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THE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE TO DRUG TRAFFICKING IN AFRICA: A PROGRAMMING GUIDE

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THE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE TO DRUG TRAFFICKING IN AFRICA:

A PROGRAMMING GUIDE

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“Defining the Potential Development Assistance Contributions to Counternarcotic Efforts in Africa” \$

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS &

AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ARQ	UNODC Annual Reports Questionnaire
ATS	Amphetamine-Type Stimulants
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DFID	Department for International Development
DTO	Drug Trafficking Organization
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
INCB	International Narcotics Control Board
INL	U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
MUJAO	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
MP	Member of Parliament
NACOB	Narcotics Control Board of Ghana
NPP	New Patriotic Party of Ghana
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance)
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
U.S.	United States
U.K.	United Kingdom
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
WACSI	West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Drug trafficking poses a growing problem in Africa. Increasing flows of illicit drugs threaten good governance, peace and security, economic growth and public health. Failure to address this threat risks undermining the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)’s investments and thwarting U.S. Government objectives on the continent.

In recognition of the issue, USAID’s Africa Bureau initiated research in 2011 on the development causes and consequences of drug trafficking and potential programmatic responses. The resulting programming guide aims to help USAID, other development actors, and other U.S. Government personnel understand the relationship between drug trafficking and development assistance and seek ways to mitigate any negative impacts. At a minimum, development actors should undertake crime-sensitive programming that ensures their efforts do no harm. Where possible, development actors should consider programming targeted to counter the flow of drugs (e.g., anticorruption efforts or judicial reform) or programming to ameliorate the impacts of drug trafficking, such as demand reduction programs including prevention and treatment. This guide helps Missions examine opportunities for incorporating such considerations into current or future USAID programming.

This guide first focuses on identifying the development challenge in Africa. The second section addresses the political economy analysis that will inform what type of programming is appropriate and which actors are appropriate partners for development efforts. The third section presents programming options to: (1) counter drug trafficking, (2) ameliorate its impacts, and (3) incorporate crime sensitivity. The fourth section presents key findings and lessons learned. These include:

- Drug trafficking in Africa threatens development. Drug trafficking has exacerbated instability in Guinea-Bissau and Mali and is corroding governance throughout Africa. If left unattended, drug trafficking threatens to further undermine stability and governance and impair economic growth and public health.
- Development practitioners must “get smart” on the issue. Given the significant threats across development sectors, USAID personnel should increase awareness of this issue by engaging with U.S. Government counterparts and incorporating issues of drug trafficking and criminality into planned assessments and analyses.
- Interdiction alone will not solve the problem. Interdiction must be accompanied by demand reduction efforts to help counteract the potential increased profitability from decreasing the supply of drugs. Moreover, interdiction must lead to prosecution of traffickers beyond the lowest level to effectively disrupt drug trafficking networks.
- Early identification of the problem and prevention efforts are critical. Although it is difficult to garner support for these issues before they erupt, early investments to contain the influence of drug money in politics and local conflicts and to prevent the spread of a retail drug market could significantly contribute to Africa’s future stability and prosperity.
- Political will must drive the counternarcotics approach. Whereas Missions can undertake crime-sensitive programming and support efforts to ameliorate harm and increase demand

for counternarcotics measures without accompanying political will, they should only pursue supply-side efforts to improve counternarcotics efforts where there is corresponding political will.

- Resources influence programming options. To the extent that a Mission has democracy and governance funds and a serious drug trafficking issue, the Mission could direct resources to building accountable governance that simultaneously addresses core democracy and governance challenges in the country and promotes counternarcotics efforts. Absent such resources, Missions may still ensure that existing programming across development sectors incorporates crime sensitivity and works to ameliorate the impacts of drug trafficking (e.g., consider using health resources to raise awareness and support demand and harm reduction).
- Change presents windows of opportunity and vulnerability. The environment for drug trafficking is fluid and Missions should identify windows of opportunity, or moments that present a chance for positive change, and vulnerability, or moments that risk fostering drug trafficking.
- Coordination increases impacts. Given the many actors involved in providing assistance, USAID should work closely with its local, interagency and international counterparts as coordinated efforts are more likely to result in system-wide reform than those undertaken by any single entity. In addition, USAID should seek ways to align efforts across a region to prevent successful efforts in one country from simply pushing the problem elsewhere.

INTRODUCTION

Drug Trafficking as a Development Challenge

Drug trafficking – like other forms of transnational organized crime – threatens political, economic, and social development: it can foster corruption and violence, undermine rule of law and good governance, jeopardize economic growth, and pose potential public health risks. Failure to address this growing threat risks undermining USAID’s investments and thwarting U.S. Government objectives in Africa.

Indeed, drug trafficking poses a clear challenge to the four objectives laid out in the “U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa:”¹

- strengthen democratic institutions;
- spur economic growth, trade, and investment;
- advance peace and security; and
- promote opportunity and development.

Research conducted for this guide reveals how the drug trade undermines these goals both directly and indirectly. In Ghana, for example, drug money has supported the election of members of parliament, weakening their accountability and undermining democratic institutions. In Mozambique, the business community has complained of unfair competition from drug traffickers, whom it accuses of evading customs excises and container inspections. In Guinea-Bissau, the drug trade has exacerbated political instability, including the double assassination of President Joao Bernardo Nino Vieira and Chief of Defense Staff General Batista Tagame Na Wai. And in Kenya, increasing drug use is linked to robbery, Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and broken families.

Drug trafficking is yet another symptom of the underlying challenges confronting Africa. The weak judicial institutions, corruption, low wages, and unemployment that characterize many countries in the region provide environments conducive to a variety of illicit economic activities, including trafficking in drugs, arms, cigarettes, pharmaceuticals, timber, wildlife, minerals, and human beings. Criminal networks take advantage of these conditions to co-opt government officials and security officers and thereby minimize the risk of prosecution. Yet drug trafficking represents a particularly pernicious threat to development in many countries. Although precise figures of the volume and profits from drug trafficking are notoriously difficult to determine, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that West African criminal networks could have earned between \$1.8 and \$2.8 billion in cocaine sales in 2009,² in a region where the average annual gross domestic product (GDP) is \$5 billion and more than 55 percent of the population lives on less than a dollar per day.³ The high profits from the drug trade,⁴ particularly cocaine and heroin, can pay for high-level corruption, fund armed groups, and distort legitimate markets, and the drug use that

¹ The White House, [U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa](#), June 2012.

² UNODC, [World Drug Report 2011](#), 2011, 126.

³ World Bank, [“West Africa Facts and Figures.”](#)

⁴ Interdiction-focused counternarcotics efforts of “the war on drugs” have resulted in decreased supply despite growing demand, and thus inflated prices and high levels of profitability for the illegal trade. See, for example, Steve Rolles et al., [The Alternative World Drug Report: Counting the Costs of the War on Drugs](#), Count the Costs, June 26, 2012.

eventually accompanies the trade can lead to increased violence, the erosion of social capital and the breakdown of families and communities.⁵

The current and potential costs of illicit drug trafficking in Africa demand the attention of development professionals. At a minimum, development actors should undertake crime-sensitive programming that ensures their efforts do no harm. Where possible, development actors should consider longer-term investments in governance and addressing the impacts of drug trafficking to help contain the costs of drug trafficking to broader development goals.

Purpose of Document

In recognition of the increased drug trade in Africa, USAID's Africa Bureau initiated research in 2011 on the development causes and consequences of drug trafficking and potential programmatic responses. The resulting programming guide aims to help USAID, other U.S. Government personnel, and other development actors understand the relationship between drug trafficking and development assistance and seek ways to mitigate any negative impacts.

Historically, much of USAID experience with illicit drugs had focused on alternative livelihood programs in production countries such as Colombia or Afghanistan or citizen security programs in gang-affected transit countries such as Honduras; little analysis or programming had focused on the broader ramifications of the transshipment of drugs. To supplement the academic literature on drug trafficking and the small experience base among development organizations, the research team carried out case studies in Ghana, Kenya, the Mano River sub-region (Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia), and Mozambique. Although the research focused on heroin and cocaine trafficking, the analysis and resulting guidance can also inform programming related to trafficking in other illicit drugs.

The guidance draws lessons learned from USAID's counternarcotics-related initiatives to date and from the broader portfolio of related USAID programming in democracy and governance, peace and security, health, education, and economic growth. It also draws on lessons from other U.S. Government agencies and donor efforts to address drug trafficking. Drawing from these experiences as well as the four case studies and relevant literature, this guidance helps Missions think through the implications of drug trafficking for their programs and provides ideas and guidance for counternarcotics-related programming.

Given the increasing evidence of drug trafficking across the African continent, USAID officials need to consider the impact of drug trafficking on their programs and of their programs on drug trafficking. To illustrate, corruption related to drug trafficking may undermine capacity building programs in the judiciary just as decentralization efforts could inadvertently strengthen local drug barons and lead to their capture of local governments. At a minimum, this programming guide helps Missions understand the relationship between drug trafficking and development assistance and seek ways to mitigate any negative impacts. Where foreign policy interests and assistance allocations permit, the guide also helps Missions implement programming targeted to counter the flow of drugs (e.g., anticorruption efforts or judicial reform) or programming to ameliorate the impacts of drug

⁵ See UNODC, *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, 2010, 16 for a comparison of costs associated with different forms of illicit trafficking. See International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), "I. Illicit Drugs and Development," *Report of the International Narcotics Control Board 2002*, November 2002 for a discussion of how cocaine and heroin trafficking can destabilize the state, economy and civil society.

trafficking, such as demand reduction programs including prevention and treatment. Using the guide, Missions can examine opportunities for incorporating such considerations into current or future USAID programming.

This programming guidance is intended for use by USAID officials and implementing partners. The document may also be useful to other parts of the U.S. Government, including the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice and the National Security Staff. Although the document contains some references to USAID policies and procedures, it also will have relevance to other donors and development actors. Each section of the guide includes analysis of the current situation in Africa, development program implications, and key considerations for Missions to apply to their specific context.

This guide first focuses on identifying the development challenge in Africa. The second section addresses the political economy analysis that will inform what type of programming is appropriate and which actors are appropriate partners for development efforts. The third section presents programming options to: (1) counter drug trafficking, (2) ameliorate its impacts, and (3) incorporate crime sensitivity. The fourth section outlines key findings and lessons learned. Three appendices contain more in-depth guidance on conducting a counternarcotics assessment, a sample assessment interview protocol, and a list of sources consulted in this research.

Research Focus on Cocaine and Heroin Trafficking

Although trafficking in cannabis, khat,⁶ and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS)⁷ also takes place in Africa, research for this report focused on cocaine and heroin trafficking. Given the high volumes and profits currently associated with their trade, cocaine and heroin trafficking present the primary risk to development at the time of this research.⁸ High volumes and profits increase the need and ability to pay for corruption leading to more extensive corruption and corrosion of governance. Research for this report found drug-related corruption at high levels of government in all of the countries examined.

High volumes and profits also are likely to fuel more violence than trafficking in other illicit drugs.⁹ Violence arises from rivalries between drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) or distribution networks, and from state opposition to well-resourced and well-armed drug traffickers. Trafficking proceeds can also fund insurgents and violent extremists, such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which likely exacts tolls to provide “security” to the traffickers.^{10, 11} Although levels of

⁶ Although khat, a plant native to Eastern Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, is legal in many African countries, it is included in this listing of illicit drugs as it contains the psychoactive ingredients cathine and cathinone. These substances have been under international control through the UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1988. These substances are illegal in Kenya and South Africa as well as most western countries, including the United States. For more information, please see World Health Organization Expert Committee on Drug Dependence’s [Critical Review of Khat](#), 2006.

⁷ Amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) are a group of substances comprised of synthetic stimulants including amphetamine, methamphetamine, methcathinone, and ecstasy-group substances.

⁸ INCB, 2002, 1.

⁹ Davin O’Regan, “[Cocaine and Instability in Africa: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean](#),” *Africa Security Brief*, No. 5, July 2010, 4.

¹⁰ See, for example, Wolfram Lacher, “[Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region](#),” *The Carnegie Papers*, September 2012; and Peter Gastrow, “[Termites at Work: A Report on Transnational Organized Crime and State Erosion in Kenya – Comprehensive Research Findings](#),” New York: International Peace Institute, October 2011.

¹¹ It is important to note that these “tolls” apply to the transportation of any manner of licit and illicit goods moving through the region. In addition, other criminal activities (e.g., kidnapping) serve as the primary source of finance for AQIM.

violence around drug trafficking in Africa are still low overall, there are pockets of violence and some worrying trends.

Drug markets are not static, however, and other illicit drugs may become more of a development concern in the future. In particular, emerging evidence suggests that ATS trafficking may be increasing in Africa beyond South Africa and should be carefully watched.¹² Despite the research focus on heroin and cocaine trafficking, the analysis and resulting guidance can also inform programming related to trafficking in other illicit drugs.

Overview of Cocaine and Heroin Trafficking in Africa

In the mid-2000s, Africa saw a notable increase in drug trafficking. In the cocaine trade, traffickers increasingly began using West Africa, and to a lesser extent Southern and East Africa, as transshipment hubs for smuggling South American cocaine to Europe. In the heroin trade, traffickers increasingly began using East Africa as a hub for moving heroin from Asia to Europe and other regions (see Figure 1). Like other transit locations,¹³ local drug use has risen along African trafficking routes, and Africa is also becoming a destination for cocaine and heroin flows.¹⁴ By most conservative estimates, some 13 percent of the cocaine seized in Europe in 2009 transited via West Africa;¹⁵ however, many assessments arrive at a much higher proportion, and perhaps a more common calculation is that up to one third of the shipments arriving in Europe have been transiting through West Africa in recent years. Moreover, the UNODC estimates that 40 to 45 tons of heroin flowed into Africa in 2009 out of global flows of 460 to 480 tons,¹⁶ giving Africa a nine percent share in global heroin trafficking.

