficient and unreliable because of the limited resources of the organizations' members. This funding is generally devoted to paying the salaries of the executive management, but does not cover the complete operational expenses of CSOs

Some professional CSOs implement projects for the government and private businesses. Notably, large mining consortia fund local development projects that are implemented by CSOs. CSOs also receive funding for microfinance projects, campaigns to promote peaceful cohabitation among ethnic groups, and campaigns against HIV/AIDS. However, CSOs are often forced to pay bribes to win grants and contracts.

Few CSOs submit to financial audits or publish annual financial reports, due to weak management procedures and poor internal governance. Notably, CSOs often fail to publish annual reports with financial statements.

ADVOCACY: 5.3

Advocacy in Guinea

	2009	2010	2011
1			
3			
5	5.7	5.5	5.3
7			

There are networks of CSOs that theoretically should maintain open channels of communication with the government. One of the reasons that the government created SACCO was to facilitate communication between the government and CSOs. However, SACCO does not have the basic policies and resources necessary to fulfill its role.

Spaces exist for CSOs to engage in dialogue and critique public policy on issues related to development. Organizations that create these platforms include notably the CSO Forum for Sustainable Development, and the National Council of Civil Society Organizations (CNOSCG).

The government, for its part, relies heavily on CSO networks to implement certain decentralized activities, particularly those related to male-female parity in decision-making bodies, and in the elaboration and adoption of a new Family Code. The Coordination of Women's NGOs in Guinea (COFEG) advocated to promote women's rights and policies and the Guinean National Coalition advocated for the adoption of a family code.

Recently, Guinean civil society organizations have been at the forefront of the fight for the return to constitutional order. CSO advocacy contributed to the successful, transparent presidential election in 2010. In 2011, CNOSCG led advocacy efforts to finalize the transition to transparent legislative elections at both municipal and community levels. While elections have not yet been held, CNOSCG has been actively involved attempting to find a solution to the impasse regarding the independent electoral commission (CENI). CNOSCG was also at the forefront of the establishment of the National Council of Transition (CNT), which plays an important role acting as the transitional legislative body.

SERVICE PROVISION: 5.1

CSOs offer a diverse range of services in Guinea including income-generating activities, infrastructure development, and microfinance. In 2011, CSOs and CSO networks also led informational workshops on the rights and responsibilities of citizens and disseminated information on the electoral process. But many CSOs are unprofessional, and the quality and efficiency of their services is often inadequate due in part to the funding constraints many CSOs now face. Because most CSOs lack financial autonomy, they are unable to rapidly respond to the needs of their community, and services can end abruptly when a source of funding is expended.

Service Provision in Guinea

	2009	2010	2011
1			
3			
5	5.1	5.1	5.1
7			

Each community in Guinea has a local development plan (PDL) which helps orient service delivery toward the needs of the community. Most CSO favor a participatory approach to service provision, but CSOs sometimes undertake activities that do not respond to the needs of the population and are generally ineffective. CSOs generally do not conduct rigorous needs assessments or research, and this kind of work is generally neglected when communities create their PDLs. Those organizations that do undertake analytical work face challenges disseminating their findings.

CSOs that deliver services in health, infrastructure development, and incoming generation are sometimes able to recover the costs of their services. However, in order to win contracts to deliver these services, they are often required to pay significant bribes.

The government awards very few contracts to CSOs to provide or monitor public services. Foreign donors, however, sometimes require that the government contract with CSOs, particularly to monitor the implementation of infrastructure and construction projects.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.7

Infrastructure in Guinea

	2009	2010	2011
1			
3			
5	5.7	5.7	5.7
7			

SACCO was intended to function as an intermediary support organization and resource center for CSOs with local branches throughout the country. However, since donors cut off funding to Guinea, CSOs have been severely underfunded and unable to fulfill their role. The UN also created local information and education centers (CIP) to support registered CSOs and youth groups in project design, management, social awareness, and project planning, monitoring, and evaluation. However, these centers are not available outside the capital.

Some CSOs and private firms provide training and technical support to emerging CSOs. However, most CSOs struggle to access current training information and online resources because of intermittent electricity and poor connection to the Internet.

Those CSOs affiliated with a network share information among themselves, but there is no general platform available for CSOs to share information. CNOSCG fills this role to a certain extent. However, given the current national climate of civil society, CNOSCG is primarily focused on advocacy and lobbying for a successful political transition.

Capacity-building trainings are available to CSOs, but the trainings are not organized systematically, and there is no organization that certifies the quality of the training's content. There is no institution at the national level specialized in providing training in financial management, accounting, grant proposal writing, volunteer management, or establishing a board of directors and internal procedures. Some organizations and consultants offer trainings in these areas, but they are offered in French rather than local languages.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.9

CSOs generally receive good media coverage locally and nationally, and the media offers them preferential rates for public announcements. Because local communities participate actively in the implementation of CSO projects, the media often presents CSOs and their activities positively. With the diversification of media outlets, including radio, television, and print media, coverage of CSOs is widely available.

Public Image in Guinea

	2009	2010	2011
1			
3	4.9	4.9	4.9
5			
7			

The government and the private sector generally have a positive perception of the roles and activities of CSOs. They call on CSOs for social mobilization, awareness-raising campaigns, conflict prevention, environmental preservation, and many other causes.

Few CSOs have the tools necessary for transparent management of their activities. Typically, they have only the required legal documents including their bylaws, rules of procedure, and registration, but do not have a

procedures manual. There is no CSO code of ethics. Some CSOs publish annual and financial reports, but this is generally to satisfy their donors' contractual requirements.

KENYA

2011 Scores for Kenya

Category	Score
CSO Sustainability	3.9
Legal Environment	4.1
Organizational Capacity	3.9
Financial Viability	4.8
Advocacy	3.4
Service Provision	3.4
Infrastructure	3.7
Public Image	4.3

1.0   3.0   5.0   7.0

Sustainability Enhanced   **Sustainability Evolved**   **Sustainability Impeded**

Capital: Nairobi

Government Type: Republic

Population: 43,013,341 (July 2012 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $1,800

Human Development Index: 143

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 3.9

The term civil society organization (CSO) is used in Kenya to refer to the wide array of organizations that operate in the realm between the individual and the state and are formed to promote the interests of their members or the public good. The term non-governmental organization (NGO) refers specifically to the almost 6,000 national and international public benefit entities that are registered by the NGO Coordination Board (NGO Board). Though NGOs comprise just a small part of the larger CSO sector, they are the most visible. Other types of CSOs include community-based organizations (CBOs, which number over 300,000), societies (32,000), non-profit companies limited by guarantee, and trusts.

Many CSOs that successfully advocated to include provisions for equitable gender representation, human rights, and basic economic and social rights in the constitution in 2010 were not prepared for next steps in 2011. Most CSOs did not know how to engage politically to ensure the appropriate implementation of constitution-related legislation and policy. Many organizations spent much of the year re-organizing and strategizing their future advocacy and lobbying initiatives; formulating policies and laws to implement constitutional provisions; and furthering government-CSOs collaboration on policy and service delivery. In addition, many donors shifted their priorities from CSO advocacy efforts aimed at passing the constitution toward initiatives aimed at the realization of the constitutional provisions, and many CSOs modified their own strategies accordingly.

CSO Sustainability in Kenya

2009	2010	2011
4.1	4.0	3.9

1.0
3.0
5.0
7.0

The legal environment remained the same this year, despite expectations by CSOs that it would improve. CSOs prepared a draft law and hoped it would serve as a basis for discussions with the government for a review of the current NGO Act. This did not happen, but efforts will continue into 2012. As in 2010, overt state harassment remained rare. Implementation of tax policy continues to be problematic, with arbitrary or erroneous applications of the law that hamper CSO operations.

CSOs continued to provide a wide range of services, especially in Millennium Development Goal areas, including health, HIV/AIDS, water, and children.

Some CSOs pioneered cost-recovery programs, but most continue to be supported by grants, particularly foreign aid. However, the global financial crisis has decreased funding opportunities, which significantly affected many CSOs. On the other hand, local support for CSOs improved in 2011, in both financial and in-kind donations, including a slight increase in volunteerism.

Intersectoral partnerships rose, including the formation of the Kenyans for Kenya campaign, which brought together individuals and key players in the corporate, civil society, and media sectors, in a massive effort to raise funds towards famine relief for over three million Kenyans.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.1

The legal environment remained stable in 2011, and new constitutional provisions promised an improved environment for CSOs going forward. For example, the by-laws guarantee greater freedom of association by defining this freedom in a very broad and detailed manner. However, some government authorities charged with implementation continued to misinterpret the laws. For example, revenue authorities routinely block income tax exemption claims. According to the NGO Coordination Board, fewer registered NGOs applied for tax relief this year, an incentive available to all

Legal Environment in Kenya

not-for-profit organizations. According to the NGO Coordination Board's preliminary report, registered NGOs claimed tax exemptions in the amount of KES 2.3 billion ($27.8 million) in 2010-2011 compared to KES 8.4 billion ($101.6 million) in 2009-2010. CSOs have suggested that the reduction may be in part because the process is so cumbersome.

The laws governing CSOs are diverse. CSOs have the choice of registering as NGOs (under the NGO Coordination Act), companies limited by guarantee (under the Companies Act), trusts (under the Trustees Perpetual Succession Act), CBOs (including self-help groups, women's and youth groups, at the Ministry of Social Development), or societies (under the Societies Act). NGO registrations increased this year. It still takes relatively longer to register NGOs and companies limited by guarantee than to register trusts, in part because the former must be vetted by the National Security Agency, which can be time consuming.

The number of lawyers with expertise in CSO law remains low. In addition, most lawyers are concentrated in cities and are too expensive for small CSOs.

CSOs are generally allowed to operate freely within the law. There were fewer reported cases of police curtailing CSO meetings than last year, and in some cases, police provided CSOs with security for their meetings when organizations feared that political hooligans could disrupt them. Because of provisions in the new constitution, NGOs and faith-based organizations (FBOs) were able to freely criticize the government, and filed a variety of cases in court barring the government from carrying out activities that they considered contrary to the constitution. For example, in June, the G10 Coalition of women's organizations filed a petition in court seeking an injunction against the appointment of the nominees to the Supreme Court on the

basis that the constitution's two-thirds gender rule was not being observed.

Subtle harassment still exists. For example, CSOs suspect that state agencies conducted surveillance activities, web hacking, and hardware theft in the offices of organizations pursuing matters of public interest. While overt harassment is rare, a few cases have been reported. In one case, police officers stopped staff members of the Regional Institute for Social Enterprise (RISE) from holding meetings in Eastern Kenya after they started raising awareness in the community on a proposed government coal mining initiative.

CSOs are allowed to compete for government contracts. In 2011, for example, CSOs worked on an agricultural extension project for the Ministry of Agriculture, and a project for the Water Services Trust Fund to scale up sustainable sanitation services for up to 800,000 people and water services for up to 200,000 people in low-income urban areas. However, many CSOs do not have the skills or capacity to compete with the private sector, and others are discouraged by the considerable time it takes for the government to pay for contracted services.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.9

Organizational Capacity in Kenya

	2009	2010	2011
1.0	3.9	3.9	3.9
3.0			
5.0			
7.0			

While CBOs successfully mobilize local constituents, NGOs often build local constituencies just to access funding, and then rarely involve them in decision making.

Few small NGOs and CBOs have well-defined strategic plans, if any. Many plans are developed strictly to align with donor interest and demand, and therefore difficult to implement.

Many NGOs have weak internal structures and lack clear accountability. While the trend is toward better governance with more effective boards with clearly delineated responsibilities, most managers face a lot of interference and micro-management from their boards. Larger NGOs tend to have better management structures.

Increasingly, NGOs are using professional IT and accounting staff. However, lack of consistent funding makes it challenging for NGOs to maintain permanent and adequately skilled staff, so they rely heavily on short-term staff or volunteers. These non-permanent staff members are often linked to specific projects, which challenges organizational capacity when a project ends and the time invested in training those staff members is lost. Larger NGOs that are able to give competitive pay packages often draw trained staff away from smaller NGOs. However, this staff movement within the sector has made the sector more vibrant, with room for continual renewal, growth, and exchange of expertise and knowledge.

CSOs embraced the use of modern technology ahead of the public sector. Donors are usually reluctant to fund equipment purchases unless they are linked to a specific project, so few organizations have the resources to buy modern equipment. However, as costs go down, access goes up. Smartphones and laptops enable increased Internet access, and the NGO Board reports that in 2011, 62 percent of registered NGOs owned computers. However, many of the smaller CSOs still rely on cyber cafes and office bureaus because they cannot afford to purchase equipment.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.8

Local philanthropic contributions rose significantly this year. The Kenyans for Kenya initiative raised over KES 1 billion ($12.1 million) from individuals, companies, media, and other local organizations, including

CSOs. Though only a few CSOs are able to successfully raise large amounts of money locally, the initiative demonstrated that Kenyans are willing to support initiatives that concern them if properly mobilized.

Despite the positive developments in local philanthropy by corporations and individuals, NGOs are generally not viewed by the public as credible receivers of this largesse, given their generally poor public image as mouthpieces of foreign interests with little impact to show for the large sums of money they receive from donors.

Financial Viability in Kenya

	2009	2010	2011
	4.8	4.8	4.8

Though most registered NGOs appreciate that it is important to diversify funding, they still rely heavily on one or two foreign donors for short-term, project-oriented funds, in some cases because of reluctance to venture into new types of fundraising or approach new donors. Few NGOs have local financial supporters. Most local NGOs do not have the capacity to engage full-time fundraisers and few have strong fundraising skills. CBOs and FBOs, on the other hand, are able to mobilize a lot of in-kind support, such as donations of materials and volunteers. Other types of organizations are able to mobilize volunteers as well, but with less success.

In 2010, the promulgation of the constitution attracted a lot of donor interest. However, in 2011, the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS, 2008–2012), a development strategy of seventeen bilateral and multilateral donors and the government of Kenya, was entering its last year, and KJAS donors reduced funding in order to strategize about the future. Many donors redirected their funds to government programs, since the new constitution provided an enabling framework for the government to advance democracy, governance, and socio-economic development. The global financial crisis also meant a reduction in funds available. Large INGOs responded to the decrease in financial opportunities by restructuring and restrategizing, and all NGOs started to think about diversifying their funding strategies.

Although various CSO capacity assessment initiatives and institutions such as the Poverty Eradication Network (PEN) have noted that financial management capacity is improving, there are few financially sustainable local CSOs. Those that thrive, such as the Africa Medical Research Foundation (AMREF), the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), and the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), usually have a good understanding of the importance of strong financial management systems; may own some property; engage in income-generating activities; have strong governance, leadership, and commitment; and have long-term funders.

The NGO sector is still heavily donor driven and some CSO financial systems are quite strong because of donor requirements. However, most CSOs are not transparent in their operations and rarely publish their accounts. In 2011, many donors supported for-profit organizations such as PricewaterhouseCoopers in implementing development projects, at the expense of local CSOs. This was due in part to the competitive bidding process, which gives large organizations an advantage in accessing funds.

Few NGOs have sources of income outside of grants. Though membership organizations collect fees, they are nominal and unreliable. Some CSOs are beginning to explore social enterprise and have invested in assets such as rental properties, or have provided consultancy and other services to the government and other CSOs. However, it has been difficult for CSOs to both engage in income-generating activities and continue maintaining civil society projects.

ADVOCACY: 3.4

Advocacy in Kenya

	2009	2010	2011
	3.8	3.5	3.4

The new constitution created institutionalized space for CSOs to take part in policy-making processes. Seats were created for CSOs on decision-making bodies such as the Independent Policing Oversight Authority, bodies set up to appoint senior government officials to the Judiciary, and other constitutional commissions. This led to a stronger, more collaborative relationship between the government and CSOs.

Many government departments have entered partnership agreements with CSOs, including the Kenya Red Cross Society and Education for Marginalized Children in Kenya (EMACK), and local and national government officials usually seek technical input from CSOs on development issues. While the two sectors have very different working styles, which can be challenging, 2011 saw the two sectors making noticeable progress toward mutual understanding. For example, government processes are more bureaucratic, and therefore slower, and invitations to participate in dialogue are often sent out last minute. In response to this complaint from CSOs, government officials have started to give early telephone notice of events to CSOs in advance of official email invitations being sent out.

There were numerous opportunities for CSOs to participate in formulating legislation aimed at advancing constitutional provisions and in reviewing existing laws in order to align them with the constitution. Some formed coalitions to lobby on issues such as land reform, elections, gender equity, and the appointment of constitutional office holders. As a result, a substantial number of laws were passed in 2011 with input from CSOs.

Advocacy campaigns were less confrontational, less visible, and more consultative, as policy conversations moved from the street and media houses, to round tables and other forums with government representatives.

The Institute for Social Accountability (TISA), Transparency International–Kenya (TI-K), Action Aid International Kenya (AAIK), and Association of Professional Societies in East Africa (APSEA) participated in forums convened by the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) to deliberate and reach a common consensus on the scope and contents of the Public Finance Management Bill 2011. Devolved Governance Non-State Actors (DEGONSA) and Jukwaa la Katiba participated in press conferences and policymaking forums that focused on decentralization-related bills. CSOs under the Usalama Umbrella Forum opposed a proposal made by the police that the Independent Police Oversight Authority should include a police representative.

CSOs were also active on monitoring the budget process. The MARS Group, an anti-corruption watchdog organization, pointed to errors in estimates that the Minister of Finance submitted to Parliament that left KES 251 billion ($3.02 billion) unaccounted for. Transparency International Kenya (TI-Kenya), Action Aid International Kenya (AAIK), and the National Taxpayers Association (NTA) submitted a memorandum to the Parliamentary Budget Committee that identified critical gaps in the budget, such as the lack of allocations to the Political Parties Dispute Tribunal.

There were several proposals to funders by CSOs that wanted to coalesce around issues of common interest, but some of these initiatives were hampered by competition for visibility and resources. In addition, many CSOs that had temporarily engaged in advocacy campaigns around the drafting and passage of the new constitution started to return to their own spheres of operation. This resulted in less CSO coordination and influence overall.

Many CSOs lack the technical skills, such as drafting and analysis, necessary to engage in policy and legislative influence. In addition, most lack the political skills necessary to push their views all the way through the policy or legislative processes to the final vote. In addition, there is a lack of consensus within the sector about advocacy and lobbying strategy and about which CSOs should lead discussions on particular policies or laws.

CSOs are advocating for a new law that will provide a more enabling environment for CSOs, but the government is resisting. Efforts will continue into 2012.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4

Given the global economic downturn over the last few years, long-term service provision by NGOs, especially those dependent on foreign funding, has become almost non-existent. FBOs' service provision has also been hampered by the economic crisis, as local supporters have been financially compromised. Nonetheless, CSOs continued to provide a wide range of services, especially in Millennium Development Goal areas including health, HIV/AIDS, water, and children.

Service Provision in Kenya

2009	2010	2011
3.5	3.4	3.4

This year, most service provision was shaped by the availability of funds. For example, the fallout between the government and donors over a corruption scandal in the government-funded education sector meant more donor funding was directed toward CSOs working on education. The Kenya for Kenyans campaign gave a financial boost to emergency response work and the Kenya Red Cross society led a massive emergency initiative all over the country.

Generally, services provided do not respond to community needs, reflect community priorities, or use the best methodology. Rather, they reflect donor priorities and interests.

Because the poor cannot pay for services, most CSOs are reluctant to venture into cost recovery, and prefer to provide free or heavily subsided services. CSOs also fear other types of cost recovery efforts will lead to prioritization of commercial goals at the expense of development goals. However, a number of CSOs are being forced by decreased funding opportunities to consider cost recovery options.

Many government officials appreciate the role CSOs play in providing services to marginalized communities, where CSOs are often the only service providers, and local communities have come to rely on their services. The government increasingly provides funding to CSOs to support service delivery. For example, the National Disability Fund received KES 200 million ($2.4 million) in the 2011/12 budget. The Fund disburses resources to organizations for persons with disabilities, including self-help groups, CBOs, NGOs, and societies, with the aim of channeling credit to entrepreneurs with disabilities and providing start-up funds for group-based income-generating projects. The government's Community Development Funds and several ministries, such as the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development, also support the work of CSOs. For example, the Ministry of Gender has contracted CSOs to disburse accessible and affordable credit to registered women's groups that aim to start or expand businesses for wealth and employment creation.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.7

Kenya has both training institutions and individual trainers. AMREF provides fee-based services, and Act Change Transform! (ACT!, formerly Pact Kenya) and AAIK provide no-cost training. Contracted consultants also provide a range of training services in response to CSO demand, including on resource mobilization, internal governance, and project planning.

Infrastructure in Kenya

2009	2010	2011
3.7	3.7	3.7

1.0
3.0
5.0
7.0

This year, donors moved away from supporting traditional capacity building that focuses on a few specific areas, such as financial management, in favor of new, more sustainable techniques, such as organizational mentoring, which build the overall capacity of organizations to become effective change agents.

At least forty CSOs, as well as large private sector firms and INGOS, sub-grant funds. There are a few local grantmaking institutions, such as the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) and the East Africa Association of Grantmakers (EAAG), whose members include the Rattansi Education Trust, a Kenyan family foundation set up in 1956. A few companies such as Safaricom have started setting up foundations. Companies fund water, education, environment conservation, entrepreneurship, health, economic empowerment, disaster relief, and arts and culture.

Long, drawn-out leadership disputes and warring factions characterize the National NGO Council, the umbrella body for NGOs, and weaken the NGO sector.

There is some information sharing among CSOs with common interests in areas such as the constitution, land, HIV/AIDS, agriculture, and the dairy sector. However, outside of a few well-organized networks, and given the weak NGO Council, information flow within civil society as a whole remains weak.

Partnerships between CSOs and the government, the private sector, and the media, as well as corporate social responsibility (CSR) partnerships, are on the rise. In addition to the Kenyans for Kenya campaign, Safaricom and other corporations supported the Safaricom-Lewa Marathon, which raises funds for the Lewa Foundation's education, community development, health, and wildlife conservation projects.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3

The new constitution was of interest to both CSOs and the media, and there was a lot of positive coverage of CSOs' constitution-related activities, such as press conferences by CSOs urging the government to sustain the momentum in implementing legislation and setting up constitutional mechanisms. Many articles were carried free of charge, since the interests of the media and CSOs converged. The media also gave a lot of positive coverage to the Kenya for Kenyans campaign.

Public Image in Kenya

2009	2010	2011
4.3	4.3	4.3

1.0
3.0
5.0
7.0

The NGO Coordination Board found that in 2011, 135 newspaper articles covered NGOs, over two-thirds of which were positive. However, only a few large CSOs such as the Kenya Red Cross Society enjoy regular media attention, in large part because they have publicity budgets and are media savvy. Few CSOs can afford to invest in publicity, and many remain ignorant about how to engage with the media. Furthermore, few CSOs use media platforms such as call-in talk shows to publicize their efforts.

Public perception of CSOs is mixed. Generally, the recipients of CSO efforts appreciate CSOs' role, especially where the government is perceived to have failed in its duties. The Kenya for Kenyans campaign gave many Kenyans confidence that by uniting they can formulate and support the implementation of solutions to perennial national challenges. However, there are members of the public who have a negative attitude towards CSOs, especially NGOs, which they view as mouthpieces of foreign interests with little impact to show for the large sums of money they receive. The public also seemed less willing to entertain CSOs that

criticized the government over its rush to pass laws that were faulty, because people wanted to see the implementation of the constitution. Compared to 2010, the NGO Coordination Board received more complaints from the public in 2011 about NGO accountability and governance.

Government officials usually have a positive view of CSOs that deliver services and work cooperatively with them. They also appreciate the role that CSOs play as employers and revenue sources.

The business sector generally views CSOs as needing to be more prudent in their use of resources and execution of programs. However, some private sector entities see CSOs as strategic partners with competencies in development. For example, the Chase Bank Foundation has launched the Stand Up for African Mothers campaign in partnership with AMREF, which has a long history of addressing health and maternal health issues. The campaign aims to train 15,000 midwives by 2015, reducing maternal deaths by 25 per cent.

Viwango, an institution that promotes standards and best practices in the CSO sector, set up a voluntary, independent mechanism for CSO certification. The mechanism is not yet ready for use, but will involve a signed commitment to implementing a code of practice and standards, an internal self-analysis with a self-assessment tool, and a certification site visit.

Other CSO efforts towards self-regulation include the Civil Society of the Year Award (CSOYA), an annual award given to CSOs for their exemplary democratization work. The Health NGOs Network (HENNET) is a signatory to the Health Sector Code of Conduct, which binds health sector stakeholders to certain guidelines.

LIBERIA

2011 Scores for Liberia

Category	Score
CSO Sustainability	4.8
Legal Environment	4.9
Organizational Capacity	5.1
Financial Viability	5.8
Advocacy	4.1
Service Provision	4.4
Infrastructure	4.8
Public Image	4.7

1.0   3.0   5.0   7.0

Sustainability Enhanced   **Sustainability Evolved**   **Sustainability Impeded**

Capital: Monrovia

Government Type: Republic

Population: 3,887,886 (July 2011 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $500

Human Development Index: 182

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.8

The political and economic environment in Liberia in 2011 led to an overall improvement in the sustainability of the civil society sector. Presidential and general elections were held in October of this year; the presidency, half the senate, and all legislative seats were contested. Following a run-off vote, the incumbent president won an additional six-year term, with a mandate to consolidate peace and to transition from recovery to national renewal and development. Voters effected sweeping changes in both the senate and legislature. Elections were generally peaceful, although the death of an opposition protester on the eve of the run-off vote led to the main opposition party's withdrawal from the election. Earlier in the year, voters rejected a national referendum held on various proposals for constitutional changes, including lowering the residency requirement for presidential candidates from ten to five years, moving the presidential election from October to November, and increasing the retirement age for Supreme Court justices from sixty-five to seventy-five years.

CSO Sustainability in Liberia

Year	Score
2009	4.8
2010	4.8
2011	4.8

The pace of economic activities during the election year was slow. Wary of the potential massive changes wrought by the election, major economic players were cautious about investing and spending and donors delayed a number of new projects. Public sector employees were also nervous about losing their jobs to those aligned with the new administration.

During 2011, the NGO Coordination Unit within the

Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs accredited and certified 232 new organizations, bringing the total number of accredited CSOs to 838. No estimate of the number of unaccredited CSOs is available.

CSOs continue to operate freely and without harassment, with little change from last year. CSOs believe that the National Policy on Non-Governmental Organizations in Liberia (NGO Policy), the only instrument regulating CSOs, needs to be enacted into a law that specifies that the NGO Coordination Unit alone is responsible for CSO accreditation. Currently, several government agencies are involved in accreditation, which makes both the process of receiving accreditation and the overall coordination of the sector confusing and cumbersome.

Capacity building and infrastructure remain areas of concern. Most organizations do not undertake strategic planning and do not have the experience and knowledge to raise funds from local sources. In addition, most CSOs hire staff only on a project basis. Although service delivery is diverse, CSOs struggle to manage the cost of these activities. Most CSOs are donor-dependent and would shut down without international donor funding. CSOs generally do not engage in networking to share expertise, as many organizations are protective of their strategies and information.

The opening of direct lines of communication between CSOs and policymakers signifies increasing cooperation between CSOs and the national government. In 2011, advocacy initiatives were particularly effective in restoring the social development fund, which had been suspended because of abuses by public officials. CSOs also advocated on other issues, including education, HIV, natural resources, and human rights. The CSO sector's relationship with the business community is also improving, especially with transnational corporations. In 2011, the iron ore mining company Arcelor-Mittal awarded a contract to the CSO Merlin Liberia to operate a clinic in the port city of Buchanan.

Media coverage of the CSO sector is inadequate, both in quantity and content. The public perception of CSOs is still generally negative, especially at the national level. At the community level, CSOs seem to be viewed more favorably because communities believe they can benefit from CSOs.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9

Over the past year, the NGO Policy has gained more recognition as the main instrument regulating domestic and international CSOs. The NGO Policy outlines the conditions a CSO must meet to register and get accredited. A CSO can be dissolved or lose its accreditation if it fails to fulfill all reporting requirements or operate in accordance with its work plans approved by the Ministry of Planning.

Legal Environment in Liberia

2009 — 5.0   2010 — 4.9   2011 — 4.9

The National Registry provides a one-stop shop for CSOs to incorporate and obtain tax-exempt status. After incorporating, an organization can register and receive accreditation with the NGO Coordination Unit, which is based in the Ministry of Planning in Monrovia. Neither the Coordination Unit nor any line ministry has set up facilities outside of Monrovia to ease registration and accreditation of organizations operating in rural areas. The inaccessibility of the Coordination Unit to many organizations, particularly given the difficulties of transportation throughout the country, causes major delays in registering and certifying CSOs. A previous plan to establish online registration was not implemented.

Though the NGO Policy recognizes the NGO Coordination Unit as the authority to register and accredit organizations, other ministries still register CSOs, and multiple agencies extra-legally involve themselves in accreditation. The NGO Coordination Unit has introduced an annual fee of $400 for registering local CSOs and $500 for international CSOs. The participation of multiple ministries in registration and certification

increases the likelihood of an organization paying duplicate fees. The overlapping involvement of ministries also undermines the Unit's authority and allows for the operation of organizations that may not have a clear sense of direction. Many CSOs feel that the NGO Policy is not sufficient to reduce these weaknesses in coordination and that a law is necessary.

CSOs are required to submit periodic reports on their programs and finances, including statements on the sources and uses of funds. Although there has been some improvement in this regard recently, most CSOs fail to meet submit required reports. Beyond requesting reports, the Ministry has no concrete plan to independently monitor organizations.

During 2011, there were isolated cases of harassment by public officials. In Grand Bassa County, a local organization was denied the use of an administrative building for no given reason. In addition, government officials sometimes request to have private meetings with CSO leaders before signing certificates or other documents.

There are still few lawyers available to local CSOs, but local bar associations are emerging and mitigating this issue; the Liberia National Bar Association, with program support from the American Bar Association since 2010, has established chapters of the bar in all political subdivisions. As a way of giving recognition to the local chapters, the National Bar rotates the hosting of quarterly conventions among the chapters.

CSOs are regarded as not-for-profit entities and are generally exempt from taxes on income and most imports. Income-tax exemptions are accorded, permanently, at the time of registration, while exemptions from import duties are usually on a case-by-case basis. The process to obtain an exemption from import duties is lengthy and complicated, and most organizations pay taxes because it facilitates clearing imports at ports of entry.

There is no legislation that enables CSOs to earn income. However, a few CSOs incorporated in 2011 included provisions for generating income in their articles of incorporation. CSOs are allowed to compete for government contracts, but due to limited institutional capacity, most local CSOs are generally unable to compete for government contracting opportunities.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1

Organizational Capacity in Liberia

Internal management systems did not change significantly in the past year. The internal management structure of most CSOs remains unclear. Not all organizations have boards, and when they do, there is no clear distinction between the roles of board and management. It is still common to have a director overstepping his or her policy advisory role to be involved in the day-to-day affairs of the organization.

There were, however, encouraging developments in the area of constituency building. At the national level, CSOs continue to struggle to find shared values with their target populations. However, there are encouraging signs of constituency building at the local level and in rural areas. For example, the Liberia Initiative Development Services (LIDS), a local organization that mobilizes groups of women in Bong and Lofa Counties around commercial activities, is considering expanding its program to include establishing small rural community banks. The LIDS initiative launched in 2011, is entirely local, and is not driven by external funding.

Most organizations do not have strategic plans and lack the capacity to develop or implement long- or medium-term goals or strategic plans. CSOs have limited appreciation of the value of planning and those

organizations that understand what strategic planning is often lack the internal capacity to develop a strategic plan.

Most organizations do not have permanent paid staff. Typically, CSOs operate on a project basis and link employment directly to projects, as funding does not allow them to maintain long-term staff. In addition, CSO founders and supporters tend to reserve employment opportunities for their friends and relatives, regardless of qualification. Further, it is difficult for CSOs to recruit and retain volunteers because potential volunteers expect compensation that most CSOs are unable to afford.

Few CSOs have modern office equipment, and those that do lack the skills to use them. Donor funding is usually insufficient to cover office equipment; most organizations use Internet cafés and commercial printers or secretarial services.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.8

Many CSOs do not have a steady source of funding. Most organizations also lack sufficient or diverse enough funding to remain viable over the long-term, and some organizations remain inactive during periods when they lack funding. Most CSOs rely completely on foreign donors. Most organizations do not raise funds locally, lacking both the experience and technical capacity to fundraise. CSOs are complacent, and have not invested any effort toward building resource-mobilization capabilities. Rather, they operate in anticipation of tapping into external funding or becoming implementing partners to national or international organizations.

Financial Viability in Liberia

2009	2010	2011
5.8	5.8	5.8

Some organizations have realized that they can be financially viable without donor support. For example, LIDS started its initiative with UNDP support. After this support expired, LIDS continued its work with women's groups, helping them realize that they can mobilize resources within their communities.

Other organizations also attempt to diversify their funding sources. Organizations such as Planned Parenthood Federation/Liberia and the New African Research and Development Agency (NARDA) charge membership fees; however, these are rarely paid. In 2011, NARDA and Development Education Network/Liberia (DEN/L), a national, faith-based development education group, were local partners to The Mitchell Group under a five-year M & E USAID contract. A number of local CSOs such as the Children Assistance Program (CAP), National Adult Education & Literacy (NAEL), and the Community Empowerment Program (CEP) are presently engaged by the Ministry of Gender as service providers, training adolescent girls and young women in life skills and business training.

CSOs struggle with pervasive poor financial management practices. Few have adequate technical experience or the resources to establish and maintain a simple accounting system. Accountability and routine financial reporting are rare.

CSOs do not actively pursue government contracts, neglecting an avenue for income generation as well as an opportunity to provide more services to their constituencies.

ADVOCACY: 4.1

Cooperation between CSOs and the national government improved in 2011, as there are now direct lines of communication between CSOs and policy makers. For example, early in the year, a consortium of CSOs

Advocacy in Liberia

	2009	2010	2011
1			
3	4.3	4.2	4.1
5			
7			

under the umbrella of the Community Forestry Management met with government officials on promulgating regulations on community rights in forestry matters; in June 2011, the national legislature passed the Community Rights Law, addressing this issue.

Advocacy has been effective in restoring the social development fund. The national government established the fund to support infrastructure and service delivery projects selected by communities. However, after multiple reports of gross misuse of the fund, the government suspended it. Organizations operating in Nimba, Bong, and Bassa Counties, in which the bulk of social development funds were spent, interceded with the government to restore the program. The program was restored on condition that a full financial audit of fund activities in each county is conducted, and that a management audit is instituted to guard against further abuses. The General Audit Commission conducted audits, and a tender was released that invited firms to bid on conducting management systems audits.

CSOs have advocated around education, HIV, natural resources, and human rights. In 2011, a coalition of organizations campaigned in support of the Whistle Blower Act pending in the legislature.

There is no organized lobbying in Liberia. Interest groups seeking to raise awareness or petition to shape a public agenda do so in an unplanned fashion. When the issue has passed, any group that has formed dissolves. It is therefore doubtful that the consortium established to advocate for community rights in forestry or the Whistle Blower Act will survive.

Many CSOs hope that strengthening and passing the NGO Policy into law will benefit the sector. They believe that wider awareness of a favorable legislative framework will further strengthen and consolidate reforms.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.4

CSOs deliver a diverse range of services in health care delivery, education, agriculture and food security, human rights, and peace building. Given the evolving transition in the country from relief to development, services are changing from the likes of food-for-work, food-for-school, skills training, and backyard gardening to include fisheries and lowland development, enterprise development, youth empowerment, and rural banking. The Lofa-Net CSO coalition has made advances in supporting thirty-two women's groups in the Zorzor and Voinjama Districts in

Service Provision in Liberia

	2009	2010	2011
1			
3	4.4	4.4	4.4
5			
7			

various activities of the women's choosing, including agriculture. CSOs also offer training and consulting services to members, communities, and other CSOs, and issue publications.

Service delivery remains largely influenced by donors. While these interventions are making some impact on vulnerable beneficiaries, they would have been of greater impact if they reflected the needs of communities or at least were properly introduced. For instance, insecticide-treated nets were introduced in a southeastern Liberian community. The idea of nets was not community-generated, and their purpose was not adequately explained. Ultimately, the nets were used for purposes other than protection from mosquitoes.

CSOs do not typically network to share expertise. Many organizations are reluctant to share information with others because they are concerned that their information may be used to develop a competing project. There

are, however, exceptional cases where an expert from an organization is assigned to work with another organization. Action Aid has occasionally seconded a project officer to a CSO to mentor the organization.

Managing costs is a major challenge for CSOs. Communities believe that CSOs have ample funding to offer free services and products for beneficiaries, which makes it difficult for CSOs to ask for payments for services.

Though national and local government have begun to recognize the value of CSOs, they are still not engaging fully with the sector. Governments do not provide CSOs with subsidies or grants, although a school grant program managed by the Ministry of Education was restored in 2011.

There are examples of CSOs and coalition groups offering services to constituencies beyond their membership. During the general elections, the Liberia Media Center published its election results on the Internet. Quarterly newsletters by NARDA provide updates to non-members on developments in community works around the country.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.8

Infrastructure in Liberia

2009   2010   2011

4.8   4.8   4.8

Infrastructure showed no significant improvement from last year. There are no new resource centers. NARDA continues to provide limited resource services to its members at its head office and through county network offices. During the year, We Care Inc., a local organization, established another library in the eastern suburb of Monrovia, but this new location does not improve access to resource materials since most CSOs are in rural communities across the country. Further, the library's materials, mostly textbooks or textbook supplements, target youth and students, not development and community initiatives.

There are few training opportunities for CSOs. NARDA offers courses in various aspects of development, including project cycle management, proposal development, financial management, advocacy/lobbying, organization development, strategic planning, sustainability, and participatory rapid appraisal. DEN/L periodically offers various training modules in areas such as change management, community mobilization, and leadership. DEN/L has also designed programs tailored to the needs of individual local CSOs and rents out its facilities to other organizations.

There is no local grant making in Liberia. In 2011, the Ministry of Education restored the school grant system that was administered prior to the armed conflict. However, there are limitations to the school grants. The schools that receive grants are generally community-based schools supported by government-paid staff; the grant does not cover schools under private management, which have been recognized for providing quality education in Liberia. Furthermore, the program's grant administration suffers from financial malpractice.

Intersectoral partnership with the government included the engagement of the Liberia Media Center to publicize election results on the Internet.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.7

Overall, the sector's public image remains consistent with 2010. Media coverage of CSOs is lacking in both frequency and content. The media does not distinguish between CSOs and businesses, no media outlets have dedicated sections on CSOs, and coverage is costly. Furthermore, CSOs have not created a forum for

partnering with the media. CSOs use the print media to publicize vacancy notices. Upcountry community radios, which have a wider reach than newspapers outside of Monrovia, are still being used to reach communities with news and event announcements.

Public Image in Liberia

2009	2010	2011
4.7	4.7	4.7

The public perception of many CSOs is still largely negative; there is a belief that CSOs have a lot of money but use it ineffectively and that they are not doing anything for communities. International organizations in particular have come under fire, with communities claiming that signboards placed at project sites are the only visible evidence that a project is underway. Local communities, where most CSOs operate, seem to have a more positive view of CSOs and their work because they believe that CSOs can benefit them in concrete ways. CSOs have not developed public relations campaigns to change the public's perception of the sector's role.

Government officials also perceive that CSOs are not making the best use of donor money. Some view CSOs, especially international organizations, as a means for donors to circumvent the government. Because of this, partnerships between CSOs and the government have broken down.

CSOs are developing a more engaging relationship with the business community, especially transnational corporations. In 2011, Arcelor-Mittal Liberia contracted the CSO Merlin Liberia to manage its clinic in Buchanan. Chevron and Merlin held discussions to design and implement a reproductive health project in Grand Bassa County as part of Chevron's corporate social responsibility; this project is expected to be implemented in 2012.

As in previous years, CSOs still show limited commitment to being transparent to the public. Very few CSOs conduct external audits and when such audits are done, results are not published.

MALAWI

2011 Scores for Malawi

Indicator	Score
CSO Sustainability	5.1
Legal Environment	5.2
Organizational Capacity	5.3
Financial Viability	5.8
Advocacy	4.4
Service Provision	4.5
Infrastructure	5.6
Public Image	5.0

Scale: 1.0 Sustainability Enhanced — 3.0 Sustainability Evolved — 5.0 Sustainability Impeded — 7.0

Capital: Lilongwe

Government Type: Multiparty Democracy

Population: 16,323,044 (July 2012 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $900

Human Development Index: 171

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.1

Modern civil society in Malawi emerged from the welfare societies, cultural associations, trade and workers unions, producer and consumer cooperatives, and independent religious organizations that were formed during the colonial period. From the 1940s through the 1950s, these more or less autonomous organizations came together to form the nationalist movement and advocate for the country's independence. During the one-party era (1964-1993), the sector was largely replaced by the state; the most successful organizations during this period were faith-based organizations (FBOs). In the 1990s, human rights and good governance organizations, labor and student organizations, FBOs, and media grew rapidly. Organizations involved in both service delivery and advocacy assisted with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) development process in Malawi, and slowly started to organize under umbrella organizations.

Malawian CSOs are highly dependent on foreign funding and competition for resources and visibility is high. Many CSOs are "one man shows" and lack or have weak missions and strategic plans. There is a capacity gap between local and national level organizations, with little interaction between the two types of organizations. The government perceives CSOs that criticize government policy or engage in governmental monitoring as siding with the opposition.

CSOs engage in a wide range of activities, including advocacy and lobbying, human rights, democracy and governance, capacity building, gender and development, and media development. Social service activities include projects in agriculture and food security, construction and infrastructure development, counseling, disability, disaster management, drug and substance abuse, education, energy, environment, land and natural

resources management, health, HIV/ AIDS, microcredit and finance, orphan care and children's affairs, social rehabilitation, water and sanitation, and youth empowerment.

It is difficult to determine how many CSOs are registered in Malawi because organizations can register under many different organizational forms; a CSO can register as an NGO under the NGO Act, a trust under the Trustees Incorporation Act, or a limited company by guarantee under the Company Act among many other forms of registration.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.2

The NGO Act of 2000 provides for the development of a strong independent civil society and facilitates the formation and effective function of NGOs for public benefit purposes. Although passed over a decade ago, the law is still not implemented fully. For instance, the law requires the government to appoint an NGO Board to provide oversight over the operations of NGOs, but the Board was still not constituted by the end of 2011. The NGO Law requires organizations to submit annual and periodic reports to the responsible ministry, but this has not been enforced due to the absence of an NGO Board.

The registration process for NGOs in Malawi is not clearly defined. According to the NGO Act, an NGO should register with the Registrar of NGOs through the NGO Board, neither of which exists. Moreover, over the past five years, the government has shifted responsibilities for NGO coordination from the Office of the Vice President to the Office of the President and Cabinet and then to the Ministry of Gender. Multiple offices are responsible for registration, depending on the type of organization. For example, CBOs and FBOs can register as NGOs at a Ministry of Local Government's district council. Trusts register with the Office of the President and Cabinet, and limited companies by guarantee register through the Registrar of Companies. International charitable and voluntary organizations registered outside Malawi can be recognized through a memorandum of understanding with a relevant ministry or department.

Registration for service delivery organizations is simple, as they are generally viewed as partners to the government. CSOs working on human rights and governance issues, however, often have tense relations with the government, and may face difficulties registering. It is also difficult for an organization to register if "Malawi" is part of its name, as "Malawi" is protected under the Protect Names and Emblems Act. A CSO wishing to use the word "Malawi" in its name must obtain the consent of the Minister of Justice, which can be time-consuming.

CSOs are free to engage in any activity as long as they remain apolitical. CSOs working in service delivery and non-confrontational policy issues are generally allowed to operate freely, while those working on human rights and governance issues face serious hurdles. For instance, the government accuses CSOs advocating for minority rights of being sponsored by foreign governments and labels them as mercenaries.

The Police Act stipulates that organizers of any demonstration or public rally must receive permission from the Police or City Councils; failure to obtain permission can result in arrest. Nationwide demonstrations organized on July 20, 2011 to protest the government's inaction in addressing the worsening economic and socio-political environment in the country were marred by confusion over whether the proper permissions were received in advance. The protests culminated in violence and looting; twenty people were killed by the police during the demonstrations. In October 2011, five human rights activists were arrested for protesting during the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Heads of State meeting. The activists carried banners denouncing the dictatorial tendencies of the President and Malawi's hosting of Sudanese President Omar al Bashir of North Sudan, currently wanted by the International Criminal Court for genocide in Darfur.

In general, CSOs pay all taxes unless they are using tax-exempt funding from foreign donors such as the European Union. CSOs that receive tax-exempt funding must pay taxes up-front and then get reimbursed. The Finance Minister changes the tax regime affecting CSOs regularly. In 2011, for example, the government

announced that CSOs are no longer automatically tax-exempt. Instead, institutions that are eligible for tax exemptions must go through a time-consuming process to seek authorization from the Minister. In addition, the Finance Minister decided that no CSOs, including churches, are exempted from paying taxes on building materials and capital equipment like vehicles any longer.

CSOs are free to engage in income-generating activities and compete for government contracts. However, most CSOs do not take sufficient advantage of opportunities to generate income because either they lack resource mobilization strategies or they limit their fundraising to applying for grants through calls for proposals. In practice, only some service delivery organizations take advantage of the legal possibility to earn revenue by engaging in income-generating activities or competing for government contracts.

The number of lawyers who understand NGO law is increasing, but remains quite low. Private lawyers' fees are considered exorbitant and out of the reach of most CSOs; therefore, most CSOs, especially local organizations and CBOs, take advantage of pro bono legal advice when possible. For example, the Women Lawyers Association provides pro bono services to CSOs addressing gender-related issues. The Malawi Law Society provides legal advice to NGOs at a reasonable cost. During the July demonstrations, members of the Malawi Law Society provided legal services to CSOs when the courts issued an injunction barring the CSOs from holding nationwide demonstrations.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.3

Most CSOs do not conduct needs assessments or otherwise consult with their constituents; therefore, their initiatives do not always reflect constituents' needs. Some CSOs do try to build local constituencies, albeit with limited success. Faith-based organizations such as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Church of Central Africa, Presbyterian (CCAP), tend to have the strongest constituencies.

Urban-based CSOs, especially those dealing with governance and human rights issues, and membership networks have the most trouble connecting with constituents as they lack a presence in local communities. Moreover, due to resource constraints, few rural participants attend meetings in the cities. On the other hand, service-delivery CSOs establish committees and structures that actively engage their constituents in order to enhance constituent ownership and program sustainability.

Some Malawian CSOs have clearly defined missions and strategic plans to which they adhere; many CSOs pursue donor priorities instead. In addition, CSOs rarely update strategic plans due to the limited funding available for institutional development.

On paper, most CSOs have governance systems and structures that clearly segregate powers. In reality, however, some CSOs lack an appropriate division of responsibilities between their boards of directors and staff members and many CSOs lack effective governance systems altogether. Furthermore, many local CSOs suffer from "founder syndrome," in which the founders make all organizational decisions without effective supervision from their boards, which are comprised of the founder's friends and associates.

Most CSOs find it difficult to retain qualified staff due to limited funding and donors' reluctance to cover administrative costs. Most CSOs have human resources practices and personnel policies in place, including recruitment procedures and staff welfare policies. However, local CSOs have challenges implementing these policies. Most CSOs do not sufficiently recruit volunteers. Some service delivery CSOs have engaged community-based educators, who assist on a voluntary basis. Volunteerism is more limited around human rights and governance issues.

Urban CSOs generally have basic offices and capital assets, including motor vehicles and motorcycles, most of which are purchased with donor funding at a project's inception. However, district-level CSOs do not have the funding to purchase or maintain adequate office equipment. In addition, many CSO staff members do not

know how to use technology, and donors are often unwilling to fund the purchase of IT equipment or to support technology training.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.8

CSOs are primarily dependent on foreign funding. As a result of the global financial crisis, local CSOs had access to less funding this year.

While some organizations are able to access funds from both international and local foundations and trusts, very few CSOs have truly diverse sources of funding as a result of limited proposal development capacity, weak resource mobilization strategies, and the global financial crisis. Most CSOs survive from one project to another. Most donors will not support overhead or administrative costs.

Support from local sources is very limited and the few local philanthropic organizations that exist have political ties. Few CSOs engage in local fundraising. The government awards contracts to CSOs to deliver some services, including health services and cash transfer projects to vulnerable households.

Very few CSOs have assets that they can rent out to other institutions to generate income. Membership-based organizations collect dues, although some members do not pay because they do not see the benefits. CSOs believe that networks should help their members access funds to implement activities. In practice, however, networks often act as implementers, competing with their members for scarce resources. Some service provision CSOs, including those that provide health-related services, charge their beneficiaries fees, although fees do not cover the full costs of providing the services.

Funders require sound financial management systems and transparent reporting. Many organizations are only able to employ well-qualified financial personnel on a contractual basis for the duration of a specific project. Most organizations do not conduct overall institutional audits, but many conduct project-specific audits to meet donor requirements. While the NGO Law requires annual reports, this is not enforced because of the defunct NGO Board and weak capacity of the Council for Non-governmental Organizations in Malawi (CONGOMA).

ADVOCACY: 4.4

Service delivery organizations communicate and collaborate closely with the government at all levels. Many local CSOs participate in district-level decision-making processes and forums, including the District Executive Committees. The government at various levels also consults with CSOs and CSO coalitions on sector-related policy issues, in part because donors require this.

At the national level, CSOs have several opportunities to engage in policy making by participating in different government-initiated mechanisms, including Thematic Working Groups (TWGs), Sector Working Groups (SWGs), Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) reviews, and Sectoral Parliamentary Committees, including the Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Budget and Finance Committees. For example, the Civil Society Agriculture Network (CISANET) is a member of the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee, a multi-agency committee chaired by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development. CSOs also participate in the Food and Nutrition Security Joint Task Force/Technical Secretariat (FNJTF/TS) within the Ministry of Agriculture, which has different committees addressing issues such as food security and nutrition. For the past three years, the Ministry of Finance has been inviting input on the budget from various stakeholders, including CSOs.

In 2011, CSOs petitioned the government to address the deteriorating socio-economic and political standards in the country. When government failed to address these issues in a timely manner, CSOs organized nationwide demonstrations on July 20th, which culminated in violence and looting; twenty protestors were killed by police.

Political and civil space for CSO input has shrunk recently. A majority of parliamentarians are from the ruling party. As a result, the ruling party occupies the membership of a number of parliamentary committees, which eliminates the possibility to discuss diverse views. Furthermore, the ruling party uses the government and party machinery to stifle freedoms and hamper CSO operations. Specifically, the government isolates and castigates CSO leaders through the public media and limits public media coverage of CSOs leaders seen to be critical of the government.

Coalitions and networks such as the Malawi Economic Justice Network, the Malawi Health Equity Network, and the Civil Society Coalition for Basic Education bring together like-minded organizations on advocacy initiatives. In the past, CSO coalitions have organized advocacy initiatives such as the Jubilee 2000 Debt Cancellation campaign and the campaign against the privatization of the Agriculture Development Marketing Company, a government-run company that provides farmers with easy access to farm inputs.

CSOs have not pushed for legal reforms or new legislation to enhance the sector's effectiveness or sustainability. CSOs generally have limited understanding of the legal and regulatory framework that governs their operations, and therefore have little interest in lobbying for a review of the NGO Act.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5

CSOs deliver a wide range of services in agriculture and food security, capacity building, construction and infrastructure development, counseling, disability, disaster management, drug and substance abuse, education, energy, environment, land and natural resources management, gender and development, health, HIV/AIDS, media development, microcredit and finance, orphan care and children's affairs, social rehabilitation, water and sanitation, and youth empowerment.

CSO programming should be developed in response to local and government policy frameworks and guidelines, including district development plans, sectoral policies, and the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy. However, few CSOs take these policies into consideration when developing their activities, either due to donor influence or lack of knowledge and understanding of these guidelines.

CSO services in areas such as health, education, and water and sanitation are provided to broader constituents than their memberships. For instance, faith-based institutions provide basic services to the entire community regardless of a beneficiary's religious, tribal, or political status.

Few CSOs sell goods or services. Some CSOs do charge for services, such as health or education, in order to cover administrative costs. However, CSOs rarely charge their clients the actual costs of delivering their services, as they are subsidized by the government. The Centre for Social Concern conducts and publishes media analyses, which are sold by subscription. Most development CSOs implement programs with funding from development partners and do not try to recover costs.

The government generally appreciates CSOs' role in basic service delivery and cooperates with them. The government awards contracts to CSOs to provide services in areas like health and education. CSOs engaged in human rights and political governance advocacy generally do not get government funding for their work. One exception is during elections when the Malawi Electoral Commission provides funds to CSOs to conduct civic and voter education.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6

Local grantmaking organizations are almost nonexistent in Malawi. One exception is the National AIDS Commission (NAC), which provides resources to local and international CSOs for HIV/AIDS interventions. In addition, the Malawi government has established a fund called the Democracy Consolidation Program (DCP) to support governance and human rights CSOs.

A number of networks exist through which organizations in the same sector share information through meetings and newsletters. Online facilities like the CivSOc blog, a forum for dialogue on civil society issues, also provide space for information sharing. In practice, however, information sharing remains a challenge as not all CSOs have Internet access and not all CSOs participate in networks. In addition, some CSOs prefer to work alone in order to increase their visibility. CONGOMA is an umbrella body for NGOs in the country and is supposed to promote sector-wide information sharing and build sector capacity in resource mobilization, advocacy, and engagement with government. However, CONGOMA does not fulfill these roles effectively due to limited staff capacity.

Training institutions such as the Malawi Institute of Management provide general training, but such offerings are not specifically tailored to the issues CSOs face. Most training centers are located in urban areas, and most training materials are in English, making them inaccessible to CSOs located outside of cities. In addition, training opportunities are not publicized widely. Development partners usually organize workshops to address gaps and challenges identified through their programming. For example, the European Union offers workshops in governance and USAID offers training in health and livelihoods. However, such programs are not regularly scheduled. There are trainers specialized in CSO management, but they usually charge for their trainings.

Intersectoral partnerships continue to be rare.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0

Media coverage of CSO activities depends on the nature of the issues being addressed and the media strategy of a given CSO. The private media generally provides positive coverage of CSO activities through newspaper analysis, public debates, and live phone-in programs. In contrast, the state-owned media only covers activities and issues that are not perceived to be antagonistic toward the government. The government sometimes criticizes the private media if it seen as supporting or popularizing issues that the government deems antagonistic.

The media does not fully understand CSO issues. CSOs usually have to pay for media coverage. Other coverage is provided based on the personal connections of CSO leaders. Some CSOs have been accused of focusing more attention on obtaining media coverage than on building their constituencies.

The public has a positive perception of CSOs, although public understanding of what CSOs do is limited. There have been questions about CSOs' financial management practices, lack of transparency, and inappropriate use of funds. CSOs have publicized their work through the media and community local government structures in an effort to create a more positive image of the sector. Rural communities have less access to the print media and CSO activities, and therefore feel less connected to the sector than the urban population.

The Malawian business sector has a positive perception of CSOs, considering them as an alternative and credible source of information to the government on policy issues related to trade, investment, taxation, and competition. The government sometimes has a negative perception of CSOs working on advocacy and governance issues, especially when such advocacy is done without proper consultation or engagement with the relevant authorities and is only heard through media.

Most Malawian CSOs do not publish or disseminate annual reports since the enforcement of the NGO Act is weak. Although the NGO Act requires NGOs to subscribe to a code of ethics, NGOs' operations are not always in conformity to the code due to limited knowledge of the code, limited monitoring of compliance, and lack of enforcement mechanisms or structures.

MALI

2011 Scores for Mali

Dimension	Score
CSO Sustainability	4.4
Legal Environment	4.2
Organizational Capacity	4.2
Financial Viability	5.6
Advocacy	3.9
Service Provision	3.6
Infrastructure	4.6
Public Image	4.4

1.0   3.0   5.0   7.0
Sustainability Enhanced   **Sustainability Evolved**   **Sustainability Impeded**

Capital: Bamako

Government Type: Republic

Population: 14,533,511 (July 2011 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $1,100

Human Development Index: 175

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.4

The approaching presidential and legislative elections, scheduled for April 2012, an ongoing school crisis, and the escalating conflict in the north of Mali created a climate of uncertainty and tension for CSOs in 2011. CSOs engaged extensively in advocacy and lobbying in 2011, but these campaigns revealed divisions within the sector. In addition to the 1,254 registered CSOs in Mali, there are numerous informal, traditional groups, which are typically mosque associations or groups that follow a particular traditional religious leader (marabout). These groups do not always share the priorities of registered organizations. No statistics are available on informal, religiously-affiliated CSOs, but based on the assumption that each of Mali's 13,000 villages has two or three informal CSOs, it is estimated that there are approximately 40,000 to 60,000 such CSOs.

Divisions within the CSO sector were revealed in 2011 in the intense lobbying efforts surrounding the revision of Mali's 1962 Family Code. Women's rights and human rights organizations led a campaign to revise the code to include more egalitarian rules on inheritance and marriage, but these efforts were overwhelmed by

CSO Sustainability in Mali

	2009	2010	2011
	4.4	4.4	4.4

competing pressures from religious associations. Many consider the revision of the code that was ultimately adopted in December, 2011 to be a major step backwards for women's rights in Mali. CSOs also engaged actively in the political events of the year. The head of the independent national election commission (CENI) was selected from civil society and a proposed constitutional reform was the subject of significant lobbying.

The Support Program for CSOs (PAOSC) remained stable

and continued to provide support to CSOs, particularly in advocacy and public policy. Foundations, international CSOs, and private telecommunications firms responded to the food security crisis in Mali and across the Sahel in 2011 by launching funding initiatives to help the most vulnerable populations. However, foreign donors, following the guidelines of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, increasingly provided budgetary support directly to the central government in order to help it forge its own national development strategies. Some believe this has decreased the funding available to CSOs.

The Local Development Support Unit (CADB), an office within the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government (MATCL) charged with tracking CSOs, has warned that because many CSOs are created and supported primarily with foreign funds, the sector will suffer due to the ongoing international financial crisis. The CADB is expected to publish a report in June-July 2012 that will either confirm or deny this trend.

CSOs' own internal financial, organizational, and structural weaknesses also impeded the growth and sustainability of the sector. Decentralization has opened up new opportunities to CSOs including access to local resources allocated in the Economic and Social Development Programs (PDSEC) of local government, but many CSOs are not aware of these funds or do not have the capacity necessary to access them.

Nevertheless, CSOs' public image in Mali remained strong because the general population associated CSOs with public or collective investments such as constructing of schools, health centers, and wells.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.2

There are several laws that govern CSOs and specify the requirements for technical and financial reporting, authorized activities, and the conditions for dissolution. Law 04-038 of 2004 governs NGOs; Law 01-176 of July 2001 regulates cooperative societies; and Law 93-044 of August 1993 regulates the Regional Chambers for Agriculture (ARAM) and the Permanent Assembly of Agricultural Chambers (APCAM), which is a public institution set up by the state with representatives from rural associations. Law 21 governs the Consular Chambers. Labor unions are governed

Legal Environment in Mali

by the International Labor Organization (ILO)'s conventions 87 of 1948 and convention 98 of 1949. There are still no laws regulating umbrella organizations such as the Forum of International NGOs and the Forum on Civil Society, or foundations, though there is an existing bill for foundations that has not yet been passed.

The MATCL oversees all CSOs through the CADB and its decentralized offices, and the sectoral government ministries provide additional oversight. The Ministry of Education, for example, manages the Parent Teachers Associations (APEs). Associations and CBOs are registered on the basis of a certification (*récépissé*) issued by the CADB, which can be obtained by submitting an application, minutes from a general assembly meeting, internal operating procedures, and contact information of the senior management. However, the government became more diligent in 2011 in conducting background checks on new associations, which caused delays in some cases. This was an attempt by the government to minimize the number of fictive associations, particularly those associated with smuggling and trafficking of illegal goods. CSOs also sometimes face corruption and solicitation of small bribes to have their application reviewed. CBOs and women's rights organizations are less likely to be registered because they often do not understand the procedures for registering at the local level.

1,254 associations have additionally signed a Framework Agreement (*Accord-Cadre*) with the government, which entitles them to certain benefits but subjects them to additional requirements. Signing the Framework Agreement is not mandatory but an association must be active for at least three years in order to sign the

document. The registration process for this status is more involved and requires the submission of reports and financial records from the CSO's three years of existence and greater detail on their areas of intervention.

CSOs must submit an annual report detailing their finances and activities each year. Authorized activities are established in the Framework Agreements and must be aligned with the national and decentralized development plans. A national, regional, or local commission monitors and evaluates the effectiveness and impact of CSOs' projects and programs that are signatory to a Framework Agreement. However, the government does not have the resources to monitor all the activities of CBOs throughout the county.

The government can dissolve a CSO if it is engaging in overtly political activities, but this rarely happens and CSOs are permitted to conduct activities in civic education, governance, and anticorruption and to participate in the development and implementation of public policy. The government can also dissolve a CSO if the organization violates the terms of its Framework Agreement. For example, due to scarcity of funding, CSOs frequently bid on projects outside of their declared areas of intervention as outlined in their Framework Agreement. This technically constitutes a violation of the Framework Agreement, but in practice, this is rarely enforced.

CSOs that are signatories to a Framework Agreement are eligible for tax exemptions on goods and services necessary for the implementation of its activities. Income-generating professional organizations are granted trading licenses after registering with the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Individuals and businesses that donate to CSOs, however, cannot deduct their contributions from their taxable income. Generally, both the tax system and the Framework Agreement are unclear on CSOs' tax liability. The relevant articles of the Framework Agreement can be read differently, leaving the impression that some exemptions are to be negotiated.

No laws specifically regulate the ability of CSOs to generate income. Consular chambers and community health associations (ASACOs), which manage all community health clinics including their operating expenses, fees, and staff, are legally authorized to charge fees to recover their costs. All CSOs are authorized to bid on grants and contracts to implement projects. Service provision is taxed by the Service Provision Tax (TPS) or Service Provision Contribution (CPS), but the application and monitoring of this tax is very ambiguous.

There are no lawyers in Mali that specialize in CSO law.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.2

Organizational Capacity in Mali

The most professional CSOs increasingly develop strategic plans, often to meet donor requirements. However, most CSOs do not have staff with sufficient training in strategic planning, and many organizations focus on the implementation of particular interventions while neglecting their institutional development. Donors tend to favor projects that provide basic social services, such access to drinkable water, health, and education, rather than projects that provide training, capacity building, and institutional support to CSOs.

Many CSOs have clearly defined statutes, internal policies, and procedure manuals, but in many cases, these policies are not properly implemented and CSOs are dominated by a single individual. Many organizations do not hold their general assembly meetings, board meetings, and executive management meetings as frequently as required by law. External audits are also mandatory but rarely occur, in part because of a lack of funding. Many CSOs do not publish technical or financial reports and many CBOs do not even have procedure manuals or functional bank accounts. In the absence of new capacity-building measures or regulations, there was no improvement in this area in 2011.

Most CSOs cannot retain permanent staff because of limited resources and because they implement foreign-funded projects of limited duration. Smaller associations and CBOs do not issue employment contracts based on a scope of work. This year, the Agency of Employment Promotion of Youth (APEJ) placed 3,000 young educated volunteers in public services, local government bodies, consular organizations, and other CSOs. However, these volunteers receive a small stipend from the government with a contribution from the organization. CSOs are typically unable to mobilize broad volunteer support at the community level for infrastructure projects and other community development. Most CSOs do not have long-term funding, so their use of accounting and legal services is inconsistent.

CSOs remain dependent on donor funding for modern office equipment. CSOs regularly use new information and communication technologies, but this is less common among CBOs.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.6

CSOs remain largely dependent on foreign donor agencies and have not developed a culture of mobilizing local resources. Funding from multilateral and bilateral donors accounts for about three-fourths of Mali's budget for development, but funding available to CSOs has declined as donors increasingly shift to providing general or sectoral budget support directly to the government. However, multilateral and bilateral assistance is still available to CSOs and some international NGOs continue to fund Malian CSOs and national umbrella organizations.

Financial Viability in Mali

2009	2010	2011
5.7	5.6	5.6

Notably, the 1.2 billion FCFA ($2,393,160) pilot phase of the Support Program for CSOs (PAOSC 1) recently ended. The organization created through this project will implement the second phase of the project (PAOSC 2). The second phase will be led by the EU and has a budget of over 13 billion FCFA ($25,925,900) over five years, funded by a partnership of all donors in the Technical and Financial Partners group (PTF).

Foreign funding was also available for initiatives to support the 2012 and 2014 elections. However, the PTF generally provides less funding for the institutional development and operational expenses of CSOs and more for concrete activities.

Though less significant than donor funding, there are other sources of funding available to CSOs. International foundations such as the Orange Foundation, the Youth Foundation, the Foundation Partage, the Bank of America Foundation, and the Aga Khan Foundation and local foundations including the Thiam, Salif Keïta, Pathfinder, and the Oumou Sangaré foundations all provide funding to CSOs. Malian expatriates, particularly in France, fund projects in their native villages in health, education, drinkable water, solar energy-related infrastructures. The private sector also contributes to CSOs. The Employers Federation, for example, provides funding and equipment to support community development and relief for the poor and disaster victims. However, the overall quantity of this funding is still quite low. Foundations and businesses generally fund charities, welfare activities, and visible projects that create good publicity. The Aga Khan Foundation is a notable exception as it funds multiyear development programs rather than individual, small-scale projects.

A few local CSOs have successfully organized telethons and fundraising events featuring Malian artists and celebrities. International NGOs experienced in fundraising do not provide training for local CSOs in this area, but retired businessmen are increasingly working at CSOs and contributing their experience in this area. However, these activities are still in their infancy. Generally, even the most professional CSOs have weak capacity for outreach and communications and do not systematically mobilize resources.

Professional CSOs that implement large grants and contracts are required by their contracts to develop strong financial management systems. CBOs, however, have weak financial controls.

Some CSOs charge fees for managing public markets, stockyards, fountains and stations, and other community infrastructure. This is much less common for projects funded by the private sector. CSOs raise very little revenue through internal resources such as membership fees.

ADVOCACY: 3.9

Advocacy in Mali

2009   2010   2011

1
3   4.1   3.9   3.9
5
7

Several frameworks for cooperation between CSOs and the government continued to function in 2011. The government has held annual consultations with CSOs that are signatories to a Framework Agreement for the last ten years excluding the years 2006-2008. The government also conducts annual reviews of sectoral programming with the participation of sectoral umbrella groups of CSOs. Civil society participation in these meetings is frequently a requirement of foreign donor agencies that provide funding to the government.

Cooperation with the national and local government was further strengthened by the inclusion of civil society representatives as full members of certain advisory bodies, including the monitoring committee of the Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Reduction (CSCRP), an IMF-sponsored five-year development plan created in collaboration with the government, the PTF, civil society, and the private sector. In 2011, the third CSCRP was drafted and adopted with the full participation of civil society. Umbrella groups such as the CSO Forum and the National Council of Civil Society were better organized and structured this year to participate and contribute to the national and local debates. CSOs also participated in numerous other committees for specialized economic and development objectives. CSOs specializing in finance and budgeting were also consulted in the formulation of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance's framework letter, which launches the budgetary process in Mali. Finally, CSOs were also consulted in the creation of the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), which was headed by a member of civil society.

Though the breadth of collaboration is quite wide, in practice, CSO participation is biased by the choice, quality, and representation of CSO participants. Because the donors frequently require government to consult CSOs, they often choose the people they know personally, and the CSOs frequently choose the representative to send based on their availability rather than their competencies. However, in 2011 the sectoral umbrella groups placed more priority on selecting effective representatives to participate in the CSCRP's commissions.

In 2011, the CSO Advocacy Committee led a broad-based six-month campaign to modify fifty-two items in the revised Family Code, including a woman's legal age of marriage, inheritance and succession procedures, and the validity of religious marriage compared to civil marriage. However, this movement was opposed by informal religious associations, and the revision to the law that was adopted in December, 2011, was generally considered to be a step backward for women's rights. Another coalition successfully campaigned to modify an article of the constitution banning discrimination to be extended to specifically require the government to take measures to improve women's access to voting.

CSOs also reacted strongly and publically to a proposed constitutional amendment. The Malian Coordination of Democratic Organizations (COMODE) and the Confederation Labor Union of Mali (CSTM) in particular, opposed the constitutional revision on the grounds that the government should prioritize improving basic social services, reducing poverty, and improving living conditions. The Civil Society Forum, a working group of diverse CSOs, which meets periodically with donors and government agencies, also expressed strong disapproval of the proposed revisions through public debates and joint press conferences with political parties.

Environmental CSOs successfully opposed the construction of a monument for the country's fiftieth anniversary because of the harmful ecological impact it would have on the Niger River. The Coalition of African Debt and Development Alternatives (CAD-Mali) successfully advocated to increase funding to the health sector at the local level. However, while these campaigns mobilized an impressive number of CSOs, they have also exacerbated conflicts within civil society and made civil society's relationship with the state, the public, and the international community more fragile.