¹² For more information, please see UNODC, [West Africa 2012 ATS Situation Report](#), June 2012.


¹³ See, for example, Emily Schmall, “[Once Just a Stopover for Drug Traffickers, Argentina Has Now Become a Destination](#),” *The New York Times*, July 7, 2012.

¹⁴ The drug trade includes countries where drugs are grown or manufactured (producer countries), those where drugs are trafficked (transit countries), and those where drugs are consumed (destination countries). Countries may fall into one, two or all three of these categories.

¹⁵ UNODC, [The Transatlantic Cocaine Market: Research Paper](#), April 2011, 18.

¹⁶ UNODC, [World Drug Report 2011](#), 40 and 45 respectively.

FIGURE 1. MAP OF GLOBAL COCAINE AND HEROIN TRAFFICKING &



Sources: Ricardo Pravettoni, *"Intense Traffic. The Routes for Drug in Africa."* Trans. Silvia Dotti. *Internazionale*. 84. 23 June 2010; UNODC, *The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment*, July 2011.

International market conditions explain the increased drug trafficking in Africa. In the cocaine market, decreased demand in the U.S., increased demand and profitability in Europe, and increased interdiction on direct shipping routes from South America to Europe prompted cocaine traffickers to diversify itineraries and ship cocaine to Europe via Africa. In the heroin market, pressure on traditional trafficking routes prompted traffickers to reopen the African route to Europe that had been very active in the 1980s and early 1990s. Increasing heroin use in parts of Africa has also stimulated increased flows to the continent.¹⁷

Most countries in the region share characteristics that make them vulnerable to drug trafficking. These include widespread corruption, weak law enforcement and judicial systems, and limited border controls. Specific characteristics that draw traffickers to some countries in the region and not others include their geography, notably their strategic location on a trade route and along the coast; infrastructure, particularly the existence of air and sea ports; the existence of smuggling networks and routes that can be tapped to move drugs; and connections with African facilitators.

Although much of the reporting focuses on cocaine transiting through West Africa, the issue of drug trafficking in Africa is much more widespread, implicating security actors and political and economic elites in countries throughout the continent. As drug trafficking persists and potentially

¹⁷ UNODC, *Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment*, July 2011.

grows, the illicit profits and transactions will further corrode governance and potentially contribute to political instability and weakened economies. In addition, rapid urbanization and a youth bulge alongside increased flows of drugs raise significant concerns about increasing levels of problematic drug use, violence and gang activity across the continent.

IDENTIFYING THE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE OF DRUG TRAFFICKING IN AFRICA

When faced with drug trafficking in a country, USAID Missions need first to understand whether, how and to what extent drug trafficking presents a development challenge.¹⁸ Missions should consider the impact of drug trafficking in terms of the threat to stability, the corrosion of governance and the socio-economic costs of the trade.

Threats to Stability

Drug trafficking poses a threat to stability when rivals fight for control of the market, trafficking proceeds finance activities of other violent actors (e.g., violent extremists or armed rebel groups), corruption eviscerates security institutions, or counternarcotics efforts threaten drug traffickers. Guinea-Bissau most clearly illustrates the threat posed by political elites fighting for control of the market. The drug trade is largely believed to have at least partially motivated the double assassination of President Joao Bernardo Nino Vieira and Chief of Defense Staff General Batista Tagame Na Wai in March 2009¹⁹ and the 2011 coup attempt by Bubo na Tchuto, a U.S. Department of Treasury-designated drug kingpin and former Head of the Navy.²⁰ The instability stemmed not from conflict between the government and a non-state actor but rather from the complicity in drug trafficking of senior government officials who fought for control of the sizeable trade within the state. High-level complicity presents a particularly difficult environment for development assistance to succeed in directly countering drug trafficking. In this context, programming to counter drug trafficking would focus on developing political will, supporting credible actors working to address the issue, and promoting reform to professionalize the military and/or build credible and effective civilian control of the military.

An additional threat to peace and security from drug trafficking in Africa arises from the link to other illicit activities. The transportation, communication, and logistics networks used in drug trafficking can facilitate other illicit trafficking, with linkages apparent to trafficking in arms, persons, stolen vehicles, lumber, and minerals.²¹ Drug traffickers often engage with African “fixers” who have long been coordinating logistical arrangements to illegally transport a wide variety of goods to also facilitate the transportation and storage of hard drugs. In addition, drug trafficking can provide revenue to insurgent or terrorist groups and contribute to instability in places where traffickers, terrorists and insurgents operate.

¹⁸ The programming guide can be applied to essentially any unit of analysis from a specific community to a multi-country region. For the sake of brevity and simplicity, this guide uses “country” as the unit of analysis throughout.

¹⁹ See, for example, “Guinea-Bissau: Mutually Assured Destruction,” *Africa Confidential*, vol. 50, no. 5, March 6, 2009.

²⁰ “Poder military na Guiné e ‘permeável ao narcotráfico,’” *Lusa*, May 17, 2012 as cited in International Crisis Group, “[Beyond Turf Wars: Managing the Post-Coup Transition in Guinea-Bissau](#),” Africa Report No. 190, August 17, 2012.

²¹ Douglas Farah, “[Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized States: Emerging Alliances](#),” *PRISM* 2, no. 3, June 2011.

In Africa, drug trafficking in the Sahel represents the most significant threat to stability arising from rivalries and links among illicit activities. The Sahel has long been home to a variety of illicit smuggling networks and although drug trafficking should not be isolated as the sole, or even primary, cause of instability in this region, it is most certainly a contributing factor. Clashes related to drug trafficking in the region involve a variety of actors, including AQIM, Tuareg groups, Sahrawi traffickers linked to the Western Sahara-separatist group the Polisario, and local smuggling networks.²² In some instances these actors may be working in coordination with the government. For example, in January 2010, tensions between an armed group that seized a “large cocaine shipment transported by government-aligned Lamhar and Imghad smugglers” led to a kidnapping in the Gao Region.²³ The type of violence arising from rivalries or competing interests between illicit actors in Mali serves as a cautionary tale for other parts of the continent.

Although limited concrete evidence exists that AQIM directly engages in drug trafficking, a United Nations assessment in December 2011 found that “terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, have begun to form alliances with drug traffickers and other criminal syndicates...”²⁴ It is likely that AQIM and other armed groups in the Sahel exact tolls to provide “security” to drug traffickers moving through areas under their control.²⁵ The leaders of the AQIM-splinter group, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), including Cherif Ould Taher and Mohamed Ould Ahmed “Rouji,”²⁶ are “known to be drug traffickers involved in the drug trade in the Sahel and southern Algeria”²⁷ and Mokhtar Belmokhtar, former AQIM commander and current leader of an al-Qaeda affiliate called “Those Who Sign With Blood,” is a significant smuggler in the region of a variety of goods including cigarettes and illicit drugs.²⁸

The complexity of the actors involved in the Sahel and their various relationships to drug trafficking underscore that drug trafficking is an important factor to consider when assessing the conflict. In places with levels of instability as high as the current situation in northern Mali, development assistance, if it is still being provided at all, can do little to directly counter the threat of drug trafficking. It is important, however, to ensure that those delivering humanitarian and development assistance are aware of the issue and work to incorporate crime sensitivity into any programming that does occur. As the security situation improves, related programming to assist the transition from conflict must also explicitly consider the factors that facilitated drug trafficking and the potential role that continued illicit economic activities may play in the transition process. For

²² See, for example, “[Sahel: A Clash Between Drug Traffickers Thursday Killed 5 People](#),” *Ennahar Online*, May 28, 2011; “[West Africa: Polisario’s Involvement in Drug Trafficking in the Sahel Exposed by U.S. Experts](#),” *Maghreb Arabe Presse for AllAfrica.com*, September 15, 2011; and Martin van Vliet, “[The Challenges of Retaking Northern Mali](#),” *West Point Combating Terrorism Center*, November 28, 2012.

²³ Lacher, 2012.

²⁴ United Nations Secretary General. “[West Africa, Sahel Face “Toxic Brew” of Crime, Drug Trafficking, Piracy, Terror: ‘We Must’ Do More to Keep the Situation From Escalating, Says Secretary General](#),” United Nations: Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, February 21, 2012.

²⁵ See, for example, Lacher, 2012 and Lamine Chikhi, “[Algeria Says Al-Qaeda Guards Sahara Drug Smugglers](#),” *Reuters*, February 22, 2010.

²⁶ Lacher, 2012.

²⁷ United Nations Security Council, “[QE.M.134.12. Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa \(MUJAO\)](#),” United Nations Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 2012.

²⁸ “[Those Who Sign With Blood, Masked Battalion/el-Moulethamine Battalion: Jama’at Tawhid Wal Jihad fi Garbi Afriqqiya \(‘Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa,’ MUJWA/MUJAO\)](#),” *Global Security.org*, January 17, 2013; and Christina Hellmich, “[Algeria: Islamist Threat to Europe is Overstated](#),” *The Guardian*, January 22, 2013.

example, post-conflict governance programming in Mali should seek to ensure that drug traffickers and other illicit economic actors do not continue to “control” the region either as part of or separate from the official government structures. The instability in northern Mali also highlights the importance of efforts to assess and respond to issues of instability, including those related to drug trafficking, before conflict escalates.

Although the instability in Guinea-Bissau and Mali represent the most acute drug-related threats to peace and security in Africa, attention should also be given to the potential for drug trafficking to support other terrorist or armed groups. For example, there is concern, but limited evidence, that violent extremists operating along the transit routes in East Africa, notably al-Shabaab, are using drug trafficking proceeds to fund their activities.²⁹ In addition to the Polisario and rebel groups discussed in the context of northern Mali, other armed groups also have engaged in drug trafficking. For example, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia operated its own drug routes during the Liberian civil war³⁰ and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance has long exchanged cannabis for weapons.³¹ Insurgent groups may also supply drugs to soldiers to improve their effectiveness in battle, as the Revolutionary United Front did in Sierra Leone.³²

Insurgent groups and terrorist organizations operating in producer countries such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Taliban may also generate revenue by transporting drugs through Africa. For example, in 2011, five people were arrested in Liberia and charged with narco-terrorism after a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operation. They agreed to store multi-ton shipments in Benin of what they believed to be Taliban-owned heroin and then transport a portion of the drugs to Ghana for transfer via commercial airplane to the United States for distribution. Some defendants also agreed to sell multi-kilogram quantities of cocaine and arms to the informants they believed to be members of the Taliban.³³

Complicity among security actors can also pose a threat to stability by corroding the very institutions designed to promote stability and protect against such threats. When drug money purchases complicity among law enforcement, border protection, and military personnel, it undermines their professionalism and erodes their credibility. Senior security and law enforcement officials have been implicated in drug trafficking across the continent; most notably, Jackie Selebi, former South African police chief and International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) head, was convicted of narco-corruption in 2010 after taking bribes from drug traffickers to ignore their activities.³⁴ In Mali, an army officer with close ties to then head of state security, Lieutenant Colonel Lamana Ould Bou, arranged the movement of a large shipment of cocaine in exchange for payment.³⁵

Likely due to the relatively limited opposition threatening their activities compared to other regions, DTOs in Africa typically do not use violence to conduct their operations, except in places where there has been opposition to drug trafficking. For example, drug traffickers have attacked security sector officials who are not complicit in the trade as witnessed by the rise in killings of police

²⁹ Gastrow, 2011.

³⁰ Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War*, New York, NY: NYU Press, 2006, 170.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 169.

³² Michael G. Wessells, *Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.

³³ U.S. Department of Justice, “[Member Of International Narcotics Trafficking Conspiracy Pleads Guilty In Manhattan Federal Court](#),” U.S. Department of Justice Press Release 12-336, November 8, 2012.

³⁴ “[Jackie Selebi: South Africa’s Ex-Police Chief To Be Freed](#),” BBC News Africa, July 20, 2012.

³⁵ Lacher, 2012, 11.

officers in Mozambique in the past few years,³⁶ the murder of a non-complicit police officer in Kenya,³⁷ and reported intimidation of police in Benin.³⁸ Similarly, in Ghana late President Atta Mills made linkages between a spate of murders and drug trafficking and stated that, “the magnitude of wealth derived from the trade allows drug barons to buy almost anything they desire, including ‘contract killers.’”³⁹

Drug traffickers have also struck out at journalists exposing their operations and civil society members advocating a crackdown on trafficking. In Kenya, for example, traffickers issued death threats against journalists investigating cocaine trafficking and threw acid in the face of an activist working to keep drug money out of politics.⁴⁰ An increase in opposition to drug trafficking may result in an increase in violence. Development actors should implement a “do no harm” principle to ensure that assistance does not put our partners at greater risk. The risk of such violence also advocates for early development interventions to support good governance and prevent traffickers from gaining strongholds in African countries. In instances where the violence is not avoided, development actors can support citizen security programs similar to USAID’s efforts in the Latin America and Caribbean region to mitigate the negative impacts of drug-related violence.⁴¹

Corrosion of Governance

The corrosive effects of drug trafficking on governance are widespread and give serious cause for concern. The impact of transnational organized crime on the quality of governance arguably poses one of the greatest risks of drug trafficking.⁴² A primary threat arises from corruption and the infiltration of state institutions by drug traffickers. The large profits associated with drug trafficking can pay for bribes, campaign contributions, and political campaigns in the case of traffickers running for elected office. For example, West Africa’s leading academic researcher on the drug trade, Kwesi Aning, and the Ghanaian Narcotics Control Board (NACOB) Director Yaw Akrasi have both spoken out publicly on the issue of drug profits financing election campaigns.⁴³ As *Illicit* author Moisés Naím notes, “it is virtually guaranteed that where there are substantial drug profits, there will be corruption and official complicity—very often at the highest levels.”⁴⁴ Larger profits both in absolute terms and in comparison to alternative sources of wealth generation suggest greater potential for illicit influence. Profits amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars every year can exert substantial influence especially in less developed countries where government salaries are lower, alternative sources of revenues and influence are smaller, and rule of law is weaker than in wealthier countries.

³⁶ Loro Horta, “[The Bite of Mamba: Mozambique’s Bloody War against Crime](#),” Center for Strategic International Studies, 2008.

³⁷ Interviews conducted as part of Phyllis Dininio and Brooke Stearns Lawson, “Narcotics and Development Assistance in Kenya Field Assessment,” prepared by Management Systems International for USAID, December 2011.

³⁸ Interviews conducted as part of a U.S. Government interagency assessment in Benin, April 2012.

³⁹ “[Recent Cases of Cold-Blooded Murder of Ghanaians](#),” Press Release: Office of Prof. John Evans Atta Mills on GhanaWeb, July 11, 2007.

⁴⁰ Interviews conducted for Dininio and Stearns Lawson, 2011.

⁴¹ See, for example, Gabriela Chojkier, “[Ask the Expert: Enrique Roig, Coordinator for Central America Regional Security Initiative \(CARSI\) at USAID](#),” *USAID Impact Blog*, May 31, 2012.

⁴² Jan van Dijk, “[Mafia Markers: Assessing Organized Crime and its Impact Upon Societies](#),” *Trends in Organized Crime*, vol. 10: 39-56, 2007.

⁴³ “[Drug Money ‘Tainting Ghana Poll](#),” *BBC News*, October 28, 2008; and Kwadwo Anim, “[Sorogho Urges NACOB Boss Not to Bow to Public Pressure](#),” Ghana MPS, nd. See also, Kwesi Aning, “Comprehending West Africa’s Security Dilemmas: State Fragility, Narco-Terrorism and Oil Politics,” Forthcoming.

⁴⁴ Moisés Naím, *Illicit*, New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2005, 84-5.

As a first step in defining the challenge to governance, therefore, Missions should understand the volume and estimated profits generated from drug trafficking in their country. UNODC's annual publication *World Drug Report*⁴⁵ may contain the relevant information, or a search for other data may be necessary. In the Kenya case study, the assessment team was able to use UNODC data to generate a current estimate of \$175 to \$182 million per year in profits from cocaine and heroin trafficking,⁴⁶ whereas in the Mozambique case study, UNODC data were insufficient to do so, but the assessment team could refer to an academic's earlier estimate of \$60 million in annual profits from the trade, which provides a ballpark figure for current profits assuming stable market conditions over the period.⁴⁷ With 2011 GDP of \$33.6 billion in Kenya and \$12.8 billion in Mozambique, profits in both countries represent roughly 0.5 percent of GDP. In total, the UNODC has estimated that the profits reaped by West African groups from cocaine trafficking in 2009 could be between \$1.8 billion and \$2.8 billion.⁴⁸

Throughout Africa, DTOs use corruption of government officials as a key tactic for carrying out their activities. The question is often not whether DTOs have corrupted government officials, but rather how high the corruption goes and how widely it is spread. Drug traffickers target different levels of government, from lower-level officials such as customs agents or police officers, to mid-level officials such as mayors or judges, to high-level officials such as presidents, ministers or members of parliament. Corruption at lower levels usually targets the immediate application of laws and procedures within an office. For example, twelve members of Ghana's Narcotics Control Board were arrested for assisting drug traffickers in transporting drugs through the country. They admitted to charging traffickers \$1,500 per kilogram of cocaine that passed through the Kokota International Airport;⁴⁹ however, the Accra circuit threw out the case against the ten officers.⁵⁰

Corruption at higher levels may involve the interference in the application of laws and procedures from outside an office or the distortion of the laws and procedures themselves. For example, a Kenyan parliamentary committee cleared the Charterhouse Bank of money laundering allegations and ordered its re-opening in a challenge to the Central Bank's handling of the case.⁵¹ Corruption generally targets higher levels of the state apparatus when it involves relatively large drug shipments: larger-scale trafficking entails greater complexity, visibility, and risk calling for greater protection,⁵² but also larger profits make that protection affordable. For example, cocaine trafficking via containers or transport planes involves more complex and risky arrangements that require higher-level facilitation than does trafficking via individual mules, although coordinating a group of mules on one flight may entail more organization. Even as traffickers target higher-level officials, they

⁴⁵ UNODC compiles its estimates on drug production, trafficking, and consumption from the Annual Reports Questionnaire (ARQ) filled out by UN member states, government reports, international seizure data (collected by INTERPOL, the World Customs Organization, and Europol), and the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of the U.S. Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, among other sources.

⁴⁶ See Dininio and Stearns Lawson, 2011 for the calculations.

⁴⁷ Joseph Hanlon, "[Drugs are Now Mozambique's Biggest Business](#)," *Metical*, June 28, 2001.

⁴⁸ UNODC, *World Drug Report 2011*, 126.

⁴⁹ Mary Mensah, "[NACOB Chairman Confirms Arrest of 12](#)," *Daily Graphic*, August 24, 2011.

⁵⁰ Byron Ampofo Akuffo, "[Court Frees 10 NACOB Officials Arrested in 2011 on Drug Charges](#)," *GHBUSINESSWEEK*, November 6, 2012.

⁵¹ Peter Opiyo, "[CBK Governor Summoned over Bank](#)," *Standard Digital*, October 25 2012.

⁵² McGuire, Peter L., "[Narcotics Trafficking in West Africa: A Governance Challenge](#)," *The Pardee Papers*, No. 9, March 2010, 8-9.

continue to direct corruption efforts at lower levels of government, too, to facilitate the logistics necessary to transport the drugs without detection. Corruption at higher levels of government is more distorting to notions of responsiveness, accountability, and equity and is harder to counter.

While it occurs at different levels of government and can involve the application as well as the formulation of laws, corruption can also vary by the role of the corrupt official. Most often, corruption entails principal-agent transactions in which drug traffickers are the principals and government officials are their agents, misusing government offices in exchange for money. The extent of the corruption and implication of government officials can go so deep as to be considered infiltration, however, as in the case of Guinea-Bissau. In this case, government officials' involvement reached such a high level that they, themselves, are considered to be drug traffickers. Infiltration represents the more pernicious manifestation of trafficking as the interests of illicit power structures dominate more broadly across state policies rather than just in specific transactions. Assessment teams found individuals in high government positions complicit in drug trafficking in Kenya, notably in Parliament and the Ministry of Transport and in Ghana, notably in Parliament. Sierra Leonean Vice President Sam Sumana, who has been linked to a variety of illicit activities including a corruption affair known as Timbergate, was briefly named, but not arrested, in the 2009 cocaine scandal.⁵³ In the Gambia, the former police chief, Ensa Badjie, and two former senior army officers were convicted of drug trafficking.⁵⁴ And in Mali, the 2009 "Air Cocaine" episode in which a large shipment of cocaine was transported across the desert from a Boeing 727 that landed in the northern village of Tarkint implicated the mayor of Tarkint and close advisor to the President, Bab ould Cheikh.

In addition to politicians being implicated in drug trafficking, our research found that often close relatives of senior officials are involved in drug trafficking. For example, Ousmane Conte, the son of the late Guinean President Lansana Conte, publicly confessed on television to his involvement in the cocaine trade⁵⁵ and was designated a presidentially-designated drug kingpin in 2010. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, the Aviation Minister's brother was one of the masterminds behind a shipment of 700 kilograms of cocaine at Lungi airport and convicted of drug trafficking.⁵⁶ In Mauritania, a former president's nephew and the son of another former president were arrested in connection with a 2007 cocaine trafficking incident.⁵⁷ Similarly, according to Ghana media reports, Raymond Amankwa, the brother-in-law of Ghana's former attorney general and New Patriotic Party presidential candidate Nano Akufo-Addo, was arrested in Brazil for drug trafficking.⁵⁸ Evidence of specific individuals was not provided in Kenya, but interviewees alleged that family members of senior government officials were also involved in drug trafficking.

Although cases of corrupted government officials complicit in drug trafficking in Africa abound, it is difficult to understand how widespread such corruption is in a given country. This makes it particularly challenging for development actors to "do no harm" by avoiding programming that

⁵³ Mansaray, Issa A. "[The End of Vice President Sam Sumana's Power](#)," *The Africa Paper*, September 29, 2012.

⁵⁴ Agence France Presse, "[Gambia Jails Ex-Police Chief for Drug Trafficking](#)," *The Daily Nation*, January 21, 2013.

⁵⁵ "[Guinea: Ex-president's son Ousmane Conte Freed on Bail](#)," *BBC News Africa*, July 16, 2010.

⁵⁶ Jimmy Kandeh and David Hirschmann, "Sierra Leone Democracy and Governance Assessment Final Report," prepared by Management Systems International for USAID, 2011.

⁵⁷ Lacher, 2012, 10.

⁵⁸ "[Ghanaian Drug Baron Arrested in Brazil](#)," *GhanaWeb*, May 19, 2008.

bolsters the power of government officials complicit in drug trafficking. It also challenges the ability of development actors to identify opportunities to support governance efforts that would effectively address issues of narco-corruption. In many instances, addressing narco-corruption may best be done as part of larger efforts designed to broadly address issues of corruption and impunity throughout the government.

The incursion of drug money into the political system exacerbates existing governance challenges and weakens nascent democratic cultures. Drug money, backed up with intimidation and violence, invokes deviations from rules and regulations and corrodes public institutions generating inconsistent administration, perverse incentives, and inefficiencies. The existence of corrupt networks is often likened to a secret fraternity, leaving those officials on the outside unsure of its boundaries and operations and contributing to a climate of uncertainty and fear within the government. As a result of these distortions, service provision deteriorates and public cynicism grows.

Drug money also skews political competition, giving advantage to capital and the narrow interests of drug traffickers over formal state institutions and the broader public. The distribution of drug money within and across political parties is an important factor to examine. Political competition will be less skewed where politicians from different parties have access to the revenues, as in Kenya, and more skewed where drug profits flow disproportionately to one political party, as in Mozambique. Regardless of whether drug profits accrue to one or multiple parties, however, these resources skew electoral competition by pricing out individuals not complicit in the trade.⁵⁹ Over time, skewed electoral competition could lead those disadvantaged by the corrupt system to either disengage from the political process or to push for change outside the system and possibly resort to violence.

Another threat to governing justly and democratically arises from the gifts or services that drug traffickers may provide to local populations to counter resistance. Although drug traffickers have typically used this tactic when they have crops or consumer markets to protect in a given territory, they may also use it to ease transit operations. Gifts or services can increase the popular acceptance of illicit trafficking and thereby undermine good governance and rule of law. In Kenya and Ghana, for example, some politicians linked with drug trafficking invest in community projects and hand out cash during community visits in order to maintain the support of their constituents.⁶⁰ Many observers believe that Eric Amoateng, a Ghanaian Member of Parliament now serving a sentence for drug trafficking in the U.S., would be re-elected without difficulty if he stood for election after release from jail.⁶¹ In much of Africa, politicians routinely provide money, goods and services to community members, particularly around elections. The general acceptance of this practice makes it difficult to address the issue of drug money financing politics through development efforts.

⁵⁹ Although drug money could provide a small corrective to a skewed system by facilitating the participation of those previously marginalized in the political system, in most cases it will skew the system further.

⁶⁰ Interviews conducted for Dininio and Stearns Lawson, 2011 and Stephen Ellis, Will Reno and Brooke Stearns Lawson, "Narcotics and Development Assistance in Ghana Field Assessment," prepared by Management Systems International for USAID, September 2012. Although the practice of providing money or gifts to voters around elections is common practice in many places in Africa, interviewees indicated that the politicians involved in drug trafficking may give constituents these gifts more often and/or in larger sums.

⁶¹ Interviews conducted for Ellis, Reno, and Stearns Lawson, 2012.

Socio-Economic Impacts

When the drug trade is linked with violence, instability and weakened rule of law, economic growth may decline as a result of higher risks and lower investment. One way to approximate the extent of this cost is through businesses' perception of the cost of organized crime in a country as reported in the World Economic Forum "Global Competitiveness Report." In Africa, it is unclear the extent to which instability and weakened rule of law have deterred investors, however, this was presented as a concern by interviewees in both Ghana and Kenya.

Even in the absence of instability, drug trafficking can destabilize the economy in several ways. First, inflows of illicit profits may inflate the currency and make legitimate exports less competitive, which is known as the Dutch disease.^{62,63} Second, drug traffickers may evade customs excises at the same time that their containers evade inspection, which allows them to underprice their competitors and push them out of the market. Such unfair competition was a particular concern made public by the business community in Mozambique.⁶⁴ Third, to launder money, drug traffickers may invest in real estate or front operations such as hotels, which can contribute to disproportionately expanded financial, real estate and construction industries and elevated real estate prices, increasing the costs of business across all sectors of the economy. Interviewees in Ghana, Liberia, Kenya, and Sierra Leone raised concerns about inflated real estate prices due to laundering drug proceeds in this sector. Finally, the illicit gains from drug trafficking may result in investment in non-productive sectors, encourage "conspicuous consumption at the expense of long-term development," and exacerbate unequal income distribution.⁶⁵

Efforts to ameliorate these economic impacts largely center around creating a financial and regulatory environment that supports legitimate business development and restricts illicit economic activities and money laundering. For example, development assistance could support passing and applying anti-money laundering legislation and safeguards based on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),⁶⁶ banking regulations, greater oversight into real estate and other sector development, and tighter regulation of businesses, investments and financial flows. Arguably the best approach to ameliorating the economic impacts of drug trafficking is to invest in governance efforts that deter DTOs from operating in a given country.

The social impacts of drug trafficking stem largely from the increased retail market and local consumption that the drug trade almost inevitably promotes in transit countries, even where local populations are poor. Retailers are able to offer their product in forms that their consumers can afford, such as crack or marijuana cigarettes laced with cocaine. Evidence from the case studies confirms this: problematic drug use is increasing along trade routes and affecting people with divergent backgrounds ranging from uneducated former child soldiers to private school students from relatively well-off families. In Africa, consumption of hard drugs is more common in urban or coastal areas. Interviewees in Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, and Sierra Leone indicated that

⁶² INCB, 2002.