Teachers unions successfully advocated for salary increases on par with teacher salaries in neighboring countries. This unleashed a crisis in the education system, but several CSOs, including women's organizations and the Traditional Communicators' Organization, joined religious leaders, traditional chiefs, past prime ministers, ministers, and ambassadors as mediators, and successfully resolved the crisis. This was a long-term victory for teachers which will be integrated into future Social, Economic and Cultural Development Plans (PDSECs).

Lobbying was generally more successful at the local level than at the national level in 2011. At the local level, CSOs successfully lobbied to include women's issues in several communes' PDSECs. In several communes in Tombouctou, CSOs successfully lobbied to include salaries for literacy instructors in the PDESCs, which previously were not funded by the national government. CSOs also advocated on a national level to include grants in the national budget to support CSOs' activities and build their capacity. In 2011, the Advocacy and Lobbying Network (RPL) began lobbying the government to review the CSO law and pass a draft law on foundations. However, lobbying and advocacy activities are impeded by a lack of cohesion among CSOs during collective advocacy operations, diverging goals on issues such as paternity, and a lack of technical expertise.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.6

CSOs provide a diverse range of services but focus on basic social services. Mali's 761 ASACOs provide health services with support from the Village Health Committees (CVS) and the decentralized School Management Committees (CGS) work closely with Parent-Teacher Associations (APE) to manage the education system. CSOs also provide services to improve access to clean water and food security and work on economic development, the environment, governance, and institutional capacity

Service Provision in Mali

2009: 3.6
2010: 3.7
2011: 3.6

building. They are also beginning to work in the fields of microfinance, peace and security, and conflict management.

CSOs working in certain established fields such as capacity building and economic development have become more professional and specialized. However, the majority of CSOs freely shift their activities based on the opportunities for funding.

The government recognizes CSOs' contribution to provision of basic social services. In 2010, CSOs that signed a Framework Agreement provided goods and services valued at 111,332,696,542 FCFA ($222,030,000). The 2011 figure will only be published by the government at end of July 2012. However, while central and local governments have funding available in their sectoral budgets for CSOs to participate in the implementation of projects, CSOs are often unaware of these funds.

CBOs generally respond better to the needs of local communities than other larger CSOs because they participate in developing the communes' five-year development plans (PDSEC). Larger CSOs are sometimes pressured to adopt the agenda of international donors which may not correspond directly to the priorities of local communities.

CSOs do not systematically recover the costs of their services, but some organizations charge fees for services such as drinking water, health care, education, and maintenance of public infrastructure such as markets. CSOs that have contracts to implement projects receive funding for part or all of their operating expenses. CSOs that build infrastructure or public facilities can recover up to 20 percent of their costs by allowing beneficiaries to participate in the construction and the monitoring of the project. Beneficiary communities also sometimes provide office space for CSOs to work in as a contribution toward their project.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.6

Infrastructure in Mali

2009   2010   2011

1

3   4.9   4.7   4.6

5

7

Several resource centers provide training to CSOs and act as platforms for sharing information. Large CSOs and professional umbrella organizations also have space to host consultations, meetings, and training workshops. However, a mapping exercise carried out by the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) found that these organizations typically work in particular programmatic domains rather than providing resources for CSOs' overall institutional development. For example, one organization that functions as a resource center, the Malian Center for Interparty Dialogue and Democracy (CMDID) was formed by 52 political parties as a platform to strengthen democracy in Mali. While it provides trainings and opportunities for exchange and dialogue with CSOs, its primary purpose is not to advance the institutional development of CSOs. Several consortia and networks have attempted to consolidate the resources available to CSOs and provide access to information, technology, and technical training, but many CSOs are not aware of these initiatives. According to the AKF study, only the Djoliba Center provides capacity building resources to CSOs at a national level.

International NGOs, donor-funded projects, certain large CSOs, and national umbrella organizations subgrant funds from foreign donors. The few local grantmaking institutions in Mali focus primarily on charitable activities and grants to improve living conditions.

CSO networks were strengthened in 2011 and opportunities for sharing information improved. The Civil Society National Council established fourteen sectoral coalitions and the Forum of Civil Society Organizations created thirteen sectoral coalitions dedicated to issues ranging from health to governance and legislation. These coalitions participated as full members of sectoral commissions set up by the government and PTF for the various goals in the CSCRP. The groups monitor the implementation of programs and policies, collect data, and prepare and submit reports to their national sectoral group for distribution. These coalitions led visible campaigns to raise awareness, diffuse information, and organize meetings on the areas of their intervention.

Formal and informal partnerships exist between CSOs and the national and local government, local radio stations, and private firms. Some of these partnerships include the Partnership for the Extended Vaccination against Poliomyelitis, the Partnership between the High Council on Fighting Aids with CSOs and some CSO collectives.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4

The media covers the activities of certain CSOs, but rarely provides broader coverage of the CSOs themselves and their missions. Even organizations that have a communication plan often lack the resources to implement them. They are also frequently unaware of the opportunities for coverage such as the community radio stations that are required to cover CSO activities under their foundational statutes.

CSOs are one of the principal sources of revenue for grassroots radios or community radios. CSO announcements are considered public service announcements, and are run three times for the cost of a single run for a regular commercial.

The public increasingly perceives CSOs as technical and financial supporters of local initiatives and institutions whose interventions require participation and contributions from beneficiaries. Local communities have increased their in-kind and cash contributions to projects.

Public Image in Mali

2009	2010	2011
4.5	4.5	4.4

In their official statements, government officials recognize the contributions CSOs make to community development by working closely with local communities on a daily basis, as well as their flexibility and capacity for rapid mobilization. The government also recognizes their contributions to the execution the government's policies, strategies, and programs, notably in the areas of access to water, health, and education. However, some public officials are critical of the use of public resources by CSOs.

CSOs do not have a code of conduct but some have procedural manuals and submit to regular audits and produce technical and financial reports.

Partnerships between CSOs and the private sector are still largely limited to grants for charities and community activities. The private sector funds certain activities like cultural events, mosque and school construction.

MOZAMBIQUE

2011 Scores for Mozambique

Indicator	Score
CSO Sustainability	4.8
Legal Environment	4.7
Organizational Capacity	5.3
Financial Viability	5.0
Advocacy	4.5
Service Provision	4.0
Infrastructure	5.1
Public Image	4.7

Sustainability Enhanced / Sustainability Evolved / Sustainability Impeded

Capital: Maputo

Government Type: Republic

Population: 23,515,934 (July 2012 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $1,100

Human Development Index: 184

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.8

Mozambique is often held up as a model of a country that has successfully transitioned from conflict to peace, stability, democracy, and continual economic growth. The civil society sector has played an important role in this transition, moving from a sector based largely around emergency work and service delivery, to one focusing on public awareness on health issues, the protection of basic human rights, and more recently, on monitoring, advocacy, and good governance. The latter three are becoming increasingly important with the recent discoveries of natural resources. While these resources, if properly managed, could lead to the country's long-term growth and economic stability, and reduce reliance on outside funding, mismanagement could lead to mass corruption and ultimately benefit the elite only. In such a context, it is fundamental that CSOs fight for access to information, transparency, and the rights and needs of Mozambique's citizens.

CSO Sustainability in Mozambique

2009: 4.8　2010: 4.8　2011: 4.8

Many organizations lack the technical capacity to carry out projects in these new areas or the ability to create strong links to new communities and constituencies. CSO staff usually lack the experience or skills needed to engage the population or challenge the government. Because many directors of CSOs rely on their jobs for survival, many are unwilling or unable to strengthen the capacity of their staff members, in part because they worry that newly-trained staff members will attempt to take over their organizations. This greatly limits opportunities for organizational change. The

result, along with the impact of the global financial crisis on CSOs' financial viability, is that many organizations will struggle to survive in the coming years.

There are still no regularly updated statistics on the number of CSOs in Mozambique. The most recent data is from a 2003/4 study carried out by the Mozambican National Institute for Statistics, which reported that there were 4,853 nonprofit institutions. While the number of organizations continues to grow, particularly at the grassroots level, many organizations also fold or are no longer active, making it impossible to estimate the current number of CSOs functioning within the country.

While overall CSO sustainability has not changed from 2010, there were some small improvements to the legal environment, organizational capacity, and public image dimensions. CSOs now have a greater understanding of the NGO law, resulting in more CSOs implementing income-generating activities and more contractual agreements between the government and CSOs, for example in the areas of service provision and training. At the same time, an increasing number of CSOs are undertaking donor-initiated strategic planning exercises. In the area of public image, more organizations are receiving community radio and national television and newspaper coverage of their work, including a growing number of investigative journalism pieces focusing on the sector.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.7

CSOs in Mozambique are established and operate under the Law on Associations (Law 8/91). CSO registration continues to be very time consuming and expensive, particularly for associations located in remote rural areas, as the process, including registration with the Ministry of Justice and the publication of registration in the Boletin de Republica, must be completed in the regional capitals. In addition, CSOs need to submit criminal records, which can only be obtained in Maputo.


Legal Environment in Mozambique

2009	2010	2011
4.8	4.8	4.7

The legal environment has improved from last year, as CSOs have increased access to information about Law 8/91. As a result, more associations now understand that they are allowed to engage in income-generating activities, including bidding on and fulfilling government contracts.

Law 8/91 does not make any stipulations about internal management, permitted scope of activities, dissolution of organizations, or reporting requirements. Implementation is accordance with these terms, and the government did not harass or otherwise try to illegally control CSOs this year.

CSOs that pursue national or community interests and contract with the national or local government in service delivery can obtain public utility status. However, since few CSOs enter into contractual relationships with the government, fewer than five percent of organizations operate under public utility status. This number has not changed even with the new understanding of the possibility to enter into contracts with the government. Only CSOs with public utility status are granted tax exemptions, which are the only benefits that public utility status offers. As per Decree 37/2000, exemptions are given on staff salaries; office equipment, when used exclusively to meet organizational objectives; and small bureaucratic costs incurred during registration or when an organization alters its constitution.

The very few CSOs that have lawyers on staff are those that have large-scale strategic funding, including Livaningo, Centro Terra Viva, the Center for Public Integrity (CIP), and Liga dos Direitos Humanos. Other large CSOs and CSOs in cities and towns have access to legal assistance, but there are very few lawyers of any sort in the provinces.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.3

Organizational Capacity in Mozambique

	2009	2010	2011
	5.4	5.4	5.3

Organizational capacity has improved since last year, as more and more organizations develop strategic plans. In 2010, eighteen CSOs had strategic plans in place. An additional twelve organizations developed plans in 2011. While organizations developed these plans in order to be eligible for funding, the process of developing the plans has strengthened the capacities of participating organizations in areas such as managing fundraising and reflecting on goals.

Implementation of strategic plans remains challenging, however, due to lack of funding. Funding tends to be awarded for short-term projects lasting approximately a year; little funding is available to support medium- or long-term strategies. This also deeply affects the ability of CSOs to remain sustainable. Most CSOs spend the beginning and end of each year scrambling for funds to try to ensure continuity.

There was also a rise in technical capacity this year, as grantees of the Civil Society Support Mechanism (CSSM) and the SIDA-supported Program of Action for Responsible and Inclusive Governance (AGIR) received funding to acquire up-to-date office equipment, including computers, faxes, scanners, and Internet access.

CSOs identify their target constituencies through participatory approaches such as rapid rural appraisals (RRA) and baseline studies. According to CSSM's 2011 assessment, 76 percent of organizations defined the community in general as their target group, rather than identifying niche constituents, indicating that CSO-constituent relationships are weak. Indeed, most organizations fail to involve their constituents in project planning, implementation, or monitoring.

Some boards of directors are completely inactive while others have board presidents who interfere with the day-to-day running of the institutions they are meant to serve. In addition, many organizational leaders lack accountability.

Many CSOs have adequate human resource practices, including contracts and job descriptions. However, many CSOs continue to have trouble maintaining long-term staff, as budgets remain dependent on short-term project funding. CSOs are not able to recruit sufficient numbers of volunteers to meet their needs. Only well-funded organizations are able to hire professionals such as accountants, information communications and technology (ICT) managers, or lawyers.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.0

CSOs continue to raise most of their funding from international donors. There are no local philanthropic sources or local in-kind donations. While 75 percent of CSO staff members are volunteers, organizations are unable to mobilize sufficient numbers of volunteers to meet staffing needs. Most people live hand-to-mouth and are therefore unable to contribute funds, goods, or time.

Financial Viability in Mozambique

	2009	2010	2011
	5.0	5.0	5.0

Most donors support only specific, short-term projects rather than long-term strategic goals, and most organizations rely on one or two project-specific funding sources, making the organizations unsustainable over the long term. The few large organizations that have multiple sources of funding are limited by donor restrictions that stipulate that they can only use up to 50 percent of received funds for general operating costs. Many

organizations cease to implement projects; rather, they downsize to one or two people who spend their time looking for funding. The availability of funding for service provision in particular is declining.

Some CSOs engage in income-generating activities, including the Nampula-province based Development Facility of Civil Society (FDSC), which generates 1.3 percent of its budget through income-generating activities. Local governments began contracting with CSOs this year. For example, the Association for Social and Economic Development (OPHAVELA), a microcredit organization operating in Nampula province, contracted with the government to provide training and technical assistance to local organizations, and to assist the government in monitoring those organizations.

Few member-based organizations are successful in collecting membership dues.

Organizations with regular funding tend to have strong financial management systems to meet donor requirements. These organizations are also able to afford independent financial audits. However, no CSOs make their annual or financial reports available to the public, sharing them only with a limited number of institutions and partners.

ADVOCACY: 4.5

Advocacy in Mozambique

	2009	2010	2011
	4.5	4.5	4.5

The advocacy environment has not changed over the past year. Local networks and organizations have the opportunity to meet with government officials in direct, informal meetings that occur when there is an urgent need identified by either a CSO or the government. CSOs and government representatives have partnered on various projects, primarily in basic service delivery, but also on governance matters such as reconstructing local councils, which involves improving the selection process of local councilors as well as their overall functioning; training district administrators; and tracking district-level public expenses. CSOs were also invited to participate in the annual development observatory sessions – meetings of local governance councils that set, implement, and review community development objectives – at the central and provincial levels and in meetings of consultative councils. However, as per last year, CSO input had little actual impact.

Legally, all districts are supposed to have consultative councils that should include CSOs at all four sub-levels within each district, including district, administrative, locality, and settlement, and to hold semi-annual sessions. However, not all districts have councils at all sub-levels and those that do are rarely able to meet twice a year.

CSOs engaged in several advocacy campaigns this year. For example, twenty-five human rights CSOs signed a document advocating for Mozambique to allow the Universal Periodic Revision (UPR) Mechanism to review the human rights situation in the country. The UPR reviewed Mozambique's human rights situation in February 2011.

The Forum of Budget Monitoring (FMO), a coalition of thirty organizations created in 2010 to monitor and influence fiscal policies to benefit marginalized groups, presented its position paper on the proposed 2012 state budget to the Commission of Planning and Budgeting. The FMO also benefited from technical and financial support from UNICEF to strengthen the advocacy campaigns of its member organizations.

CIP partnered with five other organizations – Anda, Estamos, Liga dos Direitos Humanos, Facilidade de Desenvolvimento da Sociedade Civil, and Wonelela – for its annual tracking of public expenditures in fifteen districts. The reports on their findings indicated incorrect allocation of funds and failure to implement annual

plans. The governments recognized their failures and showed interest in trying to improve the situation in the future.

Access to information is problematic in Mozambique. The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) Mozambique surveyed the perceptions of government employees, members of parliament, and civil society workers about the right to information, freedom of speech, and freedom of press, as a means to pressure the Assembly of the Republic to debate and approve the 2005 draft law on the Right to Information. In a July 2011 meeting between MISA and the Commission of Public Administration and Social Communication, it was promised that the law would be debated in the 2012 parliamentary session, following some necessary technical improvements to the draft.

Lobbying takes place through informal discussions with parliamentary deputies and government ministries on the role of CSOs and changes the sector is hoping to achieve.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.0

There has been no change in service provision from last year. CSOs continue to offer a diverse range of services, including education, health, and basic social services. Services often follow donor priorities, and therefore may reflect the needs of target communities, but not always their priorities. While some organizations conduct baseline studies, few are extensive.

Service Provision in Mozambique

CSOs also provide goods and services that go beyond basic social needs, including publications and analyses that are sold to other organizations and the government. For example, the Nampula-based Akilizetho used its experience and expertise to prepare a manual on training local council members on their roles, the rights and duties of citizens, and the functioning of the state for Helvetas, another Nampula-based organization. The Civil Society Development Facility elaborated a summary of the provincial strategic plan and sold it to the provincial government.

However, CSOs usually lack an understanding of the market demand for their products and rarely recover any of their costs by charging fees. Project funding usually covers the costs of goods and services.

The government recognizes the role CSOs perform in the provision and monitoring of basic social services. For example, Helvetas and the government of Nampula conducted a joint assessment and discussion around boreholes that were opened in 2011.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1

Infrastructure in Mozambique

Twenty-five local associations, including the FDSC and Open Society Mozambique (SA) received international grants to provide support to CBOs in Nampula and Maputo provinces. Support includes sub-granting for agricultural and small animal production projects. Few other organizations fulfill the function of an intermediary support organization or CSO resource center. Those that exist are in Maputo or other major urban centers.

Coalitions and networks of organizations working on the same issue areas share information through site visits and workshops.

Capable CSO management trainers exist in Maputo as well as in smaller cities. While there are no organizations that are strictly training centers, Nampula-based organizations such as the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV), Akilizetho, IBIS, and Centro Cooperativo Sueco provide training in addition to their other roles. Advanced training is available in accounting and financial management, but lacking in fundraising, volunteer management, board development, and strategic management. There is little written training material available in local languages, but training is often conducted in the local language.

Some CSOs engage in intersectoral partnerships. For example, the non-profit media organizations MISA and PANOS have been working closely with for-profit newspapers and TV and radio stations to conduct joint investigative journalism and bring issues such as pollution and corruption within the extractive industries to the attention of the public. In addition, twenty-seven organizations received grants and technical assistance to implement governance projects in partnership with the government and the media. However, partnership with the media is too expensive for most CSOs. In addition, most organizations do not recognize the benefits of this kind of partnership.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.7

Public image improved this year, largely as a result of more press coverage of CSOs outside of Maputo due to funding of investigative journalism by donors such as CSSM, IBIS, and Diakonia, a Swedish organization for international development co-operation. Media coverage is largely positive; the state media tends to cover activities related to social infrastructure, while the private media also covers corruption and large macro-level projects and investments.

Public Image in Mozambique

2009	2010	2011
4.9	4.8	4.7

The launch of the Institute of Social and Economic Studies' (IESE) annual publication on the challenges facing Mozambique in 2011 received broad coverage from the press, as did IESE's intervention in the re-negotiation of mega-project contracts in Mozambique. CIP's annual report around extractive industries, public integrity, and corruption, part of the Mozambique Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (MEITI), also received strong coverage on social media platforms. For example, one of CIP's publications, launched in November 2011, focused on mining mega-projects in the central province of Tete. The book drew attention to the fact that despite the recent investments in the province, there was not yet any evident reduction in poverty and the resettlement of the population had resulted in a number of problems in terms of access to basic public services, transportation, and markets, thereby reducing their agricultural income generation activities.

Very few CSOs publicize their activities due to budget and time restrictions. There is a lack of understanding of the benefit of allocating financial resources to publicity. CSOs do not create relationships with journalists to encourage positive coverage because they are not aware of the advantages of partnerships with the media.

The public understands the concept of CSOs and supports their activities. The public generally perceives CSOs to work more effectively than the government in supporting the most vulnerable segments of society.

The private sector regards CSOs as competitors offering free services. Government perception varies at local, district and provincial levels; some governments see CSOs as partners, others as opponents with a hidden agenda.

No progress was made in 2011 on CESC's efforts to develop a code of ethics. Few organizations publish annual reports.

NIGERIA

2011 Scores for Nigeria

Dimension	Score
CSO Sustainability	4.6
Legal Environment	4.9
Organizational Capacity	4.7
Financial Viability	5.5
Advocacy	3.7
Service Provision	4.2
Infrastructure	5.0
Public Image	4.0

1.0 Sustainability Enhanced 3.0 Sustainability Evolved 5.0 Sustainability Impeded 7.0

Capital: Abuja

Government Type: Federal Republic

Population: 170,123,740 (July 2012 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $2,600

Human Development Index: 156

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.6

Nigeria has a population of about 160 million people with over 250 diverse ethnic groups and languages. Although the country is one of the world's largest producers of oil, 69 percent of the population lives in poverty, according to the National Bureau of Statistics' 2010 report. In 2011, the unemployment rate reached 23.9 percent.

In 1999, Nigeria returned to democracy after many years of military rule. Since then, the country has held four general elections, most of which were marred by electoral irregularities. The 2011 general elections were regarded as the fairest elections since 1999. However, they were marred by violent protests that erupted in some northern parts of the country immediately following the announcement of the results of the presidential race.

CSOs were actively involved in educating the public on electoral issues in the period leading up to the 2011 elections. During the post-election crisis, CSOs also played an important role in advocating for peace.

CSO Sustainability in Nigeria

2009	2010	2011
4.6	4.6	4.6

The CSO sector in Nigeria experienced slight improvement in 2011. CSO registration at the national level now takes about one week to complete. However, registration at the local level takes longer, because the process has not been computerized. According to the most recent data available from the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), there are over 54,000 registered CSOs in Nigeria. In addition, many unregistered CSOs operate throughout the country, although there are no reliable estimates of how many. Although the

organizational capacity of CSOs is evolving, it is still generally weak. More CSOs are beginning to have financial management systems in place, usually in order to meet funding requirements. There were numerous advocacy successes in 2011, including the passage of the Freedom of Information Bill into law.

CSOs collaborated with the government at all levels to implement a number of projects this year, indicating that the government has continued to recognize the value of CSOs in service provision. There was an improvement in CSOs infrastructure in 2011, as more CSO coalitions emerged and more capacity building trainings were organized. More CSOs started working with the business sector in 2011. The public perception of CSOs in Nigeria is still generally positive.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9

The legal environment in Nigeria in 2011 is still favorable for CSO operations. CSOs are regulated by the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990, which also regulates for-profit organizations. An organization is required to register at the local, state, or national level, depending on the scope of its operations; an organization may only operate at the level at which it registers. The CAC continued to respond positively to demands from CSOs to streamline registration at the national level, and it organized a meeting of stakeholders to discuss ways to ease the process; registration at the national level now takes about one week to complete, as compared to a few months in the past. However, registration at the state and local levels has not improved, largely because the registration process is still not computerized.

Legal Environment in Nigeria

2009	2010	2011
5.0	5.0	4.9

CSOs are still exempt from taxation. Certificates of tax exemption are issued to CSOs on request; however, very few CSOs are aware of this. Some tax collectors still inappropriately demand taxes for the names and logos of CSOs placed on official cars and buildings. Little has been done to stop this from happening.

The law requires CSOs to submit annual audited financial reports to the CAC, but this has not been effectively enforced. The dissolution of a CSO can only be done by a court decision upon petition by the governing council, the CAC, or a majority of the CSO's members. No petitions have been filed, therefore there have not been any cases of dissolution.

CSOs are still free under the law and in practice to address matters of public debate and express criticism.

CSOs can earn income from the provision of goods and services. They can also compete for government contracts. However, as with for-profit organizations, personal contacts are important in order for CSOs to secure government contracts at all levels.

There are no lawyers who specialize specifically in CSO law, because CAMA also regulates for-profit organizations. However, general legal advice is available for CSOs that can afford it. Such services are primarily available in major cities.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.7

The organizational capacity of CSOs in 2011 did not experience any significant improvement from 2010. Large CSOs at the national level continue to build constituencies around issues such as gender, youth, and human rights. Local CSOs do not engage in much constituency building, largely due to lack of funding and low capacity.

Organizational Capacity in Nigeria

2009   2010   2011

1
3   4.7   4.7   4.7
5
7

National organizations usually have strategic plans, but state- and local-level organizations do not. Their activities are mainly determined by the availability of donor funds, irrespective of their areas of focus.

Board members of many CSOs at the national, state, and local levels do not meet regularly, although they are required by law to do so. Consequently, some executive directors make decisions unilaterally, and many CSOs are effectively "one man shows." In some organizations, there is no clear division of responsibilities between the board and staff members, and board members do not operate openly or transparently.

Although CSOs are becoming more professional in their operations, only a few can maintain permanent paid staff because of lack of funding. Many CSOs rely on volunteers for their activities. Investment in staff capacity development remains limited. International CSOs and donors often recruit skilled staff from local CSOs, thereby discouraging many CSOs from investing in staff capacity development.

CSOs at the national level make use of professionals like accountants whenever the need arises. Few CSOs can afford the services of a lawyer when they need one.

More CSOs have Internet access than last year, because the services are now cheaper with new providers in the market; however, technical advancement for many CSOs remains low.

There is a lack of funding for capacity building for state and local organizations.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.5

CSOs in Nigeria still depend largely on foreign funding, as they have historically, and many CSOs lack the resources for even short-term viability. Although some organizations choose their board members based on their level of societal influence, few have been able to leverage their board members to access the few local sources of funding that do exist. Local funding sources include the Tony Elumelu Foundation, the T.Y. Danjuma Foundation, the Mobil Foundation, Dangote Foundation, the Oando Foundation, and the MTN Foundation. However, there was no significant

Financial Viability in Nigeria

2009   2010   2011

1
3
5   5.6   5.6   5.5
7

difference between what the foundations funded in 2010 and 2011. For example, the T.Y. Danjuma Foundation continues to give grants to CSOs to carry out health-related activities.

Few CSOs have cultivated a loyal core of financial supporters, and most do not engage in membership outreach or philanthropy development programs. Many CSOs do not have the assets necessary to generate income, but some have been able to earn income by providing training on fundraising and capacity development to other CSOs.

In 2011, a number of CSOs at the national, state, and local levels received government contracts to implement projects. For example, during the 2011 elections, the Center for Research and Documentation (CRD), Kano, was contracted by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to implement a civic education project in Kano and Katsina States. Similar contracts were awarded to other CSOs like the Center for Democracy and Development, Abuja. The Center for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria (CLEEN) Foundation was contracted by Shell Oil to train its security personnel; they were also engaged by the Ministry of Police Affairs to help the police force produce its 2011 annual report.

The federal government engaged other CSOs, such as Center for Democracy and Development (CDD), to monitor government projects like the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) projects and the Universal Basic Education projects. The Civil Society and Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC) was engaged to educate the public on the Public Procurement Act and the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. In Benue State, the government contracted the Women Environmental Project (WEP) to monitor and build the capacity of local government staff on water and sanitation provision.

Membership-based organizations like the Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP) collect dues; however, many members of such organizations are not committed to paying their dues, probably because there are no clear sanctions for failure to pay.

More CSOs are beginning to implement financial management systems due to meet funding requirements and to be more competitive for donor funding. However, only big national CSOs publish their annual reports with financial statements; many CSOs at the state and local levels do not have annual reports.

ADVOCACY: 3.7

Advocacy in Nigeria

As in 2010, some state governments still maintain offices through which they interact with CSOs. For instance, in Kano State, there is an office of the Special Adviser to the State Governor on CSOs, which meets with organizations to strengthen collaboration

The relationship between government and CSOs in 2011 was cordial. In the period leading up to the 2011 elections, the government worked with CSOs to educate the public on electoral issues. For example, CDD carried out sensitization programs on the electoral process in Kaduna and Kano states. The Electoral Act was amended before the elections due to CSO pressure.

The Freedom of Information bill was finally signed into law due to a massive advocacy campaign. The Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Bill was also signed into law. Some states also signed the Public Procurement Act, and in Ekiti State, a bill on gender-based violence was signed into law.

CSOs also campaigned against the removal of fuel subsidies. As a result of this, on December 9, 2011, the President of Nigeria met with civil society leaders to solicit their support for removing the subsidy. CSOs refused to accept the removal of the subsidy, but the government did not accept their position.

In spite of the positive relationship between CSOs and the government, CSOs were not invited to participate in the debate about gay rights in the National Assembly.

Although lobbying is not an entrenched practice, there were some lobbying successes this year at both the national and state levels in 2011.

The Center for the Development of Civil Society attempted to promote legal reforms that would benefit CSOs in Nigeria; however, the level of awareness in the CSO community about this effort was low, hence, it did not receive the required support.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.2

CSOs provide a wide variety of services. In 2011, many CSOs focused on health and governance issues at the expense of the environment, policing, and housing. In the period leading up to the 2011 elections, many

CSOs were engaged by the government and international donors to sensitize the public on issues relating to the electoral process.

CSO activities sometimes reflect the needs of their communities, and sometimes they do not. In some cases, CSOs implement projects without proper needs assessment.

The wives of top political office holders still operate their own CSOs. These organizations are often seen as government-owned, given their close ties to the state and the political elite.

Service Provision in Nigeria

	2009	2010	2011
1			
3	4.2	4.2	4.2
5			
7			

CSOs usually do not charge fees for their publications; donors pay for the cost of producing and disseminating project reports to the public. In cases where CSOs charge for publications, fees are minimal and do not cover costs.

CSOs in Nigeria still have weak marketing skills and do not understand the market demand for their products. Some CSOs have provided research services for business membership organizations such as the Kaduna Agro-Processors Coalition and the Kaduna Chamber of Commerce, Mines, Industries, and Agriculture in the northwestern part of Nigeria.

The government recognizes the value CSOs bring to the provision and monitoring of basic social services by partnering with them on the many activities mentioned above. In many instances, the government contracts with CSOs to implement such projects.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0

Infrastructure in Nigeria

	2009	2010	2011
1.0			
3.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
5.0			
7.0			

There are still very few Intermediary Support Organizations (ISOs) in Nigeria. The few resource centers available, such as the Development Research Project Centre (DRPC) based in Kano, are located in major cities, making it difficult for CSOs at the local level to access them. They mainly provide capacity building training in areas such as strategic planning. Some of the resource centers earn income from training fees, but it is minimal. Nevertheless, the fees charged prevent small CSOs from attending such trainings.

Organizations like the Society for Family Health re-grant funds from international donors to address locally-identified needs on health issues. CSOs rarely re-grant local funds.

More CSO coalitions, such as the Legislative Action Against Violence Against Women, are beginning to emerge to facilitate information sharing among their members. In 2011, the Global Fund for Women brought together all of its Nigerian grantees to form an information sharing network. Other coalitions have been formed around issues such as good governance, human rights, and government budgeting.

Most local CSOs that provide management training, such as the Abuja-based African Center for Leadership Strategy and Development, are located in major cities. Trainings are offered in areas such as strategic planning, women's empowerment, and staff capacity building. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) trained its partner CSOs on capacity building in election observation before the April 2011 elections in Nigeria. There were few training workshops offered on board development or fund raising for CSOs in 2011. Few CSOs can afford to attend trainings that are not funded by donors. Training materials are still mainly in English.

CSOs continue to partner with the government on a variety of projects. For example, in the period leading up to the 2011 general elections, many CSOs were engaged by the government to educate the public about the electoral process. In addition, CSOs have continued to monitor certain government projects such as the MDG projects in the year under review.

There is a rise in awareness for partnership potential across all sectors. This year, CSOs started working with local business organizations, especially in the areas of research and advocacy. For example, CRD Kano conducted a survey for the Kaduna Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (KADCCIMA). The Center for Public Policy Analysis in Lagos also provides such services to business organizations. CSOs also partnered with the media on advocacy around the Freedom of Information Bill. They organized workshops to educate the public on the bill in order to gain support.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.0

CSOs in Nigeria enjoy positive media coverage. The media generally covers CSO activities as public service announcements. Hence, CSOs are not charged for such services. Some newspapers like the Daily Trust have regular columns that analyze CSOs' activities.

The perception of CSOs by the public is generally positive and the public supports the sector on many national issues, such as the Freedom of Information Bill and the removal of the fuel subsidy.

Public Image in Nigeria

	2009	2010	2011
	4.0	4.0	4.0

CSO activities across the country have increased public awareness among the public on the concept of CSOs. However, some people still perceive CSOs as avenues to make money because they receive grants from donors.

The partnership between CSOs and the business sector in Nigeria is still emerging. Little has changed since 2010, but the perception of CSOs by the business sector remains generally positive. In spite of the increased partnership opportunities between the government and CSOs in 2011, some government officials still mistrust CSOs because they are afraid of having their corrupt practices exposed.

Some CSOs publicize their activities, but only large organizations in major cities have the skills to do so. Very few CSOs have developed relationships with journalists to cover their activities. However, some journalists still expect kickbacks to cover CSOs activities.

Leading CSOs publish their annual reports. CSOs in Nigeria do not have code of ethics for self-regulation.

RWANDA

2011 Scores for Rwanda

Indicator	Score
CSO Sustainability	4.5
Legal Environment	4.3
Organizational Capacity	4.5
Financial Viability	5.3
Advocacy	3.8
Service Provision	4.0
Infrastructure	5.0
Public Image	4.4

1.0   3.0   5.0   7.0
Sustainability Enhanced   **Sustainability Evolved**   **Sustainability Impeded**

Capital: Kigali

Government Type:
Republic; Presidential; Multiparty System

Population:
11,689,696 (July 2012 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP):
$1,400

Human Development Index: 166

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.5

The CSO sector in Rwanda is steadily evolving. There are now approximately 2,500 registered and active CSOs operating in all development sectors and in all parts of the country. The political environment is generally favorable for CSOs. The government considers CSOs to be partners in development, especially in service delivery. However, in the past, the government has consulted infrequently with CSOs on public policy issues, and CSOs have continued to advocate for increased involvement in policy process. For example, a coalition of Rwandan CSOs led by the Health and Development Initiative (HDI) advocates to decriminalize sex workers. In addition, CSOs continued their advocacy efforts in favor of a new National Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Law which explicitly recognizes CSOs as partners in public policy issues.

CSOs have started conducting self-assessments in order to improve their internal management systems, including their financial and human resource practices. Through the Millennium Challenge Corporation's Civil Society Strengthening Project (MCC/CSSP), implemented by IREX in partnership with the Central Structure for the Development of Local NGOs (CCOAIB), fifty-three CSOs carried out self-assessments to identify their technical and management strengths and weaknesses; trainings in different disciplines were then developed to address identified needs.

CSO Sustainability in Rwanda

Year	Score
2009	4.5
2010	4.5
2011	4.5

Both the government and the general population increasingly understand and appreciate the work of Rwandan CSOs. CSOs are often called upon to be part of the National Evaluation Team of the District Performance Contracts (IMIHIGO) between district mayors and the President of the

Republic of Rwanda. In 2011, as in preceding years, the Rwanda Civil Society Platform (RCSP) delegated two CSOs - CCOAIB and the Rwanda Muslims Association (AMUR) - to represent the sector on the National Evaluation Team. Other members of the team include representatives from the Rwanda Private Sector Federation (RPSF), the Rwanda Association of Local Government Authority (RALGA) - both CSOs - the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB), the Prime Minister's Office, and representatives from various government ministries. The exercise was conducted in all thirty districts of the country.