⁶³ Douglas Keh, *Drug Money in a Changing World: Economic Reform and Criminal Finance*, UNODC, 1996.

⁶⁴ Marcelo Mosse, "MBS: The Fall of the Mask," *Mocambique para todos website*, June 3, 2010.

⁶⁵ INCB, 2002, 5.

⁶⁶ The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has issued 40 recommendations, which are, in effect base requirements for establishing the legal, regulatory, and enforcement framework and capacity necessary to deter illicit finance. The FATF also publishes reports from peer reviews assessing compliance with the recommendations and produces a public "black list" of countries with grossly deficient systems. For more information, please see www.fatf-gafi.org.

cocaine, including crack cocaine, and heroin are available on the streets, and the *Report of the International Narcotics Control Board* states that there is increasing level of cocaine and heroin abuse in Africa.⁶⁷ For example, the UNODC estimates that there are more than 200,000 heroin users in Kenya.⁶⁸

Problematic drug use is associated with poor health, low life expectancy, lack of productive employment, and domestic violence. It can also increase the transmission of HIV/AIDS due to sharing of needles among intravenous drug users, commercial sex work (undertaken as a means of financing drug consumption), and risky behaviors related to lowered inhibitions. Problematic drug use is generally seen as a mental health issue, and medical facilities are severely lacking in Africa. Some residential facilities for drug users are available, but they serve men and boys almost exclusively. In many countries, mental health units in hospitals are the only residential treatment options for drug users.

Drug consumption can also affect education and youth. Hard drugs may be distributed in schools and could result in even lower school enrollment, attendance, and completion. This presents a threat for youth who are susceptible to peer pressure or those who feel marginalized and lack hope for the future.

Another negative social impact of drug trafficking is the street crime linked to local drug sales and consumption, including thefts by drug users to pay for their drugs. Although levels of drug consumption and associated street crime are still relatively low in most parts of Africa, there are pockets of growing drug use and crime and the potential for these to increase along trade routes. Assessment teams found that drug consumers reported committing crimes, particularly theft and even armed robbery, to be able to pay for their drugs in Ghana, Kenya and Liberia. The large number of unemployed youth and increased urbanization are cause for concern as increased demand for hard drugs could result in competition over the income-generating opportunities of selling drugs, which can lead to violence among different individuals or groups. Limited competition in urban retail markets and a relatively limited history of gangs mitigate the risk of gang-related violence at this time; however, South Africa, which has a more developed retail drug market and gangs involved in drug sales, may serve as a cautionary tale for the risks of growing retail markets on the continent. Development actors can play a critical role in mitigating the spread of problematic drug use and related criminality and violence through demand and harm reduction efforts including awareness and treatment programs.

Evaluating the Impact

There is no easy way to tabulate the impact of these various harms to development as the context will alter the salience of any individual threat. USAID Missions will need to make a subjective evaluation of the costs of the various harms identified in this guide. In general, however, the impact on peace and security objectives will often represent the most significant threat to development, followed by the impact on governance and the socio-economic impacts. The impact is influenced by the amount of drugs trafficked, the tactics pursued by drug traffickers, and the traffickers' links to other illicit actors. In general, the greater the volume of drug flows, the more serious is the problem.

⁶⁷ INCB, *Report of the International Narcotics Control Board 2010*, March 2011

⁶⁸ Mugumu Munene, "Drug Barons Getting 'Real Dirty,'" *Daily Nation*, May 8, 2010. This number is also used in the U.S. Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2012*, March 2012.

Larger amounts of drugs magnify the impact of the trade across development areas as described below. The four tactics traffickers pursue are intimidation/violence, corruption/infiltration, provision of gifts/services, and avoidance. Drug traffickers combine and vary these tactics depending on the opportunities and threats they face. In general, intimidation/violence and corruption/infiltration pose the greatest challenge to development followed by provision of gifts/services and lastly avoidance. The existence of cooperative relationships between drug traffickers and other illicit actors also tends to magnify the development challenge.

ANALYZING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

Understanding the development challenges presented by drug trafficking in a given country is an important first step in determining whether and how Missions should address this problem; however, it is equally important to analyze the political economy around drug trafficking. Political economy analysis “is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain, and transform these relationships over time.”⁶⁹ In terms of drug trafficking and development, political economy analysis essentially examines the incentives, influence and interests of various stakeholders to better understand the context for related programming.

Incentives and interests may create pockets of political will as well as individuals from within the government, business community and general populace committed to hampering any counternarcotics efforts. High-level political will in the government buttressed by strong support in civil society to combat drug trafficking is the optimal scenario, but not typical where high volumes, high profits, and high levels of corruption are found. Missions need to examine what reform options may be possible given the configuration of supporters and opponents.

Overview

As a starting point, a game theory approach can explain the basic interaction between drug traffickers and state enforcement. The goal of the drug trafficker is to maximize his profits and minimize his risks by choosing trafficking patterns that minimize the resource investments needed to avoid interdiction.⁷⁰ Often the most cost-effective tactic for drug traffickers is avoidance. For smaller quantities of drugs, traffickers conceal narcotics in the bodies or luggage of couriers. For larger amounts, traffickers conceal drugs within shipments of legitimate goods such as auto parts or in containers declared as rice, sugar, or some other substance that the drugs may resemble. Traffickers also use private airplanes and ships to minimize the risk of inspection. For example, when moving drugs by air, traffickers may develop private airstrips or use military or commercial airports. When moving goods by sea, they may move drugs from larger to smaller vessels offshore, and then unload drugs at private residences along the coast. Similarly, to avoid detection traffickers may use pervious border crossings, secondary roads and/or traveling at night to minimize detection. In addition to transportation costs, traffickers may have expenditures related to bribes, arms, intimidation, money laundering, or local expertise in transit and consumer countries in order to gain access to markets or cover their trail. The risk of arrest and imprisonment also presents non-

⁶⁹ Sarah Collinson (ed.), [*Power, Livelihoods and Conflict: Case Studies in Political Economy Analysis for Humanitarian Action*](#), Humanitarian Policy Group, February 2003.

⁷⁰ Daniel Mejia, “[The War on Illegal Drugs](#),” CESifo Venice Summer Institute, July 14-15, 2008.

monetary costs to drug trafficking.⁷¹

On the other hand, enforcement agencies aim to minimize their costs of fighting illegal traffickers while accomplishing some minimally acceptable level of interdiction and deterrence.⁷² They attempt to allocate the minimal amount of interdiction resources necessary to achieve the reputational and societal benefits of combatting drug trafficking, which demand for counternarcotics in civil society and the media can influence. The effectiveness of interdiction efforts against these trafficking activities can be increased in a number of ways. Enforcement agencies may invest in better and/or more boats, airplanes, or vehicles to cover open areas more thoroughly. They might attempt to improve their ability to monitor trafficking activities via improved radar, video, and other communications equipment. Training and equipment can also be provided at transportation hubs such as airports, bus or train stations, and major road points to detect and deter traffickers from using these methods of transit. Agencies also can conduct investigations into trafficking activities such as money laundering, bribery, extortion, and conspiracy, which can entail interrogations, cooperation with international agencies, or brute police force. At the same time, efforts can be made to improve the quality of the court system so that offenders are effectively prosecuted, with the goal of increasing deterrence. Development assistance can support regulations and anticorruption efforts that make it more costly for traffickers to avoid interdiction and arrest. They can also increase demand for such efforts by supporting civil society and the media in speaking out against drug trafficking.

One of the major goals of these enforcement efforts is to drive the cost of trafficking up to a point that is undesirable for traffickers. This can be accomplished by increasing the relative amount of illicit goods and proceeds seized, thus reducing profitability; however, an inadvertent consequence of a reduced supply of drugs might be higher prices in consumer countries, which then increases the profitability of drugs and creates incentive for more traffickers to enter the market.⁷³ Conversely, more enforcement may lead to less efficient, more costly trafficking methods, which could decrease the profitability of drug trafficking.⁷⁴ Demand-side efforts do not have the same divergent effects on prices – decreasing demand can reduce the price of drugs and increase the costs of searching for buyers.⁷⁵ Thus demand reduction efforts in Africa by development actors, combined with demand reduction efforts in the primary destination markets of Europe and the United States, play an important role in decreasing the profit incentives of drug trafficking and could potentially counteract the increased profits and drug prices resulting from successful interdiction efforts.

Sources of Support for/Tolerance of Drug Trafficking

Among the population, a lack of awareness of the dangers posed by drug trafficking and social acceptance of illicit economic activities result in tolerance of, or even support for drug trafficking.

⁷¹ Beau Kilmer, et al., “[Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico: Would Legalizing Marijuana in California Help?](#)” RAND Occasional Paper, 2010.

⁷² Daniel Mejia and Pascual Restrepo, “The War on Illegal Drugs in Producer and Consumer Countries: A Simple Analytic Framework,” Documentos CEDE 007960, Universidad de Los Andes CEDE, 2011.

⁷³ Daniel Mejia and Carlos Estaban Posada, “[Cocaine Production and Trafficking: What do We Know?](#)” *World Bank Working Paper WPS4618*, 2008.

⁷⁴ Beau Kilmer and Stijn Hoorens, “[Understanding the Illicit Drug Markets, Supply-Reduction Efforts and Drug-Related Crime in the European Union](#),” RAND Europe, 2010.

⁷⁵ Mejia and Posada, 2008.

Often the transportation of drugs is an “invisible threat.” Those not engaged in the trade may be unaware of its existence. In many instances, an influx of foreign nationals, notably Latin Americans for the cocaine trade, and/or relatively sudden, unexplained wealth by individuals are the first signs that raise questions among Africans, particularly journalists. Where local populations are aware of its existence, they often have a complaisant attitude toward the trade. Interviews conducted by assessment teams in this research found that local populations tend to view drug trafficking as not Africa’s problem, but the problem of consumers in North America and Europe.

In general, there is little stigma associated with wealth acquired through trafficking. In fact, the lifestyle choice is frequently celebrated in music, TV shows and movies influencing youth attitudes. Limited economic opportunities especially for the large number of unemployed youth, wealth disparity, the weakening of the traditional social fabric, and a norm of informal and unregulated economic activities may all reduce any stigma with money earned through drug trafficking. Some Africans idolize drug traffickers for their enormous wealth without questioning, or caring, how they acquired it. The “fast and easy” money and the material possessions it can afford conform to the flashy materialism or “bling bling” culture that is gaining increased appeal among some African youth. They may dream of such an escape from unemployment or marginalization for themselves and are grateful for any gifts or services provided by drug traffickers. Even in instances where individuals may look unfavorably on drug trafficking, they may see little incentive to speak out against an issue that they perceive as dangerous. Where drug traffickers do not face real punishment if caught, either due to government complicity or a lack of capacity, the population has even less incentive to oppose drug trafficking. In this context, development actors can help to create popular opposition to drug trafficking by increasing awareness of the social, political and economic threats posed by drug trafficking and building media and investigative journalism capacity.

In Africa, traffickers generally do not provide goods and services to the same extent seen in other places, most notably the Medellin cartel in Colombia; however, this tactic does appear to be a primary source of support for traffickers in the population where utilized. Politicians sharing drug-related wealth with constituents, as seen in the Kenya and Ghana case studies, is the most typical form of a “gift” and consistent with the patronage-based politics prevalent in Africa. For example, Ghanaian New Patriotic Party (NPP) Member of Parliament (MP) Eric Amoateng, who was arrested and convicted of drug trafficking charges in the U.S., helped to “finance the construction of eight streets and drainage systems in the town which is his constituency capital,”⁷⁶ sponsored students, provided tractors to plough fields, provided interest-free loans, supported the registration of young voters, and gave awards to high-performing schools and students.⁷⁷ According to Ghana media reports, after his arrest, volunteers worked on his maize farm to repel bushfires,⁷⁸ held a rally that included placards that read “Cocaine or No Cocaine Amoateng is Still Our MP,”⁷⁹ and named a street after him for his “contribution to the socio-economic development of the area.”⁸⁰ An NPP organizer, Simon Ameyaw, said that “Mr. Amoateng is a philanthropist who is always ready to assist individuals and communities.”⁸¹ Broad support gained in this way can secure the reelection of

⁷⁶ See, for example, “[Nkoranza Honours Amoateng](#),” *Myjoyonline.com*, September 14, 2011; and Camino Kavanaugh, “[Book Review: Africa and the War on Drugs by Neil Carrier and Gernot Klantschnig](#),” World Peace Foundation, January 15, 2013.

⁷⁷ Kavanaugh, 2013.

⁷⁸ Ghana News Agency, “[NPP Agents Volunteer to Harvest Amoateng’s Farm](#),” *ModernGhana.com*, January 26, 2006.

⁷⁹ “[Cocaine or No Cocaine, Amoateng is Still Our MP](#),” *Ghana Web*, March 28, 2006.

⁸⁰ “[Street Named After Amoateng](#),” *GhanaWeb.com*, April 10, 2007, 1.

⁸¹ Ghana News Agency, 2006, 1.

politicians complicit in drug trafficking and can lower the popular and political will to pursue counternarcotics reforms. Non-government actors involved in drug trafficking can also provide “gifts.” For example, MUJAO gained popular support in Gao by using its wealth, which is derived from a variety of illicit activities including drug trafficking, to distribute food to the people.⁸² In terms of service provision, drug traffickers in Africa have provided security in areas such as northern Mali.

The larger traffickers are often connected with legitimate trading businesses. Communities may support these businesspeople who provide jobs and economic opportunities. For example, Kenyan Naima Mohammed Nyakinyua, aka “Mama Leila,” is a Kenyan businesswoman with real estate investments, a beauty salon, a convenience store and a spare parts auto shop. A presidentially-designated drug kingpin, “Mama Leila” was arrested in Tanzania; however, her community questions whether she is involved in the drug trade and sees her primarily as a successful “rags to riches” story. She is known for being philanthropic and providing financial support to her community.⁸³ Links to legitimate business facilitate drug trafficking because they afford access to cargos and containers moving into the country as well as clearing, forwarding, and warehousing operations. In Mozambique, for example, presidentially-designated drug kingpin Mohamed Bashir Suleman uses his conglomerate Grupo MBS and other businesses (including the new Maputo shopping center) to conceal narco-trafficking operations, smuggling drugs from Pakistan via Dubai in containers carrying televisions, electrical equipment, cooking oil, and automobiles. In Kenya, four of five individuals named in Parliament as suspected of drug trafficking have links to shipping through Mombasa port. Legitimate businesses also provide a means to launder money and an explanation for drug traffickers’ wealth. Investments in hotels, real estate, restaurants, night clubs, shops, and exchange bureaus are typical means for laundering money. In Ghana, interviewees indicated that it is difficult to distinguish drug traffickers from other businesspeople and those returning from living and working overseas as the behaviors of the traffickers appear to mirror legitimate business elites.

As discussed in greater detail above, the primary incentives for government complicity or involvement in drug trafficking stem from the financial gains. In most instances the culture of corruption and impunity and the relatively weak rule of law present little risk to politicians. With little risk of consequences for their actions and relatively high potential for financial rewards, drug trafficking presents an opportunity for government officials. Even where government officials are not necessarily interested in engaging directly with DTOs, there are few incentives for them to actively combat it. Fear of challenging illicit power structures and competing political priorities may also result in tolerance of drug trafficking. In the Mano River sub-region countries, for example, interviews indicated that government and popular attention tended to focus on building fledgling democratic institutions and, in the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone, recovering from the aftermath of violent conflict rather than pursuing drug trafficking. Similarly, interviews conducted in Guinea-Bissau indicated that a crackdown on drug trafficking could impede critical first steps towards promoting civilian governance in the country.

Sources of Opposition to Drug Trafficking

The greatest incentive for a state to oppose drug trafficking is likely the reputational risk of participating in transnational organized crime. The consequences could include suspended foreign

⁸² Lacher, 2012.

⁸³ NTVKenya, “[Is Naima a Drug Pin or Philanthropist?](#),” June 30, 2011.

aid, reduced foreign investment, and restrictions on officials' travel. In Africa, only Guinea-Bissau has experienced concrete consequences in loss of foreign assistance due to drug trafficking, but on balance, the resources available from the DTOs could well exceed the foreign assistance provided to Guinea-Bissau. In some instances, African political leaders have chosen to actively oppose drug trafficking, such as President Mills in Ghana. Their position may reflect personal values, ideology, and/or a strategic calculation that fighting the drug trade provides ready supporters and ammunition against opponents. Diplomatic pressure and international engagement have also worked to foster opposition to drug trafficking.

Outside of national politics, opposition to drug trafficking typically arises when individuals and communities feel the negative socio-economic impacts of the drug trade. Most notably, where consumption of hard drugs has become a problem, local opposition to the drug trade has emerged as individuals can see a more direct negative consequence of drug trafficking. At the Kenyan coast, for example, mothers' groups, religious leaders, and human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have spearheaded calls for action against illicit drugs. Such organized opposition has not emerged in the other countries examined in the case studies.

The infiltration of drug money in politics may generate broader opposition. Activists at the coast in Kenya, for example, are mobilizing to keep drug dealers out of office. In another example, political parties and their supporters in Ghana are using accusations of complicity in the drug trade to discredit opponents, though this may represent more of a partisan issue than a real manifestation of opposition to drug money in politics as people defend the actions of politicians from the party they support, irrespective of legality.

Violence can also trigger increased popular opposition to drug trafficking, as occurred in Colombia in the 1990s. The Mission should look for signs of increased rivalries among drug traffickers, increased opposition from the state, and increased retail distribution of drugs that could lead to power struggles and violence. Although the violence linked to illicit drugs is still insufficient to make it a significant concern for local populations in most of Africa, the threat should not be discounted and warrants consideration.

Finally, some cultural norms may also lead to opposition of drug trafficking. Although in general there is little stigma associated with wealth acquired through trafficking and the largely informal economy, exceptions do exist. For example, some high-status Guineans regard the drug trade as vulgar and despise the *nouveaux riches* for whom it has been the means of rapid economic ascent. This and other cultural or religious values may provide an entry point to garner public opposition to drug trafficking.

Government Complicity and Opposition

In assessing the political economy of the drug trade, Missions need to examine who in government is complicit in the trade and who opposes it even though they may find limited information on this topic. USAID personnel can coordinate with other parts of the U.S. Government, particularly the DEA and the State Department, either in-country or in Washington; the UNODC; USAID Africa Bureau Bureau's Transnational Organized Crime Advisor; and researchers to increase their awareness of the issue. Complicit officials, like their opponents, may be concentrated within offices, ministries, levels of government, political factions, or political parties or may have networks operating across these divides. The complicity of higher-level officials denotes a greater threat to governance than the involvement of just lower-level officials, but the stance of other officials in the

government influences the contours of this threat as captured in Figure 2. When high-level government actors are complicit in drug trafficking and opposition from other parts of the government is weak, the situation is stable and the prognosis for counternarcotics efforts is poor. Direct interventions to reduce drug trafficking are unlikely to have an impact. When high-level government actors complicit in drug trafficking face strong anti-trafficking factions in other parts of the government, the prognosis for reform is hard to predict; direct interventions may be possible but are potentially destabilizing. By contrast, when government involvement only extends to lower-level officials, the threat to governance is lower. The prospects for reform are strongest when high-level officials champion counternarcotics efforts, but are less clear when no high-level officials do so, though political pressure may advance reform in this scenario.

FIGURE 2. IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT COMPLICITCY AND OPPOSITION FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS

		Level of Corruption/Infiltration	
		Low-level Officials	High level Officials
Opposition within Government	Strong: High level officials oppose state involvement in trafficking	Best scenario for direct interventions	Direct interventions possible but potentially destabilizing
	Weak: Relatively few high-level officials oppose state involvement in trafficking	Direct interventions most effective when combined with increased political pressure	Direct interventions not advisable

In the case studies conducted for this research, Kenya and Mozambique fall into the box at the bottom right of the table: higher level officials are complicit in drug trafficking and no top officials actively oppose it. In Kenya, top officials from both political parties were represented in the 2008-2013 coalition government and individuals across party lines and ethnic groups collaborate in the drug trade, making the situation more stable and intractable. Those officials who actively oppose the drug trade are pressured to play along or are pushed out, but may also maintain a low profile and provide leaks to the media. In Mozambique, it appears from the secondary sources available that those in power benefiting from the drug trade are mostly Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) officials but some Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) officials at local levels. To the extent that FRELIMO maintains its electoral dominance and intimidation tamps down RENAMO accusations, the situation is stable. In the West African case studies, prospects for counternarcotics efforts are somewhat more encouraging. Liberia and Ghana both have high-level officials who have actively supported counternarcotics efforts and there is limited evidence of continued high-level involvement,⁸⁴ placing them in the top left box. In Guinea and Sierra Leone, there appears to be neither high-level government opposition to drug trafficking (with the possible exception of the UNODC-supported Transnational Organized Crime Unit) nor widespread high-level involvement, placing these countries in the bottom left box. Historical linkages raise concerns, however, that high-level involvement in drug trafficking may be continuing, suggesting they fall

⁸⁴ In recent history, high-level Ghanaian government officials were involved in drug trafficking. The assessment team did not find the same evidence for current government officials; however, they did find credible concerns that relatively high-level politicians remain complicit in drug trafficking and evidence of involvement by the brother-in-law of the NPP Presidential candidate in the last election. This illustrates the difficulty of having full information and the importance of not oversimplifying analysis on the drug trafficking situation, e.g., definitively determining that a given country falls within a certain box in Figure 3.

more in the bottom right box. Guinea-Bissau falls in the bottom right box with very limited government opposition to drug trafficking and high levels of corruption/infiltration.

Stakeholder Interest and Influence


Based on this examination of sources of support and opposition and consideration of government complicity and opposition, Missions can then develop a mapping of stakeholders in a country's counternarcotics efforts, like the map in Figure 3. A stakeholder's support or opposition to counternarcotics efforts is gauged on the x-axis and influence over counternarcotics efforts is gauged on the y-axis. Blue boxes designate government officials; red boxes designate non-government actors; and grey boxes designate foreign governments and international organizations.

The placement of each stakeholder on the map is approximate and involves best judgment based on information available. Each stakeholder's level of support is influenced by cost/benefit calculations, which can include their perception of risks, trends, and scenarios. Reform efforts can, and ideally should, influence those calculations.

Quadrant I represents the best combination for reform with strong support alongside high influence in fighting drugs, followed by Quadrant IV, Quadrant III, and finally Quadrant II, which represents the worst combination for reform with strong opposition alongside high influence in fighting drugs. Actors in Quadrant I can be engaged in direct counternarcotics efforts, with a more heavily populated quadrant representing a more conducive environment for tackling drug trafficking. Actors in Quadrant II indicate the potential for “spoilers” that can undermine counternarcotics efforts and the negative unintended consequences of direct counternarcotics programming (e.g., violence or political instability). In comparing Quadrants I and II, a key distinction is the location of actors with the most influence over counternarcotics efforts – typically the president and prime minister – as their interest in countering drug trafficking may constitute the single most significant factor for reform efforts. It is also important to consider the relationship between influential actors in these two quadrants. For example, if key members of the executive branch are located in Quadrant I but senior leaders in the military are located in Quadrant II, heavy-handed law enforcement efforts to counter drug trafficking may, in the extreme, lead to a coup attempt.

Actors in Quadrant III will not likely be a notable force as they have low influence over counternarcotics efforts and are unlikely to mobilize in meaningful ways with other actors. Those in Quadrant IV may provide support to actors in Quadrant I and possibly influence some actors in Quadrant II to become more supportive of counternarcotics efforts, depending on the political system, so many actors in the quadrant are likely to represent a more promising reform scenario. In both the Mozambique and Kenya case studies, no high-level stakeholders were located in Quadrant I but some were located in Quadrant II, revealing the challenge for counternarcotics efforts in those environments. In Ghana, by contrast, no high-level actors were located in Quadrant II, but one was located in Quadrant I representing a more favorable environment for direct counternarcotics programming. The large number of actors in Quadrant IV in both Kenya and Ghana suggests more potential for progress in counternarcotics efforts than in the case of Mozambique with notably fewer actors in that quadrant.

FIGURE 3. ILLUSTRATIVE MAP OF STAKEHOLDERS' INFLUENCE AND INTEREST IN COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS &



DETERMINING COUNTERNARCOTICS DEVELOPMENT APPROACH

Counternarcotics efforts may include any of three areas of focus or a combination thereof: directly countering drug trafficking, ameliorating the impacts, and incorporating crime sensitivity in development assistance. A range of programs could contribute to each of these areas as the list in Figure 4 illustrates. The decision about which approach or approaches a Mission will employ depends upon the assessment of the severity of the problem and U.S. Government development priorities in the country, the political economy and level of political will, availability of resources, and the characteristics of the overall development portfolio.

Directly Counter Drug Trafficking

Direct efforts to counter the flow of drugs take aim at the source of the problem by: (1) bolstering political will, (2) fostering accountable governance, and (3) developing counternarcotics capacity. Although alternative livelihoods programming (along with crop eradication) comprises an important aspect of counternarcotics efforts in production countries, it is less relevant in African transit countries where far fewer people receive their primary income from the trade, and thus is not discussed in this programming guide.⁸⁵ Additionally, some geographic factors make certain countries more attractive to traffickers than others, notably their strategic location on a trade route and along the coast⁸⁶ and the presence of long coastlines or uninhabited islands that can help hide the trade. Similarly, many parts of the continent have historically served as smuggling routes for a variety of goods, which can be tapped for drug trafficking. These exogenous factors cannot be changed, however, and thus are not considered in this programming guide. It is important to note that direct counternarcotics efforts, where successful, may shift the problem from one country to others, so development actors should take a regional approach to direct counternarcotics programming to the extent possible.

In determining whether and how to support direct counternarcotics efforts, the first step is to analyze the political economy, particularly government complicity and opposition. Whereas Missions can support efforts to increase demand for counternarcotics measures without accompanying political will, they should only pursue efforts to improve counternarcotics capacity where there is corresponding political will. In that case, developing counternarcotics capacity includes establishing legal and policy frameworks and improving the effectiveness of the criminal justice sector. When the highest levels of government are involved in drug trafficking, however, then there is little sense in USAID investing in supply-side security sector or democracy, rights and governance programs that address the issue head on. Those opposed to reforms will easily derail them. In Mozambique, for example, reform of customs took place between 1996 and 2006 even transferring management to the British firm Crown Agents, but containers owned by drug traffickers still cleared customs without inspection.⁸⁷ Complicit officials may agree to reform

⁸⁵ In fact, many of the African couriers who have been caught were employed in import/export businesses or other forms of transportation or trade. The nature of their business activities make them valuable couriers, and they were supplementing their income with drug trafficking. Similarly, drugs moving by sea and overland tend to target existing transporters.

⁸⁶ The shortest distance from South America to Africa follows the 10th parallel north, which connects northern and eastern South America (e.g., Colombia and Venezuela) to Guinea and Sierra Leone, earning it the name of “Highway 10.”

⁸⁷ Marcelo Mosse, “Corruption and Reform in the Customs in Mozambique,” Maputo: Centro de Integridade Publica and London: Tiri, 2007.

initiatives to mollify critics or target opponents without any real intention of unraveling corrupt systems that enrich them or help keep them in power. In the worst case, complicit officials could use the assistance provided instead to bolster their drug trafficking operations.