Despite these improvements, the sector still needs to strengthen local legal capacity, develop mechanisms to retain staff, implement strategic plans based on citizens needs, strengthen capacities to raise funds locally, improve partnerships with both government and businesses, and attract more media coverage. Finally, CSOs must continue their advocacy efforts and work to provide practical suggestions that respond effectively to community concerns at local, regional, and national levels.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.3

During 2011, CSOs in Rwanda continued to be governed by Law 20/2000 Relating to Non-Profit Making Organizations and Organic Law 55/2008 Governing Non-Governmental Organizations. CSOs did not face problems with registration under either of these laws. However, most organizations did not comply with the requirement to renew their registration annually, despite the fact that renewal was granted upon submission of the previous year's annual report, a simple requirement with minimal cost. Even without renewal, CSOs

Legal Environment in Rwanda

2009	2010	2011
4.3	4.3	4.3

are not harassed by the state and are allowed to participate in any activity or sector that contributes to their missions or goals. However, an organization that repeatedly fails to renew its registration may face obstacles in accessing funding from donors that require proof of legal existence.

During 2011, CSOs advocated for the passage of a new NGO Law that would grant CSOs the right to enter into partnership with government in development. The new law would grant domestic organizations the right to participate in designing national policies and legislation related to the functioning of national CSOs; to advocate, protect and promote human rights and other national values; to express opinions and views on national policies and legislation; to enter into agreements with other organizations and entities; and to enjoy tax exemptions in accordance with relevant laws.

In addition, the new NGO Law would allow CSOs the freedom to engage in commercial activities related to the organization's main purpose and to compete for goods and service contracts that promote the welfare of their beneficiaries or their missions. The new law would also make public benefit CSOs eligible for such tax benefits as may be provided under the tax code, but does not specify what those benefits are. The new law was passed in early 2012.

Although CSOs can get legal advice, few lawyers in Rwanda specialize in CSO law. Legal advice, which is generally quite expensive, is more accessible in cities than in rural areas.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.5

Rwandan CSOs' organizational capacity has grown stronger with the support of programs such as the African Capacity Building Foundation's Rwandan Civil Society Capacity Building Project and MCC/CSSP. Through MCC/CSSP, fifty-three Rwandan CSOs improved their operational capacities and skills in outreach, networking, and advocacy. In 2011, these organizations continued to benefit from training in financial management, procurement, project design and management, fundraising, and information and

Organizational Capacity in Rwanda

	2009	2010	2011
	4.7	4.6	4.5

communications technology (ICT) skills. As a result of these trainings, these organizations have developed financial control systems, procurement committees, fundraising strategies, and websites.

Each CSO has an organizational chart showing the different responsibilities of internal decision-making structures, including the General Assembly, Board of Directors, Audit Committee, Executive Secretariat, and staff.

CSOs face problems in maintaining professional staff; the lack of secure, long-term funding results in high staff turnover. Contractual staff lack motivation and often seek better paying and more stable positions elsewhere. As a result, most local CSOs depend on volunteers.

Due to their dependence on external funding, CSOs face problems adhering to their strategic plans and missions, especially when their priorities differ from those of donors. A number of CSOs design projects that satisfy donor requirements but are not tailored towards organizational objectives. CSO efforts to reach out to their constituencies and include them in the project cycle, from planning to evaluation, have improved.

Most CSOs have their own offices, as required for registration. Most CSOs also have basic office equipment, including computers and Internet facilities, although Internet connections can be unreliable.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.3

CSOs in Rwanda still depend on foreign funding. Support from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria increased this year. Local sources of support are still minimal and membership in CSOs is still very low, as are membership contributions, which are paid begrudgingly. A few local CSOs engage in income-generating projects, such as renting out their conference halls, investing in rental properties, and selling products. For example, Duhamic-Adri Association for Integrated Rural Development helps farmers

Financial Viability in Rwanda

	2009	2010	2011
	5.3	5.3	5.3

in cooperatives to grow cereal crops and legumes such as soya beans by supplying them with the inputs and then buying the produce, which it processes into Sosoma, a highly nutritional porridge.

Various training programs have addressed CSO financial management weaknesses, including budgeting, procurement, and general accounting procedures. As a result, many CSOs now have financial management systems, including relevant software, in place. CSOs are also increasingly undergoing independent audits and some CSOs are beginning to understand the benefits of transparency and accountability in their fundraising efforts.

ADVOCACY: 3.8

CSOs engaged in several successful advocacy initiatives in 2011. CSOs advocated for improvements to the electoral law, which resulted in a more transparent electoral process, and increased their participation in elections monitoring. Furthermore, CSOs disseminated the electoral law and organized various talks aimed at helping the sector to understand the provisions of the law that allow them greater participation in the electoral process.

During 2011, there were CSO advocacy campaigns against the criminalization of homosexuality and sex workers, while also increasing public awareness about these issues. While homosexuality has not been

Advocacy in Rwanda

	2009	2010	2011
1.0			
3.0	4.0	3.9	3.8
5.0			
7.0			

legalized, an amendment to the Draft Penal Code means it is no longer criminalized. Some CSOs also lobbied to criminalize abortion, which is viewed by many as against Rwandan culture.

CSOs also helped formulate the Law on Access to Information. As a result of talks between a coalition of CSOs including the Rwandan Collective of Leagues and Associations for the Defense of Human Rights (CLADHO) and CCOAIB and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed to track public budget expenditures and create a public guide to the budget that would be disseminated broadly.

CSO advocacy coalitions are emerging, organizing, and becoming active and responsive to specific issues and policies. A coalition of health and human rights CSOs formed this year to increase public officials' awareness of issues affecting sexual minorities. CSOs including Youth Association for Human Rights Promotion and Development (AJPRODHO), Never Again, and others also lobbied for alternative funding for university students' financial aid.

However, many weaknesses continue to hamper CSOs' advocacy. Few CSOs have a proper understanding of where to direct their concerns; there is insufficient information sharing, coordination, and networking among CSOs; and CSOs do not sufficiently involve their constituents in their advocacy activities. Moreover, the government sometimes perceives the sector as unresponsive, unprofessional, and unwilling to provide practical options, choosing to complain rather than to step up with viable suggestions.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.0

Rwandan CSOs are highly involved in service provision, working nationwide in areas including health, agriculture, education, environment, infrastructure, human rights, and capacity building. The government tends to value CSO contributions mainly when they lead to physical outputs such as schools, water, or infrastructure. Capacity building and human rights work, on the other hand, are not appreciated; therefore, funding of these programs largely comes from outside of the government. Interventions are still generally identified by CSOs, donors, or the government, rather than by beneficiaries.

Service Provision in Rwanda

	2009	2010	2011
1.0			
3.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
5.0			
7.0			

Service provision is still hampered by CSOs' failure to use cost recovery systems. CSOs claim that people are too poor to pay fees for CSO services, so most CSOs do not charge their beneficiaries for services. Some CSOs in the health sector have successfully created self-sustaining income sources for marginalized groups and people with HIV/AIDS. Projects included distributing cows and the creation of 1,248 cooperatives across the country.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0

Umbrella organizations act as intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and CSO support centers. These groups publish newsletters, maintain databases of their members, operate libraries with relevant CSO literature, and provide basic training. On occasion, they award grants to CSOs obtained from different partners and donors. However, they are weak at raising local funds, resulting in competition for funding with their members. This inhibits their legitimacy and ability to set standards and codes of conduct for member organizations.

Infrastructure in Rwanda

2009	2010	2011
1.0		
3.0		
5.0	5.0	5.0
7.0		

Information sharing within networks is still weak, as most CSOs do not understand how to use technology for these purposes. Some training capacity in ICT exists, but the availability of training is limited by a lack of funds.

CSOs have created many coalitions, including the Network of Development Organizations (ROAD) with six CSOs and the Network of Member Organizations of CCOAIB in Eastern Province (NOMOCER) with seven CSOs. NOMECER has received funding from the European Union to empower youth through the development of cooperatives, while ROAD has been funded by the Belgian Embassy to monitor and evaluate the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS).

CSOs are also forming more intersectoral partnerships with the government and the media, although these tend to be informal and based on personal relationships and interests. Partnerships with local businesses are hampered by businesses' focus on immediate financial gain, as well as their perception that civil society is overly dependent on donor funds.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4

CSOs are increasingly interested in using media to cover their work and engage their constituencies. Some CSOs such as Huguka (Be Informed) have acquired radio stations that they use to inform farmers on how to use fertilizers, protect the environment, and use rainwater for irrigation. Most CSOs have mechanisms to reach out to the public, including radio programs, TV shows, journals, press releases, and press conferences. For example, CCOAIB produces a weekly radio program, a bi-annual periodical titled "Interaction," and a

Public Image in Rwanda

2009	2010	2011
1.0		
3.0	4.5	4.5	4.4
5.0		
7.0		

monthly newsletter titled "Gana Aheza" (Move Towards a Better Future). Others with regular electronic and print media coverage include Transparency Rwanda, CLADHO, Association of Widows of the Genocide (AVEGA), Ibuka, Pro-femmes, and the Central Trade Union of Workers of Rwanda (CESTRAR).

Many CSOs do not yet fully understand how to take advantage of social networks such as Twitter and Facebook. Some CSOs do not even have websites. Unstable Internet connections further undermine CSOs' ability to utilize these tools to increase their public presence.

Government perception of CSOs has improved. CSOs are increasingly involved in government-funded service provision, and the government increasingly welcomes CSO participation in sector working groups and forums including Joint Action Development Forums (JADF) and the District Performance Contracts evaluation.

The public also trusts civil society, regarding the sector as a source of both service delivery and policy advocacy. This positive image is especially firmly rooted within marginalized groups.

The private sector does not yet understand the benefits it can reap by partnering with CSOs, and particularly how joint efforts can showcase the private sector's products.

Due to limited resources, few CSOs publish annual reports. However, CSOs present their achievements in their annual general assemblies, which are usually covered by the media.

SENEGAL

2011 Scores for Senegal

Dimension	Score
CSO Sustainability	4.3
Legal Environment	4.7
Organizational Capacity	4.0
Financial Viability	5.0
Advocacy	3.9
Service Provision	3.9
Infrastructure	4.7
Public Image	3.8

1.0 — 3.0 — 5.0 — 7.0

Sustainability Enhanced — Sustainability Evolved — Sustainability Impeded

Capital: Dakar

Government Type: Republic

Population: 12,969,606 (July 2011 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $1,900

Human Development Index: 155

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.3

The approaching presidential elections scheduled for early 2012 created tension between the government and CSOs in 2011. Civil society opposed the incumbent president's move to run for a third term as president, which was widely considered to be contrary to the constitution. The government tended to treat any advocacy for good governance or transparency and any collaboration with the opposition parties as a threat. This led the government to take several legal actions to restrict CSOs, including notably suspending all host-state agreements with international CSOs, and actively intimidating a CSO-led movement that had mobilized to oppose constitutional reforms that would strengthen the incumbent president's position. However, despite these constraints, the number of CSOs increased this year. There were 517 officially registered CSOs in 2011, up from 503 in 2010.

The persistent problems of poverty and unemployment were aggravated by weak agricultural production due to limited and late rainfall in 2011. CSOs faced increasing demands for services, particularly in humanitarian assistance. CSOs provide vital services to vulnerable, poor populations that are not served by the government. In many rural areas and some marginal urban areas, basic social services are provided solely by CSOs.

CSO Sustainability in Senegal

2009	2010	2011
4.2	4.2	4.3

However, CSOs have increasingly expanded beyond service provision to promote citizen participation, monitor national and local governments, and engage the authorities through dialogue and advocacy. The Technical and Financial Partners (PTF), the association of donors and major technical

partners, emphasize that improving good governance is a more sustainable way to improve public services and human development than providing social services directly. The PTF notably supported the National Program on Good Governance, which was launched in 2004. One notable goal of this program was to improve the regulation and transparency of public procurements and service delivery.

The global financial crisis continued to challenge CSOs, as funding for institutional capacity building has become increasingly scarce. In 2011, the Dutch donor agency, which has played a significant role in supporting state and non-state actors working on environmental issues, announced they would withdraw their aid in 2012 due to budgetary constraints.

Faced with an unfavorable legal and regulatory environment, CSOs made considerable efforts to advocate for institutional reform in 2011. However, the government responded in many cases by marginalizing organizations outside of its control, such as farmers' organizations and the National Council on Cooperation and Coordination of Rural Issues (CNCR).

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.7

In 2010, the government modified Decree 96-103 of 1996, which governs the scope of permitted CSO activities. The modifications increased government control over CSO resources and transferred the oversight of CSOs to the Ministry of Interior. The modifications also subjected CSOs to annual financial reviews by the Ministry of Finance and Economy, including a review of funding sources.

Legal Environment in Senegal

2009: 4.2 2010: 4.3 2011: 4.7

In 2011, the transfer of oversight to the Ministry of Interior impeded the registration process when there were delays establishing an operational system for CSO oversight and registration. Normally, CSOs can submit an application for registration to the Ministry of the Interior after two years of operation. Then, an inter-ministerial commission composed of government agencies, and a representative of the Council on NGOs Working in Support of Development (CONGAD) provides a technical recommendation on the approval or denial of the CSO's registration and the ministry issues a registration on that basis. However, during the first half of 2011, the inter-ministerial commission did not meet due to the political climate and all registration approvals were suspended.

CONGAD organized an informational meeting of its general assembly in 2011 to mobilize CSOs against the modification to the Decree 96-103 and issued a joint communiqué, signed by CONGAD's partners, denouncing the additional controls. The Administration of General Affairs and Territories (DAGAT) and the Ministry of Interior organized a workshop at the request of CONGAD aimed at finding alternatives to the recent modifications. CONGAD additionally held a one-day workshop with inter-ministerial commission in charge of reviewing CSO registration applications to discuss the new constraints placed on CSOs and to develop actionable remedies.

However, these activities had little impact. On September 18, 2011, the government further suspended their host-state agreements with international CSOs operating in Senegal. The government also blocked upcoming training programs, and denied all requests for tax exemptions, renewals of temporary vehicle approvals, and requests to register expatriate personnel.

Due to this suspension, several CSOs were forced to suspend their services. Senegal Plan had to cease construction of a well when its request for tax exemption was rejected, resulting in an 18 percent increase in cost. The government's actions also forced the German Leprosy and Tuberculosis Relief Association (DAHW) to suspend construction of a refrigerated supply chain to conserve vaccines in the regional

pharmacy of Saint-Louis. The customs administration began to impound project vehicles, including those of the international CSO World Vision on the grounds that their temporary approvals were not renewed.

In response, international CSOs participated in a series of meetings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Interior, and the PTF group, which culminated in a conference meeting with the president, who agreed to lift the suspension of the host-state agreements for three months. The government announced the decision on October 3, but it was only implemented on November 15, and expired on December 29, 2011.

Due to the slow progress of talks with the government, CSOs met with the PTF group to request that it advocate the government on their behalf. The PTF did so on November 21, 2011 during a validation workshop led by the Prime Ministry for Senegal's new Political, Economic, and Social Document (DPES), a five-year development plan. Represented by the chief delegate of the European Commission and the head of cooperation of the Canadian Embassy in Dakar, the PTF group advocated for further postponing the suspension of international CSOs' host-state agreements, and creating a commission to review these agreements. They also advocated for restoring Decree 96-103. The PTF subsequently sent an open letter to the Prime Minister reiterating these demands.

In addition to the changes to Decree 96-103 and the suspension of international CSOs' host-state agreements, the government also began a fiscal reform process based on study supported by the IMF which would eliminate many tax exemptions and impose a moderate tax on CSOs. CSOs currently receive limited tax exemptions for goods that have been approved by the inter-ministerial committee presided over by the Ministry of Finance and CONGAD representatives. The PTF group advocated for the government to consult with CSOs on this fiscal reform. However, during a meeting in 2011 with the PTF group, the representative from the IMF announced that in January 2012, the IMF would send a mission to Dakar to support the government's fiscal policy reform process, including the moderate tax on CSOs.

Law firms generally lack knowledge on the regulatory framework governing CSOs. Significant disparities exist between access to legal services in urban and rural areas and the capital and the regions. CSOs also have trouble affording legal services.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.0

Organizational Capacity in Senegal

2009	2010	2011
3.9	3.9	4.0

In 2011, many CSOs faced financial constraints that disrupted normal operations. CSOs can rarely secure funding for three-year strategic plans, even when they have extensive experience, proven competencies, a democratic organizational structure, and reliable and transparent financial and accounting procedures. There are some exceptions; for example, the National Alliance against AIDS (ANCS) has been the primary recipient of the Global Fund since 2005. This efficient, seventeen-year-old organization, has provided resources and training to nearly 1000 sub-grantees (both national level CSOs and CBOs) and mobilized these organizations in the fight against HIV/AIDS and STDs, and against discrimination of persons living with HIV/AIDS.

As a result of ongoing financial constraints, an increasing number of CSOs cannot undertake significant activities and some have been forced to close. In order to survive, CSOs devote significant resources to bidding on grants and contracts funded by the PTF, often moving away from their areas of expertise to adopt the PTF's strategic objectives. Some CSOs have shifted from service delivery to research in order to bid on analytical projects from the government and the PTF.

Local CSOs find it difficult to retain highly qualified staff members, because these experts usually find better working conditions and salaries with foreign aid agencies, international CSOs, and UN agencies.

Organizations that do hire high-level experts have less funding available for operational expenses. Sometimes staff members agree to volunteer so that a financially challenged CSO can continue to function.

CSOs can rarely afford to regularly upgrade their office equipment and vehicles, except for international CSOs and the few local organizations whose project budgets include equipment.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.0

The financial viability of most CSOs has deteriorated due to the increasing practice of donors of to provide development assistance directly to the government in the form of budgetary support. Within the PTF group, the sub-group for budgetary support including the donor agencies of the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, and Spain, as well as the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and the European Union have signed a Framework Arrangement on Budgetary Support (ACAB). However, this has not eliminated direct support to CSOs completely. The Dutch cooperation agency provides budgetary support to the Ministry of the Environment, but it also provides direct funding to local CSOs working in this field. The European Union likewise supports CSOs with a 5 billion Francs CFA ($9.5 million) support fund for non-state actors. However, the maximum amount per grantee was reduced in 2010 from 300 million Francs CFA ($560,000) to 65 million Francs CFA ($120,000).

Since the financial crisis, funding for the operational expenses and institutional development of CSOs has been particularly hard hit. In 2011, funds available from international CSOs for subgrants were held up by the suspension of host-state agreements and the delayed transfer of CSO oversight. The CSO Plan International, for example, had to suspend its activities because of delays renewing its registration. Without this registration, the organization did not receive tax exemptions and could not afford the increased cost of its program activities.

The financial insecurity of CSOs was further exacerbated by the increased role UN agencies play as a direct service provider. Local CSOs also face competition from international CSOs. Many CSOs feel that financial viability will continue to deteriorate if the government imposes the proposed tax on CSOs.

As financial resources become scarce, it is no longer viable for CSOs to incorporate operational costs into their project budgets. The grants offered by the PTF are very restrictive and in many cases require a cost-share contribution of 15-20%. Because many CSOs lack the independent resources to provide this funding, they sometimes take on commitments they cannot meet and attempt to implement a project with only the funds they receive from the grant.

In order to reduce dependence on foreign donors, local CSOs have begun to develop skills raising funds independently. In some cases, they provide revenue-generating services, which they then reinvest in their activities and projects. The Union for Solidarity and Mutual Aid (USE), for example, opened a health care and artisanal skills training center, and also provides ophthalmology services. In 2011, this service received on average 200 patients per day, and provided 62.8 percent of cataract-related services in the Dakar region, according to a report by the Ministry of Health. This income allows USE to cover their operating costs, but not the costs of their medical equipment.

Private businesses are still minor players in funding CSOs. Only the Sonatel Foundation, founded by the principal telecommunications operator in Senegal, has significant resources, which it contributes to the public health care system and organizations close to public authorities, such as the Solidarity and Sharing Foundation, which is strongly supported by the current president's wife.

ADVOCACY: 3.9

Advocacy in Senegal

Decree 96-103 mandated the creation of a permanent advisory council for cooperation between the government and CSOs to be housed at the secretariat of the presidency of the republic. The group is mandated to bring together representatives of CONGAD and the ministries for dialogue on the legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for CSOs. Despite CONGAD's numerous calls for dialogue, the secretariat has not called a meeting of the group since 2005. As a result, dialogue between the government and CSOs has weakened, and there are frequent misunderstandings regarding the governance, legislation, and regulation of CSOs. The revision of Decree 96-103, for example, was issued without input from CSOs. To fill this gap, regional governors have instituted regional harmonization workshops to coordinate interventions by CSOs and the government.

Other mechanisms for cooperation between CSOs and the government have also stopped functioning. The National Commission on Land Rights became idle when the government launched a reform process to create investment areas that would place large expanses of land under the ownership of the national government. Under the program, control of the land would shift from local councils to the Agency for Investment and Large-Scale Construction Projects (APIX), enabling the state to sell land to private investors at the expense of small agricultural farmers. The establishment of APIX is contingent on the new government initiative taking place after the March 2012 elections.

The government also reformed water services without input from CSOs. Sénégalaise des Eaux, a subsidiary of the French company Bouygues is currently conducting a feasibility study and has positioned itself to provide all water services upon completion of the reform. While the government has promoted the approach of giving out a sole contract as a means to decrease cost and increase efficiencies, many CSOs oppose this approach on the grounds that a private firm may attempt to quickly recover it costs by charging fees that are unaffordable to impoverished populations.

The government consistently refused to engage in dialogue on the National Agricultural Investment Program (PNIA), a framework signed in 2002 as part of the New Partnership for Development in Africa (NEPAD). In 2010, the Ministry of Agriculture refused to consider amendments proposed by CSOs and autonomous farmers' organizations. In 2011, the CNCR, representing the principal farmer organization in Senegal, conducted an in-depth study and made recommendations on how to effectively implement the PNIA and the land reform initiative. The recommendations sought to provide a more equitable distribution of resources and protections for small farmers. However, these recommendations were ignored and the CNCR was excluded from talks on these initiatives.

CSOs were more successful advocating for provisions in the new DPES. When the government prioritized infrastructure over basic social services, CSOs collaborated with key members of the PTF to lobby the government to allocate more resources for basic social services and improve the implementation and monitoring of these services.

Dialogue between the government and CSOs has improved on education, training, and the National Program on Health Development (PNDS). The Ministry of Education works in close collaboration with CSOs that participate in the planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the Decennial Education and Training Program (PDEF). The Ministries of Health and Education are generally open to dialogue and CSOs have played a key role in community response to HIV/AIDS, leprosy, and malaria. Dialogue is also enhanced in these fields because of the personal relationships between doctors working for the MOH and those working for CSOs and because the PTF insist on collaboration with CSOs in these domains. In 2011, for example, CONGAD co-signed a memorandum with the Senegalese government addressed to the GAVI

Alliance calling for the inclusion of new vaccinations in the Expanded Vaccination Program (PEV). CONGAD also represented civil society in a multi-actor task group convened to revise the national policy on community health.

CSOs are also represented on steering committees for public projects to alleviate poverty and accelerate development, which they use as a platform for dialogue and advocacy. For effective collaboration and advocacy through these platforms, CSOs require resources to conduct situational analyses and studies. In 2011, the African Network for Integrated Development (RADI) conducted a report on women's access to water, and the Agricultural Monitoring Initiative (IPAR) worked in partnership with the CNCR to analyze the land reform process. CERFLA's research helped breeders' organizations and CSOs define their positions and lobby the government for the conservation and efficient governance of the forestry-pastoral area of Ranch de Dolly. Their propositions were shared with parliamentary representatives, local elected officials, land administration officials, and the director of the cabinet of the Minister of the Environment during a forum organized in November 2011.

Though the National Program on Good Governance was launched in 2004 to facilitate CSOs work, they still face numerous obstacles in their advocacy campaigns on good governance. The government altered the composition of the Council on Regulation, the governance body for the Regulating Authority of Public Markets (ARMP), adding new members. The Council on Regulation is an independent authority representing civil society organizations grievances. It has financial and management autonomy to set the general policies for the ARMP, and evaluate these policies within the limits set by its charter.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.9

The decline in financial resources available to CSOs in 2011 had a negative impact on the diversity and quality of services provided by CSOs. Many CSOs provide services by implementing projects under grants or contracts. It has become increasingly difficult to mobilize independent funds to implement a strategic plan. As CSOs are required to make do with the resources available through grants and contracts, they are increasingly unable to cover their operating expenses.

In many cases, the priorities of the PTF also are not aligned with CSOs' strategic plans. For example, in the area of illegal migration, the EU and the International Migration Organization (IMO) focus on creating incentives for illegal immigrants to return, whereas Senegalese CSOs focus on supporting sustainable development in emigration zones and protecting the rights of immigrants.

However, CSOs provide vital social services including construction of schools and water systems, improving public sanitation, and running grain banks, health centers, and health committees. In many rural areas, CSOs are the only entities providing these services. Though service delivery was impeded in 2011 due to the suspension of host-state agreements, international CSOs still delivered vital services. The German Leprosy and Tuberculosis Relief Association (DAHW), provides the majority of funding for the National Program on Fighting Leprosy; Caritas plays an important role in water access; and Aid and Action has contributed to building the capacity of the education and professional training system. Local CSOs also provide numerous services. For example, Action and Development (AcDev) builds community health centers; the Senegalese Association for Family Well-Being (ASBEF) offers counseling in reproductive rights and women health; and the Society for Women and AIDS (SWAA) organizes awareness campaigns, and disseminates educational materials in the fight against HIV-AIDS.

CSOs are generally strong in sharing analytical work. Many CSOs organize multi-actor validation workshops to disseminate their resources to civil society actors, state institutions, academics, the PTF, and journalists.

CSOs recover a small portion of the cost of delivering services. In many cases, contracts do not take into account the real financial costs of providing services, including salaries, wear and tear on equipment, and monitoring of contract deliverables.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.7

Infrastructure in Senegal

	2009	2010	2011
1			
3	4.7	4.7	4.7
5			
7			

There are several CSOs that act as resource centers. The Association of the Council for Action (ACA) works to establish and disseminate best practices for management and organizational development. Africa Consultants International (ACI) focuses on building CSOs' capacity in advocacy and expanding access to information and information technology. But these resource centers do not have sufficient funding to sustainably offer all services free of charge.

During the pre-electoral season of 2011, CSOs attempted to improve their coordination through CSO umbrella organizations, networks, and labor unions. CONGAD and the CNCR collaborated to establish common positions and propositions to influence agricultural policies and land reform. They remained united against the government's attempts to marginalize the autonomous farmers' organizations. CSOs also held dialogues with labor unions to influence the economic development policy, particularly the DPES.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.8

CSOs garnered significant interest from the media in 2011. The media covered the Global Social Forum in Dakar in February 2011 and the activities of CSOs like the African Encounter for the Defense of Human Rights (RADDHO), which mobilized citizens against the government's proposed changes to the constitution. CSOs stayed in the media by disseminating information about the electoral process, verifying voter rolls, and contributing to the debate over the validity of the incumbent president's candidacy for a third term.

Public Image in Senegal

	2009	2010	2011
1			
3	3.9	3.9	3.8
5			
7			

Media coverage also improved because large CSOs such as World Vision, Senegal Plan, Aid and Action, and Action Aid have increasingly prioritized improving the visibility of their activities, especially social service delivery. In many local communes, CSOs are the only actors that provide basic social services. The beneficiaries of these projects generally perceive CSOs positively.

CSOs have not yet implemented an overall communication strategy to share information and gather feedback from communities in a structured way. For example, disseminating the Debt and Investment Department's Annual Report on CSO Investments publicly would allow communes and other socioeconomic development actors to evaluate CSO activities. During the working session organized with the inter-ministerial commission on May 26 2011, CONGAD called on the government to make this report publically available, but this effort was not successful.

The government has a conflicting relationship with CSOs. Politically, it often views CSOs as a threat. However, certain ministries have very good relations with CSOs working in their sector. The Ministry of

Health and CSOs build long-term partnerships with numerous international and local CSOs working in the health sector.

The private sector has a generally good perception of CSOs and their efforts to promote good governance. Businesses also supported CSOs' advocacy against Senegal signing an agreement with the EU that would open West African markets to the EU. However, in some cases, private consulting firms and research offices compete with CSOs for contracts.

SIERRA LEONE

2011 Scores for Sierra Leone

CSO Sustainability	4.8
Legal Environment	5.0
Organizational Capacity	4.8
Financial Viability	5.7
Advocacy	4.5
Service Provision	4.1
Infrastructure	5.1
Public Image	4.5

1.0 — Sustainability Enhanced   3.0 — Sustainability Evolved   5.0 — 7.0 — Sustainability Impeded

Capital: Freetown

Government Type: Constitutional Democracy

Population: 5,485,998 (July 2011 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $900

Human Development Index: 180

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.8

CSOs in Sierra Leone are not required to register in order to operate. To be an NGO, however, the 2009 NGO Policy Guidelines state that an organization must first register with the Sierra Leone Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (SLANGO) and then register with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED). Community-based organizations (CBOs) can register with the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children's Affairs or with other relevant line ministries as appropriate, but this is optional.

As of December 2011, there were 320 NGOs registered in Sierra Leone, 114 of which were international organizations. Eighty-four new NGOs registered in 2011, including sixteen international NGOs (INGOs). These organizations work in diverse areas including health, water and sanitation, agriculture, and education, and advocacy on human rights, gender, extractive industries, and environmental issues. The broader CSO sector, on the other hand, is largely unregulated, so it is difficult to determine how many are operating; estimates are that there are upwards of 2,000 CSOs in the country.

CSO Sustainability in Sierra Leone

2009	2010	2011
4.8	4.8	4.8

The NGO sector continues to be largely dependent on foreign donors; however, both NGOs and other CSOs are increasingly successful in bidding for service-delivery contracts from national and local governments as well as multilateral donors. The Ministry of Health has been particularly active in awarding contracts to NGOs in the area of health care delivery. For example, the ministry partnered with the Health for All Coalition to monitor and evaluate free healthcare delivery nationwide. With support from the

European Union, Concern Worldwide formed a partnership with Tonkolili District Council to deliver healthcare and awareness programs to lactating mothers and children under the age of five.

CSOs continue to suffer from a shortage of basic office equipment, which is cost prohibitive to obtain and maintain. Formal partnerships between NGOs have improved somewhat, with increased sharing of best practices. Partnerships between NGOs and CBOs have also noticeably increased, as NGOs have recognized that CBOs have stronger relationships with targeted local constituents.

While there is still a lot of work to be done to ensure the sustainability of the civil society sector in Sierra Leone, the sector as a whole understands the challenges and is working toward greater sustainability, transparency, and accountability.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.0

NGOs currently enjoy a friendly working environment. The 2009 NGO Policy Guidelines provide general guidance for the operations of NGOs in Sierra Leone. The NGO Policy Guidelines are scheduled to be updated in consultation with a wide range of stakeholders, including NGOs, line ministries, local communities, and donors.

Legal Environment in Sierra Leone

The registration process for an NGO is fairly simple and straightforward. NGOs must register with both SLANGO and MoFED. In practice, however, many organizations only register with MoFED, in part because of a lack of awareness about the contents of the NGO Policy Guidelines among both government officials and NGOs. This can lead to problems when an NGO applies for a Duty Free Waiver and is asked for a Letter of Attestation from SLANGO that it is a registered and operating NGO and the goods being imported are for a specific program, project, or intervention. While the registration process is not complicated, government offices tend to be understaffed or staffed by unqualified personnel, which can hinder an NGO's ability to register promptly and in accordance with guidelines. The Human Resource Management Office of the Government of Sierra Leone is currently working to ensure that all front-line staff members are fully conversant with their duties and roles.

CBOs are, by and large, unregulated but may choose to register with the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children's Affairs or other relevant line ministries in order to gain credibility with international donors and to avail themselves of duty-free importation of office equipment, vehicles, and any other program-related goods.

NGOs do not pay taxes on their incomes and are eligible for tax exemptions on imported goods and equipment. Since 2009, SLANGO has been discussing with the National Revenue Authority (NRA) extending the exemption from the Goods and Services Tax (GST) to local NGOs; the exemption is currently only available to INGOs. This issue, along with the continuation of the existing NGO Duty Free Waiver, has become very sensitive as the 2012 elections approach and the government strives to maximize revenues.

NGOs can bid for, and often win, government contracts in areas such as health, water and sanitation, training, and agriculture. There are still no legal mechanisms for the government to provide grants to NGOs.

Sierra Leone urgently needs new laws, regulations, and systems promoting alternatives to foreign funding. For example, there are no tax incentives for domestic philanthropy. Additionally, while corporations are legally required to spend 3 percent of their annual profits on corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, there is little evidence that this regulation is properly implemented, and the NRA seems to lack the capacity to enforce it. Most CSR tends to be channeled to CBOs and not to registered NGOs. Tax exemptions for income generating activities would encourage NGOs to engage in more of this work.

Despite the rapid expansion of the CSO sector, there are no lawyers in Sierra Leone providing specialized services in CSO law. Those that do represent the sector tend to do so in the context of labor law and land matters.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.8

Organizational Capacity in Sierra Leone

NGOs tend to be reasonably well organized, with the mandatory structures and prerequisites required by SLANGO. CBOs increasingly adopt more accountable and transparent practices, such as program and financial audits and publication of annual reports.

Due to the changing nature of donor requirements and the noticeable drop in available funding, CSOs need to be much more professional in order to secure continued funding. For example, INGOs, as well as an increasing number of local NGOs and CBOs, are utilizing sophisticated strategic planning models, including extensive stakeholder consultations and reviews. INGOs are also increasing their partnerships with CBOs and smaller, local NGOs in order to build stronger constituencies and deliver relevant interventions. Despite this progress, all types of CSOs continue to need capacity building support in areas such as financial management, reporting, monitoring and evaluation, advocacy and service delivery.

Many larger NGOs, particularly those with international support, attract competent staff by offering attractive salaries. However, much of the sector survives from program to program. Smaller organizations rely on a core of dedicated and committed staff, members, and volunteers. Volunteerism continues to be popular at the grassroots level, and more organizations throughout the sector are now making use of volunteers due both to the decline in funding and increased public awareness that volunteer experience can be invaluable in securing full-time employment.

Many CSOs lack proper management structures. Some organizations have boards of directors or trustees that supervise the executive management, although the division of roles is not always clear. NGOs and CBOs working in partnership with INGOs have very good governance structures with clearly defined roles, as INGOs tend to require accountability in their partners. The Anti-Corruption Commission's 2010/2011 Review of Systems in the NGO Sector, which highlighted areas in need of improvement and potential loopholes in accountability, reflected great improvement in the board competence of organizations partnering with INGOs.

CSO constituency building has been gradually improving. The growing number of partnerships between NGOs and CBOs has facilitated the process of reaching grassroots communities, at least for larger organizations.

There is a noticeable increase in the availability and use of technology, particularly Internet and communications technology (ICT). In part, this is due to improvements in electricity distribution in the capital and greater awareness of the use of the Internet.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.7

While Sierra Leone has experienced dramatic economic growth this year as a consequence of increased mining activity, this has yet to impact local communities. This is partly due to corruption by local authorities such as district councils and chiefs. The Local Government Policy Document of 2010 stipulates that royalty payments from the companies to communities should be channeled through district and local councils; however, these councils often fail to release the funds in full to intended beneficiaries. A number of CSOs and NGOs have been advocating for changes in this policy, but their efforts are mostly uncoordinated.

Financial Viability in Sierra Leone

	2009	2010	2011
	5.7	5.7	5.7

Most CSO funding comes from international, bilateral, and multilateral donors. Donors tend to fund interventions in line with the government's published priority areas, and invite bids and applications from organizations with greater capacities and established track records in relevant areas. Most such grants are therefore awarded to INGOs. CBOs are more likely to be found operating at community and grassroots levels with little or no external funding. Instead, they rely on local manpower and equipment in order to conduct their work.

Organizations still struggle with fundraising. Most CSOs continually prepare proposals based either on local needs assessments or their own available skill sets and send these proposals to prospective funders in the hope of securing funding.

NGOs lack the know-how to raise funds locally, thus limiting their funding opportunities. In addition, Sierra Leone lacks a tradition or culture of philanthropy. On the contrary, CSOs (particularly NGOs) are viewed as channels for donor funding to come into the country. Local NGOs and CBOs often lack the necessary start-up capital to develop income-generating activities. Most earned income comes from providing services for government programs, often for monitoring and evaluation or information dissemination programs. For example, SLANGO successfully secured funding from the United Nations Peacebuilding Mission in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) to disseminate information around the country about the Accord on Non-Violence and Political Tolerance signed by the leaders of the three main political parties.

There are still no records on how the commercial sector utilizes its CSR budgets, as corporations do not report to SLANGO and their financial records are closely guarded.

Most NGOs maintain sound financial management systems and have realized the importance of accountability and transparency, including the use of audits. CBOs tend to carry out audits only as required by funders. The financial accounting standards for NGOs proposed in 2010 by the Council for Standards of Accounting, Auditing, Corporate, and Institutional Governance (CSAAG) have yet to be adopted by the Ministry of Finance because of a lack of capacity within the National Revenue Authority to review, implement, and police thoroughly the proposed standards. CSAAG continues to advocate for the standards' adoption.

ADVOCACY: 4.5

Both SLANGO and a number of CSO coalitions and networks continue to lobby the executive office and legislators on behalf of the NGO community. The enactment of the Persons with Disability Act 2011 was the direct result of such lobbying. In addition, the government and NGOs jointly work on projects. For example, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children's Affairs, the Women's Forum, and other gender-focused organizations collaborated to get parliament to enact three gender acts.

Advocacy in Sierra Leone

	2009	2010	2011
1			
3	4.5	4.5	4.5
5			
7			

CSOs regularly work on joint advocacy initiatives. The Sierra Leone Union of Disability Groups (SLUDI), One Family People (OFP), Health for All Coalition, National Youth Commission, and others collaborated to push through the establishment of the National Youth Commission and to monitor the Free Healthcare Initiative for pregnant women and children under the age of five. SLUDI, UN Women, the Network of Women Ministers and Parliamentarians (NEWMAP), Women's Forum, Health Alert, and others have successfully formed both issue-based (disability and women's rights) and broad-based coalitions with varying degrees of efficacy.

Despite the high level of political consciousness that now reaches down to the grassroots level, there are many issue areas in which advocacy is unsuccessful or non-existent due to a lack of financial and technical resources. In some instances, a lack of political will also impedes advocacy, particularly where a cause does not dovetail with the government's agenda or conflicts with an agreement the government may have entered into with a foreign direct investor.

In order to communicate with government officials, CSOs must currently go through the Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDA) in an ad hoc fashion. Ministries lack structured communication systems, so NGOs channel their inquiries through each ministry's NGO Liaison Officer. The government's Human Resource Management Office (HRMO) is making advances in providing a more structured environment for CSOs to communicate with government officials, for example by developing structured communication channels and recruiting key personnel to handle such communications.

INGOs meet monthly to discuss issues of importance to them. When needed, they have mandated SLANGO to represent them to advocate and lobby for legislative changes. For example, the Amendment to the Labor Act 2011 stipulated that changes to the minimum wage, end of service benefits, and gratuities were to be increased retroactively from January 1, 2011. SLANGO lobbied for these changes to be applied to NGOs effective as of January 1, 2012.

Both the private and public sectors are increasingly consulting with CSOs. For example, the Addax Bioenergy Strategic Consultative Steering Group has covered environmental and community impact and the National Employment Policy Consultative Group has focused on the drafting of the new National Employment Policy.

Existing and emerging advocacy groups still require more technical development in the areas of drafting policy and legislation and monitoring and evaluation; and organizational capacity development in the areas of lobbying, campaigning, and public relations.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1

CSOs offer a variety of services in areas such as agriculture, education, health care, social welfare, and human rights. Most services provided by national organizations are supply driven, not demand driven, thus weakening their impact. In contrast, local NGOs and CBOs continue to conduct assessments to identify the needs of the communities they serve and tailor their proposals accordingly.

Service Provision in Sierra Leone

	2009	2010	2011
1			
3	4.2	4.1	4.1
5			
7			

National and local governments increasingly partner with CSOs and NGOs to fill gaps in social service provision, thereby raising the visibility of the sector and recognizing CSOs as development partners. The bidding

process for service provision contracts from government and multilateral donors is transparent, and contracts are awarded on the merit of bids.

CSOs rarely charge fees for services to their communities, due to the poverty of target constituents. Those that do provide services and products such as agricultural support materials and training for fees charge only nominal amounts, and are heavily subsidized by donors. However, many organizations now build some cost recovery into their projects. For example, agricultural projects recover costs from the sale of produce and reinvest those profits back into the projects, helping to sustain them.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1

Infrastructure in Sierra Leone

	2009	2010	2011
1			
3			
5	5.1	5.1	5.1
5			
7			

The emergence of new partnerships and coalitions, such as the Health for All Coalition, SLUDI, and the Women's Forum, have encouraged CSOs to share knowledge, build capacity, and develop needs-based programming. In turn, this has led to more relevant programming that is more appealing to INGOs and donors. Networks and coalitions also continue to successfully fundraise for and implement joint projects. For example, Health for All received funding from DFID to monitor the Free Healthcare program.

Most coalitions and networks hold regular meetings at which they share information with each other and strategize on advocacy. SLANGO continues to hold monthly sectoral meetings on health, youth, environment, agriculture, gender and children, and social protection to identify issues requiring advocacy and lobbying.

There are only three resource centers in the country: SLANGO, the Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO, which has now been absorbed as a department within the Ministry of Finance), and Enhancing the Interaction and Interface between Civil Society and the State to Improve Poor People's Lives (ENCISS, which is managed by Christian Aid). None of these centers earn income from providing services. SLANGO and ENCISS have regional offices that provide decentralised services around the country. ENCISS continues to be the sole local foundation, re-granting DFID funds to CSOs. SLANGO and most INGOs provide a range of training programs in organizational management and strategic and financial management.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5

Most media houses continue to charge for the publication of news items. Only INGOs and other large organizations can afford to employ public relations specialists or pay the media for coverage. Some organizations may also budget for such media coverage in project proposals.

Public Image in Sierra Leone

	2009	2010	2011
1			
3	4.5	4.5	4.5
5			
7			

Some local governments have a negative perception of CSOs, often viewing them as competitors for donor funds. However, other local and central government authorities welcome collaboration with CSOs and continue to enjoy a healthy working relationship with the sector. Public perception of CSOs is slowly improving as the local communities become more aware of the work they do and feel their impact directly.

The collaboration between CSOs and the commercial sector continues to grow, which benefits the communities in which they operate. For example, Farmer Field Schools around the country have been funded by commercial enterprises such as Addax Bioenergy.

All NGOs are required to produce annual reports, which are available for inspection at the SLANGO Secretariat; other CSOs do not have to meet such requirements. SLANGO has drafted an NGO Code of Ethics, which is currently being debated within the NGO community and will hopefully be adopted in 2012.

SOUTH AFRICA

2011 Scores for South Africa

Category	Score
CSO Sustainability	3.6
Legal Environment	3.3
Organizational…	3.8
Financial Viability	4.1
Advocacy	3.4
Service Provision	3.2
Infrastructure	3.8
Public Image	3.6

Sustainability Enhanced — Sustainability Evolved — Sustainability Impeded

Capital: Pretoria

Government Type: Republic

Population: 48,810,427 (July 2012 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $11,100

Human Development Index: 123

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 3.6

South Africa is a constitutional democracy with a free market economy. The present governing party, which has been in power since 1994, is committed to development. While South Africa's economy continues to grow at between 2 and 3 percent and the state argues that over 200,000 jobs were created in 2011, jobs in various sectors continue to be lost and income inequality, impervious to redistributive policies, is on the rise. At the same time, the government is notoriously inefficient in certain sectors such as education, housing, and roads. At the municipal level, there are serious problems with basic service delivery such as water and electricity. Finally, a number of provincial departments have been placed under national government administration in order to deal with alleged corruption and mismanagement.

The local government elections held in May 2011 significantly changed the political landscape at the local level,

CSO Sustainability in South Africa

2009	2010	2011
3.6	3.6	3.6

with decreasing levels of support for the African National Congress (ANC). During protests about poor service delivery in the lead up to the local elections, Andries Tatane, a community activist who had registered to stand as an independent in the local elections, was killed at the hands of the police. His death, which was caught on camera, has taken on iconic significance among civil society circles.

As a result of these political and economic trends, CSOs face increased pressures to scale up their service delivery,

although this has not been accompanied by increases in financial support. At the same time, there has been a mushrooming of community-based organizations (CBOs) staffed entirely by volunteers who rely on their individual resources to fund these organizations' activities.

By March 2011, 76,175 organizations were registered as not-for-profit organizations (NPOs), of which 55 percent worked in social services, development, and housing, and the remainder in various areas such as health (11 percent), education and research (11 percent), and law, advocacy and politics (2 percent). Registered NPOs are largely clustered in Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal, and the Western Cape, home to the three largest cities in South Africa. The state estimates that CSOs deliver 70 percent of government services but only receive 10 percent of the Department of Social Welfare's budget. As a result, many service delivery CSOs in both urban and rural areas are on the brink of collapse.

Civil society is encouraged and protected by the constitution and a variety of laws, and operates freely and openly. It is as diverse as the society in which it operates, and consists of numerous local voluntary associations, self-help groups, professional bodies, interest-based associations, single-issue campaigns, advocacy organizations, and professional not-for-profit organizations working on issues ranging from welfare to public policy.

According to Round Five of the Afrobarometer, an African-led series of national public attitude surveys on democracy and governance, conducted in late 2011, one in ten South African adults is an active member of a voluntary association or community group; one in three regularly attends a community meeting of some type; one in four has worked collectively to raise an issue of public importance; and one in three reports regular involvement in a religious association.

In 2011, CSOs continued to campaign to improve the distribution of Lotto funding and the portion of the National Lottery that is distributed to public benefit organizations (PBOs). CSO advocacy led to an agreement to restructure the fund and review funding priorities.

Advocacy-related funding shifted away from institutional support toward campaigns and rights-awareness projects. The 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which met in Durban, created an incentive for CSOs to focus on climate-related projects.

As South Africa celebrates its fifteenth year of constitutional democracy, "traditional" civil society space is diminishing, even while new organizational forms, issues, and actors are emerging. Old challenges inherited from the apartheid era, such as race and the increasing disparities between white and black communities, remain. Extremely high levels of corruption – especially in the police service – continue to bedevil the state at all levels and pose significant challenges for civil society in terms of partnership and advocacy with government.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.3

The legal framework for CSOs as a whole has not changed since last year. CSOs in South Africa continue to be governed by the Non-Profit Organizations (NPO) Act of 1997 and the Companies Act of 2008, and register with the Department of Social Development (DSD). In 2011, after consulting both the business and civil society sectors, the government amended the Companies Act of 2008. The DSD continues to streamline the registration process, but new provisions in the act may make registration more difficult for NPOs.

Legal Environment in South Africa

The number of organizations registering as NPOs and PBOs in order to access government contracts, take advantage of tax exemptions, and receive fundraising protections continues to increase steadily.

Establishing a legal entity as either a trust or an NPO, which is necessary in order to access tax exemptions, is not simple. The South African Revenue Services (SARS) established a consultative process with CSOs and commissioned a research report in 2011 to address this and other issues. The tax exemption system has flaws; restrictions on which organizations qualify to receive exemptions inhibit the growth of advocacy groups. In addition, the tax law constrains cost recovery and income generating activities, compelling organizations that want to access the exemptions to rely primarily on grants and donations. Tax relief to donors is also limited.

The state continues to harass some CSOs, especially in poor communities and informal settlement areas where local elites may view CSOs as competitors. The government criticizes CSOs that object to the state's laws, policies, or quality of services. These organizations have not been subject to physical bullying by state agents or arrests, but may find it harder to win new government contracts. Because so many organizations are dependent on state contracts, criticism of state policy or implementation has become muted. Immigrant organizations, including both associations of immigrants and CSOs that advocate for the rights of immigrant communities, and commercial associations are particular targets for discrimination and state harassment, which makes it difficult for them to operate. Political battles are harsher at the local level than at the national level. For example, there have been reports of 'palace coups' by governing party associates that have taken over the boards of community radio stations accused of being too critical of the government.

CSOs can compete for government contracts. South Africa has preferential procurement legislation to enhance broad-based black economic empowerment, but this requires a demonstration of equity ownership, which CSOs cannot easily provide. In addition, procurement has become fraught with delays and bureaucratic impediments as the government attempts to clamp down on corrupt practices. In the future, this may benefit CSOs if it results in a more transparent awarding of contracts by the state, particularly at a provincial and local level.

In general, legal arrangements and policies support and encourage larger professional organizations and inhibit the growth of new organizations, which have "market entry" problems, such as delays in registration, difficulty accessing donor funding because of lack of a track record, and branding problems in a crowded field.

CSOs in urban centers generally have more access to legal support, although legal services are also available in small towns such as Oudsthoorn in the Cape. Regardless of accessibility, legal services remain unaffordable for many CSOs.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.8

The civil society sector in South Africa is too large and diverse to make generalized statements about organizational capacity. Significant differences in capacities exist between organizations in cities, suburbs, and rural areas. Organizations that receive funding from institutional sources, such as the government, Official Development Assistance (ODA), corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, or philanthropic foundations, are highly professional, and prepare business plans, project proposals, and M&E frameworks. The majority of organizations, however, conduct themselves more informally, often driven by key local individuals and voluntary committees. The complexity of management systems within CSOs is related to organizational size. In urban

areas, large professional CSOs have complex managerial systems, whereas informal CSOs rely on the energy of one or two individuals to drive the coordination of activities.

Few organizations have been able build national constituencies or to bridge the gap between urban and rural concerns, although many are true to the needs of their relatively small constituencies, and some have given these constituencies a say in organizational governance and policy.

As reported in 2010, the global financial crisis and resulting reductions in funding continue to drive qualified staff into more stable sectors. Smaller organizations in particular have had to cut back on staff this year because of reduced budgets. In response, there has been an increase in the formation and deepening of networks at the district level (including in Vhembe District in Limpopo and Ixopo in Kwa-Zulu Natal), especially in rural areas where smaller organizations have banded together for advocacy and support as well as to strengthen capacity.

Technology is expensive in South Africa. As a result, although South Africans and concomitantly CSOs have always been innovative early adopters of new technology, they are now falling behind. While some organizations utilize social media tools, others do not even have access to electricity.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.1

Organizations providing social services on behalf of the state have a steady source of income, although they face challenges in relation to timely payment by the state for services. CSOs also face challenges around procurement and tendering systems, with high levels of corruption impacting the fair award of government contracts to CSOs, especially those that are critical of the state.

Financial Viability in South Africa

2009   2010   2011

3.8   4.0   4.1

Corporate social investment (CSI) obligations continue to grow at a rate of roughly 6 percent a year. Informal estimates put the level of CSI from various private sector trusts and companies in 2011 at R 6.2 billion ($820 million). CSI money usually funds health, housing, education, and welfare projects.

Most donor and government funding does not cover general operating costs, so even organizations with funding are in precarious financial positions. Organizations that have traditionally relied on ODA funding found it more difficult to access in 2011, as donor contributions to South Africa, a middle-income country, were steeply cut as a result of the economic crisis.

Competition for foundation and private donations is fierce. Applications for funds from the Lotto distribution agency continue to far outweigh the funding available. This is compounded by the inefficient management of Lotto funds. Funding tends to go largely toward issues such as HIV/AIDS, while others, such as public health policy programs, are under-resourced.

Organizations that receive funding are heavily regulated, and most financial management systems (FMS) are geared to donor reporting requirements rather than effective management. A CSO that tries to put in place a single, coherent FMS typically will often have difficulty complying with varied donor-mandated reporting systems. Some more professional organizations have computerized FMS that are compatible with banking systems, such as electronic funds transfer (EFT) systems. Organizations that are registered with DSD and organizations that receive international and corporate funding regularly undergo independent audits by regulated audit firms.

South African organizations are creative fundraisers. For example, the South African Association of Depression and Anxiety Group organized a raffle with prizes including a trip to London to have dinner at

Gordon Ramsay. Fundraising techniques range from localized appeals to online and SMS (text) donation campaigns. Gift of the Givers combines a print and televised appeals with a very sophisticated email-based fundraising campaign in relation to disaster management. The local cinema chain Ster Kinekor also has an electronic appeal system connected to the purchase of cinema tickets for donations to various charities. Private schools run raffles to support the purchase of sporting equipment for under-funded primary schools. Citizens are generous givers; individual giving tends to go to religious organizations and, to a lesser extent, welfare and environmental groups.

Although statistics are not available, anecdotal evidence suggests that CSOs are attempting to recover costs and raise money through commercial ventures. While the tax treatment of these activities is still unfavorable, the consultative process that is underway may change the landscape and encourage CSOs to invest their scarce resources in business development initiatives.

ADVOCACY: 3.4

A focus on advocacy and lobbying by particular CSOs obscures, and may even undermine, the more important democratic process of building accountability between citizens and their elected representatives, and building citizen power rather than elite accommodations. CSOs whose advocacy and lobbying campaigns are not backed by substantial citizen constituencies may meet their goals, but their interests frequently do not reflect those of the broader citizenry, particularly the poorer and more marginalized segments of society. This is a particular problem in the socially and economically unequal and racially polarized society in South Africa.

During 2011, the Right to Know (R2K) campaign continued to advocate for changes in the Protection of Information Bill, draft legislation that would curtail access to information and criminalize whistle blowing on state activity. This legislation remains in the parliament pending additional amendments.

A groundswell of public opinion, union pressure, and media attention stopped the roll out of a large-scale road electronic tolling (e-tolling) system, which had been due to open in early 2012. Opposition to the system was based on objections to the further financial burden the tolls would place on the poor and marginalized. The anti-toll campaign was not centrally organized, but arose from public anger, which led to the coalescence of various organizations. The campaign, which included litigation and public protest, was perhaps more effective in building a groundswell of public support than a more traditionally planned and organized campaign.

Migrant rights have become one of the most active and vibrant areas of advocacy, with both South African human rights groups and migrant associations taking up the challenges posed by poor laws, state inefficiency and abuse, and citizen prejudices.

The courts have defined the level of public participation required in legislative and public policy development. Citizens have the right to know the basis on which policies or laws are being proposed, adequate forums organized by the government at which they can express their views on these policies or laws, and a certainty that their views have been taken into account in the final versions of these policies or laws. This includes, but is not limited to, public access to all parliamentary committees, access to the proceedings of these committees, and invitations to address members of these committees. At the local level, CSOs can participate in Ward Committee, council plenary, and committee meetings, while at the provincial and national levels, CSOs can make their voices heard through, for example, public hearings and public consultation on the budget. Some CSOs do participate, but this is not the norm. A few organizations monitor whether these

requirements are met. Idasa, for example, regularly insists to the speaker of parliament that committee proceedings remain open to the public, and for the moment, publicity seems sufficient to ensure that they are.

There is a gap between the work of CSOs and on-the-ground priorities. Relatively unorganized and spontaneous local level protests over poor delivery of basic services such as water, electricity, and housing continue in South Africa, with participation reportedly in the thousands. Because CSOs fail to create advocacy campaigns that address expressed citizen concerns, the government can easily dismiss these campaigns and their organizers.

The Foundation for Human Rights, a major funder in the advocacy sector, established new priorities in 2011, including the promotion of constitutional rights, human rights awareness and education, and policy dialogues on farm dwellers and workers' rights. Many other funders have followed suit in redefining their priorities in line with perceived changes in the political environment, in particular, the governing party's efforts to limit freedom of expression and association. Statements from the ruling party on independent media control, an expansive approach to the classification of state documents, and civil litigation against cartoonists all suggest a party that is becoming intolerant of views that differ from its own or are expressed outside of the party itself.

At present, there is no focus on local advocacy for legal reform related to the civil society sector.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.2

Services provided by CSOs range from the supply of medicine to mental health care, from pre-school education to the mentoring of post graduate students, and from town planning to support for low-cost builders.

As in previous years, all basic services offered by CSOs are provided free of charge to constituents with funding from companies, donors, or the state. However, it is becoming more common for CSOs to charge for professional services, such as research or training, to the government or donors.

Service Provision in South Africa

Service delivery is provided throughout the country, but is concentrated in urban centers largely within poor communities. The continuing demand for direct services has reduced the number of organizations able to work on political and community dialogue, citizen empowerment, and civic education.

In general, service delivery organizations are responsive to community needs, while larger organizations are generally further removed from the communities they serve and may not be as responsive to shifting dynamics at a community level.

In theory, there should be a relationship between service provision and advocacy based on an understanding of people's needs, aspirations, rights, disappointments, and areas of oppression. In practice, there is a divide forced by the availability of funding, and the CSOs that used to bridge this gap are less active than they used to be.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.8

Intermediary and resource services continue to decline due to decreases in funding and competing needs for direct service provision in communities. The remaining organizations have no financial safety net and do not coordinate with one another. While a few relatively small resource organizations exist, there is no single civil society coordinating or service agency. Forums, networks, and coalitions established for mutual support are limited in number and scope.

Infrastructure in South Africa

	2009	2010	2011
	3.9	3.8	3.8

While there are no trainers specializing in CSOs, many formal training opportunities are available for a fee. The NPO directorate in the Department of Social Development also provides some resources.

Issue-based campaign coalitions, such as R2K and the e-tolling campaign, continue to exist, but there has been no significant movement to link the coalitions or establish organizational lessons that could be shared more broadly. Besides the coalitions that formed for these large visible campaigns, there are still no large-scale intersectoral partnerships.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.6

In theory, government continues to regard civil society positively, but in reality, prefers to consult citizens through paid consultants rather than dealing directly with CSOs. When the government must engage with CSOs, there is an ongoing tendency to cherry pick which organizations to consult with depending on the issues being addressed. Furthermore, the government often accuses CSOs that disagree with governmental opinion of lacking representativeness.

Public Image in South Africa

	2009	2010	2011
	3.5	3.6	3.6

Public opinion of CSOs continues to be generally good. Public support for environmental and welfare-focused organizations is growing, while LGBTI groups and some freedom of expression advocates face some public criticism. For the first time, there is significant voluntary and financial support by citizens and the government for humanitarian work outside South Africa. For example, South African organizations, such as the disaster-relief organization Gift of the Givers, work in countries like Haiti and Somalia.

South African businesses continue to allocate substantial funds to CSOs through corporate social investment and responsibility programs, which seems to indicate a relatively positive perception of the sector.

Community newspapers and radio stations continue to report positively on the sector. Public interest work gets consistent attention in a popular national broadsheet and in a national weekly geared toward the civil society sector. Global attention on CSOs and their role in development and humanitarian aid is filtering into the national dialogue.

Some CSOs are developing public relations capacity, although most organizations do not deem this to be as important as other aspects of organizational management and activity.

In 2011, some large organizations started to draft a code of conduct in response to the King Commission, a report of recommendations on corporate governance. The code is expected to be published in 2012.

TANZANIA

2011 Scores for Tanzania

Category	Score
CSO Sustainability	4.2
Legal Environment	4.4
Organizational Capacity	4.4
Financial Viability	4.9
Advocacy	3.8
Service Provision	3.4
Infrastructure	4.3
Public Image	4.1

1.0 3.0 5.0 7.0

Sustainabiliy Enhanced **Sustainability Evolved** **Sustainability Impeded**

Capital: Dar es Salaam

Government Type: Republic

Population: 43,601,796 (July 2012 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $1,500

Human Development Index: 152

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.2

Tanzanian civil society continues to make strides despite existing challenges and structural constraints. During 2011, the legal environment improved, with better implementation of friendlier registration policies. Most multilateral donors, with the exception of the United States, prefer to use the General Budget Support (GBS), an aid modality in which committed donor funds are included in the National Budget and then released to the National Treasury for financing of public service delivery. Because donors want to see CSOs promoting public financial accountability as a form of advocacy, most CSOs in Tanzania are increasingly using accountability tools, such as Social Accountability Monitoring (SAM), Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETs), the Participatory Service Delivery Survey (PSDA), and Citizens Report Cards (Pima Cards), for tracking public expenditures and monitoring service delivery.

Donor funding opportunities declined over the past year due to the global financial crisis. The financial viability of service provision CSOs in particular has weakened, as foreign funding is being channeled primarily toward advocacy.

CSO Sustainability in Tanzania

Year	2009	2010	2011
Score	4.2	4.2	4.2

The media remains under the control of the ruling party and economic elites, who are often involved in corrupt practices. This makes it difficult for advocacy and anti-corruption campaigns to garner media, and therefore public, attention.

The most recent statistics available, from the 2009/2010 Directory of CSOs published by Foundation for Civil Society, lists 3,000 CSOs. However, few rural-based

organizations are included. The Civil Society Research Facility (CSRF) estimates the true number to be about 10,000, based on combined data from the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children (MCDGC), the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Industries and Trade (MIT), and the Registration, Insolvency, and Trusteeship Agency (RITA).

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.4

Under the NGO Act, registration of NGOs (organizations whose scope of operation are national, regional, or district and adhere to corporate governance ideals) is overseen by the MCDGC. CSOs other than NGOs, such as foundations and societies, register under the National Sports Council Act (1967) overseen by the Ministry of Information, Sports and Culture; the Societies Ordinance (1954) overseen by the Ministry of Home Affairs; the Trustee Incorporation Ordinance (1956) overseen by RITA under the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (MJCA); the Companies Act (2002) overseen by the MIT; and in Zanzibar, Act No. 6 (1995) under the Chief Minister's Office. With the exception of Zanzibar, CSOs operating under other laws can register under the NGO Act by obtaining a certificate of compliance from the NGO registrar.

Legal Environment in Tanzania

2009	2010	2011
4.5	4.5	4.4

Associations and community-based organizations (CBOs) register under the Societies Ordinance. The Ordinance is highly bureaucratic and restrictive, and registration can take up to a year, even for a small CBO. A CSO registered under the Ordinance is not considered a juridical person, meaning it lacks the status to sue or be sued in its own name, or to hold and dispose of property or other assets. For these privileges, an organization must register a Board of Trustees under the Trustees Incorporation Act. A CSO registered as a trust, foundation, or company automatically acquires corporate status as a non-profit sharing company, which confers juristic status. However, it is more expensive to register under the Companies Act than under some other acts, including the Societies Ordinance and the NGO Act, so many organizations cannot afford to register as companies and must submit to the more restrictive legal forms instead.

The multitude of laws and lack of information about the registration process are confusing, especially for CBOs. Many organizations choose to register under one act rather than another simply because they do not know about or understand all of the options. At the same time, the choice of laws provides flexibility. For example, because the NGO Act gives the Registrar of NGOs the power to deregister NGOs with impunity, robust advocacy organizations such as HakiElimu and the Tanzania Gender Networking Program (TGNP) have registered under the Companies Act, which makes it difficult for the government to deregister them. While the government twice banned HakiElimu for advocating for educational reform, it did not deregister the organization, which it could have done easily if the organization had been registered under the NGO Act.

On the other hand, awareness by grassroots CSOs about registration increased during 2011, and, in turn, the number of organizations registering at the district level is on the rise. In the past, district-level organizations registered with the NGO Unit at the MCDGC, whereas now they can register at the Community Development Department in their districts, towns, and municipal or city councils.

There were fewer threats to ban CSOs in 2011, a possible indication that the state is starting to recognize the importance of CSOs to national development. However, civil servants sometimes harass CSOs working on accountability issues. For example, in the Shinyanga region, the Shinyanga Foundation, a local organization that had been tracking public expenditures, pressed law enforcement agencies to take action against corrupt officials. The staff members involved were given eighteen-month jail sentences on trumped-up sedition charges.

NGOs registered under the NGO Act are required to submit annual financial and narrative reports. While the legal consequence of failing to report is deregistration, the Registrar rarely takes action. The law also requires CSOs to have internal management and financial accountability mechanisms, but not all organizations comply.

CSOs registered the under Societies Ordinance are required to have at least ten members, and under the Companies Act, two members. In addition, CSOs are required to hold regular elections and to institute term limits for board members. There is an exception for founders of trusts, who are permitted to be lifetime trustees. Organizations must hold Annual General Meetings (AGM) or have a General Assembly. Boards are required to meet quarterly, and the management team at least monthly.

Under the Companies Act and the Trustees Incorporation Act, organizations are supposed to submit annual financial reports to the Registrar of Companies or the Registrar of Trusts respectively. All CSOs registered under the Companies Act are required to prepare annual reports and make them available to the public, council, board, and other stakeholders. Organizations registered as trusts are not required to submit financial and program reports because they are only accountable to trustees, and not to members.

The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA) implements tax laws for all CSOs, but the laws are applied arbitrarily. For example, the National Budget 2011/2012 eliminated tax exemptions to all CSOs except faith-based organizations (FBOs) and CSOs serving people with HIV/AIDS, orphans, and other vulnerable children. All other CSOs are now required to pay Value Added Tax (VAT) as well as other duties and levies.

Under 2004 amendments to the NGO Act, an NGO is permitted to earn profits, which must be reinvested in the organization, as long as income-generating activities are aligned with the mission and objectives of the organization. Some civil society networks have started to educate their members on this opportunity for financial sustainability.

CSOs are allowed to compete for government contracts at both the local and central government levels. Environmental CSOs are increasingly winning contracts for urban garbage collection, and research CSOs provide technical support to Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) in developing policies related to, and impact assessments of, anti-poverty programs. CSOs are also contracted to provide healthcare, education, and extension services, especially in underserved and rural areas.

Several new universities were established with law faculties in 2011, including the University of Bagamoyo and Mtwara University College (MTUCO), under the auspices of the Saint Augustine University (SAUT) of Mwanza. As the number of law graduates and legal experts increases, more and more lawyers are dedicating their careers to civil society activism, including promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. CSOs, particularly human rights and environmental organizations, are attracting law school students and graduates as advocacy interns and officers. For example, the executive director of the Lawyers' Environmental Action Team (LEAT) is a lawyer.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.4

Organizational Capacity in Tanzania

2009	2010	2011
4.4	4.4	4.4

The majority of district- and rural-level CSOs tend to have lower overall capacity than urban CSOs. It is difficult for district- and rural-level organizations to build effective constituencies because they often choose their beneficiaries through personal contacts rather than through community or government channels. Furthermore, CSO activities are often donor-driven rather than needs-driven. Most urban-based CSOs lack offices in the rural districts where most of the donor-funded anti-poverty programs are implemented. In

order to access anti-poverty program funding, urban CSOs often create temporary field offices for donor assessment visits, and then close the field offices following the assessments.

CSOs recognize the importance of strategic planning, and many donors require CSOs to have a plan as an indicator of organizational capacity. However, many organizations do not follow their plans, often because they were developed to meet donor requirements, and therefore the developing CSOs lack a sense of ownership. National and other large CSOs are more likely to have and follow strategic plans than others.

There is little change in CSO staffing since last year. Understaffing continues to be a major problem. Financial constraints continue to hinder local and many national organizations from hiring qualified staff or filling vacant positions. As a result, many CSO staff members perform duties for which they are under-qualified. The sector also suffers from a lack of standardized salary scales, poor working conditions, and nepotism.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9

Very few CSOs raise local resources from their members, in part because payment of membership dues declines as the cost of living rises. As a result, most CSOs continue to rely on donor funding, especially from the Foundation for Civil Society, a European multilateral civil aid project. Overall, donor funding opportunities declined from 2010 due to the global financial crisis. More organizations this year have stagnated or closed, especially those engaged in service provision. For example, the Global Fund's Orphans and Vulnerable Children's Program was unable to extend its funding and had to shut down.

Financial Viability in Tanzania

2009	2010	2011
4.9	4.9	4.9

This year, donors have continued to shift from funding organizations directly to disbursing aid to the government through the General Budget Support modality. Donors are focusing on promoting public accountability through increased funding to advocacy and public expenditure tracking projects. These initiatives include the Accountability in Tanzania (AcT) program, funded by UK's Department for International Development (DfID), and the Strength, Transparency, Accountability and Responsibility (STAR) program, funded by USAID. The changes in aid disbursement modalities have strengthened the financial viability of advocacy CSOs and weakened the financial viability of service provision CSOs.

In the wake of declining international funding, some national CSOs have started to diversify their funding sources through income-generating activities, including microfinance, capacity development training, research, and publications. However, these activities are neither sufficient nor self-sustaining.

About 100 robust organizations at the national, regional, and district levels have ongoing and committed financial support from international donors. These CSOs include the Women's Dignity Project (WDP), HakiElimu, the Legal and Human Rights Center (LHRC), HakiKazi Catalyst (HKC), HakiArdhi, Sikika, TGNP, and the Women's Legal Aid Center (WLAC).

There is little corporate or private philanthropy in Tanzania.

All CSOs are required to submit financial reports to the government agency under which they are registered, to their members, from whom they derive their legitimacy, and to their donors, with whom they sign funding agreements. In order to meet minimum record-keeping requirements and capture sufficient data to prepare financial statements at the end of the year, organizations maintain basic records, including cash books and ledgers, petty cash vouchers, receipts and payment cash books, and bank reconciliation statements.

The majority of CSOs in Tanzania use financial management procedures to guide them in prudential financial management. Nevertheless, there are cases of financial mismanagement.