Investments in accountable governance that do not explicitly target drug trafficking may make sense. Campaign finance reform, for example, may help reduce the influence of drug money in elections and deter drug traffickers from running for office, but has a broader impact and constituencies than a counternarcotics effort. This broader reach could help obscure its specific impact on drug trafficking and help withstand opposition. Broader anticorruption and rule of law programming can establish the foundation upon which more targeted counternarcotics efforts can be built. Similarly, economic reforms that contribute to counternarcotics efforts, such as tighter banking oversight, might be worthwhile investments that fall beneath the radar of those involved in drug trafficking and also benefit from the business community's support. Fostering accountable governance includes establishing effective checks and balances; improving political standards; and combating corruption, impunity, and patronage-based politics.

In the absence of political will, counternarcotics efforts should first focus on efforts to increase demand for counternarcotics measures. Bolstering political will entails creating incentives and demand for counternarcotics efforts, including through awareness raising and international influence.

Bolster Political Will

Where political will is weak but U.S. Government interests are strong, investments in demand-side public awareness and pressure merit support unless they bear unacceptable risks to advocates' safety or well-being. As mentioned above, *social tolerance and limited awareness* of drug trafficking limit the demand for counternarcotics efforts. Programming to address both social acceptance and limited awareness entails support for research on drug issues, investigative journalism, call-in shows, public service announcements, radio or television dramas and local media development as well as efforts to foster awareness of problematic drug use through programs in schools and work places. The vibrant media in Kenya, for example, has played a key role in exposing the drug trade and speaking out against it. Public awareness campaigns can succeed in reducing tolerance for drug trafficking and related corruption, but need to connect with specific reform proposals or complaint mechanisms, such as hotlines, or else they can lead to disillusionment. Alongside broad awareness campaigns, focused awareness raising in particular sectors can help mobilize constituencies for reform and strengthen advocacy efforts. Explaining the implications of anti-money laundering legislation for the cost of doing business, for example, can motivate bankers' associations to lobby for its passage.

Yet even where awareness of the issues of drug trafficking does exist, advocacy may be hampered by *weak capacity or a lack of community mobilization*. Programming to address such capacity constraints can support institutional development of civil society groups interested in democracy and governance and public health, while programming to strengthen community mobilization can support conferences, meetings, marches and other advocacy efforts that usually focus on the negative impacts of drug use. To maximize impact and mitigate risk, advocacy efforts should support existing efforts of groups that have credibility and/or leverage such as mothers of drug users, religious groups, the media, the business community, or the donor community, and bring together advocacy efforts into broad coalitions. These coalitions may be able to work effectively with the government's agency for preventing or fighting problematic drug use. In their advocacy efforts,

groups should strive to collect and publish data on drug use, homicide rates, drug seizures, and drug trafficking. In places with the involvement of high-level officials in drug trafficking, it is likely that problematic drug use is a safer issue to tackle than drug trafficking. The Mission should consider whether there are other issues, such as rising housing prices caused by money laundering in real estate, which might be safer for people to mobilize around.

In addition to internal demand from civil society, *international influence* can help bolster political will to counter drug trafficking. Diplomatic pressure can range from private conversations to suspension of foreign aid to public condemnation, such as the U.S. Department of Treasury's kingpin designations. In addition to the restrictions the kingpin designation places on those named, it also can help to raise awareness of the issue of drug trafficking more broadly. In Kenya, U.S. Ambassador Rannenberg spoke out against drug trafficking in Kenya in a public speech to a Rotary Club.⁸⁸ In Mozambique, the Mini-Dublin group, a donor group focused on counternarcotics, has requested UNODC to assess drug trafficking and problematic drug use in the country. This kind of initiative not only can increase general access to information and awareness of the issue of drug trafficking, it also can guide programming efforts.

Foster Accountable Governance

In many African countries, drug trafficking is yet another symptom of the lack of accountable governance. Even in instances where governments or the population do not want to directly address issues of drug trafficking, they may be willing to address some of these underlying governance issues including: corruption and impunity, patronage-based politics, lax political standards, and a lack of effective checks and balances.

As discussed in greater detail in the section above on the corrosion of governance, drug trafficking is both facilitated by and fosters *corruption and impunity*. Relevant programming efforts can include streamlining administrative processes, reducing officials' discretion, and introducing competition in government to reduce opportunities for corruption afforded by wide public authority. In regard to drug trafficking, these measures can apply to customs, security, law enforcement, and judicial operations. It also entails strengthening institutions of accountability, such as a parliamentary committee on drug control and organized crime, an anticorruption agency and an ombudsman's office. The independence and authority of such institutions are good indicators of a government's genuine interest in reform. A host of transparency measures can also support efforts to improve accountability and contribute to counternarcotics efforts. Disclosure of campaign and political party finance, officials' asset disclosure, internal audit reports, and published judicial decisions are examples of transparency measures that could address the infiltration of drug trafficking in government. Experience has shown that merely expanding access to information has limited impact if there are not accompanying processes, whether internal or external, of reviewing the information and following up with any corresponding sanctions. Civil society oversight and lobbying are often critical to ensure such steps are taken.

Closely related to issues of corruption and impunity, *patronage-based politics* can also facilitate drug trafficking. Patronage-based politics uphold personal loyalty and informal practices in contrast with more meritocratic systems that uphold skills, performance, and application of rules without regard for persons. Corruption and criminal infiltration are easier to execute where political systems are characterized by patronage and informality, which are common in many African states.

⁸⁸ Peter Leftie, "[Top Officials Linked to Drugs Banned from US, Says Envoy](#)," *Daily Nation*, November 16, 2010.

Programming to address this entails public sector management reforms with meritocratic civil service structures, adequate compensation, and professional standards.

Lax political standards can also ease drug traffickers' operations. Research conducted for this programming guidance identified weak or absent campaign finance laws as a particular vulnerability, enabling drug traffickers to buy candidates or run for office themselves. The absence of eligibility criteria for politicians, such as education requirements, also enables drug traffickers to gain political positions without the education and experience to govern effectively. Especially where the general populace expects little of their politicians in terms of delivering public goods and services, the financial resources available to politicians complicit in drug trafficking may garner popular support and votes. Programming to address this issue includes establishing effective campaign finance laws and eligibility criteria.

A lack of *effective checks and balances* can also facilitate drug trafficking. Where one government actor or agency exerts dominance, other government agencies may not have the authority or the relative power to counter drug trafficking. For example, the past authoritarian rule in Guinea had extensive power concentrated in the presidency, enabling the president's son to facilitate drug trafficking through the country. In Guinea-Bissau, the dominant military and limited civilian oversight over the security sector led to such high volumes of drug trafficking that senior officials in the Navy and the Air Force were designated drug kingpins by the U.S. Department of Treasury. By contrast, a political system characterized by a balance of power across the branches and levels of government can provide a check on serious crime. This kind of balance tends to occur where alternation in power becomes a likely outcome of elections. In this context, politicians become more willing to tolerate a strong, independent judiciary and other sources of accountability in order to avoid being subject to the opposition's whims when they are in office.⁸⁹ Fostering this kind of balance in power entails efforts to improve electoral systems, election administration, political party structures and practices, campaign financing, and voter education.

Develop Counternarcotics Capacity

In instances where pockets of political will exist, development efforts can build counternarcotics capacity including establishing legal frameworks and strengthening the criminal justice system.

Without the necessary *legal frameworks*, there are legal limitations on the prosecution of crimes related to drug trafficking and money laundering. Liberia, for example, lacks a law that forbids the trade or consumption of dangerous drugs, so prosecutions of drug traffickers are pursued through public health laws. The lack of plea bargaining also hinders efforts to catch the "big fish" and results in only arresting the lowest levels of drug trafficking networks. By contrast, countries that have made headway in fighting organized crime such as France, Italy, Spain and the U.S. have pioneered legal measures that criminalize conspiracy to commit a crime as well as membership or participation in criminal enterprises.⁹⁰ Programming to address such gaps and strengthen legal tools entails drafting and passage of legislation and policies that enables prosecutors to charge drug traffickers with a criminal offense.

⁸⁹ Edgardo Buscaglia and Jan van Dijk, "[Controlling Organized Crime and Corruption in the Public Sector](#)," *Forum on Crime and Society*, vol. 3, nos. 1-2, December 2003, 29.

⁹⁰ Buscaglia and van Dijk, 2003, 24.

Even where laws do exist, their enforcement may be extremely limited due to a lack of capacity. A weak *criminal justice sector system* can lack the capacity to effectively investigate and prosecute cases related to drug trafficking. Insufficient equipment and knowledge, low salaries and professionalism, and understaffed and overburdened agencies can all hamper the ability of the justice and security sector to effectively contain drug trafficking. Capacity deficits make detection, investigation and prosecution of drug trafficking more difficult, and weaken the deterrent to traffickers. Where capacity gaps exist, programming could include training of police, prosecutors and judges; technical assistance to improve court and prison administration; provision of surveillance and interdiction equipment; and professional twinning arrangements with counternarcotics units. Although the institutional infrastructure may remain weak overall, pockets of capacity can emerge and serve as a deterrent. For example, law enforcement officials in Ghana have cooperated with international partners to successfully interdict drug shipments.

It is essential, though often difficult, to distinguish capacity issues from political will issues. Particularly where officials are complicit in the trade, weak justice and security institutions may reflect a lack of political will to prosecute drug trafficking more than a lack of capacity, rendering efforts to strengthen them ineffective. Years of assistance in security and justice sector reform have shown that supply-side interventions only succeed where there is some political will in government for reform.⁹¹ Building the criminal justice system capacity in the presence of high levels of government complicity may also provide a political tool for those in power to target rivals from the drug trade and/or politics.

If the political will is deemed sufficient to provide assistance to the criminal justice system, any intervention should ideally be comprehensive, taking into account how all parts of the system work together from the national level down to the local level. Support for police without attention to prosecutors and judges, for example, may yield little improvement in enforcement. For example, Ghanaian security forces effectively arrested several individuals, including members of NACOB; however, the case was adjourned more than 26 times and ultimately the court decided to throw out the case.⁹² In many countries, the police receive a disproportionate share of the criminal justice budget, while the prosecutorial services and the courts suffer from lack of basic operational resources.⁹³ Furthermore, efforts to ensure effective political will to prosecute cases rarely accompany capacity building of law enforcement.

In addition, support should consider institutional as well as operational deficits. Rather than focusing on technical trainings and operational support for equipment and facilities, reforms should look holistically at how institutions recruit and motivate staff and establish accountability. The experience of the United Kingdom (U.K.)'s Department for International Development (DFID) in Jamaica underscores this point. Initially, the police reform project focused on improving equipment and provided one-off training on technical subjects. But corruption within the system blocked reform as police were de facto accountable to criminal “dons.” Establishing accountability to citizens entailed dismissing corrupt police officers and introducing long-term training and mentoring, community policing, and civil society involvement in police oversight.⁹⁴ Any provision

⁹¹ U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Democracy and Governance, Rule of Law Division, [Guide To Rule Of Law Country Analysis: The Rule Of Law Strategic Framework](#), January 2010.

⁹² Akuffo, 2012.

⁹³ Buscaglia and van Dijk, 2003, 26.

⁹⁴ Department for International Development, *Organised Crime and Development: Evidence and Recommendations for DFID*, July 2010.

of interdiction and enforcement hardware by USAID's counterparts should be accompanied by long-term training and mentoring, and that will only be possible where there is some political will for reform. Otherwise, the U.S. Government could find host country counterparts using those assets in support of drug trafficking organizations.⁹⁵

Reform of the whole law enforcement-judicial system is admittedly an ambitious undertaking, and for this reason, many countries have established vetted units that are specially trained to fight organized crime. Vetted investigative and prosecutorial units require fewer resources than systemic reform and can have a strong impact on organized crime as the experience of Colombia has shown. After years of fighting drug trafficking organizations and the FARC with little success, Colombia's police, military, and judiciary formed vetted units with the support of the U.S. Government that worked together to dismantle criminal groups. The vetted units were able to overcome distrust that had kept the organizations from working together. The team concept allows for the clear allocation of responsibilities among team members and promotes a sense of unity. A number of other countries, including Chile, Italy, Singapore, and Mexico, have realized similar improvement through introduction of team-based investigation and prosecution of organized crime cases.⁹⁶ This same model is being applied by the DEA in African countries including Ghana and Nigeria. Experience has shown, however, that special monitoring is needed to keep specialized serious crime units from going rogue or being used for corrupt purposes. Moreover, complimentary efforts that support broader rule of law reforms are necessary to ensure that these interdiction efforts can result in successful, apolitical prosecutions, as the case of Ghana highlights. Establishing court watchers composed of lawyers and other members of the public to monitor serious crime cases can support apolitical prosecutions.⁹⁷

Leading expert on issues of transnational organized crime Vanda Felbab-Brown cautions against opportunistic, non-strategic law enforcement approaches to drug interdiction. She writes:

It is important to realize that indiscriminate and uniform application of law enforcement – whether external or internal – can generate several undesirable outcomes: First, the weakest criminal groups can be eliminated through such an approach, with law enforcement inadvertently increasing the efficiency, lethality, and coercive and corruption power of the remaining criminal groups operating in the region. Second, such an application of law enforcement without prioritization can indeed push criminal groups into an alliance with terrorist groups – the opposite of what should be the purpose of law enforcement and especially outside policy intervention in West Africa (and elsewhere).⁹⁸

Felbab-Brown's warning highlights the importance of the softer side of counternarcotics efforts. Although a focus on interdiction with elite units and extraditions may bring short-term victories, they are not the only requirements necessary to bring about the systemic change needed to make African nations inhospitable for drug trafficking. The longer-term democracy, rights and governance programming implemented by development agencies has a crucial role to play in

⁹⁵ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa: Hearing before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs*, [Testimony by Michael Braun](#), 111th Congress, June 23, 2009.