ADVOCACY: 3.8

Advocacy in Tanzania

2009	2010	2011
4.0	3.9	3.8

1.0
3.0
5.0
7.0

During 2011, the NGO Resource Council (NGORC), a project of the Aga Khan Foundation, mobilized CSOs and local government officers in Mvomero and Morogoro districts to improve collaboration in order to make public services responsive to the needs of poor citizens. During the same period, NGORC hosted dialogues between CSOs and local government officials in the Mtwara Mikindani municipality on how to strengthen participatory governance in Mtwara.

The public debate over the drafting of the new constitution has strengthened advocacy and lobbying capacity in the past year. Vocal national CSOs, especially the LHRC, the PF, and the TGNP, worked with the government on shaping the Constitutional Review Bill of 2011. When the bill was presented to parliament without incorporating CSO input, a group of organizations formed the Tanzania Constitution Forum (TCF), popularly known in Swahili as Jukwaa la Katiba. Forum members include the above-mentioned organizations, as well as the Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA), the Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT), the Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA), the Tanzania Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS, and others. The TCF campaigned for amendments to the bill, resulting in the Constitutional Review (Amendment) Act of 2011.

The LHRC filed a petition with the High Court and has an ongoing advocacy campaign to block the payment of Sh 91 billion ($57.6 million) by the government to Dowans, an emergency power generation firm, for breach of contract. The suit alleges that the contract was improperly procured and contrary to public policy. The government is reconsidering the payment.

In May 2011, the Tanzania African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Secretariat, an African Union instrument for measuring signatory member countries' progress on good governance, convened to discuss maximizing the participation of CSOs in the Tanzania Country Review Mission scheduled for 2012. The meeting drew together delegates from more than eighty CSOs across the country, and was jointly organized by the LHRC and the Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA).

During the year, the Policy Forum (PF), a network of eighty organizations focusing on accountability, transparency, and democratization, provided legal expertise to the government for developing a new legal and policy framework for the oil and gas sectors. The PF produced a technical analysis of the draft bill, facilitated discussion of the results with civil society groups and media outlets, and networked with members of parliament to communicate the recommendations.

In October, the Human Rights Council under the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a human rights review mechanism created in 2006 by the United Nations General Assembly, conducted a review of Tanzania. Both the government and CSOs submitted reports on the human rights situation. Participating CSOs included twenty-seven human rights organizations, twenty-two NGOs and umbrella organizations representing the hunter and gatherers community, the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania, and the Media Institute of Southern Africa-Tanzania. The sector's observations were included in the report.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4

The continued shift from project funding to GBS, as well as increased focus on promoting public accountability, has resulted in decreased funding allocations to service provision. Nevertheless, the majority of grassroots and local CSOs continued to be engaged in service delivery, including pre-primary, primary, and secondary education; primary healthcare delivery; digging water wells; and providing charcoal-efficient stoves.

Service Provision in Tanzania

	2009	2010	2011
	3.4	3.4	3.4

It is extremely difficult for service delivery CSOs to recover the costs of their services because of widespread poverty. CSOs realize that the best way for them to serve their constituencies is to increase communication with the government on quantitative and qualitative service improvement. Service delivery CSOs are increasingly adding lobbying and advocacy initiatives to their programs in order to promote such dialogue. For example, the Tanzania Association for Managers and Owners of Non-Government Schools and Colleges (TAMONGSCO) has been engaging in dialogue with the government on how to improve education services, both on its own and through the Tanzania Education Network/Mtandao wa Elimu Tanzania (TEN/MET), a network of education advocacy CSOs.

Service delivery requires sustained funding. Some funding is available through Local Government Authorities (LGAs). For example, CSOs involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS often receive funding from the Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS) through Council Multisectoral AIDS Committees (CMACs). FBOs delivering primary healthcare services also receive public funds from the Health Basket Fund jointly managed by the government and donors. However, CSOs with government connections, whether or not they are efficient and experienced, are most likely to access the limited funding available.

LGAs often invite service delivery organizations to submit work plans for incorporation into District Development Plans (DDPs). Both local and central governments prefer to collaborate with CSOs that complement government delivery rather than with monitoring organizations. CSOs engaged in monitoring public service delivery nonetheless are invited to participate in Regional Consultative Committees (RCC) and District Consultative Committees (DCC).

INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.3

Infrastructure in Tanzania

	2009	2010	2011
	4.3	4.3	4.3

CSO Resource Centers provide a range of services. For example, NGORC provides books, magazines, newspapers, and field training materials in English and Kiswahili to CSOs in both Isles and Mainland Tanzania.

Apart from the Foundation for Civil Society and Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), both of which sub-grant funds from foreign donors, there are no local grantmaking organizations.

Tanzania has both cross-sectoral CSO networks, such as the PF, the Feminist Activist Coalition (FemAct), and Tanzania Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO); and sectoral networks, including the Tanzania Education Network, the Tanzania Water and Sanitation Network, and the Network of Smallholder Farmers Groups in Tanzania (MVIWATA). These networks facilitate collective action and information sharing. For example, FemAct hosted its 10th Gender Festival (Tamasha la Jinsia), which focused on land, labor, and livelihoods within the broader themes of gender, democracy, and development. Attendees included CSO professionals and members of the public. The PF facilitates information sharing among its members and the

public about development trends in Tanzania. It recently published, in collaboration with the Tanzania Development Research Group, its second governance review, examining and analyzing official government documents, statistical data, reports from aid agencies, publications from academic institutions and CSOs, and newspaper articles.

Grassroots and district-level CSOs continued to receive trainings from umbrella organizations at the district, regional, and national levels. For example, TEN/MET provided education policy advocacy trainings to its members at various locations throughout the country. Grantees implementing home-based care for people living with HIV/AIDS and offering care and support to orphans and most vulnerable children under the United States' President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) received training in financial management, monitoring and evaluation, community mobilization, and caretaking skills.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.1

Few media outlets value CSOs' work, but there has been some improvement of coverage. The Citizen newspaper, which is owned by the Aga Khan Development Network, features both coverage and analysis of advocacy campaigns and service provision. Advocacy stories tend to get the most coverage, particularly campaigns related to the constitutional review process. There has also been some coverage of service delivery to vulnerable children.

Public Image in Tanzania

	2009	2010	2011
1.0			
3.0	4.2	4.2	4.1
5.0			
7.0			

Public perception of CSOs has improved, largely due to the constitutional review debates and the anti-Dowans campaign. In a recent television debate organized by the LHRC, viewers called in to support the work of CSOs, and noted that increased activism in the past year has enhanced the image of the sector.

During 2011, the Foundation for Civil Society inaugurated the Civil Society Sector Outstanding Contribution Award, which acknowledges the outstanding contribution of an individual to the Tanzania civil society sector over an extended period of time.

The number of CSOs with websites has increased, and many organizations now publish annual reports on their sites. Almost all networks use websites for membership engagement, information sharing, and general communication. Some donors offer funding and technical support for web development. For example, the Foundation for Civil Society funded website development for CCT, a faith-based organization, and Guluka Kwalala, a community-based organization.

NACONGO, TANGO, the PF, and LHRC all rolled out codes of conduct this year. However, the idea of self-regulation is still new for Tanzanian CSOs, and adoption and implementation of codes is slow.

UGANDA

2011 Scores for Uganda

CSO Sustainability	4.3
Legal Environment	5.1
Organizational Capacity	3.9
Financial Viability	5.1
Advocacy	3.8
Service Provision	3.5
Infrastructure	4.6
Public Image	4.3

1.0   3.0   5.0   7.0

Sustainability Enhanced   **Sustainability Evolved**   **Sustainability Impeded**

Capital: Kampala

Government Type: Republic

Population: 35,873,253 (July 2012 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $1,300

Human Development Index: 161

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.3

CSOs provide valuable social, political, and economic services in the face of a dismal economy, including inflation estimated at 25 percent and soaring food prices; declining public and social services; increased political tensions; and an unpredictable policy and political environment created by the elections.

The overall sustainability of the civil sector improved over the last year. The positive relationship between the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Registration Board and the sector enabled several important steps to be taken towards legal reform. Sectoral infrastructure and organizational capacity continue to improve with the growth of national, regional, and district-level networks, coalitions, and platforms that create space for CSOs to collectively strategize and engage around common issues.

Internally, CSOs have continued to embrace quality assurance mechanisms like the NGO Quality Assurance Certification Mechanism (QuAM), a self-regulatory mechanism to ensure the quality of institutions and programs. Advocacy efforts continued to grow in 2011, and CSOs increasingly monitored the government, particularly around service delivery. The sector's public image remains mixed, but the government increasingly acknowledges the contributions CSOs make towards the country's development and service delivery. The financial viability of the sector remains vulnerable due to continued reliance on donors.

CSO Sustainability in Uganda

	2009	2010	2011
	4.4	4.4	4.3

Presidential, parliamentary, and local council elections were all held in 2011. CSOs were involved in civic education around the elections, as well as anti-corruption initiatives that undermined the credibility of some parliamentary candidates and resulted in their electoral defeat.

At the end of 2011, approximately 9,500 CSOs were registered as NGOs with the NGO Registration Board, which is housed within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a slight decrease from the 10,000 reported in 2010. According to an official at the NGO Registration Board, this variation is a result of a data verification exercise during the year. Despite this exercise, data remains poor, with no updated statistics on the number of registered organizations or the numbers of operational organizations or failed organizations. Updated statistics are also not readily available for other types of CSOs, including companies limited by guarantee or trustees. According to the NGO Registration Board, all statistics will be updated in 2012. The actual number of registered and unregistered CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and self-help groups is believed to be much higher than previously estimated.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.1

The legal environment improved over the last year. Most CSOs in Uganda register and operate as NGOs and are regulated by the NGO Act Chapter 113 (amended in 2006). The government is now more open to the idea of legal reform, in part due to the sector's resistance to the 2006 amendments and the 2009 regulations, as well as donor demand. In addition, CSOs have been encouraged by the cabinet's passage of a relatively progressive National NGO Policy in October 2010. In this environment, the NGO Registration Board took steps in 2011 to further amend the NGO Act to remove unfavorable clauses such as those related to cumbersome pre-requisites for official registration. However, the process is currently at a standstill. The government consulted with CSOs, and invited CSOs and the public to submit legal reform ideas through the media; there were over 500 submissions. CSOs submitted a collective memorandum on reforming the NGO Act of 2006 and a legal reform memorandum that was used by the National NGO Registration Board to prepare a briefing paper for the cabinet for the legal reform agenda. The memoranda proposed a more enabling environment, including a more progressive and supportive landscape for the growth of civil society. The legal reform process has strengthened the otherwise wary relationship between CSOs and the government.

The registration process remains cumbersome, especially for village-based organizations. Furthermore, the NGO Act gives the state the power to de-register NGOs perceived to be a "nuisance" to the government. Several ambiguous terms in the law like "public interest," which CSOs interpret to mean in the public interest while the government interprets it to mean for the well-being of the state, allow government officials to exercise considerable arbitrary administrative discretion. Administrative hurdles include a requirement for the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) to endorse the applications of all NGO registrations; and a 2009 amendment, titled Special Obligations for Organizations, which prevents an organization from making "any direct contact with the people in the area of operation in Uganda unless it has given seven days' notice in writing [to the RDC at the district level and the police at all levels] of its intention to do so."

Uganda has a dangerous record of human rights violations, and advocacy CSOs often have problems with harassment. State security agencies threatened several grassroots-based advocacy organizations with closure. In 2011, CSOs advocating for oil-policy reform were illegally barred from holding meetings without approval from the oil region's Member of Parliament, who is also the Prime Minister. Human rights organizations such as the Human Rights Network for Journalists of Uganda and the Uganda Women's Network have been attacked or threatened with closure by security agents.

There is no CSO law course or degree available in Uganda; legal recourse against state harassment and intimidation is limited because there are not enough lawyers specializing in non-profit litigation.

NGOs receive tax exemptions on grants, endowments, and economic activities, but these exemptions are difficult to access. The Employment Act provides tax exemptions to organizations employing at least five disabled staff. However, the process for accessing these exemptions is also cumbersome, and most organizations, especially local ones, either do not know about or do not understand the provisions.

CSOs with demonstrated capacity can bid on government contracts. For example, the Uganda Youth Network and the Uganda Women's Network won contracts to provide technical assistance to the government on project implementation. Any earned income must be used to further the CSO's objectives.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.9

Organizational Capacity in Uganda

	2009	2010	2011
	4.0	4.0	3.9

Organizational capacity improved in 2011. The majority of CSOs have well-defined strategic plans that clearly state their missions, visions, and objectives. This has encouraged funding from donors that are interested in funding capacity development for strategic plan implementation. However, because external consultants, and not permanent staff, often develop strategic plans as part of organizational fundraising strategies that do not necessarily correlate with the strategic direction of the organization, there is often a discrepancy between strategy and implementation. In addition, many organizations, responding to changing contexts and funding priorities, experience "mission creep."

Internal management has greatly improved, with a number of quality assurance mechanisms put in place. In 2011, the QuAM Committee certified approximately twenty organizations, an improvement of over 80 percent from previous years. There are many steps involved in receiving certification, including self-assessment and verification by the committee. This rise in certification may be an indication that more organizations are confident enough about their internal systems to undergo external audits.

A large number of CSOs continue to have internal organizational conflicts, especially in the management of funds. A majority of CSO boards of directors have no clear understanding of how to manage and roles that are not clearly defined. The sector continues to rely on volunteers and part-time staff whose pay is often incommensurate with the work they do, which has led to frequent turnover.

Ugandan CSOs have a strong desire to garner the support and trust of the people they serve. CSOs build constituencies by recruiting members and creating partnerships, alliances and consortia through their activities and programs.

All CSO offices have basic equipment, such as telephones, but those in the capital have far greater technological resources than those in remote rural areas.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.1

The financial viability of the sector remains precarious. Most CSOs rely on foreign grants to function. Grant opportunities remained consistent this year. However, continued changes in the manner of dispensing funds to civil society through donor basket funds and consortium increased competition and remains challenging for a majority of organizations.

Domestic corporate philanthropy remains very limited, and usually goes to large charitable organizations such as orphanages or Rotary Clubs that sub-grant to programs in health and education. Local support remains limited because of difficult economic conditions.

Financial Viability in Uganda

Donors favor the few CSOs with well-developed financial systems and commit regular funding to those organizations. The stability of those organizations also means they are able to attract new donors, diversifying their funding sources. However, most CSOs do not seek to diversify funding or introduce innovative funding strategies. The majority of organizations, particularly those at the district level and below, do not have the capacity to write funding proposals, and therefore cannot access much funding. Instead, they often join larger consortia with a third-party grants administrator, which adds an additional level of management administration to the receipt of funds..

In 2011, more organizations participated in projects funded by public-private partnerships and sub-granted to CSOs by the government. For example, the Uganda Youth Network and the Uganda Women's Network benefited from such arrangements in 2011 under partnerships between the government and UNDP and the European Union respectively. A percentage of those grants are unrestricted and can be used at an organization's discretion.

Few CSOs engage in revenue-generating activities, although some are starting to bring in income by consulting for other CSOs. A few organizations such as the Human Rights Network (HURINET) and the Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA) collect membership fees, but those fees account for less than five percent of the organizations' total annual incomes.

CSOs in Uganda, especially smaller organizations, do not have sound financial management systems because they cannot afford to hire expert accountants or financial managers.

ADVOCACY: 3.8

Advocacy in Uganda

All collaborations between the government and civil society are done through an official framework with clear and structured guidelines. Each sector of government has working committees, within which members of the CSO community participate. All levels of government consult with CSOs on policy decisions, and CSOs have helped to formulate policies like the National Development Plan and district development plans.

Efforts by the civil sector and the government to strengthen and institutionalize their relationship included the development of memoranda of understanding for partnership building and project implementation between CSOs and local-level governments and between CSOs and parliament. CSO representatives met with the speaker of parliament in August 2011, and he committed to setting up better channels of communication. However, there is not yet much evidence of change.

Large national organizations lead most advocacy and lobbying activities, as smaller grassroots organizations still lack staff with adequate advocacy and analytical skills. Advocacy initiatives focus on corruption, the environment, domestic violence, child rights, family and inheritance, marriage rights, and other social and political issues. CSOs had some success in campaigns to prevent the lease of the Mabira forest to sugarcane growers, in which they secured the protection of the forest, and for better pay and working conditions for

teachers. CSOs have also organized public campaigns like Walk to Work, demonstrations over specific economic issues like increased fuel prices; and strikes by teachers and traders.

CSO coalitions at the national and sub-national levels organized the Return Our Money campaign in response to a government corruption scandal in which members of parliament were paid twenty million Ugandan shillings (approximately $8,600) to support the ruling party before the February presidential elections. Over 170 members of parliament were voted out of office as a result of the campaign. Following the elections, CSOs issued a statement on electoral malpractice that generated a lot of public attention to the issue of corruption. Women's coalitions like the Uganda Women's Network initiated advocacy and lobbying activities that influenced legislation on female genital mutilation and human trafficking.

The Uganda National NGO Forum provides a space for all CSOs to work together on issues of national importance such as government policy and planning processes through advocacy, lobbying, and expression of opinion. Through the Forum, CSOs track public expenditures and policy formulation; create position papers, analyses, and commentary; share information; and create civic initiatives.

Since 1999, NGOs in Uganda have been continuously pushing the Ugandan Government to make reforms in the laws regarding NGOs. This is one of the biggest advocacy agendas of NGOs in Uganda spearheaded by the Uganda National NGO Forum. In 2011, CSOs submitted a collective memorandum on reforming the NGO Act of 2006 to streamline and reduce bureaucracy and requirements around CSO registration. The Ugandan NGO Registration actually used this memorandum as a basis to prepare a briefing paper or recommendations for changes in the Act.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.5

The level and quality of service provision remains the same as last year. CSOs have historically been, and remain, core partners with the government in delivering services in health, education, water, sanitation, humanitarian aid, environmental conservation, agriculture, and legal aid.

CSOs often step in to provide services where the government is financially and logistically constrained. In the Kapchorwa district in Eastern Uganda, after the withdrawal of Action Aid International three years ago, many children lost access to education, because Action Aid, and not the government, provides most of the education services in that district. The organization returned this year and set up a school.

CSOs are expanding outreach and service delivery beyond their usual members and constituencies, sharing various publications and annual reports with academia, churches, government, and the population at large. However, these activities are limited by the high cost of publishing and distribution.

Many CSOs would like to recover their costs, but find it is difficult to charge for basic service delivery to poor communities that cannot afford to pay.

The government continues to acknowledge the contribution of CSOs in service delivery, especially in hard-to-reach areas such as Karamoja. The government funds or contracts with CSOs on a variety of programs, including special post-conflict programs such as the Peace, Recovery, and Development Program and the Karamoja Integrated Program.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.6

Infrastructure in Uganda

2009	2010	2011
4.8	4.7	4.6

CSO infrastructure continues to improve across the country. There are a number of forums and networks such as the Uganda National NGO Forum and the Uganda Women's Network working on issues such as the environment, oil transparency, and youth. Many networks, consortia, and partnerships within civil society are working together to foster grassroots-level advocacy. There is a high-level of information sharing particularly among youth and women's organizations. In 2011, the Uganda Youth Network and the National Association of Women Organizations of Uganda both developed their public manifestos around the elections. In addition, over 1,000 CSO staff and over 4,500 others attended a national civil society fair, which was created in 2011 for CSOs to showcase their projects and innovations and to engage in idea and information sharing and networking.

In 2011, the National District Support Program (NDSP), a national CSO capacity-building program hosted by the Uganda National NGO Forum and funded by the Danish Development Assistance Program (DANIDA), was re-named the Support Program for Advocacy Networks (SPAN). SPAN aims to increase advocacy for greater transparency, accountability, and quality service delivery. This program sub-grants to CSOs in four regional hubs to build the capacity of CSOs, conduct community assessments, and lead awareness campaigns around development initiatives.

Following the successful launch of the Citizens' Manifesto, a tool to help citizens demand service delivery and monitoring benchmarks from the government, the Uganda National NGO Forum identified six organizations to develop and implement an advocacy project around regional good governance. The Kabarole Research and Resource Center and Uganda Rural Development Training, in partnership with universities, train national-level CSOs to work with regional- and district-level CSOs on outreach, as a way of strengthening sectoral cooperation and networking. Other institutions throughout the country also provide capacity building and institutional development services to CSOs at all levels. However, most training opportunities are in the capital, and it is difficult for CSOs outside the capital to get the training they need.

Intersectoral cooperation remains popular. For example, CSOs and religious organizations worked together in 2011 to develop collective positions on issues such as food policy and security. Responding to questions CSOs raised in the media about the food security situation, the Senior Presidential Adviser on Security convened a government-CSO dialogue on food security. The dialogue resulted in the development of a process to deepen knowledge on the issue. Several joint follow-up meetings have been held and a number of joint undertakings agreed upon, such as drafting a national food policy and developing nutrition and food standards. However, these undertakings have since been shelved. While structured partnerships with the media are not well developed, many collaborations take place as joint interests arise.

Many international organizations such as Action Aid International, Care, Adra, and World Vision sub-grant to smaller organizations.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3

Media coverage of CSO activity increased this year. For example, Uwezo, a CSO-led East African initiative that assesses education, attracted tremendous media attention, which in turn led to national and district-level public debates involving the government. The national civil society fair also led to greater media coverage and raised the profile and image of CSOs. All stakeholders came to have a deeper appreciation of the sector's development work and increased trust in and respect of the sector, which has led to even more media coverage.

Early in 2011, CSOs led the massive Return our Money campaign, which included grassroots participants across the country. Through the campaign, the subject of corruption was widely covered by print media, radio talk shows, and television, which generated national and sub-national civil society debates and reflections on the extent of corruption in Uganda. However, due to the fact that most media is profit-based, the media often ignores CSO activity in favor of what the media considers to be more newsworthy stories and generally only the work of well-connected CSOs are covered.

Public Image in Uganda

Because it can be costly to obtain media coverage, CSOs often pool their resources to attract media attention, for example by holding joint press conferences on key issues. Some CSOs have specific staff members that focus on working with the media.

CSOs are highly regarded in the areas in which they work, but government officials, bureaucrats, and civil servants perceive CSOs as trying to undermine the government.

Businesses regard CSOs as unprofessional, and relations between the two sectors are fairly cold. This is exacerbated by the fact that CSOs provide services for free for which businesses would otherwise charge.

While the rollout of QuAm, which launched six years ago, was slow, this year there was a lot of publicity around and promotions for the initiative, and over twenty organizations, more than twice as many as last year, completed certification in 2011, with hundreds more in the process of completing certification. In addition, the majority of national CSOs have adopted individual codes of conduct that guide their operations. The formation of the Civil Society Accountability Platform has helped focus and coordinate CSO accountability efforts. The active participation of CSOs in the preparations for the 2011 Busan High Level Forum on Aid was a good opportunity for CSOs to strengthen the internal Partnership Principles for Civil Society Development Effectiveness developed during the First Global Assembly of the Open Forum for CSO Effectiveness in Istanbul.

ZAMBIA

2011 Scores for Zambia

Indicator	Score
CSO Sustainability	4.6
Legal Environment	4.7
Organizational Capacity	4.2
Financial Viability	5.5
Advocacy	3.9
Service Provision	4.5
Infrastructure	5.0
Public Image	4.4

1.0 Sustainability Enhanced 3.0 Sustainability Evolved 5.0 Sustainability Impeded 7.0

Capital: Lusaka

Government Type: Republic

Population: 14,309,466 (July 2012 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $1,600

Human Development Index: 164

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.6

The civil society sector in Zambia has flourished since 1991, when Zambia became a multiparty democracy. According to the Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD), by 2003 (the most recent year for which data is available), the number of CSOs registered by the Registrar of Societies had exceeded 10,000. Civil society in Zambia includes formal and informal CSOs; international, national, and local CSOs; and umbrella organizations. Faith-based organizations (FBOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), cooperatives, and community clubs all fall within these categories. Some CSOs have formal structures and broad, well-defined constituencies, while others, especially CBOs, have informal structures and smaller constituencies, due to limited funding and lack of capacity. CSOs address a wide range of issues, including human rights, poverty reduction, governance, HIV and AIDS, environment, basic service delivery, and economic development.

Although civil society is robust, the relationship between government and civil society can be fraught with tension, especially for CSOs involved in monitoring governance, human rights, and the rule of law. This tension was exacerbated in the period leading up to the general elections of 2011, particularly in the time preceding the pre-election debate; there were significant levels of political intimidation during this period. For example, freedom of assembly was denied during this time, and there were incidents of political violence from the ruling party, which resulted in a shrinking space for civic participation. However, despite the hostile environment, citizens were able to make informed electoral choices. The leading opposition party, the Patriotic Front, used the declining space for civic participation as a campaign issue, and promised to modify any laws that restricted CSOs' freedom to operate, such as the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Act, which was enacted by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government in 2009 to regulate

and stifle the operations of CSOs in the country. The Patriotic Front won the elections with 43 percent of the vote against 36 percent for the ruling party.

CSO can register freely under the Societies Act, with very few and rare cases of state harassment, and can legally engage in broad range of activities. The 2009 NGO Act has not yet come into force, but is much more restrictive.

A majority of CSOs have clearly defined local constituencies, visions and missions. Most are financially dependent on international donors and very few have multiple sources of funding. There are very few avenues for local funding. There are spaces for policy dialogue between CSOs and policymakers. CSOs involved in advocacy tend to form issue-based coalitions and conduct effective broad-based advocacy and lobby campaigns.

Generally, CSOs get positive media coverage, though the state media rarely covers or critically covers CSOs dealing with issues of governance. Public perception of CSOs is positive and the public is generally supportive of CSOs' work. The government and the private sector view CSOs involved in service provision as partners, while those in advocacy work are viewed as antagonistic.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.7

CSOs, as well as any club, company, partnership, or other association of ten or more persons that has a non-profit purpose, registers under the Societies Act (CAP 119) with the government's Registrar of Societies. The registration process includes submitting an application along with the rules or constitution of the society. The process is straightforward, although fees can be high for small and rural CSOs.

In 2009, the government passed the 2009 NGO Act to coordinate and regulate civil society operations. The law has not yet come in force due to legal impediments. For example, Section 7 of the NGO Act states that an NGO Board comprised of NGOs and government officials will be responsible for registering NGOs. However, in other sections, the NGO Act states that the NGO representatives to the NGO Board will be elected by the Congress of NGOs registered under the NGO Act. As a result, the government has found it challenging to operationalize the Act. The Act requires any CSO registered under the Societies Act to also register with the Ministry of Community Development. CSOs that do not do so will not be permitted to operate.

The Act provides for excessive and unwarranted government control of NGOs and a prohibitive registration regime that will impede the formation of NGOs. The foremost concern over the NGO Act relates to the restrictions it places on freedoms of association, assembly, and expression. For example, according to Section 7 (b) of the NGO Act, the Board will have to approve the area of work of NGOs operating in Zambia.

The Societies Act permits freedom of association and unrestricted operations, as long as CSO activities do not threaten public peace, welfare, good order, or national interest. It broadly details permissible activities and operations, and is free from ambiguous legal terminology. CSOs generally operate freely. However, there have been instances of state harassment of CSOs that focus on government accountability and transparency and of those advocating for policy reforms that the government has deemed to be outside its interests, such as the Freedom of Information Bill. The Act also provides a general outline of the documentation and reporting required to comply with registration. Violations of the Societies Act, such as failure to submit annual returns, carry sanctions such as fines and deregistration, though these are rarely imposed in practice.

Only faith-based and international CSOs are tax-exempt on goods and services. Local CSOs can apply for exemptions on imported goods, but the process is long and complex, and the Ministry of Finance approves applications arbitrarily.

CSOs are allowed to earn income from the provision of goods and services related to their mandates, but are not permitted to participate in commercial enterprises. CSOs are not permitted to compete for government contracts.

There are very few legal experts familiar with CSO law, some of which offer pro bono services to both national and district-level CSOs. Otherwise, legal fees are too high for most CSOs.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.2

The majority of CSOs successfully mobilize local constituencies, usually around a specific issue or activity. For example, the CSO coalition that formed in the pre-election period successfully mobilized the public to participate in the general elections, despite a hostile political environment. In addition, a number of national CSOs build the capacities of their local constituencies, who are then often trained or empowered to implement their own activities.

Most CSOs have missions and strategic plans in place, but strategic plans are often written for fundraising purposes only, with no follow-through. In addition, field offices of national CSOs often have the challenge of implementing strategic plans developed by head offices without field input.

According to ZCSD's 2011 report on the status of civil society, 89 percent of the 3,501 CSOs surveyed have boards of directors, due to donor requirements. Many CSOs have clear governance structures and reporting lines. However, the division of roles and responsibilities between boards and staff members tends to be unclear in many organizations; board members often micro-manage day-to-day operations or staff activities.

Most CSOs have paid staff, but retention is a major problem because of limited financial resources. According to the ZCSD study, only 30.7 percent of participating CSOs have sufficient human resources and therefore most rely on volunteers, interns, and recent graduates. It is common for some CSOs, especially national and well-established local organizations, to provide job descriptions, contracts, and personnel policies.

The majority of urban CSOs have basic equipment such as computers, laptops, phones, and cameras. However, the majority of rural organizations, such as CBOs, lack even basic equipment such as laptops and cameras. The Internet is easily accessible to national organizations, but it is not affordable to most grassroots organizations. However, organizations that have Internet access share it with those in the same vicinity that do not.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.5

Most funding is raised from international donors. Very few CSOs raise funds locally. What little local support exists comes through the corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives of mining, banking, and telecommunication companies. These companies provide small grants to CSOs to put into place basic services like water, health care, electricity, and sanitation. Other small-scale fundraising activities include walk-a-thons or car washes.

The Ministry of Community Development provides grants to CSOs that promote community development or social protection. Funds are channeled directly from the ministry to the implementing CSOs. CSOs that have received these development grants include the Zambia Agency for Persons with Disabilities, the Matero After Care Center, the Mission Home Craft Training Center, the Program Against Malnutrition, and the Fountain of Hope Street Children's Program.

Very few CSOs have concrete fundraising strategies, and the strategies that do exist tend to be unsustainable due to lack of funding opportunities and capacity. Lack of sufficient funding also makes it difficult for CSOs to create membership outreach and philanthropy development programs. Most CSOs want to strengthen their fundraising capacities, and those that can afford it seek relevant technical support.

Very few CSOs generate revenue from their assets or services, although some organizations provide consultancy services involving research and facilitation training. Most CSOs rent office space, and those that do own property often rent it out below market value, often to for-profit companies.

The ZCSD study found that only 50 percent of organizations have diverse sources of funding, including multiple donors or funding through investments, such as real estate, through subsidiary companies. Only large CSOs have more than one source of funding and therefore sustainable programming and long-term viability.

Large, well-established CSOs have strong financial management systems and can meet annual external audit requirements. Smaller CSOs have poor or no financial management systems and rarely publish annual reports. CSOs that fail to meet donor financial reporting requirements have trouble maintaining relationships with funders.

ADVOCACY: 3.9

The government has created coordinating committees at the community, district, provincial, and national levels in order to strengthen and institutionalize CSO-government communication and engagement. These are the Area Development Coordinating Committees (ADCCs), District Development Coordinating Committees (DDCCs), Provincial Developing Coordinating Committees (PDCCs), and the national-level Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs). Key government officials, civil society groups, and, in some cases, private-sector companies, meet every three months to discuss vision, direction, and strategies for development. Some CSOs participate in all the committees and SAGs, and play a key role in policy development and implementation, including working closely with the government on formulating national development plans. CSOs also participate in a number of other consultative forums, including parliamentary portfolio committees, which examine how government is being run and how it is spending money. Each committee invites members of the public, CSOs, and other stakeholders to make submissions. There are committees on local governance, housing, and environment; economic affairs; agriculture; education, science; and technology; and health, community development, and social welfare.

Issue-based coalitions include the Civil Society Election Coalition (CSEC), the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Coalition, the CSO-Africa Peer Review Mechanism, the Zambia Land Alliance, the Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Campaign, and the Coalition on the Constitution- Making Process. CSEC, an election monitoring partnership between CSOs and FBOs, enabled more open, honest and safe elections, which in turn led to the opposition leader ousting the incumbent president.

Major lobbying successes included the passage of the new Gender-Based Violence Amendment Act in April and the land policy review.

CSOs do not take advantage of all opportunities to participate in decision making, particularly at the parliamentary level. This is largely due to the short notice given to CSOs before scheduled parliamentary committee meetings, which often results in CSOs coming to committee meetings unprepared or not at all.

CSOs are generally aware that stronger legal and regulatory frameworks would benefit them, and there is a CSO working group partnering closely with government officials to modify the NGO Act, which has yet to be implemented. The goal of the working group is to review and make recommendations for amendments to the Act, and to facilitate the rules and procedures for registering CSOs. However, the CSOs and government

representatives on the working group have competing legal reform priorities, so the process is challenging and slow.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5

CSOs generally provide services that reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents. Most CSOs provide a range of goods and services that include basic services such as education, health care, water and sanitation; and technical services and activities such as training, research, advocacy, and networking. Training workshop topics include gender, HIV/AIDS, and income generation, and primarily target rural communities. CSOs share research papers with academia, the government, the media, and development agencies. However, provision is often concentrated in one geographic area, and there is often widespread duplication of efforts among the CSOs due to poor coordination. In addition, few CSOs provide goods and services beyond their constituencies.

Most CSOs do not understand the concept of cost recovery. CSOs work in a culture in which beneficiaries expect service provision to be free, without any form of contribution or reciprocity. For instance, CSOs often pay workshop participants for their time and travel costs. An exception is that the beneficiaries of construction projects are expected to contribute labor and materials toward those projects, but this model is unique.

While local governments do not recognize the role of CSOs in monitoring and providing services, the national government does. Some government ministries work closely with CSOs. For example, the Ministry of Health works closely with the Church Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ) on delivering health services by providing health specialists to work in CHAZ's facilities. The Ministry of Community Development provides development grants to CSOs, as discussed above. However, the government provides few other grants opportunities for CSOs.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0

There has not been much investment in resource centers in the country. There are very few centers and the majority of those that exist are underutilized because they are not easily accessible for most organizations and their materials are outdated. However, their fees are low.

A few CSOs such as the Non-Governmental Organizations Coordinating Committee (NGOCC) and the Zambia National AIDS Network (ZNAN) Global Fund offer sub-grants from international donors to their members. However, sometimes sub-grants are mismanaged or even misappropriated, mainly due to weak institutional structures and corresponding capacity gaps. This has impacted the relationships between donors and the original funding recipients, and has also called into question the legitimacy of the sub-granted organizations by beneficiaries.

A number of CSOs maintain mailing lists of other organizations working on similar issues through which they share relevant information, such as the results of studies or government reports. However, there is no umbrella organization coordinating information sharing among CSOs. There are a number of networks and coalitions built around common concerns such as the CSEC and the Civil Society Constitution Coalition, but these partnerships are usually donor-driven, and evaporate when funding runs out. The coalitions that do exist are located in urban areas only.

The Institute of Organizational Development Facilitators and the NGO Management Training Program at the National Institute for Public Administration provide training to CSOs. There are also skilled trainers teaching board management, strategic planning, and financial management. However, there are not enough

trainers in these areas to meet demand, nor is there training available in organizational management, capacity building, or fundraising. Most training is in English, and therefore inaccessible to local organizations.

CSOs have done little to promote the possibility of intersectoral partnership opportunities, and the few intersectoral partnerships that exist are generally unsustainable. For example, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) partnership, which includes government, civil society, and businesses, has not been effective due to different visions among the partners. In addition, CSOs have been denied full participation by being deprived of the information they need in order to hold the government and the private sector accountable.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4

The relationship between the government and CSOs dealing with governance has been confrontational. As a result, the state media sometimes questions CSOs engaged in governance work, including their mandates and accountability, for politically motivated reasons. On the other hand, the private media, which has taken on the roles of public watchdog, defender of freedom and truth, and government critic, provides extensive coverage to organizations that monitor government performance. With the exception of organizations working on good governance issues, CSOs receive fairly good coverage and analysis from the state media as well.

Large national CSOs sometimes conduct training workshops for the media on effectively analyzing issues of interest to the civil society sector. Some large CSOs also hold periodic media breakfasts to maintain relationships and promote positive coverage. Getting positive coverage often depends on positive personal relationships.

The public has a generally positive view of CSOs and recognizes their importance in advancing social causes and in leading public opinion through outreach and advocacy. The public exhibited considerable support of the CSEC during the presidential elections in the face of government hostility, for example by calling in to radio programs to support the coalition.

The government and the private sector view CSOs involved in service provision as partners, while those in advocacy work are viewed as antagonistic. However, to some extent, the government relies on CSO expertise in policy analysis and on the sector's participation in SAG meetings; CSOs, especially those committed to grassroots empowerment, are appreciated for recognizing the needs and priorities of citizens.

With the exception of large and international organizations, CSOs rarely publicize their work because of financial and capacity constraints. Very few organizations utilize free publicity options, such as social media, either.

There is a code of conduct currently being drafted by major national CSOs, but this is a complicated process involving many conflicting opinions reflecting the diverse values and visions within the sector. However, other concrete steps have not been taken due to poor coordination and synergy. The majority of CSOs include financial statements in their annual reports, which are distributed to the government and available to the general public.

ZIMBABWE

2011 Scores for Zimbabwe

Dimension	Score
CSO Sustainability	4.8
Legal Environment	6.1
Organizational...	4.5
Financial Viability	5.9
Advocacy	4.5
Service Provision	3.4
Infrastructure	5.0
Public Image	4.5

1.0 **Sustainability Enhanced** 3.0 **Sustainability Evolved** 5.0 **Sustainability Impeded** 7.0

Capital: Harare

Government Type: Parliamentary Democracy

Population: 12,619,600 (July 2012 est.)

GDP per capita (PPP): $500

Human Development Index: 173

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.8

Zimbabwe has been governed since February 2009 by an inclusive government made up of the three main political parties, ZANU-PF and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations. However, the ZANU-PF regime still effectively controls the country with its restrictive laws, policies skewed in favor of its party loyalists, and intolerance of dissent.

Upon its formation, the inclusive government undertook critical reforms to promote, protect, and uphold fundamental freedoms of expression, association, and movement. The reforms included drafting a new democratic constitution. In 2011, the constitutional reform process continued, albeit with challenges emanating from a lack of commitment from some of the politicians involved, inadequate resources, and bickering among stakeholders. CSOs remained committed to the process, despite growing concern that civil society was sidelined in some of the processes of the Select Committee of Parliament on the New Constitution (COPAC).

The ZANU-PF continues to denigrate CSOs at public gatherings and in the ZANU-PF-controlled state media. Initial impressions that democratic space had improved under the new government structure have faded. CSOs' new ability to operate in communities that were previously inaccessible because of political factors and indications of the government's willingness to amend restrictive laws have been replaced by threats of closure, harassment, and intimidation of CSOs. However, the relationship between the MDC and CSOs remained cordial, with the former providing updates to CSOs on key issues related to the transition and providing a space for CSOs to

CSO Sustainability in Zimbabwe

	2009	2010	2011
	4.8	4.8	4.8

lobby for critical reforms.

Between 800 and 900 private voluntary organizations (PVOs) are registered with the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. However, it is estimated that close to 50 percent of CSOs operate either without proper registration or as trusts because of intimidation and fear of government interference in their operations if they register as PVOs.

The polarized operating environment, coupled with inadequate financial resources, continue to curtail the operations of CSOs. However, CSOs remain committed to delivering much-needed goods and services to Zimbabweans.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1

The legal environment in Zimbabwe remains unfavorable and is not uniformly implemented. CSOs register as trusts, PVOs, or with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the government. Registration remains a long and difficult process due to the absence of the rule of law in the country. As a result, some CSOs choose to operate without registering.

Legal Environment in Zimbabwe

2009: 6.1   2010: 6.0   2011: 6.1

Trusts register through a lawyer with the Ministry of Justice, which administers the Deeds Registries Act. To register as a trust, an organization must provide information on the founder and the trustees. A trust deed must outline the internal management of the organization, as well as its key objectives and structures.

PVOs register with the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, and must provide police clearance, curricula vitae of board members, and district clearances from largely partisan district administrators. The ministry also interviews and vets organizational board members. PVO registration must be approved by a board appointed by the ministry that convenes irregularly, sometimes as infrequently as once a year. As a result, it can take over a year to get approval. There is currently a huge backlog of entities wanting to register as PVOs. As with most government departments, some authorities request bribes to process registration faster.

PVOs have access to more benefits, such as tax exemptions, than trusts. The registration process for PVOs is intimidating, however. In addition, PVOs, which are required to submit annual reports and financial statements, are subject to greater government scrutiny than trusts. Therefore, about 70 percent of organizations choose to register as trusts.

A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) allows organizations wishing to work regionally or internationally to register under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or with the body that works in the intended area of focus, such as the Ministry of Health or the local government. This option is unavailable to organizations intending to operate locally. Of the three registration types, the MOU is the least secure as it can easily be terminated by the government if it feels the CSO is operating outside of its mandate.

Registration can be denied, and often is, particularly to organizations focusing on governance and democracy. ZANU-PF, which largely controls government operations, considers such organizations to be "Western funded and proponents of the regime change agenda." If registration is denied, the appeal process is cumbersome, exacerbated by the absence of rule of law, a culture of bribery, and the practice by authorities of editing CSOs registration documents to suit their interests. For example, government authorities may edit the mandate of an organization to make it more acceptable. If an organization works outside of the approved mandate, it may be sanctioned or deregistered.

The government frustrates CSO operations, for example by requiring them to submit registration details to the police and district administrators as a prerequisite to operate in the different districts, although this is not legally required. As in 2010, the ability of a CSO to operate depends largely on the type of work in which it is engaged. The government barely tolerates governance work because it fosters public debate and challenges the status quo.

The government's level of tolerance of CSOs is also dependent on political developments. For example, at the beginning of 2011, the government was, to a large extent, accommodating, but talk of possible elections sparked a wave of harassment and intimidation of CSOs and pro-democracy activists, including Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe (MMPZ) advocacy officers Fadzai December and Molly Chimhanda and MMPZ chairperson for the Public Information Rights Committee in Gwanda Gilbert Mabusa. The three were arrested in Gwanda on December 5, 2011 and only released on bail on December 16. They were charged with holding a meeting unsanctioned under the nefarious Public Order and Security Act (POSA), which requires police clearance in order to hold public gatherings. The charges were later changed to "undermining the authority of or insulting the president," which falls under the Criminal Codification and Reform Act (Section 33).

In March 2011, the Human Rights NGOs' Forum, a network of approximately eighteen organizations, was charged with operating as an unregistered PVO and threatened with closure. The Forum has been operating as a Common Law Universitas, a legal form that does not require registration, since 1998 with no major setbacks from the government; this incident raised concerns that the attacks were prompted by the work done by the organization's transitional justice initiatives.

Local authorities have responded to this tense political environment by creating their own conditions for CSOs to operate in their jurisdictions. In 2011, the district administrator in Masvingo demanded that the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (Zimrights) sign an MOU with local authorities to carry out activities and pay $100 to be permitted to operate in the province. The Community Working Group on Health (CWGH) reported similar challenges in Tsholotsho.

Restrictive laws such as POSA and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), which hinder operations of CSOs by curtailing fundamental freedoms of expression, association, and access to information, remain in place despite stated commitments by the inclusive government to amend them. POSA requires police clearance in order to hold public gatherings, and the AIPPA limits access to government information. At the close of 2011, amendments to POSA, which were introduced in parliament in September, were still pending. If passed, the amendments will limit the powers of law enforcement agents and create greater space for CSO activities. Moreover, CSOs hope that the proposed new constitution will include political rights that will also give increased operating space to CSOs.

Although funding is not taxed, salaries and allowances are taxed. Some CSOs registered as PVOs can apply for tax exemptions for certain purchases. For example, PVOs such as the National Association for Non-Governmental Organizations (NANGO) have purchased tax-free vehicles.

CSOs are allowed to generate income by operating private companies, although very few do so. Proceeds are subject to value-added tax. CSOs are eligible for compete for government contracts and grants.

There are lawyers familiar with CSO law, although there are no specialists in the field. The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) provides free advice and representation to CSOs, and has offices across the country including in Bulawayo, Harare, Mutare, and Masvingo.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.5

CSOs build local constituencies. However, for most organizations, the sustainability of these constituencies is determined by the availability of funding and once funds dry up, projects also grind to a halt. Membership-

Organizational Capacity in Zimbabwe

	2009	2010	2011
	4.5	4.5	4.5

based organizations are often able to maintain constituencies even when funding is scarce. For example, Zimrights trains some of its members around the country as community paralegals, who continue with their work even after funding dries up. Community-based organizations (CBOs) also sustain their target groups even in the absence of funds as they are grounded in the communities in which they work.

Sustaining constituencies is also difficult because the poor economic situation means people move frequently to search for work. In addition, there is a practice of one political party creating organizations to counter the work done by organizations with political affiliations to another party. This, plus scarcity of resources, has led to competition for constituencies. For example, both the Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association and the Bulawayo United Residents Association do similar work in the same geographic area.

Most organizations have clearly defined missions, although some CBOs do not have written mission statements. Most organizations have broadly-defined strategies to account for the ever-evolving political environment. An estimated 60 percent of national CSOs, particularly those working on human rights and governance issues, revise their strategies as the political situation changes. Some organizations such as the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CiZC), Zimrights, ZLHR, and the Youth Forum, carry out strategic planning processes.

Most CSOs operating nationally have clearly defined management structures, at least on paper, while in practice, not all organizations have functional boards or a clear division of responsibilities between board and management. Funders try to build management capacity and assist in creating board policy manuals. For example, the Bulawayo Agenda received training in 2011 on defining board responsibilities and is in the process of drafting a board charter and policy manual. CBOs do not usually have management structures at all.

CSOs employ qualified and professional staff. Some funders require one-year contracts for employees, and according to Zimbabwe's labor laws, a person who works for more than six months in a company or organization is a permanent worker. However, it is difficult for organizations to maintain permanent staff members due to uncertain funding and brain drain of qualified personnel to more stable positions at donor organizations, in the private sector, and with the government. While many organizations have human resources policies, they are not always implemented.

Volunteers who work at the community level are responsible for project planning and implementation. However, harsh economic circumstances have forced potential volunteers to request payment.

Despite limited funding, CSOs utilize professional services, as they understand their importance. During focus group discussions with CSOs, it was estimated that more than 90 percent of both national CSOs and CBOs use accounting services, although fewer than 30 percent of these organizations, primarily large national organizations, use specialists such as technicians, IT specialists, or lawyers.

Most organizations, including CBOs, have basic equipment, including desktop computers, although not all staff members know how to use all available technology.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.9

Most CSOs' financial viability is challenged. There is little local support or philanthropy for CSOs for various reasons. These include economic uncertainty; potential corporate donors' fear of political retribution; and the alignment of economic and political elites, which means that local philanthropy goes to organizations affiliated with ZANU-PF, such as Upfumi kuVadiki (Wealth to the Young) and Youth in Farming. In

addition, the public and businesses hold a perception, perpetuated by the state-controlled media, that CSOs are well funded by foreign donors. This perception was exacerbated by the publication in *The Patriot* newspaper in October 2011 of the amount of funding a particular donor awarded to CSOs. Some companies that have resources, such as the telecommunications provider Econet, open their own welfare-based CSOs as part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, although this practice is not prevalent. The little private sector funding that exists goes towards charity organizations, as opposed to CSOs working on governance or human rights issues.

Financial Viability in Zimbabwe

	2009	2010	2011

5.9 .... 5.9 .... 5.9

As a result, CSOs rely primarily on foreign funders. More than 60 percent of organizations have core funders, although the birth of the inclusive government resulted in donor flight away from CSOs and toward the government, a situation that persists more than two years later. Foreign funding increases at times of political change or other crisis, such as this year's typhoid outbreak. The availability of foreign funds has been negatively impacted by the global financial crisis.

Most volunteers work at the community level. Bulawayo Agenda's volunteers work on community committees, which organize meetings on democracy and governance on behalf of the organization. In 2011, volunteers built shelters for expectant mothers for CWGH.

Some CSOs have individual members while coalitions have organizational members. Some CSOs, such as the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), the Zimbabwe Coalition for Debt and Development (ZIMCODD), and NANGO, collect nominal dues from their members.

Some organizations develop sustainability plans that are not dependent on mainstream donor funding. For example, the Zimbabwe Poets for Human Rights sells an album of its poetry at cost to fund further reproduction. The SAPES Trust produces and sells books and publications, using some of the income to support the costs of publication and the Trust's ongoing work.

The government contracts with CSOs for health and other social services. For example, in 2010 and 2011, the Ministry of Health contracted CWGH to orient and train their Health Center Committees.

The majority of CSOs in Zimbabwe have sound financial management systems in order to meet donor requirements. Most organizations, particularly national CSOs registered as both trusts and PVOs, publish annual reports and financial statements. PVOs are mandated by law to submit their annual reports to the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, and can be closed if they fail to submit.

ADVOCACY: 4.5

Advocacy in Zimbabwe

	2009	2010	2011

4.5 .... 4.5 .... 4.5

As in 2010, direct lines of communication, both formalized and ad hoc, exist between CSOs and policymakers, particularly since the formation of the inclusive government. For example, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committees provide an opportunity for CSOs to present evidence on key issues before legislators and to make recommendations. In 2011, CWGH met with the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare to discuss the Public Health Act of 1934. Although the act has not yet been amended, CWGH continues to lobby the government. On the other hand, the impact of engagement with policymakers is minimal because of the hostility of the ZANU-PF legislators to the sector, and access to a government official depends on the issue at hand and the official's level of interest.

CSOs working in both social service delivery and governance and human rights form loose, issue-based coalitions, such as the Civil Society Constitutional Coordination Mechanism (CSCCM), which is led by NANGO, and CiZC, which coordinates CSOs around the constitutional reform process. The Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism monitors and produces a bi-monthly report on the implementation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA), the political settlement that led to the formation of the inclusive government.. The ZLHR/Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN)/Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) Constitution Monitoring Mechanism (ZICOMM) monitors the constitution making process. The Zimbabwe Community Radio Stations (ZACRAS) advocate for operating licenses for community radio stations. These coalitions have made significant progress in increasing awareness and support for their causes.

In response to the hostile operating space particularly in some rural communities, CSOs use theatre and art to convey political messages. For example, Savanna Trust collaborates with other CSOs to stage plays across the country on transitional justice, national healing, elections, and the constitutional reform process.

The concept of lobbying is well understood by CSOs. In 2011, the CWGH lobbied the government to amend the Public Health Act (1934) and to implement the Abuja Declaration, a pledge by members of the African Union to increase government funding for health. CWGH continues to lobby the government for both the amendment of the act and the inclusion of the right to health in the new constitution. Following the introduction of the POSA Amendment Bill into the Lower House of the Assembly, the CiZC lobbied for the adoption of the amendment and the eventual repeal of POSA. Due to efforts by both CSOs and members of parliament (MPs), the amendment passed through the Lower House. However, the Senate continues to stall the amendment's passage. The ultimate success of these campaigns is highly dependent on the level of cooperation among legislators; a high level of political polarization in Zimbabwe means that ZANU-PF, which holds most of the power, usually dismisses such efforts.

Most national CSOs understand that a more favorable legal and regulatory framework can enhance CSO effectiveness and sustainability. CiZC carried out a campaign in 2011 encouraging Zimbabweans to advocate for the repeal of POSA through their MPs and senators. The success of the project was affected by its politicization by ZANU-PF. For example, in Mutare, the district administrator, via the city council, ordered CiZC to pull down a billboard that encouraged communities to become involved in the campaign.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4

CSOs in Zimbabwe provide various services in areas such as agriculture, advocacy, HIV/AIDS, human rights, elections, media, and rural development. More than 80 percent of CSOs conduct baseline studies before planning interventions, so their goods and services reflect community needs.

CSOs working on governance and human rights issues, such as CiZC, Zimrights, and the Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust (ZIMCET), continued to provide much needed civic education on the constitutional reform process to communities across the country.

Some CSOs, such as Savanna Trust, Radio Dialogue, Zimrights, and CWGH, work directly with members. However, their work impacts communities at large. For example, Zimrights educates its members on human rights, and in turn those members impart their knowledge to other community members. Organizations providing humanitarian assistance and civic education do not limit their services to members.

Reports produced by CSOs are marketed to other organizations, donors, and constituents free-of-charge. However, organizations such as research institutions usually charge minimal fees for reports and printing. For

example, the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) requests a small fee for printing publicity materials on legal issues on behalf of other CSOs.

The government does not publicly recognize the value of CSOs, except during humanitarian crises such as the typhoid and cholera outbreaks and when the country is food insecure. During the constitutional reform process, the government engaged CSOs during the outreach phase. However, this relationship is artificial, as the government, particularly ZANU-PF, remains highly skeptical of CSO activities.

The government contracts with CSOs for some humanitarian and social services, particularly when there are humanitarian challenges facing the country. For the most part, though, the government does not provide grants or contracts.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0

Infrastructure in Zimbabwe

	2009	2010	2011
1.0			
3.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
5.0			
7.0			

Donor organizations contract with Intermediate Support Organizations (ISOs) to provide training to other CSOs. CSOs, however, do not usually contract with ISOs because of the high fees ISOs charge. Some CSOs provide training to other CSOs. For example, ZLHR provides security training. Radio Dialogue provides citizen journalism training in Harare and Bulawayo for its members as well as to representatives of other CSOs. Bulawayo Agenda and the Youth Initiative for Democracy in Zimbabwe (YIDEZ) provide leadership training for their constituencies and sometimes the public. However, most training benefits urban-based national organizations, not CBOs, and the quantity of training available is inadequate.

Resource centers such as the Zimbabwe Women Resource Centre and Network (ZWRCN), the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF), ZLHR, NANGO, and the Justice for Children Trust (JCT), are also concentrated in urban areas, and primarily serve their members. Written resources are almost exclusively available in English, not in local languages or in Braille, making them inaccessible to rural populations and the blind. Foreign libraries, such as the British Council's library, tend to have international resources that do not resonate with Zimbabwean needs. The few rural-based resource centers that exist are described by their intended constituents as "buildings without resources."

Local foundations and organizations, including the Youth Empowerment for Transformation Trust (YETT), the Culture Fund, and the Zimbabwe-Europe Partnership for Democracy (ZEPAD), re-grant international donor funds to local organizations. CSOs share information with one another on critical issues. For example, Kubatana Trust shares information through its website, e-bulletins, and text messages; CiZC through e-bulletins, text messages, and social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook; and Community Radio Harare (CORAH), through citizen journalism and text messages.

Intersectoral partnerships with the government include CWGH's work with the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare. The Civil Society Coordination Mechanism and COPAC work together with other government institutions to provide information and recommendations on key issues related to the constitutional reform process..

Partnerships between CSOs and the media have been strengthened by the creation of institutions such as the Media Center in 2010, which promote ongoing interaction between the two groups. Although cordial relations exist between CSOs and businesses, partnerships between the two sectors largely involve organizations focusing on humanitarian work as opposed to governance and democracy, as this is less likely to spark outrage from ZANU-PF.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5

As was the case in 2010, the media remains as highly polarized as the rest of Zimbabwean society. The state-controlled media is aligned with ZANU-PF, while the private media, which maintains some semblance of independence, is aligned with the MDC. ZANU-PF considers CSOs that work on democracy and governance issues to be aligned with the MDC, resulting in limited coverage of that sub-sector by state media organs, including the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation (ZBC) and *The Herald. The Patriot*, a newspaper established in 2011 that purports to be independent, refers to CSOs as "regime-change agenda institutions." Private media generally covers CSOs favorably.

Public Image in Zimbabwe

(Chart showing Public Image score of 4.5 constant across 2009, 2010, and 2011)

The public has mixed perceptions of CSOs. While some people have positive perceptions of CSOs, others view their operations negatively, largely owing to negative media coverage and political rhetoric peddled by ZANU-PF.

Local businesses believe that CSOs have substantial financial resources. In general, the government regards both PVOs and trusts with suspicion. However, government officials' perceptions shift; if specific initiatives benefit them, they view CSOs positively, but if not, they treat them cynically. Social service and humanitarian organizations are seen as resources by the ZANU-PF-controlled government as long as they do not challenge the status quo.

CSOs interact with journalists at different locations including the Media Center and the National Quill Club located at the New Ambassador Hotel in Harare. CSOs also promote their activities through newsletters and online media products.

Although there is no CSO code of ethics, organizations demonstrate transparency in their operations. More then 60 percent of organizations publish annual reports; the PVO Act mandates PVOs to submit annual and financial reports, and trusts and unregistered CSOs also produce annual reports, which are distributed to donors, associates, and networks. Due to budgetary constraints, most CBOs cannot afford to publish annual reports.

ANNEX A: CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX METHODOLOGY

I.   OVERVIEW

USAID works in close cooperation with local CSOs to develop the CSO Sustainability Index. In each country, a local implementing partner convenes a panel consisting of at least eight representatives of a diverse range of CSOs and related experts to assess the sector's performance in each of seven dimensions. USAID has developed indicators for each dimension, and the panel discusses and scores each indicator of a dimension, averaging these together for a preliminary dimension score. Dimension scores are averaged together for a preliminary score for overall CSO sustainability. The implementing partner drafts a country report based on the expert panel's discussion, as well as outside knowledge of the sector.

USAID convenes an Editorial Committee, made up of specialists on civil society in the region and the Index methodology from USAID, MSI, ICNL, the Aga Khan Foundation and at least one regional expert. The Editorial Committee reviews the narrative and scores to ensure that scores are adequately supported, and accurately reflect the stage of CSO sector development. The Editorial Committee further considers a country's score in relation to the proposed scores in other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores. In some cases, the Editorial Committee proposes adjustments to the proposed scores based on the information provided and trends affecting CSO sustainability in the region overall. The Editorial Committee also raises points for clarification and requests additional information to complete the report. The project editor edits the report and sends it, along with these score recommendations and requests, to the implementing partner for comment and revision.

If the implementing partner and local expert panel disagree with the Editorial Committee's score recommendations, they have a chance to strengthen their narrative to better justify the proposed score. The Editorial Committee has final say over the score.

The complete instructions sent to the implementing partners, as well as the questionnaire used by the expert panels, are found below.

II.   DIMENSIONS OF CSO SUSTAINABILITY

The CSO Sustainability Index measures the strength and overall viability of civil society sectors. The Index is not intended to gauge the sustainability of individual CSOs, but to fairly evaluate the overall level of development of the CSO sector as a whole. Seven different dimensions of the CSO sector are analyzed in the CSO Sustainability Index. A brief description of each dimension of sustainability follows:

Legal Environment

For a CSO sector to be sustainable, the legal and regulatory environment should support the needs of CSOs. It should facilitate new entrants, help prevent governmental interference, and give CSOs the necessary legal basis to engage in appropriate fundraising activities and legitimate income-producing ventures. Factors shaping the legal environment include the ease of registration; legal rights and conditions regulating CSOs; and the degree to which laws and regulations regarding taxation, procurement, and other issues benefit or deter CSOs' effectiveness and viability. The extent to which government officials, CSO representatives, and private lawyers have the legal knowledge and experience to work within and improve the legal and regulatory environment for CSOs is also examined.

Organizational Capacity

A sustainable CSO sector will contain a critical mass of CSOs that are transparently governed and publicly accountable, capably managed, and that exhibit essential organizational skills. The organizational capacity dimension of the Index addresses the sector's ability to engage in constituency building and strategic planning, as well as internal management and staffing practices within CSOs. Finally, this dimension looks at the technical resources CSOs have available for their work.

Financial Viability

A critical mass of CSOs must be financially viable, and the economy must be robust enough to support CSO self-financing efforts and generate philanthropic donations from local sources. For many CSOs, financial viability may be equally dependent upon the availability of and their ability to compete for international donor support funds. Factors influencing the financial viability of the CSO sector include the state of the economy, the extent to which philanthropy and volunteerism are being nurtured in the local culture, as well as the extent to which government procurement and commercial revenue raising opportunities are being developed. The sophistication and prevalence of fundraising and strong financial management skills are also considered.

Advocacy

The political and advocacy environment must support the formation of coalitions and networks, and offer CSOs the means to communicate their messages through the media to the broader public, articulate their demands to government officials, and monitor government actions to ensure accountability. The advocacy dimension looks at CSOs' record in influencing public policy. The prevalence of advocacy in different sectors, at different levels of government, as well as with the private sector is analyzed. The extent to which coalitions of CSOs have been formed around issues is considered, as well as whether CSOs monitor party platforms and government performance.

Service Provision

Sectoral sustainability will require a critical mass of CSOs that can efficiently provide services that consistently meet the needs, priorities, and expectations of their constituents. The service provision dimension examines the range of goods and services CSOs provide and how responsive these services are to community needs and priorities. The extent to which CSOs recover costs and receive recognition and support from the government for these services is also considered.

Infrastructure

A strong sectoral infrastructure is necessary that can provide CSOs with broad access to local CSO support services. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) providing these services must be able to inform, train, and advise other CSOs; and provide access to CSO networks and coalitions that share information and pursue issues of common interest. The prevalence and effectiveness of CSO partnerships with local business, government, and the media are also examined.

Public Image

For the sector to be sustainable, government, the business sector, and communities should have a positive public image of CSOs, including a broad understanding and appreciation of the role that CSOs play in society. Public awareness and credibility directly affect CSOs' ability to recruit members and volunteers, and encourage indigenous donors. The public image dimension looks at the extent and nature of the media's

coverage of CSOs, the awareness and willingness of government officials to engage CSOs, as well as the public's knowledge and perception of the sector as a whole. CSOs' public relations and self-regulation efforts are also considered.

III.   METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTER

The following steps should be followed to assemble the Expert Panel that will meet in person to discuss the status of civil society over the reporting year, determine scores, and prepare a country report for the CSO Sustainability Index.

1. **Carefully select a group of not less than 8 representatives of civil society organizations to serve as panel experts.**
    Implementers are free to select panel members based on the following guidelines. The panel may include representatives from the USAID Mission, but they will not have the ability to cast their vote in terms of scores. They are welcome to provide some words of introduction to open the event, as it is funded by USAID, and they are welcome to observe and participate in the discussion. The panel members should include representatives of a diverse range of civil society organizations including the following types:

    • local CSO support centers, resource centers or intermediary civil society support organizations (ISOs);

    • local CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs) involved in a range of service delivery and/or advocacy activities;

    •academia with expertise related to civil society and CSO sustainability;

    •CSO partners from government, business, or media;

    • think tanks working in the area of civil society development;

    • member associations such as cooperatives, lawyers' associations and natural resources users groups;

    • international donors who support civil society and CSOs; and other local partners.

It is recommended that at least 70 percent of the Expert Panel be nationals. CSOs represented on the panel can be those whose work is heavily focused on either advocacy or social service delivery. To the extent possible, panelists should represent both rural and urban parts of the country. To the extent possible, panelists should be representative of women's groups, minority populations, and marginalized groups, as well as sub sectors such as women's rights, community-based development, civic education, microfinance, environment, human rights, and youth. The panel should to the extent possible include an equal representation of men and women.

In some instances, it may be appropriate to select a larger group in order to reflect the diversity and breadth of the civil society sector in the country. Please keep in mind, however, that a significantly larger group may make building consensus within the panel more difficult. Alternatively, if regional differences within a country are significant, implementers may want to consider holding regional panels.

2. Ensure that panel members understand the objectives of the exercise.

The objective of the panel is to develop a consensus-based rating for each of the seven dimensions of civil society sustainability covered by the Index and to articulate a justification or explanation for each rating consistent with the methodology described below. The overall goal of the Index is to track and compare progress in the sector over time, increasing the ability of local entities to undertake self-assessment and

analysis. It also aims to develop an increased understanding of the civil society sector among donors, governments, and CSOs for the purposes of better support and programming.

It is recommended to distribute the instructions and rating description documents to the members of the Expert Panel a minimum of three days before convening the panel so that they may develop their initial scores for each indicator before meeting with the other panel members. If possible, it may be useful to hold a brief orientation session for the panelists prior to the panel discussion. Some partners chose to hold a formal training session with panel members, reviewing the methodology document and instructions, other partners provide more of a general discussion about the objectives of the exercise and process to the panelists.

We are very interested in using the preparation of this year's Index to track lessons learned for use in improving the monitoring process in upcoming years. We would appreciate implementers recording and submitting any observations they might have that will increase the usefulness of this important tool to MSI and US Agency for International Development (USAID).

3. Convene a meeting of the CSO Expert Panel.

4. At the Expert Panel meeting, please remind panelists that each indicator and dimension of the CSOSI should be scored according to evidence-based, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, and events.

The rating process should take place alongside or directly following a review of the rating process and categories provided in "Ratings: A Closer Look." For each indicator of each dimension, allow each panel member to share his or her initial score and justification with the rest of the group. At the end of the discussion of each indicator, allow panel members to adjust their scores, if desired. Then, eliminate the highest score and the lowest score, and average the remaining scores together to come up with one score for each indicator. Once a final score has been reached for each indicator within a given dimension, calculate the average or arithmetic mean of these scores for a preliminary score for the dimension. Be sure to take careful notes during the discussion of each indicator, detailing the justifications for all scores, as this should serve as the basis of the written report. Please keep all scores on record, making sure that personal attribution cannot be made to individual panel members. Implementers may use a table, similar to the one provided below, to track panel member scores without personal attribution. Ultimately, every rating awarded should be supported by evidence in the country report (see #8 below), and should reflect consensus among group members.

Panel Member	Legal Environment	Organizational Capacity	Financial Viability	Advocacy	Service Provision	Infrastructure	Public Image
1	2	4	5	2	2	6	3
2	4	3	4	3	3	4	3
3	3	2	4	1	3	6	2

5. Once scores for each dimension are determined, as a final step, **review the description of that dimension in "Ratings: A Closer Look."** Discuss with the group whether the score for a country matches that rating description.

For example, a score of 2.3 in Organizational Capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the "Sustainability Enhanced" phase. Please read the "Sustainability Enhanced" section for Organizational Capacity in "Ratings: A Closer Look" to ensure that this accurately describes the civil society environment. If not, discuss as a group to determine a more accurate score that fits the description for that dimension.

6. Discuss each of the seven dimensions of the Index and score them in a similar manner. Once all seven dimensions have been scored, average the final dimension scores together to get the final country Index score. Be sure to include a synopsis of this discussion in the draft country report.

7. Please remind the group at this stage that reports will be reviewed by an Editorial Committee (EC) in Washington, D.C.

The DC Editorial committee will ensure that all scores are adequately supported and may request adjustments in scores and/or additional justification to support scores.

8. Prepare a draft country report.

The report should cover the calendar year. The draft report should include an overview statement and a brief discussion of the current state of sustainability of the civil society sector with regard to each dimension. The section on each dimension should include a discussion of both accomplishments and strengths in that dimension, as well as obstacles to sustainability and weaknesses.

In the overview statement, please include an estimated number of registered and active CSOs, as well as an overview of the primary fields and geographic areas in which CSOs operate.

Please limit the submissions to USAID to a maximum of five pages in English. Please keep in mind that we rely on implementers to ensure that reports are an appropriate length and are well written, as we do not have the capacity to do extensive editing.

Please include a list of the experts and their organizational affiliation who served on the panel with the report. This will be for our reference only and will not be made public.

While the individual country reports for the CSO Sustainability Index must be brief, implementers may write longer reports for their own use to more fully describe the substance of the panel meetings. In addition, we will introduce a public launch event or electronic distribution (e.g., listserves or websites) to promote the release of the report in implementers' countries.

Deliver the draft country reports with rankings via email to MSI. Please copy USAID.

The project editor will be in contact with you following receipt of the report to discuss any outstanding questions and clarifications regarding the scoring and the report's content.

9. In Washington, an Editorial Committee (EC) will review the scores and draft country reports, and will discuss any issues or concerns with the implementer.

 The EC consists of representatives from USAID, MSI, ICNL, and at least one regional expert well versed in the issues and dynamics affecting civil society in the region. Further description of the EC is included in the following section, "The Role of the Editorial Committee." If the EC determines that the panel's scores are not adequately supported by the country report, particularly in comparison to the scores and reports of other countries in the region, the EC may request that the score be adjusted, thereby ensuring cross-country comparability. The implementer will be responsible for responding to all outstanding comments from the EC, as communicated by the project editor, until the report is approved and accepted by USAID. A USAID representative chairs the EC.

IV. THE ROLE OF THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

As a final step in the CSO Sustainability Index process, all country reports are reviewed and discussed by an Editorial Committee composed of regional and sector experts in Washington, DC. This committee is chaired by a USAID Civil Society Advisor and includes rotating members from USAID (past members have included

experts from the USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance's Office for Democracy and Governance (DCHA/DG), USAID/Office of Development Partners and Private and Voluntary Cooperation (ODP/PVC), and from USAID Democracy and Governance foreign service officers). The committee also includes a representative from the Aga Khan Foundation and civil society experts representing MSI and ICNL.

The Editorial Committee has three main roles. It reviews all reports and scores to ensure that narratives are adequate and compelling from the standpoint of supporting the proposed score. A compelling narrative demonstrates that a score results from evidence of systematic and widespread cases and is not based on one or two individual cases. For example, a country environment characterized by a large number of CSOs with strong financial management systems that raise funds locally from diverse sources is a compelling justification for an elevated Financial Viability score. A country in which one or two large CSOs have the ability to raise funds from diverse sources is not. The Editorial Committee also checks that scores for each dimension meet the criteria described in "Ratings: A Closer Look," to ensure that scores and narratives accurately reflect the actual stage of CSO sector development. Finally, and most importantly, the Editorial Committee considers a country's score in relation to the proposed scores in other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores.