⁹⁶ Buscaglia and van Dijk, 2003, 25.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 28.

⁹⁸ Vanda Felbab-Brown, "[The West African Drug Trade in Context of the Region's Illicit Economies and Poor Governance](#)," Presentation to Conference on Drug Trafficking in West Africa, Arlington, VA, October 14, 2010.

establishing the systems, policies and practices necessary to effectively deter drug trafficking. These broader reform efforts also address the underlying factors that facilitate illicit economic activities in general, helping to ensure that another illicit economy does not simply take the place of drug trafficking in the aftermath of successful counternarcotics efforts.

FIGURE 4: ILLUSTRATIVE DIRECT COUNTERNARCOTICS PROGRAMMING

Bolster Political Will
Reduce tolerance through research, media programming, investigative journalism, and local media development
Strengthen community mobilization/civil society advocacy including religious leaders, women's groups, and the private sector
Apply diplomatic pressure to change attitude of elites, including cutting off funds, withholding visas, and compiling dossiers of cases
Foster Accountable Governance
Streamline and improve oversight of customs, security and justice operations
Strengthen accountability – parliamentary committees, anticorruption agency, ombudsman's office, audits
Increase transparency – asset disclosure, campaign finance disclosure, published judicial decisions
Create professional government – meritocratic civil service, adequate compensation, professional standards
Raise political standards – campaign finance reform, candidate eligibility criteria
Promote checks and balances through improved electoral systems
Develop Counternarcotics Capacity
Improve legislative framework
Strengthen judicial and security institutions – training, vetted units, surveillance and interdiction equipment, court and prison administration

Consider Unintended Consequences

Missions need to consider possible unintended consequences of direct counternarcotics programming. An examination of unintended consequences could include the potential risk to civil society activists and journalists speaking out against the drug trade or the risk of perceived discrimination of changing eligibility criteria for political candidates. Other unintended consequences could include exacerbating human rights violations from prison crowding as a result of greater enforcement of drug laws that target only the low-level traffickers or heightened tensions affecting other aspects of U.S. Government and host country relations, such as trade.

Ameliorate Impacts

The socio-economic impacts of drug trafficking, described in more detail in the section on identifying the development challenge of drug trafficking, include: (1) decreased economic growth due to drug trafficking-related instability or poor governance, (2) market distortions from drug money, (3) problematic drug use and associated health and societal problems, and (4) street crime.

To ameliorate the economic impacts of drug trafficking, development efforts can focus on decreasing the circulation of drug proceeds in the country. Many countries in the region lack anti-money-laundering laws that meet the FATF's recommendations (the international anti-money laundering standards) and have problems implementing and enforcing the anti-money laundering

laws that they do have.⁹⁹ Development efforts can generate support for anti-money laundering legislation (e.g., by increasing awareness of increased business costs related to money laundering among the business community) and provide experts to support the creation, passage and implementation of such legislation. In addition to addressing money laundering, development efforts can support the development of accompanying banking and other sector regulations and improved supervision of relevant organizations. Development efforts can also help create a financial and regulatory environment that supports legitimate business development. In addition to efforts to reduce the volume of drug money in a country, direct counternarcotics efforts that deter DTOs from operating in a given country in the first place are also important to avoid a loss of investment related to instability and poor governance.

Development actors also can play a central role in addressing the social impacts of drug trafficking. Especially where retail distribution and problematic drug use affect their current programming, Missions should consider new or modified programming to ameliorate these impacts. Development efforts to reduce demand entail education efforts to prevent drug consumption along with support to clinics, hospitals and community groups for treatment programs. Efforts to foster inclusion, reduce marginalization, and promote education, particularly among youth, can also help in problematic drug use prevention. Development efforts can also work to reduce individual-level violence related to the retail sales of drugs. Such efforts can include gang prevention and rehabilitation efforts, community policing, citizen security programs, and harm and demand reduction efforts.

Programming to ameliorate impacts does not necessarily require additional U.S. Government resources. It may entail just minor adjustments to existing programming. For example, if Missions are providing support for HIV/AIDS prevention in areas with high rates of intravenous drug use, they may need to consider harm reduction efforts such as a needle exchange program. Similarly, if Missions are working to empower youth in communities affected by drugs, they may need to discuss the harms of drug abuse and offer drug counseling to youth.

⁹⁹ James Cockayne and Phil Williams. “[The Invisible Tide: Towards an International Strategy to Deal with Drug Trafficking Through West Africa](#),” International Peace Institute. October 2009, 18.

FIGURE 5: ILLUSTRATIVE PROGRAMMING TO AMELIORATE IMPACTS &

Economic Impact
Enact anti-money laundering legislation
Strengthen banking, real estate and other relevant sector regulations and oversight
Build capacity among Financial Intelligence Units and law enforcement to analyze, target and trace financial flows
Build prosecutorial capacity to freeze and seize assets and to obtain conviction and forfeitures
Foster business development through regulatory and financial reform
Problematic Drug Use
Support clinics to treat problematic drug use
Promote education to reduce demand, including reaching out to religious groups and youth groups
Foster inclusion and reduce marginalization
Support harm reduction efforts
Violence
Support gang prevention and rehabilitation
Foster community-based citizen security
Support community policing

Incorporate Crime Sensitivity

Even in the absence of political will and/or resources to directly counter drug trafficking, Missions can and should incorporate crime sensitivity in the broader development portfolio. Missions should examine the potential unintended consequences for drug trafficking of their current and planned efforts and seek ways to mitigate any negative impacts. Development efforts could unintentionally foster drug trafficking by: (1) bolstering the power of those complicit in drug trafficking, (2) de-incentivizing opposition to drug trafficking, (3) facilitating the movement of drugs, and (4) facilitating money laundering.

To address these unintended consequences, Missions need to first understand the potential risks. In places with substantial drug trafficking, Missions need to be aware of the government institutions and officials who are complicit in drug trafficking through an assessment, basic research or discussions with U.S. Government colleagues and other relevant stakeholders. In some instances, the programming may create such a significant crime risk that Missions may choose not to implement programming for infiltrated institutions. In other cases, the Mission may decide that the development gains from the programming outweigh the crime costs and may implement the program. In other situations, Missions may modify programs in a way to not bolster complicit actors or institutions. Some crime sensitivity efforts entail adding on a program component that explicitly considers the risks and engages stakeholders in mitigating it. Figure 6 below provides an example of each of these risks for unintended consequences and mitigation strategies.

FIGURE 6: ILLUSTRATIVE PROGRAMMING TO INCORPORATE CRIME SENSITIVITY &

Unintended Consequence	Mitigation Approach
Local government capacity building bolsters political power of complicit officials	Incorporate measures to improve transparency (e.g., audits and/or citizen control/engagement) or avoid local areas with known complicit officials
Parliamentary transparency efforts dissuade opposition to drug trafficking	Allow private voting for drug trafficking issues
Trade infrastructure development facilitates the movement of illicit goods, including drugs	Include trade regulation and controls as part of infrastructure development programs
Efforts to reduce barriers to trade facilitate the movement of illicit goods, including drugs	Generate anti-narcotics support among business community and transportation professionals and work with them to identify risks and mitigation strategies
Transportation of development goods is also utilized to move illicit goods, including drugs	Include careful consideration of transportation methods and inspection of cargo
Emerging payment systems (e.g., mobile banking) facilitate the movement of drug money without detection	Ensure that efforts to promote emerging payment systems are covered by anti-money laundering regulation and entail proper supervision
Drug traffickers capture humanitarian assistance	Require partners to develop and implement risk mitigation measures (e.g., having women be the primary receiver of goods for their families and following up with household-level monitoring to ensure those goods are reaching those who need them)

KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Drug Trafficking in Africa Threatens Development

Drug trafficking in Africa represents a serious threat to stability and governance throughout the region. The infiltration of drug money in government is more widespread than realized. It is not just an issue in countries fraught with serious governance challenges like Guinea-Bissau but also in countries considered models of good governance in the region like Ghana and Mali, where drug trafficking exacerbated instability. Left unaddressed, the corrosion of governance could also result in future instability and hamper economic growth. In addition, the growing retail market of hard drugs in Africa can create significant social problems.

Interdiction Alone Will Not Solve the Problem

Although improved interdiction of drugs transiting through Africa plays an important role in addressing drug trafficking, interdiction alone will not solve the problems caused by the trade. First, efforts focused solely on interdiction may actually increase the prices of drugs and thus encourage more drug trafficking.¹⁰⁰ Interdiction must be accompanied by demand reduction efforts to help counteract the potential increased profitability from decreasing the supply of drugs. Second, interdiction without effective prosecution of traffickers, including those beyond just the lowest level, is unlikely to significantly disrupt DTO activities. To effectively disrupt drug trafficking networks, attention must be given to ensure appropriate levels of political will, legal frameworks that facilitate an interdiction leading to the arrest of higher-level traffickers, and capacity within the criminal justice system to prosecute the individuals involved.

Development Practitioners Need to “Get Smart” About Drug Trafficking

Many development actors working in Africa have limited knowledge of the issue of drug trafficking in the region; however, the significant threats the trade poses to development cannot be ignored. USAID officers, particularly those working in the fields of governance and conflict mitigation and management, should reach out to relevant colleagues in the U.S. Government to better understand the nature of the drug trafficking threat in their particular country. The DEA has offices in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa that cover both these specific countries and the sub-regions in which they are located. In addition, the Political Section of the U.S. Embassy may follow this issue. Engaging with Embassy colleagues to keep apprised of developments in drug trafficking in the country can assist USAID personnel in incorporating crime sensitivity into their programming, identifying impacts to ameliorate, and flagging the need for greater analysis of the impact of drug trafficking on development. In particular, this type of information may be critical to adhering to “do no harm” principles by incorporating crime sensitivity in implementing procurement reform. Greater awareness of the issue of drug trafficking also can inform the Country Development Cooperation Strategy development process.

To the extent that drug trafficking is considered a significant problem in a given country, USAID personnel should include this issue as a topic to be covered in relevant assessments, including

¹⁰⁰ Mejia and Posada, 2008.

conflict; democracy, rights and governance; countering violent extremism; economic growth; youth and health assessments, and political economy analyses. USAID's Africa Bureau can also provide technical assistance to Missions interested in conducting a specific drug trafficking and development assessment and has developed an analytic framework tool and a sample assessment interview protocol (see Annexes A and B). These tools should be adapted for the specific context, and interview protocols and stakeholder lists should be developed in coordination with relevant Embassy colleagues.

Early Identification of the Problem and Prevention Efforts are Critical

Early identification of the problem and corresponding prevention efforts are critical to contain the threat. Africa can learn much from the experiences of instability in Guinea-Bissau and northern Mali as well as other places with longer histories of drug trafficking and consumption problems, including Latin America and the United States. In addition to the broader threats to political instability posed by drug trafficking, Africa's demographic trends, including rapid urbanization and a youth bulge, concurrent with increased flows of drugs across the continent, raise serious concerns about the risks of increased levels of problematic drug use, violence and gang activity. Although it is difficult to garner support for these issues before they erupt as has occurred in Central America, early investments to prevent the spread of a retail drug market could significantly contribute to Africa's future stability and prosperity. In addition, once the situation has escalated to instability and conflict as seen in Guinea-Bissau and northern Mali, development assistance will have a more limited impact. The situation in the Sahel highlights the importance of early diagnosis and response to the issue of drug trafficking, and calls for analysis of the issue in countries in the region, e.g., Niger, before the situation worsens.

Political Will Must Drive the Counternarcotics Approach

The level of political will within a country to address drug trafficking is a key determinant of the counternarcotics approach. Whereas Missions can support efforts to increase demand for counternarcotics measures without accompanying political will, they should only pursue supply-side efforts to improve governance where there is corresponding political will. When the highest levels of government are involved in drug trafficking, then there is little sense in investing in supply-side security sector or democracy, rights and governance programs that address the issue head on. Those opposed to reforms will easily derail them. In these contexts, direct counternarcotics efforts should focus on fostering political will to address the issue, including raising the awareness and capacity of civil society actors to advocate for counternarcotics efforts and diplomatic pressure. Efforts to build political will should address both the demand side by working with local populations and civil society organizations and the supply side by working with government officials. Initiatives designed to bolster political will – such as the Kofi Annan Foundation's recently formed Commission on Drug Trafficking, Governance, Security and Development in West Africa – may also help strengthen national leaders' resolve to address drug trafficking.

In contexts where there is some government involvement in drug trafficking but pockets of political will, a careful analysis is needed to determine whether some institutions merit supply-side support. In particular, support for improved oversight within government institutions – targeting pockets of political will in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches – may make sense in this scenario. National or regional task forces, roundtables on drug trafficking, or emerging leaders programs may also be useful to strengthen the stance of reform proponents, depending on the context. Other

support for demand-side public awareness and pressure could be critical in bolstering the resolve of counternarcotic reformers inside the government. Working with opposition parties who advocate counternarcotic measures may appear to be an attractive option, but is likely to be too sensitive for U.S. Government support.

When drug trafficking involves mostly lower-level government officials, a range of supply- and demand-side programs could be appropriate provided there is U.S. Government interest in providing such support. If capacity rather than political will is the deficit, then U.S. Government support for skills training, institutional strengthening, equipment, legal reform, and improved accountability measures could help reduce drug trafficking activity in a country. At the same time, support for demand-side public awareness and pressure is important to help higher-level officials resist the temptations of drug trafficking.

Even in the absence of political will, Missions can pursue programming to ameliorate harm. Support for legitimate business development, public health, social programming, and community-based citizen security to ameliorate the impacts of money laundering, retail distribution and problematic drug use are unlikely to elicit notable resistance even with high-level government involvement in drug trafficking. Similarly, Missions can pursue crime-sensitive programming even in the absence of host country political will to address drug trafficking.

Resources Influence Programming Options

Unlike other regions, few African Missions will likely receive resources specifically allocated to address the issue of drug trafficking. To the extent that a Mission has democracy and governance funds and a serious drug trafficking issue, the Mission could direct resources to building accountable governance that simultaneously addresses core democracy and governance challenges in the country and promotes counternarcotics efforts. In addition, addressing the accountable governance issues that lie at the heart of the drug trafficking problem in Africa represents the most effective way of mitigating the socio-economic impacts of the trade. In cases where Missions lack democracy and governance funds but face issues of drug trafficking, analyzing and raising awareness of the issue of drug trafficking can help the Mission to advocate for needed democracy and governance resources. Absent resources to directly counter drug trafficking, including the underlying governance issues, Missions may still ensure that existing programming across development sectors incorporate crime sensitivity and work to ameliorate the impacts of drug trafficking. In addition, health resources focused on raising awareness, prevention and harm reduction can simultaneously work to ameliorate the health impacts of drug trafficking and raise awareness to create greater demand for governments to tackle the issue.

Change Presents Windows of Opportunity and Vulnerability

The environment for drug trafficking is fluid and Missions should identify windows of opportunity, or moments that present a chance for positive change, and vulnerability, or moments that risk fostering drug trafficking. For example, an election provides an opportunity for activists to protest drug traffickers' involvement in politics or for a candidate to articulate a counternarcotics platform. Other windows of opportunity may arise with incidents that raise awareness of the issue or exert pressure by the international community or civil society to address drug trafficking. These include the designation of a drug kingpin by the U.S. Government or the risk of losing the Millennium Challenge Corporation compact. More broadly, the end of conflict, transition to democracy,

constitutional reform, or governance or security initiatives in a country may present an opportunity to advance counternarcotics efforts. For example, the constitutional reforms in Kenya and concerns over candidates with human rights violations create an environment more conducive to implementing new laws that reduce drug traffickers' eligibility to run for public office.

Missions should also identify events that could create a window of vulnerability to drug trafficking. A drug trafficker running for or winning office represents a potential for DTOs to gain a significant foothold in government. The withdrawal of foreign peacekeepers, as in Liberia, could also present a window of vulnerability as the security environment will depend on Liberian police and armed forces without such support. Discoveries in extractive industries could also present a threat to counternarcotics efforts. Such resources often put pressure on governance systems and lead to more corruption,¹⁰¹ which could make it easier for drug traffickers to initiate corrupt deals. The addition of direct flights between a West African capital and a consumer market in Europe or the United States may provide new, easier routing for air couriers to transport drugs. Other trends that could affect programming include economic and financial sector expansion that could accommodate and conceal increases in money laundering, increased employment in urban areas that could provide income to purchase drugs, and counternarcotics successes in neighboring countries that could shift the smuggling routes.

Coordination Increases Impacts

Donor impact increases with coordination with local officials and the international community across development areas, but this is especially true for counternarcotics efforts. Given the many actors involved in providing assistance, USAID should work closely with its interagency and international counterparts as coordinated efforts are more likely to result in system-wide reform than those undertaken by any single entity. The main U.S. Government players in counternarcotics efforts include the State Department (notably the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement [INL]), the Department of Defense (including the Africa Combatant Command), the DEA, and the Department of Homeland Security. INL's *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* has good information on existing U.S. Government programming in each country. Where they exist, USAID should seek to embed counternarcotics efforts in U.S. Government initiatives such as the West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative (WACSI). Among international organizations and foreign governments, the main sources of counternarcotics assistance in Africa include the UNODC, United Nations Development Program, the European Commission, INTERPOL, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and individual European governments, especially the U.K.'s Serious and Organized Crimes Agency. As ECOWAS renews and updates its related Action Plan, USAID efforts should align with and support the ECOWAS plan to the greatest extent possible. More broadly, organization such as the African Union and the United Nations have a key role to play in fostering an understanding of the development impacts of drug trafficking in Africa, and building political will to develop a coordinated international strategy to combat it.¹⁰² Across the portfolio of international assistance, the Mission should consider points of overlap, gaps in assistance, as well as USAID's comparative strengths and weaknesses.

¹⁰¹ Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 213-5.

¹⁰² Cockayne and Williams, 2009, 24-6.

Due to the transnational nature of drug trafficking operations, counternarcotics efforts are also most effective when they extend beyond national institutions. Coordinating efforts across countries and regions, including shared intelligence, joint operations, aligned legal frameworks, and even regional drug courts can increase the effectiveness of counternarcotics efforts. Moreover, counternarcotics efforts experience the “balloon effect,” where successful efforts in one country simply push the problem elsewhere. The successful interdiction efforts in the Caribbean are part of the reason drug traffickers began targeting West Africa to transit drugs. Although addressing the issue from a regional perspective presents challenges, it is important to ensure that counternarcotics efforts take into consideration their regional implications and seek ways to align efforts across the region.

ANNEX A: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND CHECKLIST OF TOPICS

The text below outlines a framework for analyzing the drug trafficking and development situation in a given country as well as a checklist of topics to consider under each of the main areas of the assessment framework.

Key Narcotics Challenges

A. Drug Trafficking Patterns and Volumes

- Primary narcotics transiting the country and estimates for the volume of drugs in question
- Trafficking routes (including producer, transit and destination countries)
- Methods for smuggling drugs in and out of the country
- Profile of DTOs operating in the country, including their number, nationality, base of operations, and structure (e.g., loose network, hierarchical)
- Focus of DTO operations and vertical integration along the supply chain, identity of DTO suppliers and customers, and possibly links with other DTOs
- Competitiveness of the narcotics market and factors shaping supply and demand

B. Scale of Drug Profits

- Profits generated from drug trafficking !
- Estimated percentage of profits that remain in the country !

C. Scope and Scale of Drug Use

- Number of problematic drug users in the country and where they are concentrated
- Main types of drugs being used

Key Actors

A. Drug Traffickers and Their Tactics

- DTOs' use of avoidance to carry out their activities and locations
- DTOs' use of corruption/infiltration to carry out their activities, government officials targeted for corruption, level of their offices, and amount of narco-corruption within the government or across different parts of the country
- DTOs' use of intimidation or violence to carry out their activities, targets of the violence (e.g., government officials, competitors, business associates, customers) and regions or cities where the violence is concentrated
- DTOs' use of alternative services (e.g., security) or gifts to co-opt local populations and reliance on social (e.g., tribal, ethnic) or ideological (e.g., religious, political) ties to co-opt the general population (rural and urban), business, politicians, the state, or external actors

- (including diaspora community, neighboring states, cross-border population groups, and international business)
- Operational links between DTOs and other illicit activities, including other forms of trafficking, insurgents or terrorists or money laundering
 - Operational links between DTOs and legitimate business

B. Government Reactions

- Government's stance on DTOs--supportive, neutral, or opposed
- Unity of government in its stance, or parts of the government, such as the security sector, that operate differently than the rest in their relationship with DTOs
- Influence of different government factions on counternarcotics efforts

C. Population Reactions

- People who support drug trafficking in the population, reasons for their support and their influence on counternarcotics efforts
- People who opposes drug trafficking, why and how much influence they have on counternarcotics efforts
- Prospects for engaging these individuals/groups/organizations to reduce their support for narcotrafficking

D. Stakeholder Interest and Influence

- Mapping of key stakeholders' interests and influence in counternarcotics efforts

Development Impacts

A. Threats to Stability

- Impact of drug trafficking on violence in the country and any worrisome trends
- Impact of drug trafficking on the level or risk of conflict in the country
- Impact of drug trafficking on patterns of dominance and marginalization of groups

B. Corrosion of Governance

- Impact of drug trafficking on governance and more specifically on the effectiveness or legitimacy of the state

C. Socio-Economic Impacts

- Impact of drug trafficking on problematic drug use and related issues of street crime, prostitution and disease. Likely social impacts in the future based on current trends
- Impact of drug trafficking on economic growth including high levels of violence and insecurity deterring investment and production or drug-related profits inflating costs for legitimate business

Key Analytic Considerations

A. Facilitating and Inhibiting Factors

- The country's accountability architecture including checks and balances in the political and administrative systems, systems of internal and external oversight ombudsman's office, anticorruption agency, and meritocratic and professional civil service
- Judicial institutions' capacity and will for counternarcotics efforts including drug-related laws, staffing and resources of judicial institutions, training of law enforcement, prosecution, and court officials, and any specialized units for counternarcotics
- Customs procedures and staff capacity and will for counternarcotics efforts
- Freedom of media and civil society to monitor government behavior and disclose misdeeds including any barriers and risks in doing so
- Assessment of elections as a meaningful check on officials' behavior including regulation of campaign financing
- Clinics to treat problematic drug use and education programs to reduce drug demand and harms
- Programs to prevent gangs and community violence, and to foster community-based citizen security

B. Windows of Opportunity and Vulnerability

- Trends or events that may change the nature of the drug trafficking issue

Operational and Programmatic Environment

A. Foreign Policy and USAID Development Interests

- Threat posed by drug trafficking to one or more of U.S. Government objectives in fighting insecurity and violent extremism, fostering peace and stability, advancing democracy and good governance, improving healthcare, fighting poverty, promoting private sector-led prosperity, or protecting the international financial system

B. USAID's Relevant Portfolio

- Risk that USAID's current programming provides inadvertent support of drug trafficking
- Opportunities for incorporating counternarcotics equities into current programming

C. Other Relevant U.S. Government and Donor Programming

- Counternarcotics support provided by other U.S. Government agencies, international organizations or foreign governments and its effectiveness
- Notable gaps or redundancies in programming
- Opportunities for USAID to build upon existing efforts

Programming Guidance

A. Key Considerations

- Possible unintended consequences of proposed counternarcotics assistance
- Trends that could impact programming

B. Strategic Approach

- Recommended strategic approach to directly counter drug trafficking; ameliorate the impact; incorporate crime sensitivity in development assistance, or some combination of the above based on the severity of the problem, the political will of host country counterparts to address it, and U.S. Government interests and resources

C. Recommendations

- Recommended programming options based on the contours of the problem, the constellation of supporters and opponents, the institutional environment, the practical budgetary constraints and opportunities

ANNEX B: SAMPLE ASSESSMENT EXPERT INTERVIEW¹⁰³ PROTOCOL

Introduction

Thank you so much for taking the time to talk with us today. As we mentioned in our email/phone call, we are working to better understand the economic, political and social impacts of organized crime, particularly drug trafficking, as well as the factors that may facilitate drug trafficking in [country name]/your community. [USAID team lead name] is [position] in [Mission/office]. USAID has contracted with [contractor company name] to analyse the issue of drug trafficking in [country name]. [Consultant name] is a consultant for [contractor company name] working with USAID on this research. [Introduction of other team members]

We are here to try to better understand the issues around drug trafficking in [country name] from the viewpoint of the government, civil society, and communities. Nothing that you say to us will be directly attributed to you. We will not include your name or your organization in any of our reports, unless you would like to be listed in the acknowledgements section.

Ascertaining Who the Interviewee Is

1. ! Please tell us a little bit about yourself and your work (if relevant). [Can also use a personalized opener based on the background provided by the local logistician and/or those who recommended the stakeholder.]
 - Potential Probe: What is your job title (if relevant)? !
 - Potential Probe: How do you know about the drug trade issue? !
 - Potential Probe: Confirm name and contact details. !

Opener

2. ! First, as an opener, can you tell us a bit about your overall impressions of the issue of drug trafficking in [country name]/your community?

Impact

3. ! How would you characterize the impact of drug trafficking?
 - Potential Probe: Are there economic impacts? Political impacts? Social impacts?
 - Potential Probe: Has it increased the levels of violence?
4. ! What about drug use?
 - Potential Probe: Who uses drugs?
 - Potential Probe: Who is involved in dealing drugs?
 - Potential Probe: How fast is this market growing, if at all?

¹⁰³ This expert interview protocol is based on discussions with people who are familiar and comfortable with discussing the issue of drug trafficking. For other interviewees, this topic may be particularly sensitive and require more of a general conversation initially and less direct questioning.

Reactions to DTOs

5. ! Who benefits from the drug trafficking and in what way?
 - Potential Probe: Are there other benefits to communities where DTOs operate?
6. ! Who opposes drug trafficking, and why?

Tactics

7. ! Who is involved in drug trafficking? Why? How?
 - Potential Probe: What role, if any, do nationals/other Africans/foreigners/the diaspora/government officials play?
 - Potential Probe: Are there others who may not directly engage in drug trafficking, but who may make it easier for drug traffickers to operate?
8. ! What is your sense of how the drug traffickers operate?
 - Potential Probe: How are they able to evade law enforcement? Do they have political protection?

Logistics

9. ! How is the trafficking done?
 - Potential Probe: What are the methods of transport for import and export?
 - Potential Probe: To what extent are drugs being stored in the region? How does this work?
10. Do you have an estimate of the scale of the trade? What are the trends in the scale?
11. What is the extent of drug production or processing?

Profits

12. What are drug traders doing with their income?
 - Potential Probe: Is it being invested locally?
 - Potential Probe: How, if at all, does money laundering of drug profits occur?
 - Potential Probe: What is the connection of drug profits to politics?

Intersections

13. How does drug trafficking intersect with other types of commerce, including other types of smuggling (weapons, diamonds, timber, etc) or legitimate trade?
14. How is drug trafficking similar or different to other types of illicit trade?

Responses

15. What are you or others currently doing to address drug trafficking?
16. What do you think are three key steps that the [country nationality]/your community could take to address the issues related to drug trafficking? [Mention specific issues if they focused on either impacts or facilitating factors]
17. What lessons might there be from efforts to address other forms of illicit trade or organized crime?
18. Are there existing government, NGO or donor programs or activities that may be inadvertently bolstering drug trafficking in this region/your community?

Closer

19. Thank you very much for taking the time to share your insights with us today. !Do you have any questions for us?

(Order of questions may vary based on the specific interviewee.)

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