All final scores are discussed with drafting CSOs. USAID/Washington has the final say on all scores.

CSOs are encouraged to remind their panels from the outset that the Editorial Committee may ask for further clarification of scores and may modify scores, where appropriate. However, by adding the step for each panel to compare their scores with "Ratings: A Closer Look" (which is essentially what the Editorial Committee does), it is hoped that there will be fewer differences between proposed scores and final scores. Ensuring that the narrative section for each dimension includes an adequate explanation for a score will also limit the need for the Editorial Committee to ask for further clarification.

V. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERT PANEL MEMBERS

Use the following steps to guide you through the individual rating process. This same process will be repeated during the CSO Expert Panel meeting, where panel members will discuss their initial scores, evidence for these scores, and determine by consensus the final scores for each of the indicators and dimensions.

Step 1: Please rate each of the seven dimensions and each of the indicators within each dimension on the following scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged.

Definition of CSO:
Civil society organizations are defined "broadly as any organizations, whether formal or informal, that are not part of the apparatus of government, that do not distribute profits to their directors or operators, that are self-governing, and in which participation is a matter of free choice. Both member-serving and public-serving organizations are included. Embraced within this definition, therefore, are private, not-for-profit health providers, schools, advocacy groups, social service agencies, anti-poverty groups, development agencies, professional associations, community-based organizations, unions, religious bodies, recreation organizations, cultural institutions, and many more."

Toward an Enabling Legal Environment for Civil Society, Statement of the 16th Annual Johns Hopkins International Fellows in Philanthropy Conference, Nairobi, Kenya. The International Journal of

Sustainability Enhanced		Sustainability Evolving			Sustainability Impeded	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Step 2: When rating each indicator, please remember to consider each one carefully and make note of any specific, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, or events that you used as a basis for determining this score.

Step 3: When you have rated all of the indicators within one of the seven dimensions, calculate the average of these scores to arrive at an overall score for that dimension. Record this overall score in the space provided.

Step 4: Once the overall score for a dimension has been determined, as a final step, review the description of that dimension in "Ratings: A Closer Look" to ensure that this accurately describes the environment. For example, a score of 2.3 in Organizational Capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the "Sustainability Enhanced" phase. If after reviewing "Ratings: A Closer Look" you determine that the score does not accurately depict the description, work together to determine a more accurate score that better fits the description for that dimension.

Step 5: Once you have scores for each dimension, average these seven scores together to arrive at an overall country rating and document all scores and discussion

SCORING SCALE:

The CSO Sustainability Index uses a seven-point scale to facilitate comparisons to the Freedom House indices, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of sustainability. The following broad guidelines can be used in determining scores for individual indicators and dimensions:

1. The civil society sector's sustainability is enhanced significantly by practices/policies in this area. While the reforms or developments that are needed may not yet be achieved, the local CSO community recognizes the need for them and has a plan and the ability to pursue them itself.

2. The civil society sector's sustainability is enhanced by practices/policies in this area. The local CSO community demonstrates a commitment to pursuing reforms and developing its professionalism in this area.

3. The civil society sector's sustainability is somewhat enhanced by practices/policies in this area, or its commitment to developing the aspect in question is significant.

4. The civil society sector's sustainability is minimally affected by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a stagnant economy, a passive government, a disinterested media, or a community of good-willed but inexperienced activists.

5. The civil society sector's sustainability is somewhat impeded by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a contracting economy, an authoritarian leader and centralized government, a controlled or reactionary media, or a low level of capacity, will, or interest on the part of the CSO community.

6. The civil society sector's sustainability is impeded by practices/policies in this area. A hostile environment and low capacity and public support may prevent the growth of the CSO sector.

7. The civil society sector's sustainability is significantly impeded by practices/policies in this area, generally as a result of an authoritarian government that aggressively opposes the development of independent CSOs.

For more specific information about the meaning of ratings for individual dimensions, please refer to "Ratings: A Closer Look" below.

VI.   DIMENSIONS AND INDICATORS

The following section is the worksheet that members of the Expert Panel use to keep track of the scores they propose for each indicator of each dimension. Each panel member should rate each of the seven dimensions and each of the indicators within each dimension on a scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

- *REGISTRATION.* Is there a favorable law on CSO registration? In practice, are CSOs easily able to register and operate?

- *OPERATION.* Is the internal management, scope of permissible activities, financial reporting, and/or dissolution of CSOs well detailed in current legislation? Does clear legal terminology preclude unwanted state control over CSOs? Is the law implemented in accordance with its terms? Are CSOs protected from the possibility of the State dissolving a CSO for political/arbitrary reasons?

- *ADMINISTRATIVE IMPEDIMENTS AND STATE HARASSMENT.* Are CSOs and their representatives allowed to operate freely within the law? Are they free from harassment by the central government, local governments, and tax police? Can they freely address matters of public debate and express criticism?

- *LOCAL LEGAL CAPACITY.* Are there local lawyers who are trained in and familiar with CSO law? Is legal advice available to CSOs in the capital city and in secondary cities?

- *TAXATION.* Do CSOs receive any sort of tax exemption or deduction on income from grants, endowments, fees, or economic activity? Do individual or corporate donors receive tax deductions?

- *EARNED INCOME.* Does legislation exist that allows CSOs to earn income from the provision of goods and services? Are CSOs allowed legally to compete for government contracts/procurements at the local and central levels?

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

- *CONSTITUENCY BUILDING.* Do CSOs clearly identify and actively seek to build local constituencies for their initiatives? Are they successful in these endeavors?

- *STRATEGIC PLANNING.* Do CSOs have clearly defined missions to which they adhere? Do CSOs have clearly defined strategic plans and incorporate strategic planning techniques in their decision-making processes?

- *INTERNAL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE.* Is there a clearly defined management structure within CSOs, including a recognized division of responsibilities between the Board of Directors and staff members? Does the Board actively engage in the governance of the CSO? Do the Boards of Directors operate in an open and transparent manner, allowing contributors and supporters to verify appropriate use of funds?

- *CSO STAFFING.* Are CSOs able to maintain permanent, paid staff? Do CSOs have adequate human resources practices for staff, including contracts, job descriptions, payroll and personnel policies? Are potential volunteers sufficiently recruited and engaged? Do CSOs utilize professional services such as accountants, IT managers or lawyers?

- *TECHNICAL ADVANCEMENT.* Do CSOs' resources generally allow for modernized basic office equipment (relatively new computers and software, cell phones, functional fax machines/scanners, Internet access, etc.)?

FINANCIAL VIABILITY

- *LOCAL SUPPORT:* Do CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funding from local sources? Are CSOs able to draw upon a core of volunteer and non-monetary support from their communities and constituencies? Are there local sources of philanthropy?

- *DIVERSIFICATION*: Do CSOs typically have multiple/diverse sources of funding? Do most CSOs have enough resources to remain viable for the short-term future?

- *FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS*: Are there sound financial management systems in place? Do CSOs typically operate in a transparent manner, including independent financial audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements?

- *FUNDRAISING:* Have many CSOs cultivated a loyal core of financial supporters? Do CSOs engage in any sort of membership outreach and philanthropy development programs?

- *EARNED INCOME:* Do revenues from services, products, or rent from assets supplement the income of CSOs? Do government and/or local business contract with CSOs for services? Do membership-based organizations collect dues?

ADVOCACY

- *COOPERATION WITH LOCAL AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.* Are there direct lines of communication between CSOs and policy makers? Do CSOs and government representatives work on any projects together?

- *POLICY ADVOCACY INITIATIVES.* Have CSOs formed issue-based coalitions and conducted broad-based advocacy campaigns? Have these campaigns been effective at the local level and/or national level at increasing awareness or support for various causes? (Please provide examples, if relevant.)

- *LOBBYING EFFORTS.* Are there mechanisms and relationships for CSOs to participate in the various levels of government decision-making processes? Are CSOs comfortable with the concept of lobbying? Have there been any lobbying successes at the local or national level that led to the enactment or amendment of legislation? (Please provide examples, if relevant.)

- *LOCAL ADVOCACY FOR LEGAL REFORM.* Is there awareness in the wider CSO community of how a favorable legal and regulatory framework can enhance CSO effectiveness and sustainability? Is there a local CSO advocacy effort to promote legal reforms that will benefit CSOs, local philanthropy, etc.?

SERVICE PROVISION

- *RANGE OF GOODS AND SERVICES.* Do CSOs provide services in a variety of fields, including basic social services (such as health, education, relief, housing, water, or energy) and other areas (such

as economic development, environmental protection, or governance and empowerment)? Overall, is the sector's "product line" diversified?

- *COMMUNITY RESPONSIVENESS.* Do the goods and services that CSOs provide reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents and communities?

- *CONSTITUENCIES AND CLIENTELE.* Are those goods and services that go beyond basic social needs provided to a constituency broader than CSOs' own memberships? Are some products, such as publications, workshops or expert analysis, marketed to other CSOs, academia, churches, or government?

- *COST RECOVERY.* When CSOs provide goods and services, do they recover any of their costs by charging fees, etc.? Do they have knowledge of the market demand -- and the ability of distinct constituencies to pay -- for those products?

- *GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT.* Does the government, at the national and/or local level, recognize the value that CSOs can add in the provision and monitoring of basic social services? Do they provide grants or contracts to CSOs to enable them to provide such services?

INFRASTRUCTURE

- *INTERMEDIARY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS (ISOS) AND CSO RESOURCE CENTERS.* Are there ISOs, CSO resource centers, or other means for CSOs to access relevant information, technology, training, and technical assistance throughout the country? Do ISOs and CSO resource centers meet the needs of local CSOs? Do ISOs and resource centers earn some of their operating revenue from earned income (such as fees for service) and other locally generated sources? (Please describe the kinds of services provided by these organizations in your country report.)

- *LOCAL GRANT MAKING ORGANIZATIONS.* Do local community foundations and/or ISOs provide grants, from either locally raised funds or by re-granting international donor funds, to address locally identified needs and projects?

- *CSO COALITIONS.* Do CSOs share information with each other? Is there a network in place that facilitates such information sharing? Is there an organization or committee through which the sector promotes its interests?

- *TRAINING.* Are there capable local CSO management trainers? Is basic CSO management training available in the capital city and in secondary cities? Is more advanced specialized training available in areas such as strategic management, accounting, financial management, fundraising, volunteer management, and board development? Do trainings meet the needs of local CSOs? Are training materials available in local languages?

- *INTERSECTORAL PARTNERSHIPS.* Are there examples of CSOs working in partnership, either formally or informally, with local business, government, and the media to achieve common objectives? Is there awareness among the various sectors of the possibilities for and advantages of such partnerships?

PUBLIC IMAGE

- *MEDIA COVERAGE.* Do CSOs enjoy positive media coverage at the local and national levels? Is a distinction made between public service announcements and corporate advertising? Do the media provide positive analysis of the role CSOs play in civil society?

- *PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF CSOS.* Does the general public have a positive perception of CSOs? Does the public understand the concept of a CSO? Is the public supportive of CSO activity overall?

- *GOVERNMENT/BUSINESS PERCEPTION OF CSOS.* Do the business sector and local and central government officials have a positive perception of CSOs? Do they rely on CSOs as a community resource, or as a source of expertise and credible information?

- *PUBLIC RELATIONS.* Do CSOs publicize their activities or promote their public image? Have CSOs developed relationships with journalists to encourage positive coverage?

- *SELF-REGULATION.* Have CSOs adopted a code of ethics or tried to demonstrate transparency in their operations? Do leading CSOs publish annual reports?

VII. RATINGS: A CLOSER LOOK

The following section goes into greater depth about the characteristics in each of the seven dimensions of the sector's development. These characteristics and stages are drawn from empirical observations of the sector's development in the region, rather than a causal theory of development. Given the decentralized nature of civil society sectors, many contradictory developments may be taking place simultaneously. Therefore the characteristics of the seven dimensions are not considered as seven distinct steps of development. Instead, these characteristics are clustered into three basic stages: Sustainability Enhanced, Sustainability Evolving, and Sustainability Impeded. The Sustainability Enhanced stage, the highest level of sustainability and development, corresponds to a score between 1 and 3 points; the Sustainability Evolving stage corresponds to a score between 3.1 and 5 points; and the lowest level of development, the Sustainability Impeded stage, corresponds to a score of 5.1 to 7 points on the scale.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): The legislative and regulatory framework makes special provisions for the needs of CSOs or gives not-for-profit organizations special advantages such as: significant tax deductions for business or individual contributions, significant tax exemptions for CSOs, open competition among CSOs to provide government-funded services, etc. Legal reform efforts at this point are primarily a local CSO advocacy effort to reform or fine-tune taxation laws, procurement processes, etc. Local and comparative expertise on the CSO legal framework exists, and legal services and materials are available.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): CSOs have little trouble registering and do not suffer from state harassment. They are permitted to engage in a broad range of activities, although taxation provisions, procurement procedures, etc. may inhibit CSO operations and development. Programs seek to reform or clarify existing CSO legislation, to allow CSOs to engage in revenue raising and commercial activities, to allow national or local governments to privatize the provision of selected government services, to address basic tax and fiscal issues for CSOs, etc. The local CSO community understands the need to coalesce and advocate for legal reforms benefiting the CSO sector as a whole. A core of local lawyers begins to specialize in CSO law by providing legal services to local CSOs, advising the CSO community on needed legal reforms, crafting draft legislation, etc.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): The legal environment severely restricts the ability of CSOs to register and/or operate, either through the absence of legal provisions, the confusing or restrictive nature of legal provisions (and/or their implementation), or government hostility towards and harassment of CSOs.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): Several transparently governed and capably managed CSOs exist across a variety of sectors. A majority of organizations have clearly defined mission statements, and many CSOs utilize

strategic planning techniques. Boards of directors exist, and there is a clear distinction between the responsibilities of board members and staff. CSOs have permanent well-trained staff, and volunteers are widely utilized. Most CSOs have relatively modern equipment that allows them to do their work efficiently. Leading CSOs have successfully developed strong local constituencies.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): Individual CSOs demonstrate enhanced capacity to govern themselves and organize their work. Some individual CSOs maintain full-time staff members and boast an orderly division of labor between board members and staff. CSOs have access to basic office equipment, including computers and fax machines. While these efforts may not have reached fruition yet, leading CSOs understand the need and are making an effort to develop local constituencies.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): CSOs are essentially "one-man shows," completely dependent upon the personality of one or two major figures. They often split apart due to personality clashes. CSOs lack a clearly defined sense of mission. At this stage, CSOs reflect little or no understanding of strategic planning or program formulation. Organizations rarely have a board of directors, by-laws, staff, or more than a handful of active members. CSOs have no understanding of the value or need of developing local constituencies for their work.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): A critical mass of CSOs have sound financial management systems in place, including independent audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements, to win potential donors' confidence. CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funding from local sources, including government, corporate and individual philanthropy, and earned income. Most CSOs have multiple sources of funding, which allow them to remain viable in the short term. A growing economy makes growth in domestic giving possible.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): CSOs pioneer different approaches to financial independence and viability. While still largely dependent on foreign donors, individual CSOs experiment with raising revenues through providing services, winning contracts and grants from municipalities and ministries to provide services, or attempting to attract dues-paying members or domestic donors. However, a depressed local economy may hamper efforts to raise funds from local sources. Training programs address financial management issues and CSOs begin to understand the importance of transparency and accountability from a fundraising perspective, although they may be unable to fully implement transparency measures.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): New CSOs survive from grant to grant and/or depend financially on one foreign sponsor. While many CSOs are created in the hopes of receiving funding, most are largely inactive after attempts to win foreign donor funding fail. Local sources of funding are virtually nonexistent, in part due to a depressed local economy. CSOs have no financial management systems and do not understand the need for financial transparency or accountability.

ADVOCACY

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): The CSO sector demonstrates the ability and capacity to respond to changing needs, issues and interests of the community and country. As CSOs secure their institutional and political base, they begin to 1) form coalitions to pursue issues of common interest, including CSO legislation; 2) monitor and lobby political parties; and 3) monitor and lobby legislatures and executive bodies. CSOs demonstrate the ability to mobilize citizens and other organizations to respond to changing needs, issues, and interests. CSOs at this stage of development will review their strategies, and possess an ability to adapt and respond to challenges by sector. A prime motivator for cooperation is self-interest: CSOs may form alliances around shared issues confronting them as nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): Narrowly defined advocacy organizations emerge and become politically active in response to specific issues. Organizations at the evolving level of development may often present their concerns to inappropriate levels of government (local instead of national and vice versa). Weakness of the legislative branch might be revealed or incorrectly assumed, as activists choose to meet with executive branch officials instead ("where the power truly lies"). Beginnings of alternative policy analysis are found at universities and think tanks. Information sharing and networking within the CSO sector to inform and advocate its needs within the government begins to develop.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): Broad umbrella movements, composed of activists concerned with a variety of sectors, and united in their opposition to the Government fall apart or disappear. Some countries at this stage have not even experienced any initial burst of activism. Economic concerns are predominant for most citizens. Passivity, cynicism, or fear exist within the general public. CSO activists are afraid to engage in dialogue with the government, feel inadequate to offer their views and/or do not believe the government will listen to their recommendations. CSOs do not understand the role that they can play in public policy or do not understand the concept of public policy.

SERVICE PROVISION

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): Many CSOs provide a wide range of goods and services, which reflect community and/or local donor priorities. Many CSOs deliver products beyond basic social services in such sectors as economic development, environmental protection or democratic governance. CSOs in several sectors have developed a sufficiently strong knowledge of the market demand for their services, the ability of government to contract for the delivery of such services or other sources of funding including private donations, grants and fees, where allowed by law. A number of CSOs find it possible to cross-subsidize those goods and services for which full cost recovery is not viable with income earned from more lucrative goods and services, or with funds raised from other sources. Government bodies, primarily at the local level, recognize the abilities of CSOs and provide grants or contracts to enable them to provide various services.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): The contribution of CSOs to covering the gap in social services is recognized by government, although this is only rarely accompanied by funding in the form of grants or contracts. CSOs recognize the need to charge fees for services and other products—such as publications and workshops—but even where legally allowed, such fees seldom cover their costs. While CSO-provided goods and services respond to community needs, needs are generally identified by foreign donors, or by CSOs in an unsystematic manner. The constituency for CSO expertise, reports and documents begins to expand beyond their own members and the poor to include other CSOs, academia, churches, and government.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): A limited number of CSOs are capable of providing basic social services—such as health, education, relief, or housing—although at a low level of sophistication. Those that do provide such services receive few if any government subsidies or contracts. CSOs that produce publications, technical services or research do so only for their own members or donors. There are rarely attempts to charge fees for goods and services.

INFRASTRUCTURE

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): CSO intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and/or CSO resource centers are active in all areas of the country and provide advanced training, informational services, legal support and advice, and philanthropic development activities. Efforts are underway to establish and endow community foundations, indigenous grant-making institutions, and/or organizations to coordinate local fundraising. A professional cadre of local experts, consultants, and trainers in nonprofit management exists. CSOs recognize the value of training, although the lack of financial resources may remain a constraint to accessing locally provided training. Topics of available training cover: legal and tax issues for CSOs, accounting and bookkeeping, communication skills, volunteer management, media and public relations skills, sponsorship, and fundraising. CSOs work together and share information through networks and coalitions.

CSOs are beginning to develop intersectoral partnerships with business, government, and the media to achieve common objectives.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): ISOs and resource centers are active in major population centers, and provide services such as distributing grants, publishing newsletters, maintaining a membership database, running a library of CSO literature, and providing basic training and consulting services. Other umbrella organizations and networks are beginning to be formed to facilitate networking and coordinate activities of groups of CSOs. Local trainers have the capacity to provide basic organizational training. Donors' forum are formed to coordinate the financial support of international donors, and to develop local corporate philanthropic activities. The value of intersectoral partnerships has not yet been realized.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): There are few, if any, active ISOs or resource centers, networks and umbrella organizations. Those that do operate work primarily in the capital city and provide limited services such as access to computer equipment, faxes, e-mail, and meeting space. Local training and CSO development capacity is extremely limited and undeveloped. Primarily programs of international donors provide training and technical assistance. There is no coordinated effort to develop philanthropic traditions, improve fundraising, or establish community foundations. CSO efforts to work together are limited by a perception of competition for foreign donor support and mistrust of other organizations.

PUBLIC IMAGE

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): This stage is characterized by growing public knowledge of and trust in CSOs, and increased rates of volunteerism. CSOs coalesce to mount campaigns to increase public trust. Widespread examples of good working relationships between CSOs and national and local governments exist, and can result in public-private initiatives or CSO advisory committees for city councils and ministries. Media covers the work of CSOs, and CSOs approach media and public relations in a professional manner. Increased accountability, transparency, and self-regulation exist within the CSO sector, including existence of a generally accepted code of ethics or a code of conduct.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): The media does not tend to cover CSOs because it considers them weak and ineffective, or irrelevant. Individual CSOs realize the need to educate the public, to become more transparent, and to seek out opportunities for media coverage, but do not have the skills to do so. As a result, the general population has little understanding of the role of CSOs in society. Individual local governments demonstrate strong working relationships with their local CSOs, as evidenced by their participation in advisory committees, consultations, public-private initiatives, and the funding of an occasional grant, but this is not yet widespread.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): The public and/or government are uninformed or suspicious of CSOs as institutions. Most of the population does not understand the concept of "nongovernmental," "nonprofit," or "civil society," including government officials, business leaders and journalists. Media coverage may be hostile, due to suspicion of a free but uninformed media, or due to the hostility of an authoritarian government-controlled media. Charges of treason may be issued against CSOs. Due to a hostile atmosphere caused by an authoritarian government, if individuals or businesses donate to CSOs at all, they do so anonymously.

ANNEX B: STATISTICAL DATA

2011 CSO SUSTAINABILITY SCORES

COUNTRY	Legal Environment	Organizational Capacity	Financial Viability	Advocacy	Service Provision	Infrastructure	Public Image	CSO Sustainability
EAST AFRICA								
Burundi	5.9	5.9	6.0	4.4	4.5	5.6	4.3	5.2
DRC	5.4	5.1	5.7	4.4	4.5	5.6	5.0	5.1
Ethiopia	6.5	5.1	6.1	6.1	4.9	5.5	5.1	5.6
Kenya	4.1	3.9	4.8	3.4	3.4	3.7	4.3	3.9
Rwanda	4.3	4.5	5.3	3.8	4.0	5.0	4.4	4.5
Tanzania	4.4	4.4	4.9	3.8	3.4	4.3	4.1	4.2
Uganda	5.1	3.9	5.1	3.8	3.5	4.6	4.3	4.3
Average	**5.1**	**4.7**	**5.4**	**4.2**	**4.0**	**4.9**	**4.5**	**4.7**
WEST AFRICA								
Gabon	6.1	5.5	6.1	5.1	5.1	5.2	5.0	5.4
The Gambia	6.1	5.9	6.5	5.9	5.0	5.4	5.0	5.7
Ghana	3.9	3.9	5.7	3.8	3.8	4.7	4.3	4.3
Guinea	5.5	5.8	6.3	5.3	5.1	5.7	4.9	5.5
Liberia	4.9	5.1	5.8	4.1	4.4	4.8	4.7	4.8
Mali	4.2	4.2	5.6	3.9	3.6	4.6	4.4	4.4
Nigeria	4.9	4.7	5.5	3.7	4.2	5.0	4.0	4.6
Senegal	4.7	4.0	5.0	3.9	3.9	4.7	3.8	4.3
Sierra Leone	5.0	4.8	5.7	4.5	4.1	5.1	4.5	4.8
Average	**5.0**	**4.9**	**5.8**	**4.5**	**4.4**	**5.0**	**4.5**	**4.9**
SOUTHERN AFRICA								
Angola	6.1	5.8	6.1	5.7	5.3	5.7	5.5	5.7
Botswana	3.8	4.0	4.6	3.8	3.6	4.9	4.4	4.2
Malawi	5.2	5.3	5.8	4.4	4.5	5.6	5.0	5.1
Mozambique	4.7	5.3	5.0	4.5	4.0	5.1	4.7	4.8
South Africa	3.3	3.8	4.1	3.4	3.2	3.8	3.6	3.6
Zambia	4.7	4.2	5.5	3.9	4.5	5.0	4.4	4.6
Zimbabwe	6.1	4.5	5.9	4.5	3.4	5.0	4.5	4.8
Average	**4.8**	**4.7**	**5.3**	**4.3**	**4.1**	**5.0**	**4.6**	**4.7**

COUNTRIES RANKED BY SCORES

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT		ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY		FINANCIAL VIABILITY	
SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED		**SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED**		**SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED**	
SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING		**SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING**		**SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING**	
South Africa	3.3	South Africa	3.8	South Africa	4.1
Botswana	3.8	Ghana	3.9	Botswana	4.6
Ghana	3.9	Kenya	3.9	Kenya	4.8
Kenya	4.1	Uganda	3.9	Tanzania	4.9
Mali	4.2	Botswana	4.0	Mozambique	5.0
Rwanda	4.3	Senegal	4.0	Senegal	5.0
Mozambique	4.4	Mali	4.2	**SUSTAINABILITY IMPEDED**	
Senegal	4.7	Zambia	4.2	Uganda	5.1
Tanzania	4.7	Tanzania	4.4	Rwanda	5.3
Zambia	4.7	Zimbabwe	4.5	Nigeria	5.5
Liberia	4.9	Nigeria	4.7	Zambia	5.5
Nigeria	4.9	Rwanda	4.5	Mali	5.6
Sierra Leone	5.0	Sierra Leone	4.8	Ghana	5.7
SUSTAINABILITY IMPEDED		**SUSTAINABILITY IMPEDED**		DRC	5.7
Uganda	5.1	DRC	5.1	Sierra Leone	5.7
Malawi	5.2	Ethiopia	5.1	Liberia	5.8
DRC	5.4	Liberia	5.1	Malawi	5.8
Guinea	5.5	Malawi	5.3	Zimbabwe	5.9
Burundi	5.9	Mozambique	5.3	Burundi	6.0
Angola	6.1	Gabon	5.5	Angola	6.1
The Gambia	6.1	Angola	5.8	Ethiopia	6.1
Gabon	6.1	Guinea	5.8	Gabon	6.1
Zimbabwe	6.1	Burundi	5.9	Guinea	6.3
Ethiopia	6.5	The Gambia	5.9	The Gambia	6.5

COUNTRIES RANKED BY SCORES

ADVOCACY

SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED	
SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING	
Kenya	3.4
South Africa	3.4
Nigeria	3.7
Botswana	3.8
Ghana	3.8
Rwanda	3.8
Tanzania	3.8
Uganda	3.8
Mali	3.9
Senegal	3.9
Zambia	3.9
Burundi	4.1
DRC	4.4
Liberia	4.4
Malawi	4.4
Mozambique	4.5
Sierra Leone	4.5
Zimbabwe	4.5
SUSTAINABILITY IMPEDED	
Gabon	5.1
Guinea	5.3
Angola	5.7
The Gambia	5.9
Ethiopia	6.1

SERVICE PROVISION

SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED	
SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING	
South Africa	3.2
Kenya	3.4
Tanzania	3.4
Zimbabwe	3.4
Uganda	3.5
Botswana	3.6
Mali	3.6
Ghana	3.8
Senegal	3.9
Mozambique	4.0
Rwanda	4.0
Sierra Leone	4.1
Nigeria	4.2
Liberia	4.4
Burundi	4.5
DRC	4.5
Malawi	4.5
Zambia	4.5
Ethiopia	4.9
SUSTAINABILITY IMPEDED	
The Gambia	5.0
Gabon	5.1
Guinea	5.1
Angola	5.3

INFRASTRUCTURE

SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED	
SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING	
Kenya	3.7
South Africa	3.8
Tanzania	4.3
Mali	4.6
Uganda	4.6
Ghana	4.7
Senegal	4.7
Liberia	4.8
Botswana	4.9
Nigeria	5.0
Rwanda	5.0
Zambia	5.0
Zimbabwe	5.0
SUSTAINABILITY IMPEDED	
Mozambique	5.1
Sierra Leone	5.1
Gabon	5.2
The Gambia	5.4
Ethiopia	5.5
Burundi	5.6
DRC	5.6
Malawi	5.6
Angola	5.7
Guinea	5.7

COUNTRIES RANKED BY SCORE

PUBLIC IMAGE

SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED	
SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING	
South Africa	3.6
Senegal	3.8
Nigeria	4.0
Tanzania	4.1
Burundi	4.3
Ghana	4.3
Kenya	4.3
Uganda	4.3
Botswana	4.4
Mali	4.4
Rwanda	4.4
Zambia	4.4
Sierra Leone	4.5
Zimbabwe	4.5
Liberia	4.7
Mozambique	4.7
Guinea	4.9
DRC	5.0
Gabon	5.0
The Gambia	5.0
Malawi	5.0
SUSTAINABILITY IMPEDED	
Ethiopia	5.1
Angola	5.5

CSO SUSTAINABILITY – COUNTRY RANKINGS

	Rank	CSO Sustainability
SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED		
SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING		
South Africa	1	3.6
Kenya	2	3.9
Tanzania	3	4.2
Botswana	3	4.2
Senegal	5	4.3
Ghana	5	4.3
Uganda	5	4.3
Mali	8	4.4
Rwanda	9	4.5
Nigeria	10	4.6
Zambia	10	4.6
Liberia	12	4.8
Mozambique	12	4.8
Sierra Leone	12	4.8
Zimbabwe	12	4.8
SUSTAINABILITY IMPEDED		
DRC	16	5.1
Malawi	16	5.1
Burundi	18	5.2
Gabon	19	5.4
Guinea	20	5.5
Ethiopia	21	5.6
The Gambia	22	5.7
Angola	22	5.7

DIMENSION SCORES 2009 - 2011

Country	Legal Environment			Organizational Capacity			Financial Viability		
	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011
EAST AFRICA									
Burundi	5.8	5.8	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.9	6.0	6.0	6.0
DRC	5.3	5.4	5.4	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.8	5.8	5.7
Ethiopia	6.1	6.2	6.5	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.8	5.9	6.1
Kenya	4.5	4.1	4.1	3.9	3.9	3.9	4.8	4.8	4.8
Rwanda	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.7	4.6	4.5	5.3	5.3	5.3
Tanzania	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.9	4.9	4.9
Uganda	4.9	5.1	5.1	4.0	4.0	3.9	5.1	5.1	5.1
Average	**5.1**	**5.1**	**5.1**	**4.7**	**4.7**	**4.7**	**5.4**	**5.4**	**5.4**
WEST AFRICA									
Gabon	6.0	6.0	6.1	5.5	5.5	5.5	6.1	6.1	6.1
Gambia	-	-	6.1	-	-	5.9	-	-	6.5
Ghana	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	5.5	5.6	5.7
Guinea	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.8	5.8	5.8	6.2	6.3	6.3
Liberia	5.0	4.9	4.9	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.8	5.8	5.8
Mali	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.3	4.2	4.2	5.7	5.6	5.6
Nigeria	5.0	5.0	4.9	4.7	4.7	4.7	5.6	5.6	5.5
Senegal	4.2	4.3	4.7	3.9	3.9	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
Sierra Leone	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.8	5.7	5.7	5.7
Average	**4.9**	**4.9**	**5.0**	**4.8**	**4.8**	**4.9**	**5.7**	**5.7**	**5.8**
SOUTHERN AFRICA									
Angola	6.0	6.0	6.1	5.7	5.7	5.8	5.9	5.9	6.1
Botswana	-	-	3.8	-	-	4.0	-	-	4.6
Malawi	-	-	5.2	-	-	5.3	-	-	5.8
Mozambique	4.8	4.8	4.7	5.4	5.4	5.3	5.0	5.0	5.0
South Africa	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.8	4.0	4.1
Zambia	-	-	4.7	-	-	4.2	-	-	5.5
Zimbabwe	6.1	6.0	6.1	4.5	4.5	4.5	5.9	5.9	5.9
Average	**5.1**	**5.0**	**4.8**	**4.8**	**4.8**	**4.7**	**5.2**	**5.2**	**5.3**

DIMENSION SCORES 2009 - 2010

Country	Advocacy			Service Provision			Infrastructure			Public Image		
	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011
EAST AFRICA												
Burundi	4.6	4.5	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.5	5.6	5.6	5.6	4.4	4.3	4.3
DRC	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.5	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.0	5.0	5.0
Ethiopia	5.8	6.0	6.1	5.0	4.9	4.9	5.3	5.3	5.5	5.1	5.1	5.1
Kenya	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.7	3.7	3.7	4.3	4.3	4.3
Rwanda	4.0	3.9	3.8	4.0	4.0	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.5	4.5	4.4
Tanzania	4.0	3.9	3.8	3.4	3.4	3.4	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.1
Uganda	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.5	3.5	3.5	4.8	4.7	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.3
Average	**4.4**	**4.3**	**4.2**	**4.1**	**4.0**	**4.0**	**4.9**	**4.9**	**4.9**	**4.6**	**4.5**	**4.5**
WEST AFRICA												
Gabon	5.3	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.2	5.0	5.0	5.0
Gambia	-	-	5.9	-	-	5.0	-	-	5.4	-	-	5.0
Ghana	4.0	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.3	4.3	4.3
Guinea	5.7	5.5	5.3	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.7	5.7	5.7	4.9	4.9	4.9
Liberia	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.7	4.7	4.7
Mali	4.1	3.9	3.9	3.6	3.7	3.6	4.9	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.4
Nigeria	3.9	3.8	3.7	4.2	4.2	4.2	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Senegal	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	4.7	4.7	4.7	3.9	3.9	3.8
Sierra Leone	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.2	4.1	4.1	5.1	5.1	4.1	4.5	4.5	4.5
Average	**4.5**	**4.4**	**4.5**	**4.3**	**4.3**	**4.4**	**5.0**	**5.0**	**5.0**	**4.5**	**4.5**	**4.5**
SOUTHERN AFRICA												
Angola	5.5	5.5	5.7	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.4	5.4	5.5
Botswana	-	-	3.8	-	-	3.6	-	-	4.9	-	-	4.4
Malawi	-	-	4.4	-	-	4.5	-	-	5.6	-	-	5.0
Mozambique	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.0	4.0	4.0	5.1	5.1	5.1	4.9	4.8	4.7
South Africa	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.5	3.6	3.6
Zambia	-	-	3.9	-	-	4.5	-	-	5.0	-	-	4.4
Zimbabwe	4.5	4.5	4.5	3.4	3.4	3.4	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.5	4.5	4.5
Average	**4.5**	**4.5**	**4.3**	**4.0**	**4.0**	**4.1**	**4.9**	**4.9**	**5.0**	**4.6**	**4.6**	**4.6**